Introduction

High-modernist state projects like Islamabad, James Scott has observed, are ‘always and to some considerable degree parasitic on informal processes, which the formal scheme does not recognise, without which it could not exist, and which it alone cannot create or maintain’ (Scott 1998: 310). In some cases, however, such projects are overcome by informal processes to the extent that they try to supersede them. I will argue that such is the case in Islamabad. Like the physical planning of the city, the initial organisation of governing institutions in Islamabad baldly manifested the new military government’s programme to promote the civil and military bureaucracies at the expense of wider political participation. Since the early 1960s, civic groups have made weak and episodic efforts to establish representative government in the city. However, without exaggerating the unity of state bureaucracies (Abrams 1988, Li 2005), it is fair to say that Islamabad has remained formally under the complete planning and administrative control of the civil bureaucracy — even during the period of representative governments from 1988 to 1999.

Through an examination of government housing and mosque building, we can see that the very comprehensiveness of the formal dominance of the bureaucracy has channelled the social forces of the growing city into the uncivil politics of informal processes of the bureaucracy. Institutions of civil society were unable to prevent the initial establishment of Islamabad and have since had little impact on its development. By contrast, politics within the bureaucratic arena, while rarely challenging the planned order of the city openly, has fundamentally reshaped this by appropriating the fruits of planning or even the planning process itself.

Islamabad was established following the military coup of General Ayub Khan in 1959, after years of debate on the 1952 plan by the
Swedish firm Merz Rendel Vatten for a new capital area in Karachi. The 1952 plan ‘emphasized the desirability of promoting as close a contact as possible between the state administration and the economic and cultural functions’ (Lindstrom and Ostnas 1967 [1952]: 36). In rejecting Karachi, the new military government declared that ‘the capital is to be a capital city only, without non-official civilian population located in it and pulling the central administration in different directions’ (Doxiadis Associates 1960b: 54). Instead of a representative municipal government, a powerful government agency, the Capital Development Corporation (CDC) was created to plan and administer the new city. Costantinos Doxiadis, the project’s Greek modernist architect–planner, declared that Islamabad was ‘to be created without any commitments to the past’ (Doxiadis 1965: 26). The unity of the physical plan of Islamabad was an icon of the single-mindedness of a modern administration attempting to isolate itself from the social influences of the present and the tenacious grip of the traditional past.

The Master Plan (MP) for Islamabad called for Islamabad and Rawalpindi to expand indefinitely on parallel rays out from their nuclei, forever divided by a green belt, a major transportation artery and a linear industrial zone. A monumental national administrative area was planned to dominate a numbered and lettered grid of one- and one-quarter-mile square sectors extending down a gentle slope, articulated by roads cutting through hillocks and spanning shallow gullies. Each sector was divided into a nested hierarchy of ‘communities’, each with a school, a market and a mosque commensurate with its population. In order to establish a transparent relationship between social position and physical dwelling, planners prescribed a hierarchy of state housing sizes and designs corresponding to residents’ salary level and position in the government bureaucracy. Doxiadis called Islamabad a ‘dynapolis’ (from ‘dynamic’ and ‘metropolis’) and praised the grid because it ‘can develop dynamically, unhindered into the future, into space and time’ (Doxiadis 1965: 26) (Figure 15.1).

The pristine order of this plan has only been partially realised. Dense slums of construction workers, city sweepers and domestic servants crowd beside the undeveloped gullies and green spaces in the middle of almost every sector. In most neighbourhoods, several mosques jostle like disputing Protestant churches in a small New England town. State-owned houses and apartments often
Figure 15.1: Master plan for the Islamabad metropolitan area (from Doxiadis 1965)
bear little connection with the wealth or government rank of their occupants. Most dramatically, the boundless westward expansion envisioned by Doxiadis stalled, perhaps forever, in the 11-series of sectors, just six miles from the President’s house. Nevertheless, by comparison to the similar modernist new city projects of Brasilia and Chandigarh, which Scott (1998) has characterised as failures, Islamabad has been a success. The population has grown at a steady pace to nearly 1 million and many Pakistanis consider Islamabad to be the most beautiful and livable city in Pakistan. But should we see Islamabad in its own way as a modest failure? Are the disruptions to the Master Plan to be lamented?

As I see it, they are less evidence of a failed city as of a failed authoritarianism, allowing for a broadening of participation in the fashioning of the city. These unplanned and usually illegal developments are the halting and heterogeneous introduction of different modes of creating the built environment that had been either excluded or generated by the plan itself. It is worth emphasising that these disruptions are not solely or even mainly the work of subordinate groups using the ‘weapons of the weak’ (Scott 1985). Most involve cooperation or collusion among ‘non-caste’ residents, those outside the bureaucracy, and the powerful ‘twice-born’ within it in a range of income groups — for bureaucratic planning limits everyone’s range of action, though not equally so. Furthermore, the myriad displacements of the plan are certainly attended by conflicts and inequalities the plan would suppress. We have though, a different kind of politics, neither directly challenging state policy nor working through the mechanisms we associate with civil society. Some of the developments I discuss have been attended by the roar of public protests, parliamentary speeches, letters to the editor, muck-raking press coverage and watchdog reports. However, the effective mechanisms of this sort of politics are quiet encroachment, the capture or diversion of a file, a threat of violence, a word from an influential resident, the timely occupation of a state apartment, a well-placed bribe and diligent and conspicuous prayer.

The Master Plan

When Ayub Khan put the planning of the city in the hands of Constantinos Doxiadis, the latter was heading one of the largest architectural firms in Europe. A project as large as a new capital city was
still barely a match for Doxiadis’s ambitions. His grand vision transcended monumentality to focus on the universal requirements of a whole society, even a civilisation. This vision required nothing less than the foundation of a new practical science, which he called ‘Ekistics’ the study of human settlements to discover the relations among nature, man, society, ‘shells’ (buildings), and ‘networks’ (communications) (Doxiadis 1968). Such a broad approach demanded an all-encompassing role for the planner: ‘He must become a scientist, carry out research, create a system of thought, devise a programme of action and carry out proper schemes of organisation in government, in industry, in design’ (Doxiadis 1963: 9).

For Doxiadis, egalitarian concern for the life of the common citizen required a scientific organisation of cities as a solution to the contemporary ‘urban nightmare’ of unregulated growth (1963: 19). However, the political role entailed by this technical programme converged with the authoritarian political agenda of Ayub Khan’s bureaucratic military regime. Holston has observed that modernist architects have long maintained affiliations across the political spectrum, aligning themselves with ‘whichever authority, on the Left or Right, [that] seemed capable of implementing total planning’ (Holston 1989: 42). Le Corbusier, the leading figure of modernist architecture, dedicated his major publication, *The Radiant City*, to ‘AUTHORITY’ (ibid.). Doxiadis, too, welcomed the establishment of political power strong enough to carry through planning programmes of massive scope. In his first major report on the Master Plan for Islamabad, using the language of technical necessity, he defined his own political role and that of his successors: ‘It is imperative to create the master builders, the people who are going to be in charge of the overall city, from its conception to the implementation of every detail. There is a necessity for a conductor of the whole orchestra which is to create the symphony. He must be a strong conductor, for he will be responsible for everything within Islamabad’ (Doxiadis Associates 1960b: 435).

