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Planning as a Heterosexist Project

Michael Frisch

Abstract

The author argues that a key to understanding interactions between urban planning and lesbian and gay communities is to recognize that urban planning developed as a heterosexist project. Based on works in lesbian and gay history, he notes how the development of modern planning arose at the same time as modern conceptions of sexual orientation. Early planners were cognizant of lesbians and gays. Analyzing key texts of urban planning, the author shows how the heterosexist project works through unquestioned acceptance of Katz’s key assumptions of heterosexuality. He builds the argument by examining three dualisms within planning discourse: order/disorder, family/household, and public/private. While much of the analysis is historical, the author finds that planning continues to reinforce repression of lesbians and gays through laws, ordinances, and regulations. Analysis of emerging lesbian and gay enclaves must start with this background of repression. He concludes by suggesting several starting points for inclusive planning.

Urban planning is “a conscious effort to direct social processes to attain goals” (Fainstein and Fainstein 1996, 265-66). Urban planning then is a social project. Typically, planners characterize their work as being for the public good. In their Plan of Chicago, Burnham and Bennett ([1909] 1993, 1) characterized their plan as “the means whereby the city may be made an efficient instrument for providing all its people with the best possible conditions of living.” Yet, recent scholarly work shows that planning may be used in multiple ways. Flyvbjerg (1998) presents planning as rationalization produced by the exercise of power. Planning within this context becomes more reflective of existing power relations than of positive social action. Fogelson (1986) shows how planning facilitates capital accumulation often to the detriment of working people. Yiichtach (1998) goes further along this line of reasoning. He views planning as a process of social control and argues that planning has a “dark side of oppression” applied to people along many possible divisions, including class, race, ethnicity, gender, and sexual orientation. Thomas (1994) illustrates this dynamic in terms of race in her review of postwar planning in Detroit. Feminist writers have explored this aspect of planning in terms of urban design (Hayden 1981), zoning (Ritzdorf 1986), and planning theory itself (Sandecock and Forsyth 1992). In this article, I explore how urban planning works to promote heterosexuality at the expense of lesbian and gay people.

What does urban planning have to do with sexual orientation? Often, planning academics argue that the “community’s interest in morals” has not played a large role in development of zoning laws and regulations (Anderson 1968, 468). Contrary to this notion, recent work increasingly shows how planning laws were enacted to control immoral sexuality and especially women’s sexuality (Wilson 1992; Hooper 1998; Wirka 1998). Planning under apartheid acted to regulate by race and sexuality (Elder 1998). I will show how planning discourse advances heterosexuality and suppresses homosexuality through notions such as order, public, family, reproduction, and nature. Based on this discourse, planning strengthens spaces, places, and institutions that exclude on the basis of perceived orientation. Urban planning is, thus, a heterosexist project. An inclusive urban planning must address this exclusiveness. The inclusive project would create communities where lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, and transgendered people are accepted as full citizens (Richardson 1998). In such communities, “queer spaces” might be planned rather than repressed.

Both urban planning and categories of sexual orientation are products of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century. While a form of urban planning
existed before capitalist development, modern planning and capitalism are deeply intertwined (Fogelsong 1986). Parallel to and influenced by this development is the rise of categories of sexual orientation. Social scientists described homosexuals as pathological, and the category heterosexual was developed as the inverse “normal” state (D’Emilio and Freedman 1988). Today, direct connections between the development and promotion of these categories and modern planning are hard to find. Planning discourse assumes heterosexuality, thereby leaving homosexuality closeted and coded. Foucault and Sedgwick provide methodologies for dealing with this absence (Foucault 1976; Sedgwick 1990). I find the codes of sexual difference in the central dualisms assumed within the writings, laws, and regulation that constitute the discourse of planning. These planning dualisms include order/disorder, public/private, household/family, production/reproduction, and natural/artificial. By analyzing relations of sexual difference within these dualisms of planning discourse, I show that planning fundamentally promotes heterosexuality and represses homosexuality. I argue that an inclusive planning would promote (not just tolerate) multiple sexual orientations. Only the promotion of homosexuality can undo the damage done by planning over the past century (Sedgwick 1993). Aspects of this inclusive planning are found in the reconstructive nature of lesbian and gay communities.

I start by reviewing the existing literature on planning and queer communities. The few works that have addressed sexual orientation within planning have looked at case studies rather than at planning’s role. I briefly discuss the rise of the categories of heterosexuality and homosexuality. I show how mechanisms of repression including homosexual panic and the closet maintain heterosexist domination. This leads to the definition of a heterosexist project. I examine the work of the heterosexist project within three dualisms: order/disorder, family/household, and public/private. First, I look at concepts of order and disorder within the work of Geddes and Mumford. In their works, I find a direct and explicit connection between urban planning and efforts to control sexuality. Then, I discuss how heterosexist notions of kinship exclude lesbians and gays within the context of housing and zoning. Lesbians and gays are households not families, and this distinction is written into land use law and promoted by the zoning system. Third, I examine the fluidness of queer space to reveal relations within the public and private dichotomy. Here, planning is shown to be repressive of these spaces. The rise of these spaces reflects resistance to the heterosexual order. Finally, I conclude by presenting very briefly some general principles of planning inclusive of sexual difference.

What Is a Heterosexist Project? Definitions and a Review of the Planning Literature

I have already used multiple definitions to describe identities of sexual orientation (Rubin, 1992). For example, I use the terms queer and lesbian and gay interchangeably throughout much of this article. Lesbians and gays redefined the word queer as inclusive of a spectrum of sexual orientations to avoid being forced to choose an identity (Warner 1993). In the next section, I clarify my terms and identify central concepts used throughout the rest of the article.

