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Overview State Cyber Apparatus: Organizational and Policy Changes Modern Warfare Effect of Information Technology on State Repression Public Opinion and Technological Advancements Post-Soviet Politics
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Data/xSub Software
DIDG Teaching Contact

 Modern Warfare 

Publications

Under Review

Working Papers
  • "The Effect of the Internet of Contentious Politics in Authoritarian Regimes."  
    Abstract The internet allows autocratic governments to monitor their populations and potentially repress opposition groups. At the same time, internet access allows these groups to self-organize and mobilize collective action. We argue that, at a low internet penetration rate, opposition groups are more likely to mobilize and express their dissent. Yet this effect reverses at higher internet penetration rates, due to more targeted government monitoring and repression. We test this argument by conducting a meta-analysis across hundreds of sub-national datasets from the xSub data library (http://www.x-sub.org), along with estimates of internet penetration from 2006 until 2016. These (expected) findings highlight the curvilinear relationship between repression and dissent, and have important implications for scholars and policymakers interested in the effects of information and communications technology in authoritarian regimes.

  • "Division of Power and Accountability: Measuring Audience Costs in International Disputes." 
    Abstract When and why do leaders make concessions in international disputes? Recent years have seen a proliferation of empirical research on the effect of audience costs in crisis bargaining. This research has generated important new insights on how to detect and measure audience costs. While most of the existing works measure audience costs according to a single crisis bargaining model, this project estimates audience costs by considering difference between deterrence and compellence threats. To test the implications from each of these types of threats, we apply a structural statistical model to codings of instances of coercive diplomacy in the 1918-2015 International Crisis Behavior dataset. Our findings provide evidence that when deterrent threats are made, audience costs affect states’ decisions about whether to challenge the threat and escalate the crisis, or let the crisis lapse over time.
    • with James D. Morrow & Todd C. Lehmann

Book Chapters

General Audience Articles