While Ayub Khan saw the isolation of the bureaucracy as a means to control the country, Doxiadis saw it as a means to control the city. Doxiadis declared that the city of the future must include ‘all social, all income groups and all types of functions’ (Doxiadis Associates 1960b: 108). However, he embraced the views of the Federal Capital Commission, arguing:
the influence of the diverse in origin and cosmopolitan population of Karachi on government administration would be eliminated, if the Capital were to be a capital only without non-official civilian population located in it and pulling it in different directions... The capital should be in a place where the business community does not come into contact with administration on a social level (Doxiadis Associates 1960b: 54).

While Doxiadis proclaimed that Islamabad was to be created without any commitments to the past, the development of the Islamabad/Rawalpindi metropolitan complex lay in the tradition of British colonial city-building. The political programme of the bureaucratic–military government and the spatial organisation of the new metropolitan complex paralleled the British colonial government’s political objectives and the spatial orders through which it attempted to realise them. The division of the Rawalpindi/Islamabad metropolitan complex into areas for the bureaucracy, military and ‘non-official civilian population’ was a perfect spatial expression of the new regime’s vision of the polity. The absence of a spatialised racial division is certainly significant. However, this tripartite organisation is best understood in the context of pre-existing colonial patterns of bureaucratic and military control and urban configuration, well-exemplified by Rawalpindi itself.

Located on the roads linking the Khyber Pass and the Kashmir Valley with the cities of Lahore and Delhi, Rawalpindi was for centuries a minor trading city and district administrative centre under the successive regimes of the Mughals, Sikhs and British. It took its current form, though on a much smaller scale, after 1880 when the British selected the site as a military centre for the forces defending the northern ‘frontier’ of the empire. In the tradition of British colonial city-building (King 1976), spacious areas for civilian authorities (‘civil lines’) and military forces (‘cantonment’) were added to the densely settled area of the indigenous city.

Indian enclaves in civil station, the civilian governmental and residential areas, had many of the elements of the indigenous city itself. These neighbourhoods filled in the areas between civil lines/indigenous city. The civil lines of Rawalpindi, like that of Lahore as described by Glover, ‘never attained the grid-like, tree-lined, bungalow-dotted clarity’ often described for civil lines (Glover 2000). This blurring of the indigenous city and civil lines was greatly accelerated by the arrival of immigrants following partition, which brought the city to a population of 311,000 by 1960 (Ahmed 1960).
It was precisely this gradual intermixing that Doxiadis sought to prevent through his plan for the region. In line with his science of Ekistics, Doxiadis, unlike more conventional modernists, insisted that planners needed to understand local conditions to plan effectively. Through careful studies of Rawalpindi and the surrounding rural areas he came to understand at least the physical structures of dwellings and some of the environmental factors that contributed to them. However, he little comprehended the socio-cultural dimensions of urban environments of the region. While fond of the humble adequacy of rural Punjab houses (he did not examine villages as wholes), Doxiadis’s superficial study of urban areas only increased his revulsion for them. Like most planners, he disliked the haphazard development of Rawalpindi, the lack of distinction among transportation arteries, the intermixing of functions, the congestion and the lack of simple overall unity apparent from maps (Doxiadis Associates 1960a).

Doxiadis bluntly argued that ‘Rawalpindi should not have any role [in the capital]. It should remain the regional center…[and] the servicing center of the capital’ (Doxiadis Associates 1960b: 244). Doxiadis wrote, ‘a green belt is provided between Islamabad and Rawalpindi in order to form a physical barrier between them’ (Doxiadis Associates 1960a: 54). Initial plans even provided for a wide military zone running parallel to the industrial zone, highway, and green belt, but this was eliminated in later plans. This division loudly echoed that between New Delhi and Old Delhi and similar divisions in many other colonial cities, which represented the relation of the imperial government to its subject population and functioned to insure or reinforce the social division between rulers and ruled. There was, however, one major difference: New Delhi’s hexagonal Beaux-Arts plan was a complete whole — a symbol of imperial order and permanence, even stasis — and no provision was made for the city’s expansion or articulation with peripheral growth. By the 1950s, however, large-scale urbanisation made the management of expansion a major priority of urban planning throughout South Asia (Hull n.d.). Doxiadis planned for growth. His plan provided for the parallel, unidirectional expansion of Islamabad and Rawalpindi to insure that they would never grow together and that concentric growth would not choke the ‘centre’ of Islamabad. This programme has succeeded in keeping the two cities at a distance. The main link between Islamabad and Rawalpindi, Islamabad Highway, is a divided (normatively) four-lane road. This road is referenced in the quip frequently repeated by the car-driving
classes: ‘Islamabad is five minutes from Pakistan.’ Poorer residents, often relegated to slower modes of intercity transport such as buses and minivans, more commonly joke that ‘Islamabad is ten minutes from Pakistan’.5

In Doxiadis’s vision, the nucleus of Islamabad would remain serene, secure, and static while the city expanded indefinitely, eventually to be absorbed by what he called an ‘ecumenopolis’ (Doxiadis 1961), an urban blur smeared from Brussels to Beijing. For this reason, the limited set of alphabetic designations was assigned to the south-east axis, while the north-east to south-west axis of expansion was given the unlimited set of numerical designations. The grid of the Federal Capital Area, approximately 3,626 square kms annexed from the border areas of the Punjab and the North West Frontier Provinces, surrounds Rawalpindi on three sides, much as the British cantonment surrounded the indigenous city.6

The monumental ‘national administrative’ area was sited at the highest point of Islamabad, against the Margalla Hills, at the origin point of the city’s ray of extension. The President’s House, sometimes called the Presidential Palace in early newspapers, was placed on a small hill at the focal point of the main axis of Islamabad, a large avenue officially named with the honorific form of reference for Jinnah, the Khayaban-i-Quaid-i-Azam (Avenue of the Great Leader), but is commonly called simply ‘Jinnah Avenue’.7 For most of Ayub Khan’s tenure, little more than a yellow flag topped this hill. The President’s House was completed only in the late 1960s and Ayub Khan himself never occupied it, preferring to remain in Rawalpindi before moving into an undistinguished house in the elite residential area near the administrative area.8 The Federal Secretariat and the National Assembly buildings were located directly in front of the President’s House, at a lower level.9

Doxiadis conceptualised Islamabad as a hierarchy of ‘communities’, from the smallest gathering of a few people to the city as a whole. In a rationalised form of the neighbourhood unit originally developed by American planners (Hull n.d.), each sector was functionally differentiated and subdivided into a five-level hierarchy. The principle of subdivision was division into four parts, in order to preserve the geometry of the square, though irregularities of terrain often impeded the realisation of this ideal order. The sector as a whole, a class V community, was to contain between 30,000 and 40,000 people. The sector was subdivided into four quadrants, class IV communities, to
house roughly 10,000 people. Three or four class III communities, with populations of around 2,500, were to make up each class IV community. Each class III community contained a number of class II communities, a block with a population of a hundred or more. The lowest level class I was to consist of a family or any gathering of two or more people (Doxiadis Associates 1964: 332). Doxiadis observed that geometrical orders, in particular that of the square, were prevalent in the architecture of the region from Mohenjo-Daro to the Lahore Fort (Doxiadis Associates 1961b: 139) — leaving aside the aberrant ‘old cities’ like Lahore and Rawalpindi. However, his real source was the rationalism of European modernist planning, striking in its simplicity.