Definitions: Heterosexual

The term heterosexual commonly refers to eroticism between people of a different sex. Yet, heterosexuality contains more social meanings. Katz (1995, 13-14) identifies three basic universal assumptions about heterosexuality: the procreative necessity of it, its basis in natural sex differences, and its potential for creating pleasure. These notions about heterosexuality are assumed to have always existed. Heterosexuality is regarded as normal. With these assumptions, heterosexuality becomes a total concept, eliminating options and alternatives (Gibson-Graham 1998).

Yet, homosexuals and heterosexuals have not always existed as categories. Modern sexual identities can be traced back to nineteenth-century efforts at classifying human activity and behavior within “scientific” notions of the day (Sedgwick 1990). The word heterosexual did not exist before 1868 and possibly as late as 1892 (Katz 1995). Katz (1995, 34) continues that “ways of ordering the sexes, genders, and sexualities have varied radically.” While men had sex with men in the past, such activities were imbued with much different meanings than they have today. Strangely, the first use of the term heterosexual found by Katz was in an 1868 letter concerning sex law reform. The letter compared both heterosexuality and homosexuality to “normal sexuality,” and all of these terms had different meanings then than they do today (p. 52). Similarly, as used by Kiernan in the first published reference to the word in the United States, both homosexuality and heterosexuality referred to “perversions” (pp. 19-20). Only gradually did heterosexuality lose its pejorative nature (p. 88). Through the works of Kraft-Ebbing, Freud, and Ellis, heterosexuality became the opposite of homosexuality by representing “normal” sex (Katz 1995; Weeks 1977). Thus, the modern terminology arose out of the new fields of psychology and social science.

The development of an identity requires the connection of the terms and ideas with people. D’Emilio (1993) points to
capitalism as the producer of these identities. While same-sex activity occurred prior to capitalism, “there was no social space that allowed men and women to be gay” (p. 470). Work occurred within the family unit. D’Emilio argues that only with the rise of wage labor was it possible for someone to establish a life as an individual (p. 470). Large industrial cities provided both the cover and the supply of similar individuals (p. 471). Finally, Foucault (1976) integrates these two streams showing the interplay between the fascination with categories of pathologies and the capitalist production of identities as commodities. Thus, modern sexual identities arose in the nineteenth century, connected to processes of capitalist urban development.

Definitions: The Closet

The universal assumptions of procreative necessity, natural sex difference, and pleasure continue to define heterosexuality. For example, on 10 November 1997, the attorney general of Vermont, a liberal state, issued a long brief using the argument that the maintenance of procreation requires the denial of marriage rights to same-sex couples (Planet Out 1997). Heterosexuality is promoted everywhere, from television to churches and schools. Heterosexuality is not a choice; it is compulsory (Rich [1982] 1993). Compulsory institutions need enforcement mechanisms. The closet is one such mechanism.

What is the closet? Closetedness is “a speech act of silence” (Sedgwick 1990, 3). Rich ([1982] 1993, 238) calls the closet the “rendering invisible of the lesbian possibility.” Initially, lesbians and gays construct the closet as an “information management strategy” to minimize the negative effects of the social stigma surrounding homosexuality (Escoffier 1997). Yet, control of the closet slips from the individual to institutions. The “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy of the armed forces institutionalizes the closet (Signorile 1991). Society enforces the closet through violence (Escoffier 1997). Gays and lesbians know this violence firsthand. Gay bashing is a common occurrence in many American cities (Berrill 1992). This violence extends to murder and, in its most gruesome form, genocide as in Nazi Germany (Plant 1986). Beyond the body, the closet extends to written accounts of homosexual existence. Adrienne Rich points out that earlier in this century, it was common to destroy records of homosexuality. In the middle of the twentieth century, a professional conference of psychologists did not even use the word homosexuality; instead the “H” problem was discussed (Duberman 1991). The closet silences homosexuality and subordinates it to heterosexuality.

This silence raises a procedural problem. How can I examine the interaction of planning and sexual orientation if much of the record is repressed and destroyed? Foucault (1976, 27) offers some of the procedural answers:

Silence itself—the things one declines to say, or is forbidden to name, the discretion that is required between different speakers—is less the absolute limit of discourse, the other side from which it is separated by a strict boundary, than an element that functions alongside things said, with them and in relation to them within overall strategies. There is no binary division to be made between what one says and what one does not say; we must try to determine the different ways of not saying such things, how those who can and those who cannot speak of them are distributed, which type of discourse is authorized, or which form of discretion is required in either case. There is not one but many silences, and they are an integral part of the strategies that underlie and permeate discourse.

When there is no record of homosexuality in a planning discourse, I look at how heterosexuality is presented and not presented. What positions are taken and avoided? The lack of direct references to sexual orientation in a discourse does not negate my argument (Sedgwick 1990). The work is in finding the indirect references and structured silences that have a heterosexist source.

Definitions: What Is a Heterosexist Project?

Finally, what do I mean by project? Omi and Winant (1994, 56) define a project as “the work of linking structure and representation.” In discussing racial formation, they define a racial project as “simultaneously an interpretation, representation, or explanation of racial dynamics, and an effort to reorganize and redistribute resources along particular racial lines” (p. 56). A racial project is racist only if “it creates or reproduces structures of domination based upon essentialist categories of race” (p. 71).2 Adopting their model, planning is not only a sexual project. Because of the repetition of the three heterosexual assumptions within planning discourse, planning is heterosexist. Zoning, housing rights, and our sense of the public realm are built around heterosexual constructs of family, work, and community life. Planning reproduces structures of heterosexual domination.

