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PRECOLONIALITY AND COLONIAL SUBJECTIVITY: ETHNOGRAPHIC DISCOURSE AND NATIVE POLICY IN GERMAN OVERSEAS IMPERIALISM, 1780s–1914

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ABSTRACT

How can we understand the colonial state? Specifically, what explains variation in “native policy,” the cornerstone of colonial rule? This article examines the development of German colonialism in Southwest Africa (with respect to the Hereros, Witboois, and Rehoboth Basters), Samoa, and Qingdao, China. I emphasize five main determinants of policy: (1) precolonial ethnographic representations; (2) colonial officials’ competitive jockeying with one another for cultural distinction; (3) colonial officials’ psychic processes of imaginary identification with the colonized; (4) practices of collaboration and resistance by the colonized; and (5) the structure of the colonial state as a determinant of its own policies.

INTRODUCTION

The colonial state . . . is something we need to know a great deal more about (Rabinow, 1986, p. 259).
This article begins with a puzzle: How can we make sense of the dramatically differing forms of native policy\(^1\) that were pursued in Imperial Germany’s overseas colonies? This historical question points to a broader set of theoretical problems within colonial studies. Sociological theories of colonialism would typically attribute such policy differences to the economic and political interests of the colonizers or to features of the colony itself, such as patterns of collaboration and resistance, natural resources, and environmental factors. This literature has been less interested in the role of cultural discourses in the formation of the colonial state. Indeed, such avoidance of the role of culture is characteristic of social science research on the state more generally (Steinmetz, 1999). By contrast, within the booming field of colonial discourse theory in the humanities, especially in writing inspired by Edward Said, a direct line is often traced from precolonial representations of the non-West to practical forms of colonial domination. Here the role of discourse is prioritized at the expense of the social and the political. Yet both the sociological and cultural studies approaches ignore a third level, the properly psychic, which has been at the heart of Homi Bhabha’s (1994) crucial interventions in postcolonial theory. As Bhabha notes, Said gestures towards a deeper level of colonial discourse analogous to dreamwork, which he calls latent Orientalism, without developing this concept in any detail (Bhabha, 1994b, p. 71).

Each of these perspectives is incomplete. Commensurate with the Saidian or colonial discourse perspective, I will argue here that the stark differences in policy which emerged in the German overseas colonies can only be understood by paying close attention to precolonial German and European representations of these cultures and to the continuing circulation of these images during the colonial era. Colonies with similar sociological and material characteristics developed in very different directions, depending on the way in which the colonized had been treated during the precolonial era.\(^2\) Ethnographic discourse – defined here as any discourse which represents the character and culture of a given people or ethnos – typically encompassed explicit or implicit recommendations for the governance of the represented culture. Most ethnographic discourse is also racial discourse, but the two are not identical. I will discuss general racial theories insofar as they informed descriptions of specific non-European populations.

Yet the effects of ethnographic discourse on the formation of colonial states cannot be understood in terms of the simple execution of preexisting ideological scripts that are impervious to the pressures of the social-real, as suggested by Said and some of his followers (e.g. Zantop, 1997). First of all, most discursive formations are multivocal. Within some formations, competing ethnographic voices pointed to differing projects of regulating the colonized; other formations
were more univocal, urging a more continuous and uniform approach to colonial rule. Theorists of multiaccentuality or dialogism (Bakhtin, 1981; Volosinov, 1985) have suggested some of the ways in which social heterogeneity tends to break up even the most unstratified discursive formations. In an article of this length I cannot reconstruct in any detail the reasons for the differing degrees of multivocality but will instead be concerned mainly to provide a description of the main strands within each ethnographic formation at the moment of colonial annexation. Nonetheless, emphasizing the multivocality of these formations points back toward the general field of the social.

I will then reintroduce the theoretical elements which have been at the heart of sociological theory and research on the state, in order to understand how specific strands of precolonial ethnographic discourse come to dominate colonial policy rather than others. My argument has to do first of all with the colonial state itself as an actor and determinant of its own policies. The state has been minimized within colonial cultural studies, due partly to Foucault’s ill-conceived polemics against a state-centric analytics of power. The differing ability of various groups of colonizers to implement their preferred approach to native policy depended on their relative power within the colonial state apparatus. In the German colonies, the governor was typically able to select the groups within colonial civil society with whom he wanted to ally and to minimize the influence of others.

I will also reintroduce the element of social class, particularly as concerns the multifaceted struggle among different sections of the Imperial German elite. Class is understood here not in one-sidedly objectivist terms as a mechanical reflection of resource distributions; nor is it understood in purely subjectivist terms as the product of ideological interpellations (for instance, Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). Social class, expressed as patterns of practice and identification, is indeed built up from a foundation of economic and cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1987). But the values of both economic and cultural capital are constructed and reconstructed in the course of ongoing conflicts, and are not determined in advance.

In explaining differences in German colonial native policy, the most interesting aspect of social class concerns cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1984). Colonial governors were able to determine native policy in relative independence from other branches of the state or forces in civil society, and their individual “economic” interests played a surprisingly minor role in this process, for reasons discussed below. German colonial administrators’ policy interventions were motivated partly by their jockeying for social distinction within stratified fields of cultural capital. Officials were attracted to versions of native policy whose intrinsic or implicit vision of the colonized showcased their own
specific holdings of cultural capital. Because of the unsettled nature of the Imperial German colonial field, and of the German "field of power" more generally, such struggles were conducted constantly and tous azimuts. Attending to colonial officials' distinction strategies helps explain how they made their selections from a preexisting array of ethnographic options. In short, colonial policymaking on the spot was directed not only at the colonized but was also meant to demonstrate something to other Germans both in the colony and at home.

Yet even this is not enough to account for the patterning of native policy. The Bourdieuan theory is not interested in the psychic forces which motivate practice and lend it a certain coherence. Turning to the properly psychic level, we find that in addition to the Other-directed symbolic projects discussed by Bourdieu, colonizers were also involved in more narcissistic imaginary projects. This doubling of symbolic and imaginary projects is characteristic of subjectivity in general, of course. But particular features of the overseas colonial condition encouraged the proliferation of imaginary identifications in the minds and practices of colonizers. Like the symbolic performances, these imaginary identifications engaged the world of intra-German social class competition, but they did so in a more fantasmatological way which did not yield fungible cultural capital. Due to the structural power imbalance of the colonial situation, this fantasizing often entailed the mobilization of the colonized into scenarios which the colonizer used to exalt his own imaginary social standing. The account of the colonial state which I am proposing I will thus draw together three different levels: the cultural, the social, and the psychic.

1. A TALE OF THREE COLONIES

This article will compare the German colonial treatment of five colonized peoples in three of Imperial Germany's overseas colonies before WWI: Southwest Africa, where I explore the fate of the Herero, the Witbooi and other groups of Khoikhoi (called "Hottentots" in colonial jargon), and the Rehoboth Basters, a group descended from Boers and Khoikhoi; Samoa, and Qingdao, the port city in the Chinese province of Shandong in the Jiaozhou bay, across the Yellow Sea from Korea.

I have chosen these cases partly because existing social science theories would expect them to show specific patterns of variation. This permits an initial diagnostic that points out the shortcomings of these approaches. Southwest Africa and Samoa were both settler colonies, while Qingdao was not. Theories that derive state policy from economic class and economic structure would therefore expect the first two colonies to be more violent and exploitative than
the third, but this was not the case. The comparison between Qingdao and Southwest Africa is interesting because both colonies exhibited high levels of anticolonial resistance, in contrast to Samoa, where most of the colonized were willing to collaborate with the Germans. The so-called "excentric" theory of imperialism (Robinson, 1986) expects colonial regimes to vary according to such patterns of resistance and collaboration, even if it is vague about the exact sorts of differences this is supposed to make. As I will argue below, patterns of collaboration and resistance were more often a product of colonial policy than an independent cause.

By examining three colonies of a single colonizer it is also possible to bracket any impact of nationally-specific colonial styles – an interesting factor, but one which has been overemphasized in earlier writing. The stark differences among these three German colonies and in the treatment of the three groups within Namibia provides immediate cautionary evidence against placing too much weight on the national factor. The differences between French, British, and German colonial policies directed at populations which Europeans saw as ethnographically similar are less striking than the broader patterns of similarity. One reason for these similarities is the international, trans-European nature of most (pre) colonial ethnographic and racial discourse.

As an introduction to the sorts of differences we are talking about, it is revealing to consider two snapshots of these colonies, first in relation to German precolonial aspirations in 1879, just prior to the onset of formal colonization, and then a quarter of a century later, in 1904, when the three colonies were well established.

1879

Namibia

Friedrich Fabri’s Does Germany Need Colonies?, the founding propaganda tract in the movement for German overseas colonies, was published in 1879. Fabri was already deeply involved in Southwest Africa, through his activities as Director of the Rhenish Missionary Society (RMS). The following year saw the collapse of a ten-year peace accord between the two main ethnic groups in Central Namibia, the Herero and the Khoikhoi. During earlier periods of internal warfare, German missionaries and traders in Namibia had called on the British to extend protection from the Cape. The rise of pro-colonial sentiment in Germany meant that such appeals were now directed at the German government. A representative of the Bremen trading firm of Adolph Lüderitz began meeting with indigenous leaders in the region in 1883, collecting signatures on protection
treaties which eventually placed a large territory along the Atlantic coastline north of the Orange River in Lüderitz’ hands. In 1884, Bismarck granted German protection to the areas claimed by Lüderitz, and in 1885 Germany claimed the entire area from the Orange to the southern border of Angola and eastward to the British territory.

_Samoa_

1879 saw the signing of a “friendship treaty” between Germany and Samoa, marking the beginning of a twenty year period of informal, quasi-colonial influence carried out by Consuls from Germany, Britain, and the United States. Samoa was often referred to as Germany’s “first colony.” It was the site of the first modern German overseas plantation economy, set up by the Hamburg-based Godeffroy firm in the 1860s. The Germans emerged as the most powerful player in the Samoan politics of the Great Powers during the second half of the century. After passage of the Berlin Samoa Act of 1889, the tripartite crypto-colonialism that had been initiated in 1879 became official. Three Western Consuls and a European Chief Justice now governed the port city of Apia and advised the Samoan king, who nominally ruled the islands. Following the Samoan war of 1899, Germany became the sole colonial ruler of the western islands of Upolu and Savai‘i. The German flag was raised at Mulinu‘u on March 1, 1900.

_Qingdao_

In 1879, the first German missionaries from the “Societatis Verbi Divini,” or Steyler Mission, arrived in Hong Kong. They moved from there up into southern Shandong Province, which became their base of operations in China. The head of the SVD mission in China was Johann Baptist von Anzer, discussed below (Rivinins, 1979; Kuepers, 1974; Esherick, 1987, p. 80). In the early 1880s, the geographer Ferdinand von Richthofen, who had travelled extensively in China during the two previous decades, began focusing German attention on Jiaozhou Bay in Shandong Province, where the small fishing village of Qingdao was located, calling it the “biggest and best ocean harbor in all of Northern China.” Underscoring the growing clamor for a sphere of German influence in China, Richthofen noted that Jiaozhou would be ideally located to supply Shandong province and “large parts of the great plain” with trade goods (Richthofen, 1877–1911, Vol. 2, p. 262). Bishop Anzer’s provocations led directly to a series of counterattacks on Chinese Christians, and it was the murder of two
Steyler missionaries in 1897 which provided Germans with their long-awaited pretext for seizing Qingdao (Esherick, 1987).

1904

A quarter of a century later, the German colonies in Southwest Africa, Samon, and Qingdao had moved in dramatically different directions:

*Southwest Africa*

German colonial troops directly sparked an armed uprising by the Herero in 1904. Most historians have attributed the onset of the Herero rebellion to the ongoing German expropriation of Herero land and cattle in the preceding years (Bley, 1996, Drechsler, 1980, Krüger, 1999). But the immediate factor triggering the war, according to Jan Gewald’s (1999) careful reconstruction, was an unprovoked German military attack on the Herero. German settlers, soldiers, and officers were vehemently opposed to the colonial government’s plan to set aside land for reservations for the Herero. The Germans projected their own aggression onto the Herero, and rumors of an imminent Herero uprising began to circulate in 1903. The Herero-German war effectively started (Gewald, 1999, p. 154) at the moment when German troops opened fire on the Herero at Okahandja on January 12, 1904. Settlers also began shooting in Otjimbingue, another major Ovaherero location, ignoring Herero protestations of their loyalty and peaceful intentions. In the aftermath of the war, German missionaries and military figures contributed to the myth of a long-planned revolt (Gewald, 1999).

The war’s result was devastating in physical and cultural terms. Although there are no reliable figures, the Herero population is believed to have declined by as much as 80% from its prewar levels. After their military defeat at the Battle of Waterberg, the Herero were driven into the arid Omaheke (Kalahari) desert, where countless numbers died of thirst. Women and children were not spared. Herero men were executed by public lynching, sometimes stripped of their clothing.17 Surviving Herero were uprooted and scattered, Herero society reshuffled and atomized. Most devastatingly, the Herero, a pastoralist people whose entire religious and economic life revolved around cattle, were prohibited from owning livestock and land.

The Witbooi people, whose leader rallied many of the Khoikhoi groups in the colony to fight the German colonizers, were also decimated in the course of their uprising, which began in the middle of 1904. Witbooi soldiers who had been fighting alongside Germans against the Herero were cunningly disarmed before they had heard about their leader’s declaration of war against the
colonizers. These Witboois were deported to Togo, and then to Cameroon, where most succumbed to the drastic change in climate. Other Witboois, along with the Bethanie Khoikhoi people, were dispatched to the notorious prisoner-of-war camp on Shark Island, where the death rate was extraordinary. Namibian writer Randolph Vigne (1990) calls this the “old and terrible Namibian genocide story.” As with the Herero, all land and property belonging to the insurgent Khoikhoi was expropriated by the state. To some authors, Southwest Africa represents the clearest illustration of Hanna Arendt’s thesis about the imperialist roots of totalitarianism (Bley, 1996).

The Rehoboth Basters supported the Germans steadfastly throughout the colonial period and the Herero and Nama wars. In return, the Basters were allowed to keep the land they had claimed before the colonial era, even though many colonizers observed jealously that Rehoboth was “the most attractive part of the colony” (Bayer, 1984 [1906], p. 42; Pearson, 1987). No limits were placed on the number of cattle the Rehobothers could own. They were repeatedly referred to as the colony’s most valuable natives (Schwabe, 1899, pp. 38–39; Bayer, 1984 [1906]).

