Sarah Moss


Department of Philosophy, University of Michigan
2215 Angell Hall, 435 South State Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1003


ssmoss@umich.edu

curriculum vitae



I am the William Wilhartz Professor of Philosophy and Professor of Law by courtesy at University of Michigan. I work mainly in epistemology and philosophy of language, though my research also bears on questions in formal semantics, philosophy of mind, and legal philosophy.

In my book Probabilistic Knowledge, I argue that partial or degreed beliefs can constitute knowledge in just the same way that full beliefs can. The central theses of the book have significant consequences for social and political questions concerning racial profiling, statistical evidence, and legal standards of proof.

For an introduction to me and my work, you can listen to my interview on the Five Questions podcast or read my interview in 3:16 Magazine. For a recent public lecture, see "Knowing What's at Stake: Epistemology and Criminal Justice Reform." For discussion of my views in legal epistemology, see my interview on the Excited Utterance podcast.


Selected publications

How to Do Without Encroachment

forthcoming in Mind

Knowledge and Legal Proof

Oxford Studies in Epistemology vol. 7 (2023): 176-213
Sanders Epistemology Prize, 2019

Pragmatic Encroachment and Legal Proof

Philosophical Issues vol. 30, no. 1 (2021): 258-79
APA Article Prize, 2022

Global Constraints on Imprecise Credences: Solving Reflection Violations, Belief Inertia, and Other Puzzles

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research vol. 103, no. 3 (2020): 620-38

Full Belief and Loose Speech

Philosophical Review vol. 128, no. 3 (2019): 255-91
selected for the Philosopher's Annual, 2020

Probabilistic Knowledge

Sanders Book Prize, 2020
APA Book Prize Honorable Mention, 2019
Book symposium in Analysis vol. 80, no. 2 (2020): 316-70
Book symposium in Res Philosophica vol. 97, no. 1 (2020): 93-133
2-day masterclass on Probabilistic Knowledge, King's College London, March 2018
3-day symposium on Probabilistic Knowledge, University of Hamburg, August 2017

Moral Encroachment

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society vol. 118, no. 2 (2018): 177-205

Credal Dilemmas

Noûs vol. 49, no. 4 (2015): 665-83

On the Semantics and Pragmatics of Epistemic Vocabulary

Semantics and Pragmatics vol. 8, no. 5 (2015): 1-81

Time-Slice Epistemology and Action Under Indeterminacy

Oxford Studies in Epistemology vol. 5 (2015): 172-94
Sanders Epistemology Prize Runner-up, 2013

Epistemology Formalized

Philosophical Review vol. 122, no. 1 (2013): 1-43
APA Article Prize Honorable Mention, 2014

Subjunctive Credences and Semantic Humility

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research vol. 87, no. 2 (2013): 251-78

Four-Dimensionalist Theories of Persistence

Australasian Journal of Philosophy vol. 90, no. 4 (2012): 671-86

On the Pragmatics of Counterfactuals

Noûs vol. 46, no. 3 (2012): 561-86
selected for the Philosopher's Annual, 2013

Updating as Communication

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research vol. 85, no. 2 (2012): 225-48
Rutgers Young Epistemologist Prize, 2011

Solving the Color Incompatibility Problem

Journal of Philosophical Logic vol. 41, no. 5 (2012): 841-51

The Role of Linguistics in the Philosophy of Language

Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Delia Fara and Gillian Russell, eds. Routledge, 2012

Scoring Rules and Epistemic Compromise

Mind vol. 120, no. 480 (2011): 1053-69


Teaching materials

Phil 384: Applied Epistemology

This course satisfies the Race and Ethnicity Requirement for University of Michigan undergraduates.

Phil 404: Introduction to Analytic Philosophy

Collected problem sets for Phil 404: Introduction to Analytic Philosophy

Phil 413: Formal Methods in Philosophy

Collected problem sets for Phil 413: Formal Methods in Philosophy

Phil 601: Probabilistic Knowledge

Collected problem sets for Phil 601: Probabilistic Knowledge

Phil 611: Conditionalization and Its Discontents

Collected problem sets for Phil 611: Conditionalization and Its Discontents