A Quick Review of Recent Work in Planning and Urban Studies

Serious work on lesbian and gay topics in planning and urban studies has only occurred in the past fifteen years.3 Earlier, if the topic of homosexuality was broached, it was presented in the terms of deviance as in case studies developed in
the thirties by the urban ecology school of sociology (Johnson 1997). Castells and Murphy published the first early work on the topic in 1982. Castells (1983) then used this study of the rise of the San Francisco gay male community in his book on urban grassroots movements. As the gay community develops a sense of place and culture, it creates the potential for dynamic urban transformation. However, the potential for transformation is lost when members of the gay community bargain away their power through interest group politics, acting solely in their own short-term interests rather than reaching out to other potential allies to accomplish long-term goals (pp. 169-70). Gay community politics must be viewed within the lens of the heterosexist project of planning. The extent of institutionalized repression may lead some members of the lesbian and gay community to get what they can when they can get it. Institutional change via an inclusive urban planning may be a necessary prerequisite to the creation of long-term urban transformation.

Castells’s (1983) remarks about how gender differences between lesbians and gay men affect the articulation of their communities in space and place have led to many responses. Castells argued that lesbians establish social and interpersonal networks, are poorer than men, organize politically in forms less focused on existing structures, and have fewer choices of work and residence. In contrast, gay men seek to dominate space. Lesbians in his analysis become placeless, while gay political organizing becomes place dependent (p. 140). Critics of this work have focused on the various individual components of Castells’s argument. Lesbian community formation does seem to be more a social process consisting of networks of friends and colleagues rather than a physical process (Valentine 1993a, 1993b, 1995; Forsyth 1997). The lower economic status of lesbians combined with gender discrimination may limit their transactions within the urban land market and thus limit the establishment of lesbian institutions (Badgett 1995a, 1995b; Forsyth 1997). Yet, lesbian places may be identified if the analyst knows how to read the evidence (Adler and Brenner 1992; Wolfe 1992; Rothenberg 1995; Valentine 1995; Bouthillette 1997; Forsyth 1997). Heterosexist assumptions contained within planning limit lesbians’ visibility (Wolfe 1992; Peake 1993). Thus, “making the invisible visible” is an important strategy of resistance (Barnett 1993; Sandercock 1998).

The role of gay men in the gentrification of San Francisco has also prompted responses to Castells’s case study. Castells (1983, 158-59) identified three forces leading to urban rehabilitation: gay professionals hire renovators to do the job, gay realtors discover the gay market both in terms of labor to perform the renovation and the demand for urban renovation, and finally collectives form to do the renovation work themselves. The depth of social relations in each factor raises the possibility of urban transformation. In contrast, Knopp sees the gay role in urban transformation less positively. First, Lauria and Knopp (1985) set the terms for this work by noting Altman’s (1982) description of the spatial differential of oppression and the rise of a spatial process of homosexualization. The rise of a “gay” identity becomes a new division of consumption. In his analysis of New Orleans gentrification, Knopp (1990b) sees gays as oppressors used by capital to facilitate gentrification. Knopp (1990a) divides gays into two communities, one aligned with capital and one resistant to capital. However, Knopp’s early work (1987, 1990a, 1990b, 1992) is limited by the lack of analysis of how heterosexism determines the rules of capitalist development (1995, 1998). While gay men have access to male privilege via the closet (Gluckman and Reed 1997; Jacobs 1997; Richardson 1998), they face significant income losses due to sexual orientation discrimination (Badgett 1995b). I will show how plans, laws, and regulations guiding urban development assume heterosexuality. Significant resistance to oppression is necessary even within exploitative gay gentrification processes.

Finally, in a work published in the important volume edited by Sandercock (1998)—Making the Invisible Visible—Moira Kenney reviews the context of gay and lesbian experience in the city. She begins to relate urban planning history to the important new findings of a whole generation of historians studying pre-Stonewall lesbian and gay communities (for example, see D’Emilio 1983; Bérubé 1990; Faderman 1991; Chauncey 1995, 1996, 1997; Beemyn 1997). These historians point out the existence of many lesbian and gay communities stratified by race and class and point to multiple strategies of resistance (DuBrow 1998). In a later part of this article, I will use material from these histories as well as from geographical and architectural work on queer space to delineate planning as an agent of repression of such space. Kenney (1998) identifies three directions for incorporating lesbian and gay experience within planning history: identification of lesbian and gay planners, a deeper analysis of discrimination fostered by planning, and strategies of resistance and appropriation. By describing how planning works as a heterosexist project, I help explain the reticence of lesbian and gay planners to come out, reveal instruments of discrimination, and begin developing components of an inclusive planning.
Geddes and Lewis Mumford. Their notions of order and disorder related to both sexuality and cities. I then discuss two other dualisms within planning: household/family and public/private. Notions of heterosexual domination expressed explicitly in the Geddes-Mumford link are implied within the planning discourses around these dualisms. Planners developed land use regulations and zoning to protect families as the site of heterosexuality from people with “indulgent lifestyles” (Baar 1992). Lastly, I examine public/private through the lens of new notions of queer space. Queer space challenges the public realm by making private use of public space. Planners work to destroy these queer spaces and render them safe for heterosexuals. Through each of these cases, planning reinforces heterosexist assumptions about life.

