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OpenSSL is the reference Open Source technology for SSL (Secure Socket Layer).
Using an unsavory Certificate Authority to get a "trusted" certificate despite Mozilla's Certificaten Policy.
See www.theregister.co.uk/2011/09/06/commodohacker_claims_diginotar_hack/
Claimed DigiNotar hacker: I have access to four more CAs
Iranian 'Comodohacker' says he can still issue bogus certs
Posted in Security, 6th September 2011 11:26 GMT
The digital miscreant known as ComodoHacker has claimed responsibility for the high-profile DigiNotar digital certificate authority hack.
Soon after the Comodo forged certificates hack an Iranian using the handle Comodohacker posted a series of messages via Pastebin account providing evidence that he carried out the attack. The account, which has been dormant since March, sprung back to life on Tuesday with claims that the individual or individuals behind it hacked DigiNotar as well, net security firm F-Secure reports.
The hacker boasted he still has access to four other (unnamed) "high-profile" CAs and retains the ability to issue new rogue certificates, including code signing certificates. The hacker (active on Twitter under the username ichsunx2) claimed that the domain administrator password of the DigiNotar network was Pr0d@dm1n.
Compromises against both Comodo affiliates and DigiNotar allowed hackers to generate bogus SSL certificates. The certificates create a means to mount convincing man-in-the-middle or phishing attacks. Evidence suggests that a rogue certificate issued in July under the name of Google as the result of the DigiNotar hack was used to spy on Iranian internet users.
The still-unfolding DigiNotar saga further underlines the fragility in the net's foundation of trust first highlighted by the Comodo hack.
See www.theregister.co.uk/2012/02/09/tustwave_disavows_mitm_digital_cert/
Trustwave admits crafting SSL snooping certificate
Allowing bosses to spy on staff was wrong, says security biz
Posted in Enterprise Security, 9th February 2012 11:03 GMT
Certificate Authority Trustwave has revoked a digital certificate that allowed one of its clients to issue valid certificates for any server, thereby allowing one of its customers to intercept their employees' private email communication.
The skeleton-key CA certificate was supplied in a tamper-proof hardware security module (HSM) designed to be used within a data loss prevention (DLP) system. DLP systems are designed to block the accidental or deliberate leaking of company secrets or confidential information.
Using the system, a user's browser or email client would be fooled into thinking it was talking over a secure encrypted link to Gmail, Skype or Hotmail. In reality it was talking to a server on the firm's premises that tapped into communications before relaying them to the genuine server. The DLP system needed to be able to issue different digital certificates from different services on the fly to pull off this approach, which amounts to a man-in-the-middle attack.
The same principle approach might be used in government monitoring activities, such as spying on its own citizens using web services such as Gmail and Skype. Evidence suggests that digital certificates issued by Netherlands-based firm DigiNotar last year were used in this way to eavesdrop on the webmail communications of Iran users last year, although no firm state-sponsored connection has been established.
In a statement published on Sunday, Trustwave said it supplied the tamper-proof digital stamp issuing device to a private customer (not an ISP, government or law enforcement agency), adding that the technology could not have been used outside the private network to which it was supplied. The CA said it had carried out an audit of the target network before supplying the technology.
Nonetheless, it admits the approach was misguided and has promised not to use the technique again. It has also revoked the offending subordinate digital credential-issuing root server.
Sysadmins applying data loss prevention policies that state that a firm has the right the scan and or block webmails sent from work can set up an internal certificate authority on machines connected to a local intranet. That approach wouldn't work on personal mobile devices a user brought into work and this seems to be the reason why Trustwave took the approach it did .
Trustwave has come clean and admitted it supplied technology that enabled third parties to issue arbitrary SSL server certificates for monitoring, albeit for benign reasons. This is a significant admission and further shakes confidence in the whole digital certificate trust model, already rocked by the Comodo breach, the DigiNotar hack, the SSL BEAST attack and other problems over recent months.Leyden