Samoa

A movement directed against German rule also emerged in Samoa in 1904. The chiefs of the Malo, which until 1904 was the highest institution of nominal Samoan “self-government,” attempted to start an independent copra-marketing company, bypassing the European middlemen and providing themselves with the resources they hoped would free them from German control altogether. The colonial state’s response to this challenge was worlds away from the massacre in Southwest Africa. Indeed, the formula “this is not Southwest Africa” was often heard in official circles in Apia. One of the rebels, Lauaki, was placed on probation, while another was deported; yet Samoans were familiar with the German colonial South Seas “tradition” of deporting rebels, only to quickly repatriate them when they were needed again (Hempenstall, 1978, p. 47). There were no colonial troops or German policemen in Samoa, although Imperial Navy warships pulled in occasionally. The main jailhouse in Apia was less than awe-inspiring, and prisoners escaped from it with seeming ease. Punishment by flogging, ubiquitous in Germany’s African colonies and applied to Chinese immigrant workers throughout the German Pacific, including Samoa, was not considered appropriate for Samoans.

German Samoa became a showcase for a sort of colonial cultural preservationism. Settlers in Samoa, like those in Southwest Africa, pressured the colonial government to intensify the exploitation of indigenous labor and alienation of
native-owned land, and the 1904 uprising prompted them to increase their calls for increased security. In contrast to Southwest Africa, however, the government set itself up explicitly against the settlers as a protector of native custom. The first German Governor, Wilhelm Solf, repeatedly claimed that the colonial government did not intend to change Samoan customs, and he insisted that this was one reason the Samoans were not dying out, in contrast to other colonized peoples. Rather than compelling the Samoans to work on the plantations, as the settlers demanded, the colonial government imported Chinese laborers. The government virtually prohibited the sale or long-term leasing of Samoan land to Europeans. Rather than relating to the Samoans within an imported, foreign idiom, as in Southwest Africa, Solf governed within an adapted Samoan framework, using Samoan terminology or adapting Samoan terms to designate new colonial institutions. The German colonial government was called the “Malo Kaisalika” or imperial government, using the Samoan term malo, which traditionally meant “dominant party or faction, victorious in war” and had come to refer to the Samoan governing council of chiefs. The German emperor was described as the tupe sill (paramount king) in dealings with the Samoans.

This was still a colonial regime. First of all, the “custom” which was being defended was already a version of tradition that had been reinvented and codified by Samoans in response to European economic, political, and missionary incursions during the past seven decades. The colonial regime introduced more subtle changes through the act of abstracting Samoan custom by translating it into a European language and codifying it. Moreover, the government explicitly opposed whatever it declared to be “a really bad custom,” which typically meant anything that directly undercut its authority or promised to spark renewed internal warfare. The colonial state’s fetishization of Samoan difference also worked directly against any consideration of the colonized as equal. The Samoan idiom which Solf adopted for his relations with the colonized was an explicitly paternalistic one (Davidson, 1967, p. 78). Nevertheless, the difference between Samoa and Southwest Africa is striking.

Qingdao

By 1904, German colonial officials were beginning to introduce important changes in colonial policy in Qingdao. Early German interventions in Qingdao had unfolded under the sign of segregation and disdain for Chinese culture, recalling the situation in Southwest Africa. Qingdao was invaded by German battleships in 1897 and coercively “leased” from the Chinese government for 100 years. The following year, the Boxer Rebellion emerged in Shandong province and spread north to Beijing. Germany was heavily involved in the
joint expedition of the Great Powers against the Boxers. Almost 20,000 German troops were sent to China, and a German, Count Waldsee, was made Supreme Commander of the Allied troops in September 1900. Anxious to satisfy the German Kaiser, who had called on the departing troops to "take no prisoners" and "show no mercy," Waldsee embarked on a series of ruthless punitive expeditions against Boxer sympathizers in the region.\textsuperscript{31}

The recently-created colony in Qingdao was involved in the anti-Boxer campaign on all levels. German troops bound for Beijing passed through Qingdao. The German Third Sea Battalion, which was stationed in Qingdao, sent marines to Beijing at the beginning of June 1900. Troops from Qingdao were involved in expeditions against Boxer incidents in Shandong province itself.\textsuperscript{32} Most significantly, European propaganda that arose in the context of the anti-Boxer campaign completed the process of bringing the Chinese under the sign of the generic "native" or colonized racial other at the precise moment when the German colonial regime was taking shape.

Early policy in Qingdao corresponded to this aggressive stance. The original treaty with China had limited German sovereignty to the Qingdao peninsula but also allowed German troops to move freely within a 50-kilometer zone around the colony. The Germans took advantage of this clause, moving out into the province in a way that suggested a desire to establish a permanent presence there (Schrecker, 1971). German troops burned houses, killed Chinese citizens, seized hostages and brought them back to Qingdao, and occupied entire towns. Almost immediately after their arrival in Shandong, the Germans began building a railway from Qingdao to the provincial capital in Jinan, in the process destroying irrigation systems, dividing farmers' fields, and violating ancestral burial sites. The preexisting Chinese settlements at Qingdao were demolished and the new colonial city was laid out in quasi-apartheid fashion, with segregated districts for Europeans and Chinese. Chinese presence within the European quarter was strictly controlled.

But by 1904, the Germans in Qingdao were becoming less expansionist and aggressive. Captain Oskar von Trup, who governed Qingdao from 1901 to 1911, presided over what he called a "demilitarization" of the colony. German troops pulled back into Qingdao and stopped provoking the Shandong provincial government. New colonial institutions embodying a program of cultural\textit{rapprochement} and exchange started to be superimposed on the earlier segregationist infrastructure. The shift in policy was indicated in a speech in November 1904 by a German bank director, Homann, praising the colonial governor for making the Chinese "what they should be, namely "fully equal citizens of our colony." Homann claimed that the Governor had given the Chinese "their civil rights" and "involved them in the affairs of the colony."\textsuperscript{33}
It is worth noting here that Southwest Africans were referred to as "subjects" (Untertanen), never as "citizens" (Bürger). Of course, the citizenship rights of even the wealthiest Chinese in Qingdao were not equal to those of Europeans, but some Chinese were allowed to participate in elections to a mixed European and Chinese council of advisers to the colonial government.  

2. EXPLAINING COLONIAL VARIATION

Variation in German colonial native policy cannot be explained by economic or social class factors alone. Southwest Africa and Samoa were both populated by German settlers who agitated vigorously for specific policies, but in the latter case the government actively resisted their demands.  

Nor can the social backgrounds of the governing elites in each colony account for policy variations, at least in any simple way. Qingdao was administered by the German Navy, but colonial policy there took a less coercive turn than in Southwest Africa, which had a separate civil administration.  

It is not the case that lower-class Europeans in general were more likely to become violent Kurtz-like figures in the colonies simply by virtue of their social position (see, for example, Hochschild, 1998, p. 137). To connect social class to native policy, we need to reconstruct the particular, relational sense which individual colonizers made of their own social backgrounds and the ways they related this to the particular colonial setting in which they were active.

Nor can variations in colonial policy be explained by patterns of resistance and collaboration. It might be thought that Soll's milder approach was rooted in the simple fact that the Pacific was indeed more pacific. But Samoa had been roiled by violent internal warfare throughout the 19th century, and had erupted again in 1899, just prior to German annexation. Collaboration was as much a result of Soll's policy as a determinant of it. By the same token, resistance to colonialism in these three cases was more often a reaction to repressive policy than a cause of it. Groups that had cooperated peacefully with the colonial rulers sometimes unexpectedly found themselves the targets of brutal coercion, which itself triggered opposition.  

Nor can this theory explain why colonizers would set out to destroy their potential collaborators, as in Southwest Africa (compare Robinson, 1986, pp. 273, 278–279). Similarly, in the metropolitan German setting, the effects of extraparliamentary resistance on local social programs were mediated by the interpretative frameworks of those in charge of the centralized means of coercion (Steinmetz, 1993). There is no generalizable relationship between a particular form of resistance (or collaboration) and state policy. While resistance certainly shapes colonial policy, it does so indirectly, insofar as it is noticed and interpreted by those in charge of the state, and not
as a sheer material force. Colonizers' reactions to activities of the colonized
cannot be analyzed as some sort of context-free calculus of costs and benefits.
Social and material forces can only explain colonial policy when they are
embedded within systems of meaning.

*Discourse, Symbolic Distinction, Imaginary Identification*

My alternative account of colonial native policy emphasizes precolonial
ethnographic discourse and the subjectivity of colonial officials. There are seven
steps in this argument:

(1) First, ethnographic discourse actively shaped colonial policy, rather than
passively reflecting colonialism or merely legitimating it. My emphasis is
on German-language discourse, especially as I move toward the immediate
precoplonial era, although this is not a strict rule. Germans read European
literature in translation or in the original, and they interacted with other
Europeans in the (pre)colonial contact zones. The Germans who established
colonial administrations brought with them fairly elaborate images and
narratives concerning the populations they were called upon to regulate —
images that were much more than a reflex of political and economic
processes — and these ethnographic and racial representations shaped their
colonial policies. There is not enough space here to reconstruct the exact
audiences of precoplonial ethnographic images of their circulation; nor will
I be able to trace the ways in which these images were transmitted to each
colonial administrator. Instead I will illustrate the process of the reception
of precoplonial discourse using a single example, Wilhelm Solf.

It follows that different sorts of racial/ethnographic representations led to
differing types of colonial native policy. As part of the post-Enlightenment
obsession with the classification and comparison of races and cultures,
differing strategies were recommended, implicitly or explicitly, for the
colonization of different parts of the periphery. Of course, much colonial-era
European discourse was structured around very broad categories such as
“natives” or “blacks.” From the 18th century onward, however, differentia-
tion among races and cultures was pervasive in European discussions of the
non-west. It is impossible to understand variations in colonial state-formation
without reconstructing precoplonial ethnographic and racial representations of
a given population and then tracing the internalization and redeployment
of these images by the colonizers.

(2) The main dimensions of both ethnographic discourse and colonial policy
can be characterized using the paired concepts of *identity* vs. *difference*
and stability vs. instability. Other writers have analyzed colonial policy with the categories of indirect and direct rule, or assimilation vs. association (Mamdani, 1996; Betts, 1961; Wright, 1991). My preference for the more abstract categories stems from a reading of the colonial archives and recent theoretical literature on colonial subjectivity (especially Bhabha, 1994b, c).

This argument begins from the observation that even the most remote cultures could not remain completely untouched and unobserved by the expanding, capitalist core during the nineteenth century. By the time Germany became involved in overseas colonialism in the 1880s, most non-western populations had been exposed to Europeans. Many had adopted aspects of European or western culture. This exposure meant different things to Europeans and non-Europeans, however. While many non-Europeans were now able to understand Europeans well enough to manipulate them, Europeans perceived “partially westernized” people as oscillating ambiguously and threateningly between similarity and strangeness.

A constant theme in European literature on (pre)colonized people in the 19th century is the inconsistency between appearance and essence, words and deeds. The recurrent complaints about lying, cheating, mimicry, and dissimulation relate to this felt incompatibility between a westernized exterior and a foreign interiors. Sinophobic discourse in the 19th century, for instance, returns incessantly to the figure of Chinese Doppelsängigkeit (double dealing, or literally, “forked-tongued-ness”). According to 19th-century European descriptions, lying was a central aspect of Herero and Samoan culture. The “mixed-race” Rehoboth Basters, who presented themselves to the Germans as Europeanized, were sometimes condemned by European observers for acting like “Hottentots” when they thought Europeans were not watching. The South African Khoikhoi were often described as having a disturbing “talent for mimicry” (Müller, 1873, p. 79).

Most nineteenth century Europeans – with the possible exception of Nietzsche – abhorred such indeterminacy of meaning and identity. But their compulsion to stabilize the Other did not stem from a rationalist intellectual episteme or a psychic need to arrest the slippage of signifiers. Precolonial racial discourse arose within the context of cross-cultural practice (Pratt, 1992). In such situations, a non-westerner’s ability to move suddenly and unexpectedly between positions of similarity and difference – to switch codes – could put the European at a distinct practical disadvantage. German missionaries in precocious Southwest Africa wondered whether the Herero were attending services simply to gain access to the mission’s resources; members of the London Missionary Society in Samoa suspected that
Samoans did not really associate the signifiers of the kava-drinking ritual with the signifieds of the Eucharist; colonial rulers worried that their collaborators were actually less devoted to them than they claimed.

Ethnographic description and colonial policy attempted to arrest this endless cycling back and forth between sameness and difference. The restriction of the non-westerner to a single code and a single identity was just as much as precondition for the success of the precolonial activities of missionaries, traders, and travelers as for the colonial-era projects of a European-dominated state. Ethnographic observers before colonialism typically sought to identify a singular cultural essence beneath the shifting surface. Similarly, colonial native policy endeavored to restrict the colonized to a unitary and stable position, intervening materially in ways that simultaneously entailed a specific representation of the colonized. A case in point is the colonial “Land and Titles Commission,” whose goal was to adjudicate internal Samoan disputes over ancestral titles and land claims according to customary Samoan law. Through this commission, the Germans intervened in the distribution of material property while at the same time underwriting a specific vision of Samoan ways (Schultz-Ewerth, 1905, 1911).

Similarity and difference constitute the two limit-points of a continuum. No particular ethnographic or colonial position was essentially privileged along this continuum. Only the two extremes—absolute heterogeneity and complete assimilation—were difficult to reconcile with colonial policy. Even in the most hands-off versions of indirect rule based on “traditional custom” (Mamdani, 1996), the colonial state required that the colonized recognize the colonizers’ ultimate authority. Colonizers therefore had to find some basis of agreement with indigenous rulers about cultural categories. Within the present study, colonial policy directed at the Herero before 1904 comes closest to the hands-off model of indirect rule. German policy shifted after 1904 from a program partly centered on radical difference to a project of negative assimilation. This shift resulted from the Hereros’ unwillingness to recognize the Germans’ ultimate authority—the quid pro quo for indirect rule.