Order/Disorder

Modern city planning grew out of an impulse “to bring order out of chaos” (Burnham and Bennett [1909] 1993, 1). Chauncey (1995, 137-38), in *Gay New York*, summarizes this rise:

> In the closing decades of the nineteenth century and the opening decades of the twentieth, an extraordinary panoply of groups and individuals organized to reform the urban moral order. Although their efforts rarely focused on the merging gay world, most of them had a significant effect on its development. Some sought to reconstruct the urban landscape itself in ways that minimize the dissipating effects of urban disorder: reforming the tenements, putting up new residential hotels in which single men and women could lead moral lives, creating parks to reintroduce an element of rural simplicity and natural order to the city, building playgrounds and organizing youth clubs to rescue young people from city streets and gangs, and constructing grand boulevards and public buildings that would inspire a new order in the city itself and command respect for an orderly society.

This movement constructed the heterosexual order of life out of the disorder of the city. This impulse is directly expressed via the writing of Patrick Geddes and Lewis Mumford. In his history of planning, Peter Hall (1988) celebrates Geddes as an early synthesizer of modern planning impulses. Geddes developed the concept of the regional survey leading to the saying “survey before plan” (p. 142). Mumford was a disciple of Geddes. In their writings, there is an explicit link between heterosexuality and planning.

Patrick Geddes was more than an early planner. He was trained as a botanist and made significant contributions to biology as well as the emerging disciplines of sociology, planning, and public health. His biological work applied a form of evolutionary theory to sex and reproduction, and he contributed articles on these topics to one of the great editions of the *Encyclopedia Britannica* (Geddes 1886a, 1886b). According to Geddes, the uniting of female and male sex forces “express the highest outcome of the whole activities of the organism—the literal blossoming of the individual life” (Geddes 1886b, 724). While he did not label it, what we would call heterosexuality, Geddes describes as the pinnacle of human existence.

Geddes and his collaborator J. Arthur Thomson wrote a book further developing this evolutionary approach to sexuality and reproduction (Geddes and Thomson 1890). Based on their scientific expertise, they were asked to comment on social aspects of sex in a 1912 pamphlet (Thomson and Geddes 1912). In this work, they emphasize that humans are “social animals” (Thomson and Geddes 1912, 18). They argue that “the complexity of human social organization tends to segregate a large fraction of the population from the normal expression of sex impulses” (Thomson and Geddes 1912, 20). Yet, we are also rational beings; we can control our environment and control sexuality creating “more normal life-opportunities for its normal members” (Thomson and Geddes 1912, 20). They continue along these lines, arguing for generosity in judgments since many of our social conditions are dismally abnormal, and are directly provocative of abnormalities in sexual expression. In illustration, we may refer to frequent deficiency in one of the primary needs of family life—namely, room. The crowding together of inmates of both sexes and of various ages is still excessive for well-nigh half the nation, is often hideous and the impossibility of privacy creates situations which are revolting. (P. 24)

They view the rise of single, unattached adults in the city as worse than family overcrowding:

> More subtle, yet more severe and disastrous, provocatives to sexual irregularities than those of family overcrowding alone are those found in those social arrangements which leave large numbers of adults temporarily or permanently unmated. (P. 26)

Yet, their liberalism in judgment extends only to an occasional lapse in behavior. They argue that “sexually vicious habits of mind and body” are “evil and destructive” both to individuals and to society (Thomson and Geddes 1912, 29). They narrowly define “normal sex-expression” and emphasize self-control (Thomson and Geddes 1912, 43). Then, Thomson and Geddes (1912) define what is not normal:

> There are the terrible volumes of sexual pathology. There is sexual hyperaesthesia or the abnormal exaggeration of sexual excitability, an exaggeration all but universal in some measure through all our civilizations. There is auto-eroticism or masturbation, which often wreaks both body and...
mind; there are loathsome and sinister perversions of the attractions between the sexes and repulsive fleshly attractions between those of the same sex; there is the nemesis of uncontrolled sexuality which may make an old man a satyr or a terror to little children; and if these and other hells be escaped by the persistently uncontrolled, there is that of a mind that is preoccupied with lustful thoughts and pictures, and of an eye which betrays itself in its lecherousness.

(P. 44)

They refer to masturbation and homosexuality in the same context as pedophiles and pornography. They see all of these “perversions” as abnormal and in need of individual and societal control. While not labeled as such, their view of heterosexuality expresses each of Katz’s three assumptions of heterosexuality: biological difference, pleasure potential, and procreative necessity.

Thomson and Geddes (1912) promote two forms of control over sexuality. The first is self-control through marriage, morals, and rational thought (p. 45). The second mode of control is social organization through the use of planning in both its social and physical forms. They promote Jane Addams and her settlement house work as capable of producing “real and substantial uplift to the cause of youth and the bettering of cities” (p. 42). They also make explicit mentions of the potential of city planning to improve the conditions that create abnormal sexuality. They lament that the Town Planning Act recently passed by Parliament and the various garden cities schemes have done so little, when the need is so great (p. 25). Planning by providing space and emphasizing rationality creates an order that produces heterosexuality.

Lewis Mumford idolized Geddes. Through the Regional Planning Association of America, Mumford popularized the concept of regional planning along with Geddes’s approach to planning (Luccarelli 1995). Mumford himself talks about how Geddes makes the connection between the (heterosexual) order of life and planning. This next passage shows the degree of Mumford’s admiration:

The depletion of vitality, the arrest of growth, the domination of the living by the non-living, the persistence of fixity and habit over flexibility and purposive change—against all these forms of disintegration Geddes endlessly battled. Geddes was on the side of life, wherever it was threatened or besieged. Into the piled-up tenement districts of Edinburgh he brought gardens; into the plague ridden streets of Indian cities, he brought cleanliness; into the cram ridden school of verbalistic empalement he brought the regional survey, which sent the student out into the city and the countryside, seeing with his own eyes the realities behind his academic abstraction; into the movement for sexual development, with which he sympathized, he brought the sense of family, the need for children, the acceptance of mature responsibilities. With the wand of life he tapped the rock and made water flow forth. (Mumford 1944, 384-85)

Like magic, Geddes brought order into cities and the family. Note how Mumford’s phrase “the movement for sexual development” encapsulates the assumptions of heterosexuality. Within one sentence, Mumford has connected planning and heterosexuality.