Good architecture demands rationalism in the city plan and this rationalism in turn requires consistency in the conception of all spaces forming the city. The room, the smallest nucleus of a house must have straight walls and these must be at right angles to each other so that they can be connected with the other rooms, otherwise there is no house. The house and its plots should have straight walls at right angles to each other so that they can be connected with other houses and other plots. The plots as a whole form a block and the blocks, too, should have straight walls at right angles to each other so that they can be connected in a rational way to the other blocks. More blocks form a neighbourhood, more neighbourhoods form a city (Doxiadis Associates 1961b: 12).

Schools, markets, mosques, medical institutions and recreational facilities commensurate with their populations are focal in every level of community (Figure 15. 2). Thus, at the centre of a class V community is a post office, fire and police station, a large mosque, clothing and food markets, and so forth. A class III centre includes a primary school, a tea house and a few shops, and sometimes a small mosque. Streets are numbered as, of course, are houses. Doxiadis intended that each level of community be laid out so that its boundary could be seen from its centre and the whole of its area easily imaged. Each community was to be iconic of the whole. The size, location and quality of materials of every structure and street was planned so that it would be possible to see its replication and incorporation in a higher order (Doxiadis Associates 1961b: 18).11

This ordering of space was consistent with a simplifying, totalising, external perspective on the city (de Certeau 1984; Scott 1998), which could not grasp the mohallas of Rawalpindi. This spatial and functional
order was to be the foundation of the social order as well. The structure of a residential community is that its physical pattern should be in complete accord with the social organization of the human group which is to settle there’ (Doxiadis Associates 1961a: 6). The future inhabitants of residential sectors were conceptualised as a
population organised by the national bureaucratic hierarchy, rather than as groups formed around family, religion, tribe or ethnicity, regional affiliation, wealth — significant bases of social order in Pakistani society. Though few *mohallas* were homogeneous, these forms of sociality largely shaped settlement patterns of Rawalpindi’s *mohallas*. The social homogeneity of squatter settlements testifies to the continuing salience of such affiliations in the region. As Spaulding (1994) has shown in his study of ethnic Gujars in Islamabad, the bureaucratic process through which government housing and plots are distributed make it impossible for any group to establish itself in a particular area.

Continuing a British colonial practice, planners prescribed a hierarchy of lot sizes and house designs corresponding to residents’ salary level and position in the government bureaucracy (Nilsson 1973; King 1976). The initial Master Plan provided for the construction of eight types of government houses. The correlation of house types with income, however, is misleading. The *Socio-economic Survey of Rawalpindi*, hastily completed in 1960, gave the planners an impressive range of information on housing and income in urban Punjab. However, the income divisions employed in the plan were not derived from this study but from the salary scale corresponding to the rank hierarchy of Pakistan’s National Civil Service. Furthermore, government houses were to be allocated on the basis of the occupant’s government rank, not on income derived from any source. Note that the rank organisation even peeks through the income-based schedule — as the highest category of house, K, was to be allocated to ‘ministers’ not specified by income. Doxiadis’s criticism of variety within house types makes clear the status basis of the housing policy.

Civil servants who have more or less the same income and belong to the same class of civil service should be allocated to similar units. They should all be treated in a similar manner and on an equal basis as far as possible. Houses given, for example, to peons should all be of the same nature, of the same design and the same accommodation capacity. Otherwise, bad feelings would be created among civil servants belonging to one and the same class (Doxiadis Associates 1960b: 24).

Even by the mid-1960s, on Doxiadis’s recommendation, the direct reference to income found in early reports had been replaced by correlations with civil service rank. The rank hierarchy of the civil service
is now officially called the ‘Basic Pay Scale’ (BPS) — a financial designation that is somewhat misleading, since the more important role of the scale is status rather than income differentiation. ‘Grade’, the term for the rank of a government employee used in common conversation, better captures its social significance.

In general, higher rank houses and larger plots for private houses were distributed within the northern sectors, with particularly high status plots found in the easternmost zones near the administrative area. The F-series of sectors, on the whole, contains government and private houses that are much larger than those of G-series sectors. However, Doxiadis’s ‘neighborhood unit’ plans do provide for a degree of integration of income groups.

The neighbourhood unit was a notion developed in the US in the early twentieth century as a means to generate and represent the egalitarian and democratic community. In laying out the basic objectives of Islamabad, the Federal Capital Commission had proposed ‘to create neighborhoods that will foster a sense of belonging to a community and promote social cohesion’ (Federal Capital Commission 1960: 19). Drawing an implicit contrast between the modern, nationalist social divisions of government rank and the socially retrograde hierarchy of traditional Hindu India, the Federal Capital Commission feared a ‘caste system’ based on income groups (Federal Capital Commission 1960: 19). This goal limited slightly the Commission’s emphasis on the isolation of the bureaucracy. The plan for the new city, declared the Commission, would not ‘segregate completely for the distribution of incomes government servants from other groups’ (Federal Capital Commission 1960: 19, emphasis added).

Over the last four decades, housing for lower-income classes has continued to be built, but Doxiadis’s original plan for a gradually integrated city stretched no further than his designs for F-6 and G-6. Even F-7 contains few smaller plots and no government housing. As Kamal Pasha, a senior CDA planner observed, ‘Over the last 20 years there has been a complete separation of income groups.’ According to Pasha, mixed income projects simply cannot be pushed through nowadays. Why could it be done before? ‘Because,’ said Pasha puckishly, ‘the gorā [white] sahib had the clout’ to push it through. While the disappearance of this objective is clear, accounting for it is more difficult. Pasha’s explanation points to how much planning, conceived as the realisation of rational intention, is shaped by wider sociocultural trends.
While Doxiadis envisioned the generation of community life around clusters of facilities, several government corporations brought the ‘colony’ to Islamabad. This venerable South Asian socio-spatial form located the whole grade range of employees of a single government corporation or ‘autonomous body’ in a single area. As one interlocutor put it, in a colony ‘every person is the same’. There are more than a dozen government colonies in Islamabad of various sizes, including Telephone and Telegraph, CDA, State Bank and the Police. Occupational groups outside government also made claims for colonies. Paraphrasing the report of the Federal Capital Commission, the *Pakistan Times* wrote, ‘civil servants and their families will constitute 90 per cent of this population as 10 percent of it must, of necessity, be other than civil servants to support and provide services’ (25 May 1960). The claim to utility could be translated into a claim for plots. The declaration that Islamabad would provide housing for those outside of but serving the bureaucracy led to a spate of demands for plots on concessional rates from a wide variety of occupational groups, including imams, journalists, washermen, writers and even hairdressers. The colony, of course, bears a striking sociological resemblance to caste neighbourhoods common in South Asia, especially through the middle of the twentieth century (Hull n.d.), since in both cases occupation is central to group definition.