As for the similarity pole, it is important to stress that complete identity or assimilation was an inherently paradoxical goal for colonial policy. The colonized could never be acknowledged as equal without undercutting the legitimation of colonialism. As Partha Chatterjee (1993) has convincingly argued, the assumption of the essential inferiority of the subject population—which he calls the “rule of colonial difference”—is built into the very sinews of the colonial state. Without some barrier to the identity of colonizer
and colonized, colonial domination would appear entirely arbitrary and
groundless to the colonizers themselves. Fullscale assimilation could only
be pursued at the risk of putting colonialism out of business, transforming
it into some other type of system. By contrast, ethnographic observers, as
long as they were not in the employ of the colonial state, were not barred
from treating the colonized other as identical, or as equals.40

Colonial policy was free to vary within these limits. It was perfectly
"acceptable" for the colonized to be different, as long as they were reliably
so. Colonial policy directed at the Samoans and at the Witboois, Herero, and
Chinese until around 1904 sought to hold them in a position of stabilized
difference. Colonizers used a variety of tactics in pursuit of this goal.
Sometimes the colonized were understood as intrinsically and unreconcil-
ably heterogeneous, recalling the 19th-century theory of polygenesis.
Another option was to view them as an earlier version of oneself, as in
social-evolutionary perspectives and the discourse of noble savagery.41
In other cases the colonized were described not as underdeveloped but as
degenerate or fallen, with the colonizer assuming the role of cultural
regenerator; this was a strong tendency within nineteenth-century Sinophile
discourse.

Another set of solutions positioned the non-western Other in a consis-
tent location between similarity and difference. The culture of the Rehoboth
Basters was treated as a consolidated amalgam, located halfway between
the European and the Khoikhoi.

A third type of solution constructed the colonized as similar to the
colonizer. The effort to turn the Herero into a deracinated proletariat with
a partial, degraded version of European culture was organized around an
abject version of similarity. This position, which I call "negative assimila-
tion," seems to approximate Homi Bhabha's concept of mimicry,
described as a condition in which the colonized is configured as "almost
the same, but not quite." But where Bhabha sees mimicry as characterizing
colonialism in general, negative assimilation was only one possibility along
an entire spectrum.42 The policy of the Qingdao administration after 1904
suggests another version of (near) identity, operating at a more abstract
level. The Chinese were dealt with as civilizational equals, as Kulturvölker,
although the contents of Chinese culture were acknowledged to be rad-
ically heterogeneous. In some respects this discourse pointed away from
colonialism altogether and toward some sort of partnership, perhaps along
the lines envisioned by the Chinese themselves (as in the Shandong provinci-
cial Governor's promotion of self-opened commercial ports, zikai shangbu,
as an alternative to colonies and treaty ports; see Schrecker, 1971,
Like the policies of assimilation which some later 20th-century colonial regimes directed at native elites, German Qingdao began to test the limits of the category of colonialism.

(3) Colonial policy cannot be reduced to the simple execution of precolonial scripts. One reason is that ethnographic discourse was typically multivocal, pointing toward contradictory colonial strategies. Multivocality refers here to the existence of more than one significant vision of a given ethnic group. In the present analysis, multivocality was especially pronounced with respect to discourse on the Chinese but was evident in all of these discursive formations. Each voice or accent was socially embedded, associated with a particular group of social bearers. My use of the term "bearers" does not imply that particular views necessarily correspond to specific social positionalities; instead, they are more contingently linked.

(4) A particular perspective could not influence policy unless its social bearer was represented within, or at least recognized by, the colonial administration. The colonial state was thus a determinant of its own policies.

(5) My fifth argument concerns the reasons for the "more contingent" linkages between social groups (including classes) and particular ethnographic perspectives. Different European groups and classes were engaged, even overseas, in differing domestic (in my case, intra-German) conflicts and projects. Jean and John Comaroff (1991) have contended, for instance, that English Protestant missionaries among the Tswana were not only engaged in colonial interactions but also in European-centered class projects.

I am using the term "social class" here to refer not to objective locations in a logical social structure but to sets of agents who act within relational fields in ways that make them resemble one another with respect to their habitus, perceptions, and tastes, and which differentiate them from others operating in the same fields and competing for the same stakes. Groups need not think of themselves as classes in order to qualify as such, as long as their practices are coordinated in class-relevant ways. This is not an objectivist definition, but neither is it purely subjectivist. The habitus which underpins regularities of perception and practice is both an objective and a subjective structure (Bourdieu, 1985). By the same token, the determination of cultural capital is an objective as well as an intersubjective process. No practice or object can be coded as "distinguished" without the subjective agreement of the other actors in the field, but such definitions confront each actor as something external and quasi-objective (Bourdieu, 1984). The ways in which a given subject perceives objects and others' practices classifies that subject as belonging to a given class, regardless of whether the subject consciously acknowledges this identity.
Social class projects can be defined as sustained activities by an individual or group oriented toward gaining distinction within structured fields. In settled fields, such projects are pursued almost unconsciously, to use a term that is often employed by Bourdieu. When fields are heterogeneous and unsettled, however, with disagreement over what counts as cultural capital, class projects may take a more explicit and concerted form. The late-19th-century field of the German colonial state was unsettled in this sense, as was the German field of power more generally. Each of the three main sectors of the German elite was represented in the colonies, and each insisted on its respective definition of cultural distinction within colonial policy.

As Bourdieu has shown, cultural capital assumes particular forms in each field and is not simply transposable—even if there tend to be homological relations between the fields. The form of cultural capital specific to the colonial field was ethnographic acuity or perspicaciousness. Where a German was in a position to engage practically on a non-European stage by shaping colonial native policy or engaging in missionary work, his choice of ethnographic perspective was guided, in part, by his striving for distinction within the colonial field. Each actor gravitated toward a vision of the colonized which showcased his particular holdings of cultural capital. Ceteris paribus, educated middle-class Germans emphasized the need to develop a policy attuned to the natives’ cultural peculiarities, which were to be ascertained via a hermeneutic approach. Aristocratic Germans gravitated toward more coercive policies, and evaluated the native using traditional European military and hierarchical categories. Bourgeois German settlers, planters, and investors showed little interest in the culture of the colonized, aside from the question of getting them to work; hence questions of idleness and industriousness were central to their ethnographic vision. Missionaries were sometimes similar in their social background to members of the educated middle class, but were typically much less interested in understanding native culture on its own terms, except where this appeared to be a precondition for changing that culture (Todorov, 1984, pp. 152–164). Each group defended its own ethnographic perspective as superior to the views of its contenders. The dynamics of cultural capital thus clarify the affinities between specific individuals or groups and particular strands of precolonial discourse, as well as their preferences in native policy.

This sociological analysis needs to be supplemented by an analysis of properly psychic mechanisms. Indeed, this level is not actually separate from the sociological processes of distinction and competition discussed by Bourdieu. Only by attending to the psychic level can we make sense of the desire that drives competition for cultural capital and of the seemingly
mysterious integration of the *habitus*, its constitution as a unifying fundamental for practice. Although Bourdieu has tried to differentiate his theory from a utilitarian approach, the psychic basis of mechanisms such as habitus, strategy, and competition has not been worked out.

Exploration of the psychic level can also illuminate features of colonial officials’ activities other than the competition for cultural distinction. Colonial historians have sometimes called attention to the excessive, apparently irrational character of much colonial policy. There are important elements of this in each of the cases examined here. By massacring the Herero, the German colonizers seemed to deprive themselves of their main labor force. General von Trotha’s delirious cruelty can be placed in a long and sordid colonial tradition reaching back to Cortez. The massacre of the Herero may not represent German colonialism’s singular telos in Southwest Africa, but neither should it be minimized. Another form of strategically irrational colonial activity is the European’s hallucinatory self-promotion into the imagined role of indigenous ruler, a fantasy that was most vividly described by Joseph Conrad. In his interactions with the Samoans, the German Governor often presented himself as a traditional chief, even though the Samoans were not fooled by this performance and some German settlers ridiculed him. In China, some Germans masqueraded as Chinese Mandarins. Psychoanalysis helps to make theoretical sense of the psychic enjoyment, the otherwise inexplicable energy, associated with such perverse colonial practices.

To understand both of these dimensions—colonial excess and officials’ competition for cultural distinction—we need to thematize processes of identification. The initial identifications that constitute the subject begin with what Lacan called the mirror phase, when the fragmented subject identifies with the alienated and totalizing external image (Lacan, 1977a). Such identifications are located in the realm of the imaginary, the realm of plenitude and wholeness, as indicated by the core structure of specular identity. Imaginary identification is identification with an image which Lacan and others call the ideal ego (*Idealich*), one "in which we appear likeable to ourselves...representing 'what we would like to be'" (Zizek, 1989, p. 105; also Lagache, 1961; Lacan, 1991, pp. 134–148). The earliest imaginary identifications provide a template for a whole series of later ones which are similarly characterized by their striving for wholeness. Lagache points out that the ideal ego serves as the basis of "heroic identifications" with "great personalities from history or contemporary life characterized by independence, pride, success" (1961, pp. 41–42).
The notion of imaginary identification can be connected to the overarching psychoanalytic concept of fantasy, which has been used to great avail by theorists of nationalism, communism, totalitarianism, and postfascism (see Zizek, 1989, Silverman, 1992, Hell, 1997, Rose, 1998). Fantasy scenarios express a conscious or unconscious wish. Imaginary identification is one site for such wishful scenarios.

A second register of identifications is symbolic. The symbolic, in Lacan’s writing, is the realm of the law and language, and language itself functions via differences. The relationship of the subject to the symbolic is thus a relation of “dependence on the Other, locus of signifiers” (Julien, 1994, p. 167). Symbolic identifications are linked to the ego-ideal (Ichideal), which “constitutes a model to which the subject attempts to conform” (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, p. 144). In Lacan’s later writings, symbolic identification is understood more specifically as identification with the place from which we are observed, the location from which we “look at ourselves so that we appear to ourselves likeable, worthy of love” (Zizek, 1989, p. 105). The “demand of the Ichideal takes up its place within the totality of the demands of the law” (Lacan, 1991, p. 134). The first symbolic identification, for the young boy, is with the father. Given the Oedipal structure, however, this identification is in a fundamental way an impossible one: “there issues forth an impossible double command: to be like the father, but not to be like the father with respect to his sexual power” (Bryson, 1994, p. 233; see also Freud, 1923, p. 34). Symbolic identification is thus forever undercut by difference.

Although Lacan initially restricted imaginary identifications to the mirror phase, in his later work the imaginary was no longer a separate stage or realm, but rather a dimension of subject-formation that is dominated by the symbolic. As Samuel Weber points out, the imaginary is just as much a realm of signifiers as the symbolic. Symbolic identification dominates the imaginary form just as family name dominates forename (Zizek, 1989, p. 108). The symbolic directs subjects toward specific images for imaginary identification and confirms them in their imaginary identifications. Yet the subject also continually slips from symbolic identification back into imaginary identification. Although neither realm is actually more estranged than the other, the imaginary promises an identity which denies difference and estrangement, denies its debt to the other. It is a sort of estrangement from this “inevitable estrangement” (Weber, 1991, p. 106). There is thus a perpetual “oscillation of the subject between the ideal ego and the ego ideal” (Lagache, 1961, p. 41).

These categories shed some light on the desire for cultural distinction in Bourdieu’s theory and on the “excessive” dimension of colonizers’
practice. The benefits to be had from "distinction" are not economic in any but the most metaphoric or indirect sense of the term. We need to attend instead to the desire for recognition by the other, that is, to processes of identification with the location from which we are being observed. These questions involve ego ideals and symbolic identification. The symbolic is the realm of language and difference; a field, for Bourdieu, functions like a symbolic field. Indeed, Lacan often uses the same terms as Bourdieu (champ; enjeu) in describing the symbolic. Colonial officials struggling with one another to valorize their particular holdings of cultural capital were "identifying with the place from which they were being observed," seeking confirmation from that place.52

What light does the psychoanalytic perspective shed on colonizers' "excessive" activities? In approaching this problem we need first to recall the distinction between "the ideal as the object of the subject's aspirations (the ideal ego) and the ideal that issues injunctions and makes impossible demands (the ego ideal)" (Szpolka, 1999, p. 1179). Symbolic and imaginary identifications sometimes correspond, but can also be at odds with one another.53

Modern colonial contexts were particularly conducive to the proliferation of imaginary identifications. Consider first that the majority of German colonial officials and "men on the spot" were members of what Bourdieu would call "dominated sectors of the dominant class," middle- rather than upper-class.54 The first German colonial secretary, Bernhard Dernburg, was a banker and Jewish (Schiefel, 1974); Wilhelm Solf, who served the longest term as colonial secretary, was highly educated and from a bourgeois background. Capitalism may well have come to dominate most aspects of everyday life and even domestic policymaking in Imperial Germany, as critics of the "exceptionalism thesis" have argued (Blackbourn & Eley, 1985; Steinmetz, 1997). But the army and the foreign service were two branches of German society where the venerable cultural capital of the aristocracy was still dominant, if embattled.55 For many middle-class Germans in these branches of the state, the traditional nobility remained an object of imaginary identification, even as they were urged by another set of symbolic identifications to compete with and displace these aristocrats. Conversely, the nobility was threatened by the onslaught of modernization. Non-democratic realms like colonial administration had traditionally been the nobility's stronghold, but this was not the case in Wilhelmine Germany's colonial empire. This did not mean that aristocrats formed imaginary identifications with the rising middle classes, but it did create the preconditions for strange identifications across cultural
boundaries. An aristocrat like Lothar von Trotha might form an imaginary identity with a *negatively-coded* image of the Herero, with an image of ferocious cruelty (see below). Another member of the German nobility might identify with a positively-coded image of non-Western elites, as was the case with Ferdinand von Richthofen in China (see below). 56

Colonial situations stimulated the proliferation of fantasies of imaginary identification by weakening colonizers' super-ego defenses. Overseas areas colonized in the 19th century were often perceived by European colonizers as off-center stages in which normal rules did not seem to apply, or whose rules they simply did not understand. Europeans regarded non-Westerners as less than human, and believed that "primitive people" were themselves "led almost exclusively by the unconscious," as Freud wrote. 57 The colonizers' built-in power imbalance allowed Europeans, especially officials, to imagine themselves as omnipotent. Such feelings of triumphant invincibility are associated with infancy, in particular with the narcissistic mirror phase. 58 A colonizer was more likely than a Berlin city councillor to involve his "subjects" in fantasy scenarios related to his imaginary identifications. And anything the official did which engaged the colonized was in some sense a part of native policy. "Excessive" colonial practices were often underpinned by scenarios that related to colonizers' ideal egos.