When Mumford does address homosexuality, it is connected to death and disorder. In the following passage, he applies his mid-century view to homosexuality as represented in ancient Greece:

In sexual life if love were a purposeless welling forth of appetites, homosexual love might seem as reasonable as heterosexual love—and in turn heterosexual love might become as unashamingly sterile. All the irrationalities of human love, however, move eventually toward a goal more imperative than pleasure: the conception and nurture of children, the perpetuation of the race. The very mechanisms of sex are adapted to that higher reason: the mystery of life itself, seeking its own extension and perpetuation. Even when the love of a man and a woman has no direct biological issue, their passion and their deepening loyalty symbolize and anticipate that final outcome: the triumph of life. And as long as the ancient forms of fertility are not violated, the relationship may be a fruitful and life-exalting one. In Greece the practice of homosexuality and infanticide might seem to have cold reason on their side; yet they were profoundly hostile to life. (Mumford 1944, 24)

According to Mumford, heterosexuality promotes the natural order of things. Each of Katz’s three universal heterosexist assumptions operates in this passage. Natural sex differences are referenced in the “adaptive mechanisms of sex.” Sex would not have its meaning without its relation to procreation. Procreation as the “triumph of life” defines sex as the site of pleasure. Finally, not only are homosexual practices “purposeless” and “unashamingly sterile,” Mumford goes on to put them on the same level as baby killing.

These passages raise questions about other metaphors used by Mumford. In his remarks following the horrors of World War II, the atomic bomb, and the Holocaust, Mumford (1951, 283) makes several references that, while they do not explicitly mention homosexuality and heterosexuality, place the source of the evil on the breaking of the heterosexual order:

The violence and evil of our time have been, when viewed collectively, the work of loveless men: impotent men who lust after sadistic power to conceal their failure as lovers: repressed and frustrated men, lamed by unloving parents, and seeking revenge by taking refuge in a system of thought or a mode of life into which love cannot intrude: at best people whose erotic impulses have been cut off from the normal rhythms of life, self-enclosed atoms of erotic exploit, incapable of assuming the manifold responsibilities of lovers and parents through all stages of life, unwilling to accept the breaks and abstentions of pregnancy, making sexual union itself an obstacle to the other forms of social union that flow out of family life.
This passage has an unspoken homophobic bent within the writing. The “normal rhythms of life” fits within Geddes’s conception of natural sex difference and male and female function. Geddes saw homosexuality as separated from the natural functions of male and female. This separation might be described as “self-enclosed atoms of erotic exploit.” Homosexuality represents sterility and these men become “impotent.” Mumford seems to be implying a connection between homosexuality and the disorder created by the evil and violence of our century.

Thus, while planners did not focus on “the emerging gay world,” they did focus on explicitly structuring life for heterosexuality. Two of the great historical planners, Geddes and Mumford, saw planning as a means of bringing order into life. They explicitly connected heterosexuality with this order.

Family/Household

How did planners create order for heterosexuality? In this next section, I show how planners encouraged the development of land use regulation and zoning that would protect the family. Just as we have to bring order to the city, we must bring order to the family. Thus, arguments for the adoption of single-family zoning speak of protecting the family. Throughout these texts supporting zoning, writers make an unspoken assumption that through marriage, the family becomes the site of natural heterosexuality for procreation and pleasure. In contrast to the single-family home, proponents of single-family zoning see apartments as the site of immoral activity. Apartments contain households. Finally, I show that similar to the unspoken acceptance of Katz’s assumptions of heterosexuality, the definition of the family remained unchallenged until the sixties.

Early court cases supporting the application of zoning in cities relied on the same reasoning used by Geddes and Mumford. However, in most of these quotations the underlying purpose of controlling sexuality remains closeted. It is up to us to decode the references. For example, Gellen (1985, 112) quotes a 1925 California Supreme Court decision, Miller v. Board of Public Works of the City of Los Angeles:

> ... that justification for residential zoning be rested on the protection of the civic and social value of the American home. The establishment of such districts is for the general welfare because it tends to promote and perpetuate the American home. It is axiomatic that the welfare and indeed the very existence of a nation depends upon the character and caliber of its citizenry. The character and quality of manhood and womanhood are in large measure the result of home environment.

According to this decision, zoning is necessary to protect the “American home.” The judges continue: “with [home] ownership comes stability, the welding together of family ties, and better attention to the raising of children” (p. 113). Home is the site of the family. The judges argue that the family is the source of sex-differentiated human character. These characteristics are “the foundation of good citizenship” and thus contribute to an orderly society (p. 112). With planning, we may influence child development and thereby create heterosexuals.