**The Informal Formal Government Housing Sector**

If the physical order of sectors and houses and common discourses about them suggest a thorough realisation of planned order, the occupancy of government housing complicates the picture. In fact, today the planned (and legally stipulated) correspondence between house type and the service rank of the occupants is rare; even rarer is the normative relation between real income and house type. While employees’ unions and neighbourhood associations have tried to change government housing policy, the divergences from the planned order of rank, income and housing have other sources — the bureaucratic separation of house allocation processes and hiring and promotion processes, the role of money and influence in the allocation process, the renting of government housing, the difficulty of evicting retired government servants and differential access to illegal remuneration.

The lack of co-ordination between housing allocation and hiring processes generates an increasing divergence between house type
and service over time. This divergence is greatest in G-6, the oldest sector, but is found in all sectors roughly in proportion to their age. Official and unofficial processes of hiring and promotion are quite variable and complex, but it can be said that they are handled by the government office in which a person is or will be employed. Allocation of housing is handled by a different office within the employee’s organisation or, in the case of federal ministries, by the Estate Office of the Ministry of Housing and Works. Allocation rules are designed to align these two different bureaucratic processes, but can rarely overcome the force of two offices acting independently.

Because of financial limitations, construction of government housing in Islamabad has not kept pace with the expansion of the government since the early 1980s, limiting mobility in the government housing sector. As a consequence, a large portion of government employees are living in houses of types far below that to which the allocation rules entitle them. For example, one resident of G-6, whom I will call Ahmed, has lived in a type A house for 12 years, although in this time he has moved from grade 4 to grade 15 and is now entitled to a type D house. He keeps requesting the Estate Office — the federal government office that handles allocation of units under control of the federal ministries — however, the housing shortage, his lack of connections (sifarish), and unwillingness (and perhaps inability) to pay bribes (rishvat) has made it impossible for him to move into the class of house to which he is entitled.

There are other reasons why the planned relation between the service ranks of occupants and the classification of their houses is rarely effected. While government servants are entitled to retain their quarters for six months after their retirement, few families ever leave. Responding to protests by neighbourhood groups over the last three decades, Pakistan presidents and heads of both leading political parties have promised to grant ownership rights to occupants of government houses in G-6, the oldest sector of the city. However, this has not occurred. Continuing occupancy is achieved by other means. If a son enters the government service before his father’s retirement, the allotment of the family quarter may be transferred to the son, provided the son is entitled to it by service rank — a requirement that is rarely enforced. In practice, if the father occupies a house commensurate with his service rank, the son, rarely having a rank equal to his father, lives in his father’s house — one of a higher classification than that to which he is entitled. Ironically, in cases of
a retiring father living below his entitlement who irregularly transfers his house to his son, these two factors combine to realise the planned relation between rank of the occupant and house classification. Statistics on transfers are not available, but good estimates suggest that in G-6/1, for example, since the departure of Bengalis in 1971, less than 10 per cent of the houses have been transferred to families other than those of the original occupants. Residents of this area refer to themselves as owners (maliks) of their houses rather than allottees or renters (karaedars). Most have modified the front purdah (seclusion) wall and interior layouts and have typically added two more rooms at the back of the large rear courtyard. Ahmed told me that he had waited for five or six years before estimating that he would remain in the house for another 15 years — which was when he began modifying and adding to it. While he vows that he will not try to retain the house for his children after his retirement — ‘They should go out and get something better’ — he recognises that they may have no alternative.

Money and influence also disturb the planned social organisation of government housing and thus also that of the city in general. By most accounts, nowadays all allocations are driven by some combination of rishvat (bribe) and sifarish (intercession) — even in the rare cases in which there are no irregularities and the rules are scrupulously followed. With the right amount of money and pull, government employees can be allocated houses of virtually any class. Allocation rules, while not determining assignation directly, function as a form of market regulation that, along with the supply of housing units, determines the illegal economy of rishvat and sifarish in the government housing sector.

Even if a housing unit is allocated according to service rank, the allottee’s family is often not the occupant, or the exclusive occupant. Since the 1980s, renting part or all of a government unit has increased dramatically. A large percentage of houses in G-6/1-1 have one or more rooms rented out — the estimates of residents I spoke with ranged from 60 per cent to 100 per cent. The prospect of a rental income is one reason many residents add rooms in the rear courtyard. Such rooms allow the families of renters and allottees to remain somewhat separate even while sharing a bath and a toilet. Male allottees living without their families — with no worries for the purdah of their wives — often rent out even the rooms of the original house to as many as five or six other men. This pattern is similar in other sectors,
although renting is somewhat less common because of the prevalence of apartments. The unavoidable threat to *purdah* in apartments usually prohibits all but men living without their families from renting rooms. Violations of allocation policies and rules against renting had become so common by the early 1990s that guidelines for the recruitment of private individuals to expose these irregularities were incorporated into the 1993 Allocation Rules.  

Even when rank matches house, the wealth of the occupants of the same class of house differs widely. Illegal financial opportunities vary greatly among different government divisions. Government employees drawing the same salary may earn vastly different amounts from their service. As an example of this, one resident of G-6 pointed to some A-type houses in G-6/1-2 and said their occupants, policemen, were much wealthier than the occupants of their B-house neighbours, who live on their government salaries. The police service is an especially lucrative area of government. According to him and others, these policemen own other private houses in Islamabad that they rent out. They live in government quarters only to avoid uncomfortable questions from the Revenue department concerning the source of funds they used to buy their houses.

While quarters are legally a facility of a post, government servants appropriate them. Most occupants have invested substantial resources into modification of their government dwellings. Residents in the oldest government sector, G-6, have been agitating for decades to have what they see as their customary rights to their quarters confirmed through the grant of legal ownership. While they have not been successful, several prime ministers have pledged to do it. Though legal ownership has not been granted, individual and family rights to their quarters — irrespective of government service — are recognised in both the legally sanctioned and the informal aspects of the allocation process. The ‘Out of Turn Allotment’ (OOTA), a rationalisation in both the Weberian and moral senses of the term, has been codified in the allocation rules in order to regularise the ad hoc allocation of quarters to those who are not entitled to them according to service qualifications.

The OOTA provision is in fact one of the few provisions of the elaborate allocation rules that is regularly used. Most of the other rules rarely come into play because the CDA office that allocates housing does not have comprehensive documentation of the units under their authority. Information on each unit is contained in a file of its own.
This system is not the result of incompetence; rather, it is well-suited to serve the networks of government employees and their friends and relations. In practice, allocation of housing units runs entirely on the local knowledge of bureaucratic functionaries and neighbours who come to know of a retirement, transfer or illegal sublet.