These aspects of the modern colonial structure, especially in situations where different social elites were contending for hegemony, meant that colonial policy was multiply overdetermined in ways that could lend it an internally contradictory character. Colonizers might embrace one form of policy and ethnographic discourse because it promised to help them accrue cultural capital, while being attracted to a different set of representations and practices in their pursuit of imaginary identifications. The German missionary Anzer, discussed below, illustrates such a bifurcation in his approach to the Chinese. By contrast, Wilhelm Soli's simultaneous pursuit of class distinction and an imaginary ideal ego did not result in clashing treatments of the colonized.

(7) There were limits, however, on the European uses to which a given non-European culture could be put. These limits were rooted in other discourses and in the practices of the colonized themselves. The most important *discursive* limit involved European racial ideology, which evolved in partial autonomy from particular ethnographic discourses. The clearest example of this concerns the place of Africans. Because Europeans had placed sub-Saharan Africans at the bottom of their racial hierarchies for such a long time (Bitterli, 1970; Martin, 1993), it was nearly impossible for individual
Europeans to use Africans in pursuit of fantastic scenarios of upward class mobility or scenarios that glorified their existing class position. (The Khoikhoi were a partial exception to this, for reasons discussed below).

Nor was ethnographic perception completely oblivious to the "intransitively" existing reality of the colonized other, despite the arguments of Said and others. The fact that China became a screen for the projection of fantasies of the rule of the philosopher-king, for instance, was linked to Chinese self-representations and features of Chinese society. It would have been much more difficult for a European to view Herero society in this light, due to its less centralized power structure and oral traditions. Moreover, the willingness of the colonized to collaborate in a particular framing of their culture and identity was a key determinant of the success or failure of a given policy.

3. PRECOLONIAL ETHNOGRAPHIC REPRESENTATIONS AND THE FORMATION OF THE COLONIAL STATE

In each of the case studies that follow, I first summarize German colonial native policy, paying attention to the particular models of stabilization employed. Next, I relate native policy to the ethnographic representations that were being produced by colonial officials and other Germans during the colonial era. I then reconstruct the formations of precolonial ethnographic discourse that were internalized by the colonial statemakers and guided their actions, and show how these were appropriated by colonial officials in their symbolic struggles and imaginary identifications.

**Southwest Africa: "Khoikhoi and the Ambiguities"**

The Khoikhoi "tribes" or "Commando groups" which interacted most intensively with German officials, missionaries, and settlers in colonial Southwest Africa were the Orlams. They had migrated from the Cape to Southwest Africa in the early 19th century, spoke Cape Dutch, wore European clothes, and were often Christian converts. There is a great deal of confusion in the 19th-century literature between Orlams and the Namaqua orNama, who were the indigenous and less Europeanized Khoikhoi in the German colony. Most European texts tended to elide these differences and refer to all simply as Hottentots.

Alongside their Europeanized features, other aspects of the Orlam lifestyle were less familiar to the Germans. The Witboois and other Orlam groups lived by pastoralism, which Europeans systematically referred to as "nomadism," and
by cattle rustling, Germans felt that their own interactions with Orlams were plagued by a frustrating oscillation between difference and similarity. The two Khoikhoi leaders with whom the Germans in the precolly and colony were most involved, Jonker Afrikaner and Hendrik Witbooi, were westernized to the extent of having much greater knowledge of the Germans than the Germans had of them.

During the first decade of nominal German rule, the Witboois continued to raid Herero cattle herds and to run circles around the outgunned Germans. In 1892, their leader, Hendrik Witbooi, signed a peace treaty with the Herero, which allowed him to focus on the increasing threat from the German colonial troops. Ethnographic representations of the Witboois during the first decade of German colonialism were continuous with the main strand of precollony discourse, within which the Khoikhoi were portrayed as the very essence of volatility and unpredictability. Their nomadic existence was understood as unstable almost by definition. The Germans failed to elaborate a political project for stabilizing the Khoikhoi during this period.

The situation changed after 1894, when German troops led by Landeshauptmann Theodor Leutwein finally subdued the Witboois. For the rest of the next decade the Witboois were integrated into the colonial regime as military collaborators. Leutwein allowed them to keep their weapons and horses in exchange for their services in helping to put down various insurgen-
cies (see Drechsler, 1980, pp. 82, 100). The prevailing official description of the Witboois also shifted during this era. They were now portrayed as heroic noble savages, along the lines of Fenimore Cooper's Native Americans. German officials sang the praise of Khoikhoi bravery and intelligence (e.g. Schwabe, 1899, pp. 33, 35). In a lecture to the Military Society in Berlin in 1899, Leutwein reported that the Khoikhoi were “natural soldier material” (1899, p. 2). The Witboois were described as courageous and loyal warriors, gifted with extraordinarily keen vision and skilled in tracking enemies across the colony's illegible landscape (von François, 1899, p. 204). In his memoirs from this period, Lieutenant Kurd Schwabe compared the Witboois to the Huns — a figure with strong positive connotations at the time, at least within conservative German circles. This suggested the image of a primitive warrior with “strong feelings of independence” (Ibid., p. 55). In another passage, Schwabe characterized the Khoikhoi as “knighthly” (rittenlich; Ibid., p. 361).

The most widely-circulated “scientific” treatments of Southwest Africa during this ten-year period were written by Karl Dove, a Privat-Dozent at the University of Berlin. Dove's descriptions resonated with official views and policies. Dove set out to counter the centuries-old stereotype of “the Hottentot” as “the dregs of the human species” (1896a, p. 14) with an ode to the virtues of this
"wonderful and mentally very developed race" (1896b, p. 80). His book *Images of War and Peace from the first German Colony* focused particularly on the Orlams' warrior qualities (1896a, p. 53). Searching for a trope powerful enough to wrench the Khoikhoi away from their association with abjection and volatility, Dove described Hendrik Witbooi as "actually having the traits which Cooper's imagination attributed to the redskins" (ibid., p. 54). One of these traits was unflappability in wartime, which Dove illustrated with a scene of Orlam warriors riding calmly into enemy gunfire (1896a, p. 53). Such courage and self-possession was the exact opposite of the skittishness and unreliability that had so often been attributed to the Khoikhoi. It was also a metonym for a more general stability – precisely the goal of the colonial regime.\(^6^5\) Ethnographic representations and colonial policies ratified one another.

The stabilizing configuration collapsed immediately in 1904, however, when Hendrik Witbooi united many of the Khoikhoi peoples in the colony and declared war on the Germans. The discourse about the Khoikhoi as infuriatingly unstable, as fluctuating between similarity and difference, reemerged instantly. Witbooi's use of a written declaration of war seemed European, for instance, but his guerrilla tactics did not. Alfred von François perceived in the very abruptness of Witbooi's decision to break ties with the Germans a sign of the essential unsteadiness of "Nama character" (1905, p. 86). The former Governor, Leutwein, now reversed his view of Hendrik Witbooi, describing him as a split person with "two souls in his breast":

The soul he showed during the ten-year period of peace under our domination [1894–1904] was Christian and decent. The other was the cruel, fanatic Hottentot soul, which evidently had simply been dormant (1907, p. 305; my emphasis).

This suggestion of a kind of cultural schizophrenia was made more explicit by another German officer, who concluded that the "Hottentot" character "bordered on insanity."\(^6^6\) The ideological-political solution elaborated during the 1894–1904 period had been abandoned virtually overnight. The German army's fury against the Khoikhoi during the war of 1904–1908 reflected the utter collapse of the stabilizing formula and the resurgence of the older discourse in which the essence of the Khoikhoi was instability itself. The depredations on Shark Island and the packing off of prisoners' body parts to Germany for anthropological study reflected this fury.\(^6^7\)

Some historians have described Leutwein's treatment of Hendrik Witbooi after 1894 as driven by rational, strategic calculations. The Germans' barbaric treatment of the Khoikhoi after the war is then to be understood as signalling the colony's turn toward a sort of quasi-fascist violence. But this juxtaposition between a period of rational rule and an era of irrationality cannot explain why
the colonizers came up with these two *particular* ethnographic/political formulae for dominating the Witboois. As the other German cases demonstrate, collaborating colonized peoples were not always treated as noble warriors; nor did rebels always receive the same treatment as the Khoikhoi after their defeat.

**Precolonial Discourse, Symbolic Struggle, and Imaginary Identification with the Khoikhoi**

Instead, these colonial policies were deeply conditioned by long-standing ethnographic representations. This is most obvious with respect to the governance formula used before and after the Leutwein period, which drew upon the dominant strand of ethnographic discourse concerning the Khoikhoi. This system of representations had first emerged in the Cape colony, and had subsequently been transferred to the Khoikhoi north of the Orange River with the migration of the Orlams and their missionaries in the first half of the 19th century. During the 18th and 19th centuries, the Cape Khoikhoi had come to be seen as volatile mimic men, oscillating uncontrollably between positions of identity and abject difference. The cultural-studies literature on European representations of the Khoikhoi has focused almost entirely on the aspect of abjection. It is certainly the case that the earliest representations of the Khoikhoi in the 17th and 18th centuries focused on signifiers of putative abjectness, such as Khoikhoi genitalia and buttocks, or their consumption of cow entrails. By the later 18th century, however, the Khoikhoi no longer figured as the simple epitome of *ignoble* savagery, but were increasingly perceived as disturbingly indeterminate. The figures of mimicry, lying, dissimulation, and unreliability came to the fore, as a distorted response to the Khoikhois' ongoing Europeanization, their cultural in-betweeness, and their ability to manipulate native and European codes in order to eke out certain advantages or simply to disrupt the racist operations of Cape colony colonialism.

The Khoikhois' ambiguity was reflected within the taxonomic view of "race." The earliest European observers had assimilated the Khoikhoi to a general category of "blacks" or "Ethiopian blacks," calling them "progeny of Cham" (Ham, Noah's third son). After the founding of the Dutch colony at the Cape in 1652, Europeans began describing the Khoikhoi as "yellowish," "tawny," "chestnut-colored," or "olevaster." In the race-theoretical systems of the 19th century, the Khoikhoi sometimes figured as a so-called "transitional" race (see Herder, 1985, p. 165; Krieg, 1854, p. 4); though for others they were a distinct race (F. Müller, 1873, pp. 14, 73ff.). Another site of racial ambiguity concerned the "mysterious" origins of the Khoikhoi, which were discussed obsessively throughout the 18th and 19th centuries. The Khoikhoi were variously argued to have descended from the Jews, Phonecians, Fijians, and Chinese.
Khoikhois’ relationship to the Bushmen/Bosjesman served further to destabilize their “racial” identity in European eyes. The earliest Dutch colonizers had seen the Bushmen as impoverished or outcast Khoikhoi, and this opinion continued to be expressed well into the 19th century. Some later writers reversed this position, however, speculating that the Khoikhoi might have sprung from the Bushmen instead (Sommerville, 1979 [1799–1802], p. 28). During the 19th century, the theory emerged that the two groups had initially derived from distinct origins but had subsequently intermingled.

The colonizers’ failure to find a strategy for stabilizing Khoikhoi identity during the first decade of German colonialism in Southwest Africa was correlated with a high level of hostility to the Khoikhoi. This political failure was directly continuous with Dutch and British colonialism in the Cape, and with the practices of the Rhenish missionaries in Namibia during the middle decades of the 19th century. The founding Commander of the Cape settlement, Van Riebeeck, had contemplated enslaving or exterminating the Khoikhoi and expropriating their cattle from the very beginning (Moodie, 1960, pp. 22–25, 44–45, 50–53, 68). When the British took over in 1795/1806 and extended certain legal rights and protections to the Khoikhoi (Wilson & Thompson, pp. 224–254), there was some expectation that the new regime would differ from Dutch rule. Yet in 1883, the British Northern Border Commissioner recommended that the heads of Khoikhoi families be scattered, “leaving children destitute to be apprenticed” (Blue-Book on Native Affairs, 1883, p. 123). Khoikhoi were never brought into a stable collaborative relationship with the Cape colonial regime, although they were regularly recruited for “commando” raids on Bushmen—a harbinger of the Germans’ use of the Witbooi troops against native insurgencies.

In the years leading up to 1894, Germans discussed the Khoikhoi in hostile and uncomfortable terms. The ethnologist Gustav Fritsch acknowledged the considerable intelligence of the Khoikhoi, but immediately added that this strength was offset by their “unpredictability of character” (Unberechenbarkeit des Charakters, 1872, pp. 305–307). Another German researcher, Hans Schinz, wrote that the Khoikhoi face “instinctively awakens feelings of discomfort and suspicion in us” (Schinz, 1890, p. 79). According to Schinz, whose three-year travels in the colony in 1884–1887 were sponsored by Lüderitz (Gordon, 1992, p. 236, note 3), there was now a “gaping void” where “Hottentot” traditional culture had once been; this was filled in by an ambiguous intermediate culture (Schinz, 1890, p. 100). The head of the Rhenish mission in mid-19th-century Namibia, Hugo Hahn, was disdainful of the Orlams. Hahn broke off all contact with Jonker Afrikaner in 1852, citing his “impertinence” (1984–1985, p. 596). Hahn’s wife described the Afrikaner Orlams as the “dregs of the human race” (E. Hahn, 1992, p. 192).
German policy after 1904 was continuous with this precolonial ethnographic orientation. But during the ten-year period before 1904, the Witboois were treated as noble savages. The discourse underpinning Leutwein’s policy during this period was not generated ex nihilo. Karl Dove, the “organic intellectual” of this brief settlement period, referred to François Le Vaillant as an authority for his revisionist take on the Khoikhoi (Dove, 1896b, p. 80). Le Vaillant had travelled in the Cape’s northern regions and Transorangia during the 1780s and published the most extensive portrayal of the Khoikhoi as noble savages. He referred repeatedly to the Khoikhoi as “men of nature” and as “essentially good” (1790, Vol. II, pp. 33-34, 149). Khoikhoi men were represented as dignified primitive warriors with the qualities of hospitality, friendliness, generosity, courage and love of freedom and equality.77 The engraved portraits that accompanied Le Vaillant’s narratives emphasized the qualities of “natural man” as understood within the framework of noble savagery.78 Numerous South African travelers and writers claimed inspiration from Le Vaillant, even if his reputation had declined by the second half of the century.79 Le Vaillant’s books were translated into German and were familiar enough to play a central role in Wilhelm Raabe’s bestselling 1881 novel Stopfkuchen (Tubby Schaumann).

