Samuel Zell Professor of the Economics of Risk
Department of Economics, University of Michigan
611 Tappan Street, 337 Lorch Hall
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
e-mail: tborgers "at" umich.edu
Robust Mechanism Design and Dominant Strategy Voting Rules (with Doug Smith), forthcoming in: Theoretical Economics.
Equilibrium Bids in Auctions of Sponsored Links: Theory and Evidence (with Ingemar Cox, Martin Pesendorfer, and Vaclav Petricek), forthcoming in: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics.
Common Prior Type Spaces in Which Payoff Types and Belief Types are Independent (with Taejun Oh), August 2012.
An Optimal Voting System When Voting is Costly (with Katalin Bognar and Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn), October 2012.
An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design (with a chapter by Daniel Krähmer and Roland Strausz), May 2013.
Econ 401: Intermediate Microeconomic Theory; Econ 603: General Equilibrium Theory; Econ 617: Game Theory; Econ 619/620: Advanced Theory.