Planning creates order for heterosexual families. This reasoning led to the Supreme Court’s Euclid v. Ambler decision in 1926 that institutionalized zoning in the United States. Gellen (1985, 112) notes how Bettman, in his brief submitted on the case, “underscored the deterministic relationship between environment and moral character.” According to Bettman’s brief,

> the essential object of promoting what might be called orderliness in the layout of cities is not the satisfaction of taste, or aesthetic desires, but rather the promotion of those beneficial effects upon health and morals which come from living in orderly and decent surroundings. The man who seeks to place his home for his children in an orderly neighborhood is not motivated so much by considerations of taste or beauty as by the assumption that his children are likely to grow mentally, physically, and morally more healthful in such a neighborhood than in a disorderly, noisy, squalid, blighted and slumlike neighborhood. (Gellen 1985, 112)

The “moral health of children” in families requires zoning. Following this logic, the Supreme Court ruled in Euclid v. Ambler (1926) that “exclusion of buildings devoted to business, trade, etc. from residential districts bears a rational relation to the health and safety of the community.” Support for this conclusion was found in the “suppression and prevention of disorder” (Euclid v. Ambler 1926). What remains unsaid by the Court is that disorder includes homosexuality. Yet, as I have shown previously, homosexuality was a part of the disorder of the city that planners were aiming to control. With this case, zoning then becomes a legal tool of sexual control.

The approval of zoning went beyond just the development of districts distinguished by land use. Zoning created special areas for single-family buildings. The Supreme Court explicitly targeted apartments in Euclid v. Ambler: “the apartment house is a mere parasite, constructed in order to take advantage of the open spaces and attractive surroundings created by the residential character of the district” (Mandelker, Cunningham, and Payne 1995, 86). Once again, there is an unspoken understanding that crowded conditions create socially abnormal development. Yet, the fear of apartments went beyond just crowded conditions but actually included direct issues of social
control. Baar (1992) traces the history of this bias against apartments and shows that opposition against apartment buildings began in the 1890s. He finds that opponents of multifamily housing saw apartments as favoring people with “indulgent lifestyles” (p. 41). Objections to apartments went beyond creation of play area for children (Gellen 1985, 111). Apartment living encouraged a lifestyle in which women were not home-bound and in which children were exposed to single men and women of different social backgrounds and cultural values. Social workers and housing reformers alike believed that exposure to the lifestyles of the unattached had a detrimental effect on the moral development of young children, especially girls. (Gellen 1985, 111)

Following this line of reasoning, the Ohio Lower Appellate Court ruled in *Morris v. East Cleveland* in favor of single-family zoning. Part of the court’s reasoning was that in apartment houses, “the number of people passing in and out render immoral practices therein more difficult of detection and suppression” (Baar 1992, 45). Not only was the single-family house the designated site of heterosexuality, planners suppressed apartments as sites of difference. Apartments housed indulgent, immoral people. Apartments prevented surveillance of residents’ activities. Apartments housed households not families.

After the legal foundations of planning were established, suburbs, the site of new development, also became the sites of planning practice. Fishman (1987) argues that suburbs developed as sites of exclusion based on class. Post-World War I suburbs developed with the principles and tools of planning formed a response to the same “bourgeois anxieties” that led to late-nineteenth-century railway suburbs. Practices such as large-lot zoning and deed restrictions were used to control apartments and thus control households. Apartment houses could legally be excluded from these new communities. Apartments then were an urban phenomena while single-family homes were suburban. Thus, suburban development excludes on the basis of sexual orientation as well as class.

The legalistic family/household distinction did not arise until the 1960s (Mandelker, Cunningham, and Payne 1995). At this time, “many municipalities began to change the definition of family in their ordinances to exclude or limit the number of person unrelated by blood, marriage or adoption who might constitute a family for zoning purposes” (Mandelker, Cunningham, and Payne 1995, 260). Alternative household formations became a more public phenomena at this time, and communities responded to limit their spread into single-family districts (*Village of Belle Terre v. Boras* 1974). People with little control, those with indulgent lifestyles, still could live in apartments. By design, these apartments were separated from the real families in their single-family homes. Thus, what emerges as a “nonfamily” household in the sixties was closeted before that time. As gays and lesbians fight for family rights of custody, adoption, and marriage, the outlines of the unspoken limits of family become more defined. By raising private “family” issues publicly, lesbians and gays challenge the modern heterosexual order imposed by planning.

Public/Private

In my urban design class, someone characterized planning as the study of the spaces between the buildings. While the speaker meant to illustrate the relevance of a figure ground drawing, he also meant that planning deals with mediating the space between the public, represented by the street, and the private, represented by the interior of the building. Inside the building, if it is a single-family home, lies the family—a heterosexual space protected as I have shown by land use regulations developed by planners. Outside lies the public realm. Lesbians and gay men make private use of this public space. In this next section, I examine how lesbians and gay men have used public space. Planning and public authorities respond to these uses through benign repression such as rezoning and outright closure of spaces or through stronger forms of repression including arrest and imprisonment of the offending parties. The advent of the lesbian and gay rights movement has reduced this repression. Yet, the dichotomy of private versus public still exists in the law. The semilegal status of homosexuality threatens the stability of any lesbian or gay community formed within a city.

The industrial city was characterized by crowding both in public and private. Anonymity became possible. People traveled to the cities to find work. They were functionally alienated from the institutions of land, household production, and extended family relations that marked precapitalist development (D’Emilio 1993). The city attracted large numbers of people either single or temporarily single. The new immigrant faced alienation in the workplace but also at home. Immigrants were separated from traditional culture and social norms all in an alien space. Diversions arose to entertain the masses. Mumford (1938, 267) characterized them as “the poisons of vicarious vitality.” He goes on “to sum up these diversions”:

> to counteract an intolerable preoccupation with arithmetical abstractions and mechanical instruments, an almost equally abstract interest in the stomach and the sexual organs, divorced from their organic relations. To counteract boredom and isolation, mass spectacles; to make up for biological inferiority, a series of collective games and exhi-
Recent work by lesbian and gay historians shows the existence of gay culture at the turn of the century. In his history of gay New York, Chauncey (1995) describes a gay subculture operating out of taverns and on the streets of the city itself. He goes on to tie regulation of this culture to reform efforts inclusive of planning:

The policing of gay culture in the early twentieth century was closely tied to the efforts of these societies to control streets and tenements and to eliminate the saloon and brothel were predicated on a vision of an ideal social order centered in the family. (Chauncey 1995, 138-39)

What we now see as representative of gay culture, Mumford saw as a “form of negative vitality.” Planning laws and procedures regulate streets, tenements, and building uses to limit these forms.