Others who contributed to the representation of Khoikhoi as noble savages included Rousseau himself, who had referred directly to the “Hottentots of the Cape of Good Hope” in his Discourse on Inequality as examples of an uncorrupted “state of nature.”80 Voltaire echoed Rousseau in describing Khoikhoi “mores” as “soft and innocent.”81 An earlier German antecedent was Peter Kolb, who had emphasized the Khoihoi’s “natural freedom” and “individualism” (1968, pp. 254, 333) – central aspects of the fully-developed trope of noble savagery. A few ethnographers of the Khoikhoi, such as the German-South African settler, merchant, and University-trained amateur linguist, Theophilus Hahn (1881, p. 54), kept this tradition alive in the later 19th century.82

In sum, the web of representations and policies within which the Germans attempted to trap the Witbooi and restrain their “volatile” nature did not arise out of thin air. Precolonal discourse on the Khoikhoi was dominated by the figure of unstable mimicry, but it contained several minor strands, including one in which the Khoikhoi figured as noble savages. This case thus illustrates the multivocality of formations of ethnographic discourse. By contrast, ethnographic discourse on the Herero was quite homogeneous, and the next section will trace the baleful colonial effects of this precolonial formation.

The mere existence of multiple strands does not explain Leutwein’s embrace of the noble savagery trope in 1894, however. His attempt to enlist the Witboois as collaborators might seem to be an obvious, rational strategic choice, but he did not have to pardon the Witboois. Leutwein’s attempt to create his own
band of savage warriors was overdetermined by his class-based imaginary identifications and symbolic projects.

One writer attributes the difference between the policies of Solf and Leutwein to a conflict between “humanitarian cosmopolitanism” and “unimaginative Prussianism” (Moses, 1972, p. 54). This contrast is itself somewhat unimaginative. Although Solf was born in Berlin, like Leutwein he had spent his formative years in the Southwest German state of Baden — about as far away from the Prussian heartland as one could get while still remaining in Germany. Both men had enjoyed a Gymnasium education, followed by law studies (and in Solf’s case, a degree in Sanskritology), before beginning their colonial careers. Leutwein was the son of a Lutheran pastor, but his career was largely within the military, a sector of German society in which the traditional aristocratic elites were still dominant.

Leutwein’s “moderate” treatment of the defeated Witboois after 1894 can be read as a Janus-faced symbolic struggle against settlers and aristocrats, the local representatives of the other sectors of the Wilhelmine elite. Leutwein’s “mild” treatment of the Witboois was criticized by his predecessor, Curt von François, who called for a harsher stance, including the execution of Witbooi and the disarming of his tribe (Bley, 1996, p. 33). In a book published while Leutwein was still Governor, François wrote that it was necessary to treat the natives of Southwest Africa like those in South Africa and the United States, pushing them off their land and into “serving and dependent positions, the only ones that they are suited for” (1899, pp. 82, 203). Leutwein countered that he had a better grasp of the Witbooi’s true character.

**Southwest Africa: The Herero and Negative Assimilation: From Nomadism to Monadism**

Historians sometimes depict the 1904 massacre of the Herero and the policies of postwar period as a break with the less violent policies of the pre-1904 era. It is perhaps more accurate to say that the prewar policy was less unified, even if the central logic of postwar policy was already visible before 1904. The question of cattle and land dominated German discussions throughout the German colonial period. On the one hand, Herero culture could not exist without cattle. Like many other pastoralist societies, the Herero had a “deep sentimental attachment . . . for their cattle” and a ritual life centered around them (Wagner, 1954, p. 117). The Germans recognized that “the accumulation of cattle was the principal object of life of the individual and community” (Ibid., pp. 119–120). As a pamphlet by the Rhenish Mission put it, “cattle are the Herero’s idol” (1867, p. 10). Even before the colonial era, Europeans in Namibia had complained about the Hereros’
unwillingness to sell their cattle. Germans recognized that profitable colonial agriculture would have to be based on cattle, given the ecology of Southwest Africa. The conclusion reached by the colonial state was that land and cattle would have to pass from Herero to German hands. Yet such a transfer would obviously destabilize Herero culture. The goal of colonialism in general was to find a stable format for indigenous culture. This meant that a stabilization policy based on radical difference was unworkable. In Samoa, by contrast, the colonial state had no commitment to wresting more land from native control; a form of stabilization based on traditional forms of landholding was therefore not ruled out. German colonialism in Hereroland can be seen as a series of attempts to solve these two interrelated problems.

During the decade leading up to the war the Germans worked systematically to transfer cattle and grazing land from the Herero to German settlers, European investors, and the colonial state itself. The 1895 law on frontiers allowed the Germans to confiscate Herero cattle that wandered over to the other side, and the law was used energetically. As Leutwein noted, the policy's aim was "to hem in the Herero from both sides," adding that any oxen outside the borders would be seized and any Herero who resisted would be shot," but that "Hereros within their borders will be left alone." He concluded that even a war against the Herero "could be worthwhile, given the number of oxen they have." Another official explained that the goal of this policy was a "peaceful bleeding of the Herero by German traders." Leutwein's measures to regulate the sale of land to Europeans were ostensibly designed to prevent fraud, but they also regularized the steady transfer of land from colonized to colonizer.

If colonial policy seems slightly less one-dimensional before the war than after, this is due to the government's project of creating Herero reserves. But this was merely a continuation of the law on borders. Reserves were an alternative to more directly coercive approaches to stripping the Herero of their resources. Indeed, the first official discussions in 1893/1994 of the idea of reserves saw them as contributing to the gradual disappearance of the Herero rather than their preservation. According to the author of the official report, Richard Hindorf, the Herero would "no longer stand in our way" once they were sent to the reserves, and would "decline as a people." Leutwein passed a decree calling for the creation of Herero reserves at the end of 1903, and some Herero leaders initially supported the idea, though they became less enthusiastic once they became aware of the details (Fürst, 1905, p. 525). War broke out soon after Leutwein's decree, and the entire idea was scrapped.

In contrast to the situation with the Samoans and Witboois (from 1894 to 1904), the Germans showed no interest in preserving Herero culture. Leutwein warned that "a peaceful coexistence with the Hereros is impossible in the long
run unless they completely change their customs and views." Even as the state's actions were depriving the Herero of their cattle, Leutwein insisted that they would have to "acustom themselves to a way of life appropriate to well-to-do people." The Germans intentionally disrupted Herero leadership structures. During the struggle over Herero succession to the title of Paramount Chief in 1890 they threw their weight behind Samuel Maherero and weakened the other pretenders. The fact that Samuel Maherero was a converted Christian meant that the political aspects of chiefdom had to be separated from the cultic ones. Leutwein insisted that the Herero chiefs change their customary succession law into one "closer to our own notions." The Germans' "liberation" of the Berg Damara from their putative Herero overlords in 1894 was a further disruption of Herero custom.

The reconstitution of the Herero as a deracinated, atomized proletariat emerged as the central goal of colonial policy after the war. This was a policy of negative assimilation. Insofar as the aim was to eliminate preexisting cultural forms and to make the colonized similar enough to be easily manageable as a labor force, these postwar policies were assimilationist. Rather than trying to turn the Herero into Europeans, however, the Germans' plan was to turn them into a degraded, deculturated mass.

The 1904 war was in many ways the culmination of this project of destroying Herero culture. General von Trotha, author of the notorious Vernichtungsbefehl (Annihilation Order) against the Herero, was quite aware of the argument - made repeatedly by Leutwein and others - that a program of driving the Herero out of the colony altogether, if taken to its logic extreme, would mean a transition from colonialism to some other sort of social system. But von Trotha's diaries suggest that he himself saw a continuum between his own policies and what I am calling negative assimilation: "The natives have to give way, see America. Either by the bullet or via mission through brandy." The formula "via mission through brandy" could be replaced by the phrase "via degraded assimilation through the native policies pursued after the war."

The generalized assault on Herero culture crystallized after their defeat. The most significant blows were the expropriation of all Herero movable and fixed property, and laws prohibiting the ownership of land and cattle. The Herero lost their traditional leadership. Some leaders were killed in the war, and many survivors, including Samuel Maherero, went into exile in British Betschuanaland. The Germans eliminated the office of the Herero "Captain" altogether (Drießler, 1932, p. 207). Gunter Wagner found in interviews with elderly Hereros in the 1950s that "for many years after the war the majority of tribesmen were not able to maintain regular and close contacts with their kindred" (1954, p. 118), adding that "the complex system of rights and duties
which [previously] had linked the individual to both his patrilineal and matrilineal kin... was more less completely suspended."

The notion that there was nothing in Herero culture worth preserving was now expressed openly. Surviving Herero were assigned to locations near European workplaces.98 One analysis written immediately after the war argued that putting the Herero into "locations" was preferable to letting them live amongst themselves and reproduce their own specific culture. Living close to the colonizer would have "educative" effects on the native (Förster, 1905, p. 527). This marked a shift from the assumption which had underpinned Leutwein's prewar reserves policy, that the Herero "needed the social support provided only in a tribal area," even if they were to be proletarianized (Bley, 1996, p. 119). The Hereros' assimilation was to be an emotional one as well. As an article in the Windhuker Nachrichten put it in 1906, "We wish the Herero to adapt to the attitudes prescribed in Southwest Africa by German law and to make these the basis for his feelings."99 Paul Rohrbach, a prolific publicist and Commissioner for Settlement in Southwest Africa between 1903 and 1906, summarized this plan: "our job is to divest this tribe... of their specific volkish and national character and to gradually meld them into a single colored work force" (1907, p. 21).100 It would be difficult to find a sharper contrast with the fetishization of native tradition in German Samoa.

Various aspects of policy demonstrate that this was to be a degraded version of similarity. Herero males over the age of seven were required to wear metal identity tags around their necks, and some employers added numbers to the names of their Herero workers.101 The Herero were being turned from fundamentally strange racial others into a degraded version of the European or German. An example of the combination of similarity with degradation concerns the so-called Bambusen, who were helpers attached to individual Germans in the Schutztruppe (Gewald, 1999, pp. 204-205). As one postwar traveler observed, the Bambusen were often given comical German names. The key, however, was that these names were not only absurd, but also "a small reminder of Germany" (Freimut, 1909, p. 37). Their partial similarity made them more easily manageable and provided certain emotional rewards for the colonizers.

There were no guarantees that native policy would succeed, as was seen in the breakdown of the collaborative structure involving the Witbooi. The Witbooi example also points to the role of the colonized themselves in producing stabilized native policies. In order for a system of native policy to be reproduced there had to be at least partial cooperation on the part of the colonized. The integration of Herero men into the army provided increased opportunities for surveillance, but perhaps more importantly, it played a role in the "voluntary" adoption of the colonizers' culture by the Herero. The Herero troop (Truppspieler) ceremonies
spread precisely during a period of widespread adoption of the signifiers of the colonized. These involved a sort of Prussian-style military play-acting and, later, commemoration of the dead. While the troop ceremonies may have represented a site of oblique resistance to the colonizers, as various anthropologists have claimed, they were also a site of negative assimilation. At the very least, the Herero were exchanging their own signifiers for those of the enemy—indeed, for a degraded, object version of the colonizers’ culture. The timing of the sudden wave of Herero conversion to Christianity, immediately after the war, underscores the context of defeat in which these processes of cultural transformation occurred.

Precolonial Discourse, Symbolic Struggle, and Imaginary Identification with the Herero

Why were Germans so hostile to the Herero, even before 1904? The reason for this was an inherited, overwhelmingly hostile view of the Herero which was much older than the colony itself. Hugo Hahn, the first European missionary to the Herero, was already relentlessly negative. Hahn had described the skulls of his own parishioners in amateur craniometric style, positing a correlation between their small “brain shell” and limited capacity for thought (1984–1985, pp. 324–325). Reading these documents, one is struck by the missionaries’ projection of their own frustration onto their ethnographic object, in a language of barely concealed anger and condemnation. The mission’s annual survey in 1847 summarized the “entire character” of the Herero as consisting of “robbery and murder, theft and whoring, hypocrisy and lying.” Hugo Hahn concluded that the Herero could not be ruled benevolently “but only by fear” and that it would be best if white men would govern in the area. Echoing European discussions of the so-called “natural extinction of the lower races,” Hahn suggested ominously that both the Herero and the Nama were innately less “capable” and hence likely to die out (1984–1985, pp. 929–930, 1108). Hugo Hahn was the earliest and most influential early reporter on the Herero, whose views were communicated to countless interlocutors in the protectorate, the Cape, and Germany.

One increasingly common trope, which became central to von Trotha’s counter-identification, was Herero cruelty and “hardheartedness” (C. Büttner, 1884, p. 58). This was perhaps surprising, in that the Herero had initially been described by the missionaries as a passive people, due to their subordination to Jonker Afrikaner in the 1840s. But in a report from Hereroland to the mission headquarters in Germany from 1880, the Rhenish Missionary Baumann summarized their character as “inhumane”; and in an official report on fifty years of missionary work among the Herero in 1894, the emphasis was on their “boundless cruelty” and “cruelest cruelty.”
Missionary views of the Herero during the first two decades of the colonial era did not change much. The cultural inscrutability of the Herero and their resistance to Christianity continued to be intensely frustrating to the missionaries, and they responded with continuing symbolic violence. The Rhenish missionary J. Irle, who worked with the Herero in the years before and after the war, summarized Herero character as "boastful, vain, proud, chattering, quarrelsome, stingy and beggarly, full of falsehood and deceit, thankless and disloyal... oblivious to pain and unmoved even by the death of their own... inhuman and unmerciful with foreigners and cruel to enemies," concluding that "this character goes only too perfectly with his black skin color" (J. Irle, 1906, pp. 59–60). The missionaries had always been appalled by the Herero worship of cattle and their "nomadic" lifestyle. Irle put this at the center of his "character portrait": "in sum, they are a nomadic people, and the constant moving about with livestock has deadened their moral sensibility to the point where it has almost hit rock bottom" (nahezu auf den Tiefpunkt gebracht; J. Irle, 1906, p. 59). Irle insisted that "years of observation" had been necessary to reach this knowledge of the Herero (Ibid., p. 60), but his portrait could almost have been copied verbatim from Hugo Hahn’s reports a half century earlier (see also Viehe, 1890). The Barmen missionaries’ insistence on the moral and mental inferiority of the Herero, decade after decade, is shocking and ominous.