In what we might call friendly takeovers, individuals wanting a quarter approach its current occupant. In recognition of the occupant’s right to the house, they pay him or her Rs 2,000–10,000 to move out and let them take possession (qabza). Only after settling in does the new occupant submit a letter to the government stating that he has taken possession of the quarter and petition to have it officially allotted to him. Possession is nine-tenths of the allocation so such petitions are usually accepted. The allocation office, therefore, acts more like a registrar of market transfers than an agent of those transfers in accordance with the allocation rules.

Hostile takeovers take place when an individual comes to know that the allottee of a quarter either has illegally sublet it or is no longer eligible to keep it after retiring. In yet another example of the explicit codification of a practice originating outside the organisation, rules provide that the first party to bring violation to the notice of the authorities may claim the quarter. Printed forms to be completed by a claimant are available in government offices. Such claims are common but they are not often successful. Retiring officers, whose ineligibility is easily verifiable, usually negotiate with a new occupant before being forced out. Subletting is difficult to prove. The CDA officer in charge of investigating such charges told me that if his investigators ask about the clothes and other furnishing in the quarter, the allottee will simply claim they are his. If the sublettors are present, the allottee will say they are his friends and are staying free of rent. Inquiries from neighbours are of not much help either — they usually lie to protect their neighbour, especially since they themselves often sublet a portion of their quarter. However, in most cases, the officer told me, the allottee learns well in advance that an investigation is imminent and thus expects the arrival of the inspectors. This observation was borne out by the experience of a friend who was occupying a quarter allocated to an uncle of his. He and his family were summarily hustled out of the quarter when the uncle caught wind of someone having filed a claim against him. Even when such claims against illegal occupation are successful, the claimant usually ends up paying a substantial
Technical Planning and Sectarian Conflict

The history of mosque construction and allocation in Islamabad illuminates the complex role that Pakistan state institutions play in the sectarian politics that appear to be outside the state sphere. Through involvement with mosque building in the city, the state established a new arena of competition and conflict among Islamic sects. Court cases and energetic public protests have led to the ad hoc authorisation of a few mosques but have not reshaped government policy on mosques. Unable to control this arena, Islamabad bureaucracies have clung to long-standing policies — which have effectively left the mosque allocation process in the hands of sectarian groups.

Planners envisioned the population of the city as differentiated only by age, gender, income or rank. Mosques, like schools and markets, were planned based on population projections and on the catchment area — the area from which the mosque would draw namazis (worshippers). Planners in the early 1960s projected that 10 per cent of the residents of an area would attend Friday prayers and they should be expected to walk no more than about one-fourth of a mile in 10–12 minutes. Class A mosques, located at the centre of sub-sub-sectors, were to accommodate 100 namazis; class B, focal in the subsector, were to have space enough for 200–250 namazis; class C, at the centre of the sector, were to be spacious enough for around 1,000 namazis.

During this period, many people claimed that Islam was the ‘ideology’ of Pakistan. Put simply, the claim was that the nation of Pakistan — with its separate West and East wings — was not grounded in a language, region or culture — none of which were shared by any majority of citizens of the new state. Rather, Pakistan was defined by a religion — a distinction many Pakistanis grudgingly admitted to me it shares with Israel. However, it was less ideology than functionality that underlay the government commitment to the provision of mosques. Officials saw Islamabad not as an Islamic city but as a city populated by Muslims. Implicit in the official technical treatment of mosques was an ecumenical vision of Islam as a uniform ‘religion’, all of whose followers could be served by the same institutional facilities, much as all the residents of a locality could be served by the same schools, fruit markets and tailors’ shops.
The planned metropolitan region had over 54,000 inhabitants spread over more than 50 villages. Shrines anchored by the grave of a saint were left untouched. But like the cemeteries, most of the village mosques were demolished. However, those that were compatible with the new development plans were left intact, eventually becoming designated ‘old mosques’ in CDA parlance.

From the early 1960s through the end of the 1970s, the CDA built new mosques. It turned them over to ‘mosque committees’ — made up of local residents — who then assumed responsibility for funding and appointing the mosque staff. The CDA originally planned to construct all the mosques in the city. Instead, from the 1970s, demand for mosques outpaced the ability of the CDA to provide them. Though the CDA continued to determine the location of mosques, they were often funded and constructed by mosque committees made up of local residents. The CDA described such mosques as ‘private construction’, built on a ‘self-help basis’. By 1980, only one-third of approximately 70 mosques in the developed sectors of the city had been constructed by the CDA.

Records and the testimony of residents and long-time CDA officials show that up to this point there was rarely any controversy surrounding the allocation of mosques or mosque sites to committees. Residents never petitioned the CDA for a mosque in sectarian terms — as members of one or another Islamic sect. Instead, petitioners to the CDA often identified themselves simply as officers of a locality-based association. For example, one petition was submitted by the president and general secretary of ‘The Welfare Committee of Sector G-6/4-1’. As the name suggests, this association handled other neighbourhood issues as well.

The construction-oriented CDA maintained no records on the sectarian affiliation of mosques, reflecting its lack of open concern for such matters. By 1980, the CDA had constructed 22 mosques that came to be affiliated with the four major Islamic maslaks or sects prevalent in the region. Among the Sunni sects, 11 became affiliated with the Berelvi sect, nine with the Deobandis, and one with the Ahl-e-Hadith. One mosque became Shiah. There may have been informal understandings in official circles as to the eventual sectarian affiliation of these mosques. However, the sectarian affiliation of a mosque, insofar as it was seen to have one in this period, came mainly through the mosque committee’s appointment of a khatib (the official who leads Friday prayers and delivers the sermon) and muezzin (the official who gives the call to prayer) of a particular sect.
This planning and ad hoc allocation process began to breakdown in the late 1970s with the complementary growth of sectarian politics and the state’s Islamisation programmes. Zulfikhar Ali Bhutto renewed Islamisation in the final years of his government as a way to bolster his increasingly unpopular rule Zia ul-Haq, who came to power with the support of sections of the ulama (or Islamic scholars), expanded Bhutto’s Islamisation campaign with the ostensible goal of bringing society and the state in line with sharia. As Jamal Malik (1996) has forcefully argued, however, Islamisation in Pakistan is better understood as two complementary processes aimed at legitimising state regimes: the traditionalisation — in an Islamic idiom — of state structures derived from colonialism; and the integration of relatively autonomous Islamic institutions into the state apparatus. Thus, on the one hand, federally administered zakat (alms for the poor) and ushr (agricultural tithe) systems traditionalised economic extraction by the state. On the other, the regulation of Islamic education and nationalisation of shrines and waqfs or Islamic endowments integrated these institutions into the state.

On the local scale of Islamabad, Zia’s Islamisation programme targeted mosques as a response to the increasingly acrimonious conflicts over the sectarian allocation of mosque sites. In 1979 Islamabad was made a district and given its own administration under the Ministry of Interior. Through a 1981 Presidential Directive, all the mosques of the city were nationalised and placed under the authority of the Auqaf (or Islamic Endowments) Directorate of the new Islamabad administration. The Auqaf Directorate assumed operational control and financial responsibility for the mosques and all mosque staff became state employees.

