Robust Mechanism Design and Dominant Strategy Voting Rules (with Doug Smith), forthcoming in: Theoretical Economics.
(No) Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms: A Comment on Chung and Ely (2007), November 2013.
An Optimal Voting System When Voting is Costly (with Katalin Bognar and Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn), September 2013.
Common Prior Type Spaces in Which Payoff Types and Belief Types are Independent (with Taejun Oh), August 2012.
An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design (with a chapter by Daniel Krähmer and Roland Strausz), new version.
Notes on the Theory of Strategic Games.
Old and Unpublished Papers:
Complexity Constraints in Two-Armed Bandit Problems: An Example, with Antonio J. Morales, January 2004.
Putting Trembles Into the Extensive Form, approximately 1992.
Consistent Pairs in Extensive Games, approximately 1992.
Bertrand-Competition Without Demand-Rationing, approximately 1985.