Why then was planning necessary to keep the heterosexual order? Gay men, and to some extent lesbians too, used public space for their own private purposes. Faderman (1991) shows how working-class women first entered saloons, thereby taking advantage of public amusements. Working-class lesbians formed the nucleus of early lesbian bar culture. Faderman shows other patterns of lesbian space within women’s social networks, softball teams, same-sex colleges, bohemia, and hobo life. Gay men met each other on the street, in parks, and in public areas (Chauncey 1996). This pattern repeated itself in multiple urban areas. For example, Johnson (1997) describes the rise of “Fairytown” in Chicago. Gays adapted their strategies to the place. Within the car-oriented society of Flint, gays cruised a circuit in their cars (Retzloff 1997). In times of greater repression, such use of public space became coded:

Given the risks involved in asserting a visible presence in the streets, most gay people chose not to challenge the conventions of heterosexual society directly. But they resisted and undermined them nevertheless by developing tactics that allowed them to identify and communicate with one another without alerting hostile outsiders to what they were doing. Other gay men developed codes that were intelligible only to other men familiar with the subculture. (Chauncey 1995, 187)

The use of slang or the wearing of a certain type of tie or scarf signaled “sisterhood” to other gay men. Thus, public space becomes queer space. When society increases repression, these spaces become more fluid, as gays adopt codes to define a space rather than using place.

Society responded to overt expression of homosexuality through repression. There was always the threat of violence. More lawful means of repression also existed. Laws passed to control prostitution were used against gay men. Society made it illegal for gay men to cruise. New York went as far to make “degeneracy” a crime in 1923. The law defined degeneracy as “frequenting about any public place soliciting men for the purpose of committing a crime against nature or other lewdness” (Chauncey 1995, 185-86). Over the years, hundreds of men were arrested and charged with this crime.

Planning provided the means of another type of repression. In her classic, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, Jane Jacobs (1961) shows how planning acts to repress these public expressions of homosexuality. In her section on parks, she uses the four squares of Penn’s Philadelphia to illustrate her point about how the activities at the edge of the park determined the successfullness of the park. As Jacobs points out, one of these parks was used by nonheterosexuals:

Several decades ago, Washington Square became Philadelphia’s pervert park, to the point where it was shunned by office lunchers and was an unimaginable vice and crime problem to park workers and police. In the mid-1950’s it was torn up, closed for more than a year, and redesigned. In this process, its users were dispersed, which was the intent. (Pp. 92-93)

The dictionary still defines pervert as referring to people who prefer anything other than “normal coitus” (Merriam-Webster, Inc. 1986). No doubt, in 1961, Jacobs’ use of perverts refers to gay men. In contrast, Chauncey (1995, 180) describes in more enlightened language how gay men use parks:

Cruising parks and streets provided many young men and newcomers to the city with a point of entry into the rest of the gay world, which was sometimes hidden from men looking for it by the same codes and subterfuges that protected it from hostile straight intrusions.

This passage further explains why the city of Philadelphia had to act in Jacobs’ example. Cruisy parks provided an entrance point to the city within the closet. Through meeting other gay people, codes were taught and secrets revealed. Gays recruited in parks. This public behavior threatens the heterosexual order. As Jacobs shows, cities respond to this threat by shutting down the place.

Furthermore, the repression is not restricted to the public sphere. In many states, it is illegal to break the heterosexual order in private. Sodomy laws regulate private behavior. However, married people have a right to privacy established in a series of cases following Griswold v. Connecticut (Garrow 1994). Based on these precedents, laws regulating heterosexual sodomy (within marriage) have been overturned. In 1986, the
Supreme Court in *Bowers v. Hardwick* reaffirmed the right to regulate private homosexual behavior. The Court ruled “that no connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other has been demonstrated” (Garrow 1994, 663). The Court’s ruling again reaffirmed the central assumptions of heterosexuality with family denoting natural sex difference, marriage revealing the allowed site of pleasure, and procreation explicitly expressed. Privacy only exists within heterosexuality.

This lack of basic privacy rights has public implications. Present repression sometimes combines land use regulations forbidding uses prohibited by law with references to constitutional sodomy laws prohibiting homosexual behavior. In places with sodomy laws, some view being openly queer as living with intent to break the law. These people have legal justification then to discriminate in the areas of accommodation, employment, housing, and land use. Without a gay rights law, such discrimination is legal (Hunter, Michaelson, and Stoddard 1992). In such places, zoning may be used to prevent lesbian and gay businesses. Thus, regulation of private behavior has public consequences within the realm of planning.

This repression has dire implications for lesbians and gay men. Before the advent of gay rights laws, “every evening spent in a gay setting, every contact with another gay man or lesbian, every sexual intimacy carried a reminder of the criminal penalties that could be exacted at any moment” (D’Emilio 1983, 49). At the height of the repression in the fifties, thousands lost their jobs and thousands were kicked out of the military (D’Emilio 1983). This repression still resonates today. Lesbians who experienced the repression of the 1950s “have little faith that the progress that has come about through the gay liberation movement is here to stay” (Faderman 1991, 157). The institution of the closet developed as a survival strategy for lesbians and gays. Fear of reprisals still keeps many lesbians and gays in the closet.