Many candidates for mosque posts welcomed the opportunity for state employment and the residents were happy to have the government assume financial responsibility for mosques. However, the ulama, bureaucrats and residents understood that the nationalisation of Islamabad mosques was not an effort to Islamise the state but a means to statise Islamic institutions. The measure enabled the government to control mosque activities by appointing what one internal Auqaf report called ‘non-controversial imams’ and by restricting the content of their sermons through the direct threat of official transfer. According to the Auqaf Directorate policy, mosque committees of ‘local residents’ were maintained in order to ‘provide participation’ and were ‘entrusted with looking after the day-to-day affairs of
the mosque and creating a spirit of unanimity and natural cohesion amongst the community'.

While the policies of the CDA and Auqaf were thus different, they each saw Islam as homogeneous. On the one side, the technical policies of the CDA treated Islam in terms of socio-spatial needs. On the other, the Auqaf Directorate’s Islamisation policies reduced Islam to a uniform ideology and institution of socio-political cohesion. Both of these homogenising approaches failed in their encounter with the heterogeneity of Islam in Pakistan.

From the late 1970s, without authorisation from the CDA, competing sects erected numerous mosques on open land throughout the developed sectors of the city, particularly near markets, on parks and interstitial green spaces — such as the banks of seasonally flowing streams (nala). The CDA initially treated these mosques like any other illegal construction and destroyed them. While sects built their own illegal mosques, they used the CDA to destroy the illegal mosques of their rivals. Sometimes groups building mosques illegally even petitioned the CDA to protect them from another group that was trying to take them over.

The CDA’s demolition ‘solution’ to the mushrooming of illegal mosques was reviewed by the Federal Shariat Court in 1984. The Shariat Courts are ambiguously parallel to the secular judiciary and handle what are seen as Islamic issues. In a 1981 public education campaign, the CDA declared: ‘building house of God on earth is certainly a blessed act, but at the same time no one could be allowed to ignore principles of Shariat and Islamic orders. The sanctity of the ‘Khana-i-Khuda [house of God] is violated by constructing mosques in unsuitable places’ (Pakistan Times, 31 August 1981). While the Federal Shariat Court ruled on religious grounds that mosques should not be built on land without permission of the owner, the thrust of the ruling went the other way. The Court all but invalidated mosque demolitions, declaring, in the summary words of one Auqaf official, ‘once a mosque always a mosque’.

This Shariat Court ruling was reaffirmed in 1986 by the judgment of the Council for Islamic Ideology — a state advisory body on Islamic affairs. While there are passing references to the ‘sanctity’ of mosques, the basis of the judgment was the secular legal principle of adverse possession: title to real property is acquired by some kind of continuous possession for a specified period of time. Noting that a mosque takes months to build, the Council found that a mosque
must be considered to have been built with the tacit acceptance of government bodies charged with controlling illegal construction.

An official of the Islamic Ideology Council explained to me that in light of this ruling, every existent mosque is legal. He cited a colonial precedent from 1930s Lahore where before a British magistrate was to inspect a disputed site — in advance of the final stages of legal proceedings — Muslims worked fervently through the night to construct a room complete with a roof. On inspecting the site the next day, the magistrate found a complete mosque and ruled in favour of the Muslims saying that ‘it would not be expedient to demolish the mosque’. The official also told me that the principle of adverse possession applies not only to mosques but to prayer itself. If it is permitted to say one’s prayers at a site for some time, then the site is irreversible dedicated to prayer. ‘If an owner sees people praying but does not stop them, he cannot stop them later’.

However, the Council made a much more expansive claim focusing on the religious needs of Pakistanis.

The Pakistani public cannot be convinced that some road or park or market etc. is more necessary than the mosque. The plan of any road, park, or market can be changed on account of a constructed mosque and there will be no objection from the public as a whole...For religious demands and considerations and in view of public enthusiasm all those mosques should be considered legal that have been built up to now on government lands.

The CDA position was also complicated by the state recognition of four maslaks or sects (Deobandi, Berelwi, Ahl-e-Hadith, Shia) in educational Islamisation initiatives. Officials saw this recognition of four maslaks as a way of limiting claims by other groups and sub-factions. Following this recognition, the Auqaf Directorate quietly acknowledged the claims of the four maslaks for mosques of their own in every locality. The CDA continued to reject out of hand petitions for regionally-based mosques — for example, one by a Baltistani religious leader. However, officials found it increasingly difficult to sustain their policy that a single mosque could serve all the residents of a locality. In recognition of the need to coordinate CDA planning and Auqaf sectarian allocation policies, the ‘Special Mosque Committee’ was formed in 1981, consisting of representatives of the CDA and Auqaf and chaired by the Secretary of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. According to a report prepared for the committee in the 1980s, the aim
of this committee was to ‘meet the sectoral/sectarian balance necessary to maintain peace’.

‘Sectoral/Sectarian’ balance was conceived of in terms of the relative number of mosques of each sect in a given area — independent of the sectarian orientation of the population. Neither the CDA nor Auqaf had ever gathered controversial statistics on the maslaks of residents on the basis of which they could make a decision on the sectarian allocation of a mosque. In any case, identifications with maslaks are often diffuse or non-existent. Many residents do not know the maslak of the mosque they regularly attend, beyond whether it is Shia or Sunni. In considering every petition for permission to establish a mosque, the committee received reports on the provision of mosques and sectarian tensions in the neighbourhood from the Senior Superintendent of Police. The overriding objective of the committee was to avoid violence among groups, or, in bureaucratic parlance, a ‘law and order situation’.

For several years the committee managed to keep the peace, but its decisions became largely irrelevant as sectarian groups increasingly occupied sites and then sought regularisation. As one CDA official observed, ‘There has been practically no involvement of the committee in mosque allocation since the early 1980s. After that it was mainly qabza [possession]. It is first come first serve, a fight on the ground’. The regularisation process itself has been regularised.

Many CDA officials consider the groups that occupy mosque sites just another kind of so-called ‘qabza group’. Qabza groups are land mafias that take control of public and private land in urban Pakistan through threats of force and payoffs to government officials. The director of Urban Planning summarised a view common among more senior CDA officials. He told me that this mosque-building is nothing more than a method of grabbing land. Noting how high the land values are in the areas of the illegal mosques then said ‘The mosque provides a residence and food for the imam. Sometimes there is a school too, filled with poor students, usually from the north, whose parents are happy to get rid of a son. Maybe he teaches them a little about the Quran too!’ He described how he had once gone to a school and the students were washing the clothes of the imam and his family. He chuckled as he observed that the government then pays them money for the school, pays them to squat. Worse, he said, they are ‘using religion for politics, they incite the people in the name of religion. There is no difference, no strong difference among
the sects in Islamabad, people don’t care much, it is the qabza group who promotes it’. He cited the Shariat Court ruling but argued that no one cares about this law: ‘the mosques, which are supposed be the most disciplined, following religious rules, but instead they are the worst violators, look any place…and you will see that the buildings jutting out are all mosques’.

