6.26 Decision Theory

Keywords: decision, choose, box, actions, choice, causal, free, concern, interest, chance, option, causally, options, action, cause

Number of articles: 22
Weighted number of articles: 25.67112

A scatterplot showing the raw number of articles that are in the epistemology subtopic decision theory each year from 1945-2013. The average value is 0.32, and the median value is 0. It reaches a peak value of 2 in 2005, and has a minimum value of 0 in 1946.

Figure 6.109: Raw number of articles in topic 26, decision theory.

A scatterplot showing the weighted number of articles that are in the epistemology subtopic decision theory each year from 1945-2013. The average value is 0.38, and the median value is 0.1. It reaches a peak value of 2.63 in 2012, and has a minimum value of 0 in 1950.

Figure 6.110: Weighted number of articles in topic 26, decision theory.

A scatterplot showing the proportion of philosophy articles that are in the epistemology subtopic decision theory each year from 1945-2013. The average value is 0.1%, and the median value is 0.0%. It reaches a peak value of 0.6% in 2012, and has a minimum value of 0.0% in 1950.

Figure 6.111: Percentage of philosophy articles in topic 26, decision theory.

A scatterplot showing the percentage of epistemology articles that are in the epistemology subtopic decision theory each year from 1945-2013. The average value is 1.2%, and the median value is 0.5%. It reaches a peak value of 14.4% in 1960, and has a minimum value of 0.0% in 1950.

Figure 6.112: Percentage of epistemology articles in topic 26, decision theory.

Characteristic Articles

  1. Jessica Brown, 2000, “Against Temporal Externalism,” Analysis 60:178–88.
  2. Jonathan Schaffer, 2004, “Counterfactuals, Causal Independence and Conceptual Circularity,” Analysis 64:299–309.
  3. Arif Ahmed, 2005, “Evidential Decision Theory and Medical Newcomb Problems,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56:191–8.
  4. Paul Noordhof, 2005, “Morgenbesser’s Coin, Counterfactuals and Independence,” Analysis 65:261–3.
  5. Caspar Hare, 2011, “Obligation and Regret When There is No Fact of the Matter About What Would Have Happened if You Had not Done What You Did,” Noûs 45:190–206.
  6. Rachael Briggs, 2010, “Decision-Theoretic Paradoxes as Voting Paradoxes,” Philosophical Review 119:1–30.
  7. Arif Ahmed, 2010, “Causation and Decision,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110:111–31.
  8. Huw Price, 2012, “Causation, Chance, and the Rational Significance of Supernatural Evidence,” Philosophical Review 121:483–538.
  9. Andy Egan, 2007, “Some Counterexamples to Causal Decision Theory,” Philosophical Review 116:93–114.
  10. Arif Ahmed, 2012, “Push the Button,” Philosophy of Science 79:386–95.