Official views of the Herero during the years leading up to the war resembled those of the missionaries. German officers reproduced the conventional descriptions of the Herero as proud, incomprehensible, cruel, and even "Satanic" (Trautmann, 1914, p. 286). Five years before the war, Lieutenant Schwabe wrote that the Herero was "no longer a human, but an animal" once his passions were unleashed (1899, p. 361). Karl Döve perceived "an untamable hatred of the whites in the heart of all of [the Herero], a hatred that baptismal water cannot quench and that education cannot eliminate." He insisted that the Germans treat the Herero the way the Boers have always dealt with the Kaffirs" (1913, pp. 194–195). The colony’s second and third leaders, Curt von François and Theodor Leutwein, described the Herero in terms almost indistinguishable from their precolonial predecessors. Von François’ account of the early years of German colonialism in Southwest Africa begins his first impressions of Herero as "masters in sly peasant politics (schlauer Bauernschlau) and in the art of dissimulation (Verstellungskunst)," characterized by their "untoward impudence and arrogance (Überhebung). Von François continued that he "had encountered many Negro tribes, but never before one that treated the white man with such undisguised disdain" (1899, pp. 46–47). Later in the text he criticized the Herero for their aversion to the colonial government and the "white race" in general (Ibid., p. 108). Although von François initially went to some lengths
to assure his readers that he had distanced himself from the harsh views of the natives that were prevalent among white settlers in the colony (Ibid., pp. 29, 45), he ended up reproducing the dominant formulas concerning the Herero almost word-for-word. Von François acknowledged that the Herero would resist efforts to steal their land, and that the task would require weaponry and troops (Ibid., pp. 203, 249). This was a remarkable statement of the war’s inevitability, published five years before the 1904 massacre. Along similar lines, Major Leutwein explicitly rejected the extension of the Geneva convention to Southwest Africa, arguing that colonialism is “always inhumane” and “must ultimately amount to an encroachment on the rights of original inhabitants in favor of the intruders.”

Read against the events of 1904, such accounts have a powerful sense of the self-fulfilling prophecy. The discourse on Herero cruelty by General von Trotha continued a long tradition of precolonial and prewar representations. Precolonial ethnographic discourse on the Herero had been monotonously repetitive, homogeneous, and hegemonized. Colonial policies seemed to flow directly from such statements. Helmut Bley’s classic history of the colony is structured around the idea of a path to extremism in German policy, starting in 1904, and in contrast with the prewar policies of Leutwein (Bley, 1996, p. 152). Yet it is important to recognize the structural similarity of the post-1904 policies with these prewar policies, and the roots of both in a deeper ethnographic imaginary.

In 1872, Gustav Fritsch divided European views of the Herero into two camps, the “naive panegyrists,” who would soon be disabused of their enthusiasms, and the more realistic critics like himself (Fritsch, 1872, p. 219). Yet there is not a trace of the Rousseauian code in precolonial treatments of the Herero (disregarding the comments on “statuesque” Herero bodies). Nor is there much evidence of a relativizing or revindicating approach, even among the German Social Democrats, from whom one might have expected some sympathetic identification with the colonized. German discourse on the Herero before the war was instead almost entirely dominated by self-described “realists” like Fritsch.

Because of the homogeneous character of the discourse on the Herero, individual colonizers were less able to pursue projects of social class distinction or imaginary exaltation. Leutwein’s disagreement with Trotha may well have been motivated in part by the class hostility that arose “naturally” between a pastor’s son and a scion of the “ancient aristocracy of the Saale district” in Wilhelmine Germany, but this did not lead him to propose a more sympathetic view of the Herero or to fantasize about being a Herero chief. Attention to imaginary identifications may, however, allow us to understand the spiral of
hysterical violence associated with von Trotha’s discourse and his conduct of the war. Challenged by middle-class upstarts like Leutwein, who were threatening to usurp his ancient class privileges, von Trotha angrily adopted a paradoxical identification with his caricatured image of the enemy, becoming as savage as the “cruel” Herero. In October 1904, von Trotha issued a proclamation to the Herero, calling himself “the great general of the German soldiers” and threatening that “within the German borders, every Herero, with or without weapons . . . will be shot. I will no longer shelter women and children . . . This is my message to the Herero people” (Pool, 1991, p. 272). Von Trotha’s self-image seems to have been drawn from the Germans’ racist image of the Herero. But his wrath was directed as much against the “soft” opinions of the German middle classes as against the Herero themselves.

Southwest Africa: The Rehoboth Basters as Cultural Middlemen

The fundamental problem for Germans confronting the Rehoboth Basters, a group descended from Boers and Khoikhoi, was once again to make sense of a culture that seemed to fluctuate unpredictably between familiarity and difference. The challenge to any colonial regime was to elaborate a network of signifiers that promised to halt this endless oscillation of meaning. The web of meaning was woven from materials found in existing precolonial imagery.

The dominant colonial strategy that emerged with respect to the Rehobothers emphasized their very “in-betweenness.” The obvious political model would be one in which the Basters would be treated as solid allies with various privileges. To preserve the rule of colonial difference, however, the Rehobothers were not to be completely assimilated. The 1885 “Protection Treaty between the German Kaiser and the Rehoboth Basters” granted them greater rights than the Herero had been given in a treaty concluded just 13 days earlier. Civil or criminal legal cases involving a Rehobother and a European were to be judged by a mixed court appointed by the Kaiser and the Rehoboth Captain.16 In exchange for these relative privileges, the Basters agreed in 1895 to provide troops to the Germans for training and military reserves. The following year Rehobother soldiers helped put down an uprising by the Mbanderu, a branch of the Herero, and in 1903 they participated in the campaign against the rebellion of the Bondelswars, a small Namaqua polity in the south (Bayer, 1984 [1906], pp. 28, 30; Gewald, 1999, p. 273). General von Trotha was “generous enough” to let the Basters fight on the front line at the decisive battle of Waterberg in 1904, where the Hereros were defeated (Fischer, 1913, p. 42).

The discursive centerpiece of the stabilizing project during the German colonial period was the figure of mixed blood and the mixed culture that was seen
as emerging from it like a superstructure. Various writers derived Baster culture from their dual racial legacy. The German Lieutenant Franz Joseph von Bülow saw the Rehobothers as descendants of a “heroic race” (the Boers), which had defended their families against the “bloodthirsty Kaffirs and Hottentots,” a race in which the “Germanic element” was still visible (von Bülow, 1896, p. 60). At the same time, Bülow added, they revealed “all of the shortcomings of the Hottentot race: nomadism, indolence, love of war, thievishness, sneakiness, and “degeneracy of character and customs” (Ibid., p. 62). For Karl Dove, the Basters inherited intelligence, independence, and industriousness from their white forebears, but combined these traits with “unreliability” and “laziness” from the Khoikhoi side (Dove, 1896b, p. 82; Idem, 1913, p. 208). Maximilian Bayer believed that the Rehobothers’ white blood made them “easier for us to understand” (1984 [1906], p. 43). From the colonizers’ standpoint, this was the basis of an ideal native identity: similar enough to be comprehensible, yet containing enough of the “inferior” culture to justify foreign domination.

Yet this mixed cultural heritage mixture was not enough to provide a solid foundation for colonial domination. The combination of “white” and “Hottentot” blood could also be volatile. Indeed, in other colonial settings including Samoa, so-called half-castes were viewed as particularly “troublesome” (Salesa, n.d.). The most significant contribution to the problem of stabilizing this mixture of blood and culture was made by (in)famous eugenicist Eugen Fischer (1913). In an attempt to demonstrate the laws of Mendelian inheritance in humans, Fischer studied Baster physical traits such as size, facial structure, nose, lips, ears, hair, eyelids, and eye color. These measurements suggested to Fischer that the Rehobothers were indeed a mixture of two races rather than a new, third race (“ein Rassengesmisch, keine Mischrasse”; Ibid., p. 224). Fischer’s “genetic” analysis thus obliquely acknowledged the core dilemma of colonial governance. Shifting into a less biological mode, and gesturing toward the dangers of instability, Fischer remarked that racial half-castes sometimes exhibited “disharmonious” traits (Ibid., p. 298). As a scientist writing in an explicitly colonial setting and hoping to draw policy conclusions for colonial governance, Fischer faced the problem of reconciling his finding of a wide and “disharmonious” distribution of racial traits with the need for a stabilizing solution.

The logic of the colonial state required that Fischer ignore the potentially centrifugal implications of his genetic analysis – that since the Rehobothers were unstable and heterogeneous “racially,” they were also culturally capricious – and to seek a unifying solution within the realm of culture instead. The long section of the book that followed the investigation of inherited traits sought to demonstrate that racial mixtures did not necessarily lead to cultural indeterminacy. Fischer’s working assumption here, completely unmotivated by the
Mendelian analysis, and strikingly at odds with the general thrust of the eugenec approach with which he is usually associated, was that the Rehobothera did in fact form a cultural unity (Ibid., p. 230). Fischer described this harmonious culture as occupying an “intermediate” location between Khoikhoi and Boer, and offered numerous concrete examples. The typical Baster cane was described as a Mittelding – literally, an “intermediate object” – between an African Kirri and a European walking stick. Rehobother burial rituals were a settled “mixture” (Mischung) of “Hottentot and Christian customs” (Ibid., pp. 249, 282). Fischer’s decision to complement his “anthropological” race study with a cultural-ethnographic one was driven by the imperative to turn the Basters’ “Rassengemisch” into a solid foundation.

The last section of Fischer’s book reasserted the role of blood, but it now was mobilized to defend the rule of colonial difference. Even if the Basters are superior to other natives (Ibid., pp. 31, 35, 299), their Khoikhoi blood condemned them to a position of inferiority vis-à-vis whites, whose leadership they would always require. But they have enormous political value for the colony (Ibid., pp. 298, 301). Their feelings of superiority to other native groups were “exaggerated” but could be “usefully exploited” by deploying the Basters as a “native police force” (Ibid., p. 301).

Where the Basters’ indeterminate mix of blood might have served to reinforce their cultural ambiguousness, Fischer abandoned his biologic persona and remobilized the Baster blood mixture almost alchemically as the foundation for a coherent identity. The colonial state, and many other Europeans before Fischer, had come to a similar conclusion. Fischer’s study merely provided a reassuringly “scientific” legitimation (albeit one that could hardly stand up to scrutiny) for an approach that was already conventional.120

As in the preceding cases, this stabilizing policy required some degree of cooperation on the part of the colonized. The Basters’ very name, which they proudly embraced, insistently called attention to their “illegitimacy.” But this does not mean that all Rehobothera accepted these descriptions. The fact that they were sometimes described as wankelmütig (fickle) in official colonial documents,121 despite interventions intended to put an end to such “fickleness,” suggests as much. Individual Rehobothera protested their assignment to an inferior status. Fischer reported the indignant response to his research of one Rehobother who told him to study the white missionaries instead (1913, p. 57). Fischer reported the indignant response to his research of one Rehobother who told him to study the white missionaries instead (1913, p. 57). The Basters’ rebellion against the Germans in 1915, once they were assured of support from the South African troops, demonstrates that their earlier cooperation with the Germans had not been a sign of agreement or brainwashing.
Precolonial Discourse

Again, these colonial-era policies and representations were largely continuous with earlier Cape colony practices and representations. A letter to the Cape Monthly Magazine in 1857 (July–Dec., pp. 123) insisted that the Basters, “from having a mixture of European blood in them, are generally more intelligent than the unmixed breed.” One German writer in the Cape described the Basters as a “refinement” of the Hottentot, “at least in terms of their names,” which stemmed from the oldest, most respected Dutch families of the colony” (Kretzschmar, 1853, p. 214). Such views gained ground as eugenics and social Darwinism emerged over the course of the 19th century, even if some eugenicists argued that mixed-race individuals inherited the worst traits from both parents. In a discussion of the Basters in his 1868 travel narrative Drei Jahre in Südafrika (Three Years in South Africa), Gustav Fritsch insisted that one could not overlook the positive effects, both “physical and mental,” of “the admixture of white blood” (1868, p. 257). When the Cape Colony Basters migrated north and settled at Rehoboth in the 1870s, they were accompanied not only by their missionary, but by an entire set of ethnographic descriptions.

Samoa: the Lotos Islands

The colonial government in Samoa initially confronted a dilemma comparable to the one in Southwest Africa. Events during the period leading up to annexation had demonstrated that the Samoans were just as volatile and dangerous as the Khoikhoi. Struggles over succession to the position of tupu (king) had given Europeans a sense of the radical foreignness of the stakes and emotions driving native politics. On the other hand, the majority of Samoans had converted to Christianity during the 19th century. Samoan identity and culture therefore seemed to flicker between an unfathomable strangeness and an uncanny familiarity.

The Germans’ solution was to emphasize Samoan tradition (fa’a Samoa) rather than attacking it, as in Hereroland. The guiding principle of native policy, as it emerged under Governor Solf and was continued by his successor, Erich Schultz-Ewerth, was the preservation of the “good” aspects of precolonial tradition – those which promised stability and did not threaten German control. As Solf explained to one group of Samoans, “I have often told natives that the German Government wishes them to be ruled, not according to white man’s ideas, but according to the fa’a Samoa... For this reason I do not wish to interfere in your Samoan titles and such things.” The Ali’i Sili (paramount chief), Mata’afa, in his written communications with the rest of the Samoans,
confirmed this description of the Government's program, agreeing that "the Governor's resolve... shows certainly that he wishes to see the Samoan customs preserved." Sometimes this entailed a surprising hostility to the "modernization" of Samoa.

The ways in which the government would solve the problem of stabilizing a radically different culture were revealed almost immediately after Solf assumed office, when he was forced to deal with the ritualistic distribution of fine, sacred mats ('le toga). The Samoan tupu was required by tradition to carry out such a distribution upon assuming office. One problem for the colonial government was that distributions of fine mats in the past had provoked intra-Samoan war. A further problem was the conventional meaning of the mat distribution for Samoans. In the case of Mata'afa's promotion to tupu, mats were to circulate first from the orators in the local districts to Mata'afa, who would then redistribute the mats to the districts. This signified to Samoans that the tupu owed his position to the orators and village chiefs. But according to the Germans, Mata'afa had been made Ali'i Sili by the German Emperor and his local representative, the Governor. Solf decided not to ban the distribution outright, in keeping with his preference for tradition, but tried instead to choreograph the ritual in ways that prevented conflict and underscored his own centrality. A related problem derived from the Europeans' inability to distinguish sacred mats from mats serving as currency, or to understand how monetary values were attached to individual mats. The government attempted to bring order to this issue by creating an office, staffed by Papalagi (whites) and Samoans, whose job was to determine the exact value of each mat and to provide it with a government stamp. This example suggests that the government's aim was neither to radically transform Samoan culture nor to preserve it unchanged, but to stabilize and control it, with "tradition" as the preferred point of fixity.

