Samuel Zell Professor of the Economics of Risk
Department of Economics, University of Michigan
611 Tappan Street, 337 Lorch Hall
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
e-mail: tborgers "at" umich.edu
(No) Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms: A Comment on Chung and Ely (2007), November 2013.
An Optimal Voting System When Voting is Costly (with Katalin Bognar and Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn), May 2014.
Common Prior Type Spaces in Which Payoff Types and Belief Types are Independent (with Taejun Oh), August 2012.
An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design (with a chapter by Daniel Krähmer and Roland Strausz), final version.
Notes on the Theory of Strategic Games.
Notes on Blackwell's Comparison of Experiments.
Old and Unpublished Papers:
Complexity Constraints in Two-Armed Bandit Problems: An Example, with Antonio J. Morales, January 2004.
Putting Trembles Into the Extensive Form, approximately 1992.
Consistent Pairs in Extensive Games, approximately 1992.
Robustness of Bertrand's Equilibrium in a General Model of Product-Differentiation, October 1988.
Bertrand-Competition Without Demand-Rationing, approximately 1985.