While rival sectarian claimants to a site have occasionally clashed violently, they more often take possession of a site by praying there conspicuously five times daily. The petitions of groups requesting allocation of a site always include a history of regular prayer. One resident of F-6/1 described to me his own failing efforts to keep his neighbourhood free of another mosque. One day he saw seven or eight men spread out reed mats and begin to say prayers on an open area behind his house. He interrupted them and asked them why they are saying namaz here when there is a mosque nearby. They apologised for disturbing him and the next week returned to a spot 50 yards away. When he again questioned them they moved another 25 yards away. ‘What can one say to them?’ he exclaimed, laughing, ‘They are not breaking the law, not doing anything wrong, not challenging your authority’. Now for seven or eight years later, they are ‘publicly recognised to have been saying their namaz there for years’. They have cleared and levelled the spot, and there is a little rim of bricks. He sighed when he told me it is just a matter of time until they build a whole mosque.

In new sectors, planning maps have played a direct role in shaping sectarian conflict. Both sectarian representatives and the government are trying to wrest control of mosques from local neighbourhood networks. In order to avoid clashes between sectarian groups, a 1983 Auqaf report recommended that the government build mosques in new sectors and appoint imams before the habitation of the area. While the government has never managed to do this, sectarian groups have successfully embraced this practice. Planning maps showing the future development of sectors — including the location of mosques — have played a major role in this process. Ironically, planning has facilitated the qabza operations of sectarian groups. Groups obtain confidential planning maps from CDA officials who support their sect or mosque-building in general. With the map in hand they use surveyors to determine the planned location of mosque sites in empty fields of undeveloped sectors, erect shacks with generator-powered loudspeakers and begin to establish a record of regular prayer.
They literally honour the plans in the breach — they squat according to plan. Built on sites planned for mosques, but lacking official approval, these mosques are designated in CDA discourse as ‘unauthorised planned mosques’ until they are regularised by the Special Mosque Committee, when they become ‘authorised planned mosques’.

The maps have enabled a separation between the processes of residential settlement and mosque building. There are often very high-level people — secretaries, federal ministers, even foreign ambassadors — involved in pressuring the CDA to regularise illegal mosques. As one CDA official put it to me, ‘The sectarian representatives stay in the background. They are often just fighting for allocation. Sometimes after allocation, the group becomes silent, no one builds the mosque, beggars sleep there and say their prayers’. A dispute over a mosque in I-8 eventually resulted in a gun fight. The ensuing investigation found that all the disputants were from outside the neighbourhood.

In the western sectors of Islamabad, political and bureaucratic networks rather than neighbourhood social dynamics now shape the construction and affiliation of mosques. The Auqaf Directorate’s main role today is to ascertain which group first began to pray on a site rather than determine allocation with a view toward sectarian balance. For its part, the CDA, according to one town planner, clings to its policy of ‘no discrimination’ among maslaks. ‘We examine such issues only from a technical point of view, catchment, capacity of mosque…we will not add (a mosque) to satisfy another sect’. Without retreating from a resolutely technical policy, in the mid-1980s the CDA was able to incorporate sectarian claims into the Master Plan by raising the projected percentage of namazis in a population from 10 per cent to 20 per cent, thus doubling the number of mosques planned for the city. Under pressure from rival sectarian groups, the CDA and Auqaf sometimes duck responsibility by passing cases back and forth: the CDA requests the Auqaf to make the decision based on sectarian allocation policy; the Auqaf requests the CDA to make the decision based on technical criteria.

Illegal mosque construction and sectarian conflict over the control of existing mosques are not unique to Islamabad (Khan this volume). However, the statising and graphic representation of mosques in Islamabad literally constitute sites of sectarian conflict — bringing the politics of sectarian conflict much more within the bureaucratic arena than elsewhere in less regulated urban areas of Pakistan.
Bushes and Grass

Virtually every aspect of planning and regulation in Islamabad has incorporated aspects of the process they aim to control. The trade in the blueprints of private houses is yet another example. Most houses in the urban region through the 1960s were built by contractors who worked from rough sketches and the regular input of owners. In contrast, Islamabad building codes required that plans drawn up by a licensed architect be submitted to the CDA. One goal of this code was to compel compliance with regulations; another objective was to insure the uniqueness of each house. Ironically, the CDA architecture record store room has provided a supply of readymade plans for reproduction. At the prompting of clients who have admired a particular house, architects buy these blueprints from CDA staff in control of the record room for Rs 500–1,000, change the names on them, and sell them to clients for Rs 7,000–10,000. There are now at least nine reproductions of one large, white, pillared house placed on prominent road which was featured in a popular television serial drama as the residence of a very rich family. (Architects told me people would often come in and tell them they want to live in a ‘White House’ or a ‘house like Bill Clinton’s’). This trade in blueprints is such a common practice that in conversation with me, one architect marked it as a point of pride that his firm usually designs houses from scratch. One rough measure of the scale of traffic in house plans is provided by statistics compiled by an officer in the architecture directorate showing that an architectural firm with just one architect produced 396 plans in 1997.

The stalled western expansion of the city is the most dramatic result of the inescapable entanglement of the bureaucracy with the world beyond its offices. Doxiadis’s vision of unhindered expansion has gone no further than the 11-series of sectors. The CDA has been unable to take possession of the land in the west because the villagers have rejected the compensation packages on offer — which are based on 1958 land values adjusted for inflation, a tiny fraction of the value of the land today. Initially, under martial law regulations and the CDA Ordinance, villagers opposed to expropriation or to the specific compensation award had neither political nor legal recourse. In the 1970s, the populist government of Zulfikhar Ali Bhutto allowed the courts to hear petitions challenging the compensation policy, but the villagers lost in every case. Decades of public protests and
sympathetic press coverage, particularly in Urdu publications, have also failed to change CDA compensation policy.

Stifled in the political and legal domains, the large number of villagers who staffed the lowest rungs of the CDA brought the conflict into the heart of bureaucratic process. In collusion with CDA officials, they fabricated documents, specifically a large number of false but authorised lists, demolition certificates, and review orders. These documents fantastically magnified the number of claims for compensation for built structures and earned the villagers (and their colleagues in the CDA) many times more than what they would have received legally. These fraud schemes have turned the most basic bureaucratic technologies against the bureaucracy itself. A CDA director told me that in 1997, 95 per cent of the normatively confidential files dealing with these cases were literally in the hands of the villagers and their associates who controlled how they were used. The CDA has often found itself in court attempting to disavow its own records. A report on the situation in 1993 recommended that the remaining false claims should be paid immediately as attempts to dispute them through audits of the lists simply added to the number of claimants. ‘No fresh lists,’ the report warned.