Another dimension of the state's attempt to preserve an ordered version of custom involved the broad area of Samoan "collectivism" or communism, centered on the extended kinship or descent group, the 'aiga and its power over the individual. The government determined that fine mats could not be seized in court judgments, since they were defined as belonging to the entire community rather than the individual. The Land and Titles Court, introduced by the Germans, sometimes overruled individual interests in favor of the 'aiga. In one case, discussed by Meleisea (1987, p. 55), the Samoan Chief Justice Su'atele tried to introduce the foreign concept of a written will as a substitute for the traditional mavaega, "a chief's dying wish concerning the inheritance of his title." The German head of the Commission decided in favor of the traditional form that was supported by other members of Su'atele's 'aiga against
the more individualistic or "modern" concept. Another case of the defense of collectivism involved the government's importation of Chinese laborers to work the European plantations rather than forcing Samoans to work. In an extended discussion of native policy in the European Governing Council, on July 10, 1913, the Governor argued that Samoans were actually more productive when they were allowed to keep their "communist" or collectivist system of village-level work rather than being forced into individualistic labor contracts.

The emphasis on stability sometimes led the colonial government to repress customary practices. Solf insisted again and again that he would uphold only "the good Samoan customs." The most significant changes in precolonial ways involved the basic structure of Samoan "self-government," as it was disingenuously referred to by colonial officials. Solf attempted to shift the center of indigenous politics from the central level to the localities. The title of *tupu* was abolished in 1900 in favor of the new position of Ali'i Sili. When Mata'afa died in 1912, the Ali'i Sili position was also eliminated. At the local level, Solf tried - though with less success - to limit the power of the traditional "speaking chiefs" or orators (*tulafale*). Though the Germans never went so far as to abolish the tulafale, they created new local native officials as intermediaries between the colonial state and the districts and villages. The *mailo* at Mulimu, a central body of high-ranking chiefs (*Ta'umu*), and more numerous district representatives (*Faipule*), was abolished in 1905 after the Lafoga 'Oloa revolt, and replaced by an advisory body (the *Fono of Faipule*) made up of 27 hand-picked, salaried Faipule (Davidson, 1967, p. 83).

Solf's efforts to diminish the power of central Samoan government demonstrates that his overriding priority was stabilization rather than any particular version of stability. Yet the colonial project, once it was set in motion, had a self-perpetuating logic of its own. One example of this is Solf's opposition to marriage between Samoans and Europeans and his discomfort with the so-called half-castes. This stemmed from his politics of fetishized difference. It certainly would have been possible, and probably more rational in strategic terms, for Solf to court the Samoan half-castes as collaborators rather than repeatedly insulting them. Half-castes were indeed sometimes "unruly" - the instigator of the Lafoga 'Oloa movement in 1905 was a "syncretic" individual, Pullak, whose father was a German customs official (see Selesa, n.d.). But other "half-castes" collaborated with the colonial state. Solf relied extensively on Charles Taylor, "the educated son of an English sailor and a Samoan woman," (Fristoe, 1977, p. iv) in his efforts to understand and regulate Samoan culture. The contrast with the Rehoboth Basters is instructive. The different treatment of these two colonial "mixed-race" groups resulted from the differing assessment of the respective non-European cultures - the "ancestral race" or *Stammrasse.* German rulers in
Southwest Africa were ambivalent at best about Khoikhoi culture, but their counterparts in Samoa were motivated by a desire to protect Samoan difference. The colonizers' beliefs, in other words, could lead to "excess" enforcement of difference, overriding even strategic calculations of utility.

The colonial government's defense of Samoan tradition went so far as to overrule individual Samoans who wanted to pursue more "European" practices, accusing them of deviating from their own tradition. The government's regulations limiting the sale of Samoan land to foreigners was one example of tradition being protected even against the wishes of particular Samoans. The government tried to coax the Samoans back into traditions which they were abandoning, urging them to use traditional roofing materials rather than corrugated steel on their houses. As Schultz-Ewerth wrote, "My aim is that the customs and mores of the Samoans, and their peculiar character (ihre Eigenart) more generally, are preserved... whenever practicable." Meleisea argues that the Land and Titles Commission, whose mandate was to adjudicate internal Samoan disputes over ancestral titles and land claims following customary Samoan law, was established "not so much to preserve Samoan institutions" as to "manipulate and control the decision making process by which the legitimacy of chiefly titles and authority over land was recognized" (Ibid.: xii). This is largely true, but it ignores the specific contents of the manipulative process. Decisions like the one against Su'atele threw sand in the face of the processes that were leading inexorably to a more atomized, reified, capitalist culture among the Samoans. In Southwest Africa, by contrast, German court decisions typically favored settlers, mining companies, and the commodification of land and labor.

How can we explain the peculiar contents of the colonial manipulations in Samoa? This trajectory only makes sense if we acknowledge the existence of a relatively autonomous, inherited understanding of Samoan culture as something special and worth preserving. Colonial Governor Solf and his successor Schultz-Ewerth both articulated a view of Samoans as noble savages in their private correspondence. Solf insisted that the Samoans "don't think like us, have different emotions, and hence they have to handled differently." In a dispute with the author of the Kalahari Bushman ethnographies, Siegfried Passarge, Solf argued that the "Samoans were better than the Herero and Hottentots in every respect." Solf was adamant that the colonial office could not assimilate the Samoans to other Naturvölker, and insisted that "the conditions of the natives in our colonies are so different from one another that the ambition of finding a unified method" for the treatment of native law was invalid. Both Solf and Schultz-Ewerth studied and wrote on Samoan culture.
The dominant view was also reflected within mass culture. Samoa emerged even before 1900 as the German public’s favorite colony. There is a remarkable difference in the depiction of Samoa and China, or Southwest Africa, in contemporary mass-circulation magazines. The image of China at the turn of the century in Überall, a magazine associated with the German Navy League, was extremely belligerent. Yet despite the fact that Germans had also recently been involved in military interventions in Samoa, the newest German colony was represented by pictures of smiling, bare-breasted women, happy native schoolchildren, and palm-covered beaches. The catalogue for the exhibition called “land and people of the Samoan islands,” which toured Germany, welcomed “our new compatriots” (Unsere neuen Landsleute) and contrasted them favorably with “blacks” (Neger; Marquardt n.d., p. 3). This catalogue reproduced the usual fantasies about Samoan women, whose “salient attributes” were “softness and obligingness,” as well “loyalty as a spouse, conscientiousness as a housewife,” and the ability to “make life comfortable for the man.” Samoan men were described as proud, combative, and brave” (Marquardt n.d., pp. 3–4). This warlike aspect might have been expected to dampen European enthusiasm for Samoan culture, but it corresponded to the male variant of noble savagery (recall the representation of the Witboois between 1894 and 1904). More importantly, the first action of the new German government was to disarm the Samoans.

*Precolonial Discourse, Symbolic Struggle, and Imaginary Identification with the Samoans*

Solf’s colonial policies and views of the Samoans, and the resonating images that were produced throughout the colonial period, were all of a piece with the dominant precolonial perspective. The Samoans began their European career as ignoble savages when the French explorer La Pérouse lost twelve men in a battle after “discovering” Samoa in 1787 (La Pérouse, 1801, Ch. XI; Linnekin, 1991), but perceptions started to shift almost as soon as Europeans began settling on the islands after 1830. The Reverend John Williams from the London Missionary Society arrived along with a group of Polynesian missionary teachers (Davidson, 1967, p. 31). Williams emphasized a theme that structured later discussions of Samoa and Oceania, insisting that the South Seas had “two races of men,” one “allied to the Negro” and the other resembling the Malay (Ibid., p. 450). The Samoans were aligned with the latter “copper colored race,” which Williams described as being “among the finest specimens of the human family.” The “dark and mysterious” race of “Polynesian Negroes” (later called Melanesians), by contrast, were “enveloped in moral gloom of deeper hue” (Ibid., p. 459). Williams was not alone in this correlation between the moral worth of different Oceanic groups and their skin pigmentation or hair texture. As in Southern Africa, most
Europeans were convinced that the population could be broken up into sharply
delineated racial groups with distinct histories and capacities (N. Thomas, 1997).
Later writers typically agreed with Williams that the Samoans were “much more
cultivated” (Böhr, 1876, p. 429) than the “darker” Oceanic race.

The attributes attached to Samoa and its inhabitants during the second part
of the 19th century constitute a veritable catalogue of noble savagery.149 The
first thing mentioned by most observers of the Samoans was their physical
appearance. The German Navy surgeon Ernst Böhr enthused that “I have never,
without exception, seen such beautiful people” (1876, p. 426). Years later,
another German visitor agreed, writing “the Samoans are the most beautiful
people I have ever met” (Ehlers, 1895, p. 82). In his monograph on the Pacific,
published in 1876, the German geographer Carl E. Meinecke articulated the
emerging consensus that the Samoans were “harmless, mild and friendly, bright
and cheerful,” “clever and dexterous,” “eminently malleable,” “polite,”
“modest,” “hospitalable,” and “clean” (1876, Vol. 2, p. 111).150

The bellicosity of Samoan men, condemned during the first decades of
contact, was now valorized as a souvenir of historical virtues. Robert Louis
Stevenson compared the Samoans to his heroic Scottish ancestors, “who drove
their chariots on wrong side of Roman wall” (1996, p. 1). The men were
described as tall, handsome, muscular, and brave. This emphasis on the bravery
of the primitive warriors was complemented by a portrait of the Samoan woman
as a combination of gentleness, innocence, and sensuality. While the early
missionaries fretted about the Samoans’ “deep immorality” and “shameful rites
and orgies” (Ellis, 1853, Vol. 1, pp. 97–98), later 19th century observers like
Ernst Böhr rhapsodized that “our painters, our poets . . . should come and see
these Samoan girls” (1876, p. 426). These gendered role types were reminiscent
of Le Vaillant’s descriptions of Khoikhoi men and women.

The later Samoan writings of Robert Louis Stevenson, who was hugely
popular in Germany, represent the pinnacle of the discourse of Samoan noble
savagery.151 The Samoans, for Stevenson, were “the gayest and the best enter-
tained inhabitants of our planet” – “very genteel, very songful, very agreeable,
very good-looking, chronically spoiling for a fight,” and the islands had a
“perfect climate; perfect shapes of men and women, with red flowers in their
hair; and nothing to do, but study oratory and etiquette, sit in the sun, and pick
up the fruits as they fall.”152 The Samoans were not only noble, they were also
savages – or, at least, barbarians (Stevenson, 1996, p. 5). More than other non-
Western cultures, Polynesia had become a screen for European fantasies about
earlier historical stages of their own culture, which reinforced sympathy through
identification. Stevenson wrote in the late 1880s that these were the Homeric
Although Stevenson supported the Samoans’ futile struggle to avoid colonial takeover (1895, Vol. II, pp. 270, 272), his daily interactions were strikingly similar to Solf’s explicitly colonial practices. Stevenson’s descriptions of his activities in his estate in Vailima clarify the connections between ethnographic imagery, especially the seemingly benevolent noble savagery discourse, and the practical management of “natives.” Like Solf, Stevenson behaved like a benevolent and pedantic father, addressing Samoans as children. For Stevenson, the articulation of infantilism with barbarism seems to have meant that Samoans had to be guided, gently but firmly. But he was very pleased, like Solf, that the Samoans (his workers) seemed to “really and fairly accept me as a chief” (1895, Vol. II, p. 196). Stevenson gleefully reported to Colvin, his British correspondent, that he had received a Samoan name, called out by a chief at kava-drinking ceremony (1895, Vol. I, p. 193). Stevenson’s household “native policy,” and the personal profits he seemed to derive from it, brings us almost up to the moment of transition to explicit colonial rule.

Given that Wilhelm Solf embarked on his project of fetishized difference almost immediately upon assuming office, one might wonder about the exact transmission to him of these practical discourses of Samoan noble savagery. Solf served as Municipal President of Apia in 1899 and became the colony’s first Governor in 1900. He had no prior experience in colonial government, but had served briefly as a translator with the German Consulate in Calcutta and as a judge in Dar es Salaam, in the German colony of East Africa. Yet his papers began to betray the dominant German/European ethnographic perspective on Samoa almost immediately after his arrival in Apia. It is possible that Solf had been exposed to literature on Polynesia before arriving in Samoa. He was highly educated and ethnographically curious – his 1886 dissertation was on an obscure Sanskritist topic, the Kashmiri reception of the gandhabba Puncasikha. He immersed himself in the existing literature on Samoan custom soon after arriving in the islands. Pre-colonial Samoa had been crowded with amateur ethnographers, and Solf studied their publications. Many of the old “Samoan hands” were still in Apia when he arrived, and Solf immediately became part of this community. Another important source were the specialists in Samoan affairs within the Colonial Department of the Foreign Office: Schmidt-Dargitz, who had served in Samoa for six years during the 1890s, and Oskar Wilhelm Stuebel, a former German Consul at Apia. Stuebel, who became Solf’s main supporter and interlocutor in the Foreign Office, had published a foundational study of Samoan culture in 1896, Samoanische Texte. In a letter to Solf in 1899, Schmidt-Dargitz glowingly described the “highly attractive traits of this clever Kanaka people” and asked whether the Samoans “were not
actually more intelligent than our own peasantry, at least in the East?” 161 All of Solf’s preferred correspondents shared this view of Samoa. 162

A radically different view of Samoans did emerge among the settlers, and Solf was involved in an ongoing struggle with their main spokesman, the planter Richard Deeken. 163 Attempting to account for the settlers’ more openly racist perspective, Solf speculated that most of them were too uneducated to “find their way into” (sich hineinfinden) the Samoans peculiar “logic,” their “foreign ways of thought”; “Hence the phrases bloody Kanaka, this damned Nigger!” 164 The settlers were supported by the Center Party representative Trimborn in the Reichstag and the anthropologist Passarge. The incidents involving Deeken and the settlers illustrate not just that colonial discourse was multivocal, but that a given perspective could only influence state policy if its bearers were represented within the power structure. In his opposition to the settlers Solf received support from the highest levels of the Foreign Office and from the Kaiser himself. Deeken was thrown in jail and eventually expelled from the colony. 165

This multivocality suggests that Solf’s policy choice was not a forgone conclusion, but that he had to actively align himself with the noble savage paradigm. Why was it so obvious to him that this view, rather than the one defended by Deeken and the settlers, was correct? And why did Solf defend this position so vigorously? The answer is that Solf (like Stevenson) was guided by imaginary and symbolic social class projects. He was an educated middle-class man in a world dominated by commercial and neo-aristocratic classes. His father was a Berlin industrialist (Moses, 1972, p. 44). In his very first career posting with the Consular Service, Solf had worked under Baron von Heyking in Calcutta. The relationship between the arrogant Heyking and the younger, middle-class German with little inherited capital was strained from the start, coming to a crisis precisely around Solf’s activities as Honorary Philological Secretary of the Calcutta Council of the Asiatic Society. 166

Solf’s perspective on Samoa allowed him to develop an imaginary identification as chief of a traditional and noble society. Solf presented himself as representative of the “Kaisa’s” pule, a term that had referred in earlier times exclusively to the main orator groups from six towns on the island of Savai’i with traditional privileges, but that had assumed the extended meaning of “authority” or “power” in more recent times. Solf sometimes blurred his own identity with that of the Ali’i Sili, saying “it is difficult for me, Mata’afa,” or proclaimed “I do not come here as the Governor, but . . . as a Chief amongst Chiefs.” 167 Solf opened and concluded meetings with Samoan leaders with the traditional kava-drinking ritual, and spoke to Samoans holding the traditional emblems of the Samoan orator, the large staff and the fine or fly whisk. 168 His
communications were often framed within Samoan fables and figures of speech. After repressing the 'Oloa movement in 1905, for example, Solf travelled to the traditional Samoan power center of Lufilei and gave a speech in the form of a Samoan fable, reprimanding the people for their ungratefulness to the colonial government. The governor also regularly addressed the Samoans as children, positioning himself as their father. Becoming an imaginary Samoan chief afforded Solf a fantasmatic form of social mobility. This practice of identification was more related to daydreaming than to any real bid for fungible cultural capital. Indeed, critics tried to use Solf’s self-styling as Samoan chief to embarrass him (see Tyszka, 1904). Yet colonial officials like Solf were able to enlist large numbers of real people in their “daydreams”.