The atmosphere of repression also affected the development of lesbian and gay institutions. Lesbians and gays used public spaces on the edges of society where the mainstream would not notice. Jacobs notes this tendency in 1961:

> The perverts who completely took over Philadelphia’s Washington Square for several decades were a manifestation of this city behavior in microcosm. They did not kill off a vital and appreciated park. They did not drive out respectable users. They moved into an abandoned place and entrenched themselves. As this is being written, the unwelcome users have successfully been cleared away to find other vacuums, but this act has still not supplied the park with a sufficient sequence of welcome users. (P. 98)

The development of institutions provides a fixity to otherwise fluid spaces created by just queer uses of public space. Faderman (1991, 161) describes the lesbian bar as a dark secret nighttime place usually located in dismal areas. Other locations for the lesbian and gay institutions include bohemian neighborhoods such as Greenwich Village and Harlem of the 1920s (Chauncey 1995). The seeking out of edge spaces and “border vacuums” in lesbian and gay community formation goes beyond multiplying the rent gap and gentrification. It is connected to a process of private appropriation of public space (Bell 1995; Binnie 1995). Creating fixity also requires making public what was private. Someone has to come out of the closet to develop a queer institution. Often, these institutions and businesses are treated as “adult” establishments. Planning processes with a strict separation of public and private enforce heterosexist notions of public and private.

I have shown how notions of public and private work differently depending on sexual orientation. Heterosexuals have a right to privacy. Heterosexual notions of the public realm emphasize separations of public and private. Planning acts on these notions in redevelopment projects and in developing and enforcing land use regulations. Planning empowers heterosexuality. “Where there is power, there is resistance” (Foucault 1976, 95). Creating an inclusive planning means challenging the strict separation between the two spheres. Lesbian and gays within planning live out this challenge when they “come out.” Each act of coming out is a form of resistance.

► Conclusion: A Queer Inclusive Planning?

Urban planning produces structures that enforce and reinforce heterosexuality. Geddes and Mumford explicitly saw planning as a means of social regulation of sexuality. The legal justification for zoning and the resultant forms of suburban development explicitly promote heterosexuality. These laws, regulations, and processes continue to operate today even in a liberal state with a gay rights law such as New Jersey. Further work needs to address the role of heterosexuality in other planning dualisms such as production/reproduction and rural/urban. Knopp (1998) has begun this project in his latest work by addressing the interplay between class and sexual orientation within cities. New work in cultural geography also expands on these ideas (Nast and Pile 1998).

The heterosexist project of planning raises implications for lesbian and gay politics. The battle for lesbian and gay rights starts with breaking the silence and coming out. Yet, coming out does not change the heterosexual structures guiding urbanization and community formation. One popular writer on gay politics, Michelangelo Signorile, treats urbanization as a force independent of sexual orientation. He emphasizes gay men’s own self-oppression and extols a suburban ideal. He
Placing as a Queer Inclusive Project

What would queer inclusive planning look like? Richard Sennett (1970) described some of the possibilities in his book *The Uses of Disorder*. In the book, he traces the development of a myth of “communal solidarity” that is behind many modern planning measures (p. 48). Instead of building on measures that create exclusion, he wants to create urban areas with a “multiplicity of contact points” (p. 57). Only dense urban areas have the relative instability required to keep up social mixing (p. 152). Sennett wants to increase complexity and conflict in the city, whereby the only solution is common engagement and social interaction (pp. 147-48). Finally, he calls for a reduction in “family intensity” hoping to draw people into interaction outside of familial and protected surroundings (pp. 168-69). It is not enough to create spaces that are separate but equal. Rather, we must try to create spaces of interaction.

Feminist writers provide some of the detailed programs to achieve the inclusive city (Sandecroke and Forsyth 1992; Ritzdorf 1993; Sandecroke 1998). Ritzdorf (1986, 26) calls for changes in zoning ordinances such as the redefinition of family, the allowance of work at home, the adoption of accessory apartment ordinances, and the allowance of day care in all zones. Hayden (1984, 204) reexamines designs for congregate housing as a way to reorganize life to empower women. She also calls for dividing large single-family homes into duplexes and triplexes (Hayden 1981, 183). Finally, Stacey (1996) explicitly redeﬁnes family to include lesbians and gays. According to Stacey, “the postmodern family condition of pluralism and flexibility should represent a democratic opportunity in which individuals’ shared capacities, desires and conviction could govern the character of their gender, sexual and family relationship” (p. 37). This opportunity would be partially accomplished by the extension of marriage rights to lesbians and gays (p. 107).

We must also address the myths of heterosexuality. For example, many lesbians and gay men are parents. Challenging myths requires deconstruction, though deconstruction alone is not enough. We must recognize difference and give it equal status (Fraser 1997). Recognition implies something more than tolerance (Sedgwick 1993). This recognition challenges our conceptions of the public realm. An inclusive planning would treat lesbians and gays as full citizens (Richardson 1998). Planning is a constructive activity (Fainstein and Fainstein 1996). We have the tools to begin the inclusive project.

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Notes

1. Many writers have noted identities based on same-sex relationships in history and in traditional societies (Trumbach 1977; Boswell 1980; Halperin 1989). The dynamics of these identities differ from lesbian and gay identities within modern capitalist societies (D’Emilio 1993).

2. This concept of a project is similar to DeLauretis’s (1987) concept of “technology,” when she writes about film as a technology of gender. Planning can also be seen as a technology of sex.

3. Sociological and cultural studies slowly began appearing in the seventies (see, for example, Humphreys 1970; Harry 1974; Katz 1976; Weeks 1977; Levine 1979). Many of these studies form the basis of what became lesbian and gay studies and queer studies.

References


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