While the fraud became public knowledge in 2000, the military government has been no more successful in resolving it. But there is increasingly less at stake in doing so. In 1993, recognising the difficulty of resolving the dispute, the CDA gave up its struggle to acquire nearly a third of the territory slated for government development. This land has been zoned for development by private corporations and housing societies. But private developers are facing many of the same problems while trying to acquire land. Building in this area is mostly proceeding plot by plot — much as it would in Rawalpindi or any other Pakistan city — generating the ‘organic’ growth Islamabad was to transcend. The future lanes and streets of this area will almost certainly follow the banks and footpaths that have divided the agricultural fields of the region for centuries.

It is important not to overstate the extent to which the sorts of practices I have described have undermined the Master Plan and the institutional operations of the CDA. Through the 11-series of sectors, the main elements of Doxiadis’s vision have been realised. The CDA employs thousands and — along with the Islamabad Capital Territory Administration under the Interior Ministry — controls the majority of municipal regulation, despite sporadic calls for a representative government for the city. However, the transformation of government
housing allocation into an informal process, the return of mosques to the play of sectarian politics within the bureaucracy and especially, the astonishing halt to planned development in the west show that the making of the city has been transformed by socio-political processes that the plan aimed to exclude. Crucially, these processes engage the bureaucracy at every point. The plan succeeded in confining political participation to the bureaucratic arena itself rather than provoking successful opposition to it through the mechanisms of civil society — representative institutions, interest groups and the press. And yet, over its four-decade history, the city did not separate the bureaucracy from society but rather drew that society within the bureaucracy itself. The more the bureaucracy tried to dominate the wider socio-cultural terrain, the more it began to resemble that terrain. Bureaucratic institutions, as they plunge into socio-cultural processes formerly organised by different principles and means, are inevitably transformed through that engagement. Institutions of civil society in Pakistan are much more vibrant and influential than the history of military rule might suggest. However, the attempt of state bureaucracies to dominate the order of the Islamabad and the complementary marginalisation of civil society politics cast in sharp relief modes of participation in government that are also found elsewhere in Pakistan.

On a hill to the south of the city is Shakarparian, a garden overlook named for the village that once occupied the site, acquired in the early, less complicated years of Islamabad. The focus of the garden is a large map of the Islamabad region, a garden gridded by poured concrete lines. The closely cropped grass in sector squares iconically figures Islamabad as a giant, well-ordered garden. In contrast, Rawalpindi, the older city to the south, is represented by an unruly mass of unclipped bushes covering an irregular area in the midst of the grid. Perhaps CDA gardeners might one day pull up many of the map garden’s concrete lines and plant bushes, which are much heartier than grass.

Notes

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1. Doxiadis had proved himself to the new regime by quickly completing Korangi, a housing development in Karachi for the resettlement of 75,000 refugees.

2. As many have observed, there are continuities between this colonial tradition and the city-building activities of the Mughals, exemplified by Delhi, Agra, and Fatehpur Sikri. However, there are significant differences. Important cities such as Karachi, Bombay, Calcutta and Madras developed from trading settlements, but the British more often developed settlements outside existing cities upon which they depended (King 1976).

3. Glover observes about Lahore that ‘each of these three distinct zones would include elements (both human and non-human) of the other two in their midst, a fact often overlooked in studies of colonial urbanism’ (1999: 83). This was even more the case in Rawalpindi, where the areas allocated to the civil lines and cantonment virtually surrounded the indigenous city to the south, east and west.

4. One senior planner told me that, having conducted systematic studies, Doxiadis was better informed about traditional rural and urban architecture than today’s planners.

5. Auto rickshaws, ubiquitous in Rawalpindi, are banned from this road, as from the rest of Islamabad, but tongas (horse carts) in the break-down lane, and bicycles, often precariously balancing large loads, are common. On this road one afternoon, my car was sideswiped by an air conditioner that escaped the control of its unfortunate bicycle transporter.

6. While publicity focused on plans for the civilian population of Islamabad, as Spaulding points out (1994: 193), the army was the quiet recipient of the largest amount of land allocated to any single institution or to any single function, save that of civilian residence.

7. For one such reference to the ‘Presidential Palace’, see ‘Construction of Islamabad/Work to start in about 2 months’ (Pakistan Times, 8 August 1960).

8. In the mid-1990s, Ayub’s house was unceremoniously razed for the construction of a new house by the wealthy owner of a major hotel, in what several observers described to me as a gesture of arrogance.

9. As one senior CDA official put it, ‘The president is on the hill and the parliament is under his feet’. According to this official, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto deployed the same height symbolism when he later insisted that a new prime minister’s residence be higher than the President’s House, ‘so you see it is on a higher hill’ to the north of the President’s House.

10. The hierarchy of communities also corresponded to modes of transportation: ‘Dynapolis is not built for man only. In it we are going to have a cohabitation of man and machines, of cars, trains, airplanes and helicopters and maybe rockets. And beyond rockets, what? It is too early to predict what class of community is to have a rocket launching base…’ (Doxiadis Associates 1960b: 136).

11. Doxiadis’s reports try to accomplish this same feat on paper. Even reports devoted to the smallest element of the plan, for example house designs, include a series of maps showing the series of communities in which the element is to be located.
12. More specifically, American planners, closely tied to social workers, reformers and pragmatist philosophers, developed the neighborhood unit as a physical container and, more important, a template for the imagination of the social interconnectedness made invisible by ethnic difference and complex division of labor of the urbanising American society (Hull n.d.).

13. Bengali government servants left Karachi and Islamabad in the midst of the 1971 war that resulted in the secession of East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh.

14. While economically necessary, these rental arrangements provoke great anxieties concerning the ‘honor’ (izzat) of the female occupants — especially in men. ‘The man is very anxious’ (mard bahot fikrmand he), one resident told me. Many consider it a moral (iqlaqi) and social (masluratti) problem, and dishonorable (besti). Extra-marital sexual relations are rumored to be relatively common.


16. ibid.

17. While the city has had a substantial Christian population since its beginning, no churches have ever been planned by the CDA. Attempts to construct them have generated virulent protest.

18. In scholarly discourse, maslak refers to a ‘path’ within Sunni Islam rather than an independent sect. However, in the Pakistan government arena, maslak is used interchangeably with ‘sect’ to indicate a recognised subdivision of Islam, three Sunni (Ahl-e-Hadith, Deobandi, Berelvi) and the Shia as a whole. I follow this usage rather than the scholarly one.

19. I was told that the Islamabad administration has someone in the audience of every Friday sermon to monitor its content.

20. This and other un-attributed quotations come from ‘active’ files, written on by current officers and staff members of the CDA and Islamabad Capital Territory Administration. While I have full documentation of the writers, dates and official file numbers of the files I quote, I have not included this information in the references for two reasons. First, publishing reference information might expose the writers or those who kindly gave me access to the files to potential charges of wrongdoing as their actions or writings are recontextualised in a public forum. Second, while the lack of identification of these sources may lessen the scholarly authority of my account, such identification would in any case not serve the usual function of providing others with the possibility of evaluating my work in light of the actual sources.

21. While English language press described these events as ‘demolitions’ of ‘illegal’ mosques, Urdu coverage usually critically reported that the CDA ‘martyred’ (shahid kya) a mosque.