Within the symbolic, the field of competing representations of Samoa, Solf deployed his “hermeneutic” perspective to distinguish himself culturally from two other dominant class factions present in the colony. Solf’s approach to the Samoans was that of the refined collector who appreciates virtues that others cannot even see. This approach put on display the educational capital which was supposedly necessary to appreciate the virtues of a “primitive” people, distinguishing Solf (and others like him, including Schultz-Ewerth) from both the settlers and the neo-aristocratic elites in the foreign service and the Navy. We saw how Solf described Deeken as too crude to comprehend a radically strange culture. Solf also distanced himself from the nobility, which was associated with a more aggressive approach to Samoan internal politics. Solf had a prickly relationship with the Navy Captain Emmsmann, whom he saw as intervening in internal Samoan politics in a heavy handed way. Solf described Emmsmann, a friend of the Kaiser, as “stupid and vain.” Solf’s rejection of intermarriage in Samoa is also partly explicable in these dynamics of symbolic class distinction. First of all, this was a class strategy directed at the “lower” boundary, since marriage with Samoan women was associated in his mind with sailors and smaller planters. Second was his personal project of upward mobility in the world of German-Prussian diplomacy, which was still dominated by an aristocratic “symbolics of blood” (Foucault, 1980, pp. 124–125, 148–149).

We can now make sense of Solf’s strong adherence to the Samoan noble savage perspective and his equally impassioned rejection of the settlers’ alternative. The noble savagery approach allowed Solf to accomplish three tasks simultaneously: to stabilize indigenous culture; to argue for the superior value of his specific form of cultural capital; and to achieve a sort of status exaltation through imaginary identification with an imago of the Samoan chief. Only by flaunting his appreciation of the intricacies of a radically incommensurable culture was Solf able to claim superiority to the Deekens and von Heykings. Only if the Samoans were noble would it make sense psychologically to form
Precoloniality and Colonial Subjectivity

an imaginary identification as their chief. The noble savagery perspective thus allowed Solf to pursue imaginary and symbolic projects that did not clash with one another.

Qingdao, China, and Hybridity

Native policy in Qingdao during the initial colonial period was guided by a construction of the Chinese as radically and abjectly different. In contrast to Samoa, this strategy was premised on a code of racialized abjection that was formally similar to the treatment of the Herero before 1904. Colonial policy during these years corresponded to hostile atmosphere of the anti-Boxer campaign. A Navy report on battles with the Boxers in the Qingdao area in 1900 referred to the Chinese as “stupid and cruel.”\textsuperscript{173} The descriptions of Chinese officials by the “conqueror” of Qingdao, Admiral Otto von Diederichs, are replete with racial slurs.\textsuperscript{174} The Admiral found numerous examples of what he understood as typical “scurrilous behavior, and of the simplemindedness and superstition that accompanies it” and “the trickiness and unreliability of the yellow race.”\textsuperscript{175} Diederichs treated his Chinese counterpart, General Zhang Gaoyuan, with unconcealed disdain.\textsuperscript{176} A German play called “Our Bluejackets in Jiaozhou” from 1899 began with the lines “here among these Kaffirs” – using the South African epithet as a generic term for “natives” in reference to the Chinese (Schmasow, 1899). The official gazette for the Qingdao colony remarked in 1901 that “there can hardly be an single human race that has a less romantic appearance than the Chinese.”\textsuperscript{177} Chinese laborers in the colony were referred to as “coolies” (Craemer, 1900, p. 229).

The dominant perspective during this period centered on the unbridgeable gap between Europe and China. Every effort was made to separate the Chinese and European zones. The original city planning created a purely German and European bubble, sharply divided from the Chinese locations within Qingdao and from the surrounding Chinese society. Nearby villages which grew too fast or disturbed the careful planning of colonial urban space were “put to rest,” in the revealing words of one of the Navy’s original surveyors (Deimling, 1900, p. 57).\textsuperscript{178} Rather than constructing houses from local materials with local labor, which would have resulted in Chinese-looking dwellings, the Navy command imported a number of prefabricated “tropical houses” (\textit{Tropenhäuser}), staking out a distinctively European built environment (Deimling, 1900, p. 56). Shops, villas, apartments and offices buildings looked as if they had been airlifted out of Munich or Berlin. There were broad, tree-lined boulevards close to the beach.\textsuperscript{179} Many writers echoed the German traveler who began his discussion of Qingdao by remarking: When I arrived in Tsingtau . . . I was overcome by
the feeling: you're in wholly German territory here (ganz auf deutschem Boden), and this feeling accompanied me everywhere during my stay in Tsingtau (Schweitzer, 1914, p. 136). The impression of being in Germany was enforced by the transformation of the natural landscape: "Millions and millions of trees and bushes were planted" in Qingdao.  

German policy attempted not just to accentuate radical cultural difference but to regulate its practical expression. Every aspect of the "native" districts was designed to be distinctively Chinese in ways determined by the colonizer. Streets in the Chinese settlements were named after places in China, whereas street names in the German district had names like Hohenzollernstrasse. At the same time, the Chinese districts were laid out on a grid pattern to facilitate police control — regulated difference. The dwellings of the Chinese apprentices for the Qingdao dockyard were visually indistinguishable from comparable buildings in Germany, but were physically set apart from German housing. The colony's legal code had a dual set of Chinese and European regulations for every institution (Mohr, 1911).

Colonial policy thus began on a note of regulated radical difference. Yet policies in Qingdao began to shift in the middle of the first decade of the 20th century. Communications at an official dinner in 1904 reflected the emerging atmosphere of equality between Germany and China. The German Legation Counsel von der Goltz spoke in praise of the Chinese Emperor, and the Governor of Shandong, in perfect symmetry, replied with a speech in honor of the German Emperor. Several years later, a photograph of the wives and children of Governor Trupel and the Shandong Governor Zhou Fu appeared in the Berliner Abend-Zeitung with a caption that put the Chinese and German Governors on equal footing ("The children of the two Governors"). When a number of upper-class Chinese moved to Qingdao during the 1911 Republican Revolution, the Germans partly lifted the ban on Chinese residence in the city center. Some new public buildings began to combine Chinese and European design elements.

Perhaps the most striking example of cultural rapprochement in this second period was the Qingdao Chinese-German College, which brought together German and Chinese teachers in an atmosphere of mutual respect for a civilizational equal. Plans for the school were developed by the German Sinologist Otto Franke and approved by the central Chinese government. Franke (1911, p. vi) criticized the German "educated classes" for their "race-feeling" and their image of China as the source of a "yellow peril." As we will see below, Franke's views were representative of the translators and Sinologists who increasingly set the tone in Qingdao. The Chinese-German school opened in 1909 with a mixed curriculum of Chinese and German subjects, including
Chinese language and classics and western sciences such as physics and chemistry. The Imperial German and late Qing dynasty flags flew alongside one another in front of the school. The colony's Annual Report of 1907/08 noted that the "Chinese government has insisted on a parallel Chinese track and curriculum" alongside the German one, and that "We agree with their concern that the young people not lose touch with their own literature and culture." According to the Report, "the young men should be educated to love their fatherland... but also to appreciate German culture and to develop their country according to these values." Religious teaching, which in this case meant European religion, was banned at the Qingdao school. This was a highly significant gesture of cultural reconciliation in light of the centuries of conflicts around Christian missionaries in China. Chinese provincial authorities selected the students for admission and helped pay the costs, and alumni were guaranteed admission to Beijing University. By 1914 over 400 Chinese students from all over China were enrolled in the College. At the school's opening ceremony in 1909, speeches were given by a representative of the Chinese Education Ministry and the Governor of Shandong. A central theme was the idea of combining the best of Chinese and European or German culture. Following the speeches a toast was raised to the Chinese Emperor and the Chinese national anthem was sung. The school's German director proclaimed that "all of the cultural peoples (Kulturvölker) are linked by a common bond," and should "share their discoveries." Here the Chinese were unambiguously reinscribed into the dominant pole of this racial/anthropological binary, on the same cultural level as the colonizer, in contrast to their earlier "barbarization."

Precolonial Discourse, Symbolic Struggle, and Imaginary Identification with the Chinese

The two approaches to colonial policy in Qingdao were linked to two distinctive perspectives on China with a very long history, Sinophilia and Sinophobia. The Sinophilic perspective was the older of the two, originating with Marco Polo, and more importantly, with the Jesuit mission to China. The most important aspect of the Jesuit discourse, for our present purposes, was its description of China as a sort of paradise for the educated elite, where they were free of the hereditary aristocracy and superior to the commercial bourgeoisie. Matteo Ricci, who opened the first Jesuit mission in China in 1583, lauded China's government and moral system (Spence, 1998, p. 31). His books presented a "picture of a vast, unified, well-ordered country" run by a "professional bureaucracy" selected on the basis of merit (Ibid., p. 33). The Jesuits' appreciation of certain aspects of Confucianism was the basis for their famous "accommodation" that eventually led to the Rites Controversy,

German Jesuits and philosophers disseminated this image of China in German-speaking Central Europe. Significantly, the most famous German Jesuits' successes in China were due to the Chinese state's recognition of their specifically intellectual capacities. Johann Adam Schall von Bell served as astronomer at the Emperor's Court in Beijing and created the Astronomical Institute (Dühr, 1936; Váth, 1991; Malek, 1998). Johannes Schreck, who came to Beijing in 1695, continued Bell's work (Ruland, 1973, p. 45; Reil, 1978, p. 64). Killian Stumpf, who arrived in 1695, created the first glass factory in China and directed the Imperial Mathematical Office (Reil, 1978, pp. 62, 73).

The Jesuits' picture of China as a system in which political power was based on individual merit rather than inherited position or economic capital had great appeal among European intellectuals. China needed only western science and Christianity in order to progress — something which the intellectuals (and Jesuits) were best suited to provide, according to Leibniz (1994, pp. 31–35). China provided an ideal imaginary solution to the tensions of these dominated classes. Leibniz's pamphlet Latest News from China (1697/1699) insisted that "human cultivation and refinement [was] concentrated . . . in Europe and in China," with Europe being superior in theoretical or scientific knowledge, and China superior with regard to social and political arrangements (1994, p. 45, my emphasis).

The celebrated burst of relativism in which Leibniz called for "missionaries from the Chinese," his insistence that the exchange of knowledge between Europe and China "must be reciprocal," shifted the emphasis from religion to knowledge in general (Leibniz, 1994, p. 51; 1990, p. 64, my emphasis). The leading German Cameralist philosopher during the 18th century, Johann von Justi, agreed in seeing China as much more civilized and enlightened than we Europeans" (1978, p. 35). Frederick the Great's most famous interlocutor, Voltaire, completed the secularization of the Jesuit discourse in his Essai sur les moeurs et l'esprit des nations. The Chinese, according to Voltaire, were "rationally policed" or regulated (policié) "atheists" with an accurate, "strictly empirical" historiography and no absurd creation myths or doctrines of hell (1963, Vol. 1, pp. 66, 71).

This admiration was rooted socially in the middling, knowledge-based sectors of the European population, especially among academics and missionaries. Tellingly, China was not chided in this perspective for its lack of capitalism or a hereditary nobility, in contrast to the Sinophobic discourse of the 19th century. Instead, the fact that "intellectuals" were seen as controlling the Chinese state and were held in such esteem was one of the main reasons for China's appeal. Voltaire revealed that the Sinophile discourse was centered specifically on the
educated Chinese elite by criticizing Anson (see below) for confounding the "little people" of Canton with the Chinese government (1963, Vol. 1, p. 217).

During the precolonial period, most European intellectuals' class projects could only engage China indirectly, but colonialism offered more practical opportunities. Yet one of the paradoxes of the Sinophile discourse relates precisely to this practical field of action. It was difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile colonialism with a discourse that insisted on a reciprocal exchange of knowledge between Europe and China. This dilemma had not confronted the Jesuits, who had fitted themselves into the existing Chinese power structure. The translators and Sinologists working in the Qingdao administration were forced to confront the incompatibility between their understanding of China as an advanced civilization and colonialism itself, which relied on the rule of difference. The logical conclusion would have been some sort of partnership with China rather than colonialism. This conclusion was avoided only because German colonial officialdom in Qingdao remained divided, with representatives of the Sinophobic view still active and powerful even during the last decade.

The conventional story about European and German views of China points to a shift from mainly positive representations to increasingly negative views in the mid-18th century. Rather than reviewing this large literature in its entirety, I want to focus on three central changes: (1) the racialization of the Chinese, that is, their transformation into generic "natives"; (2) the recodification of the Chinese as mimic men who had lost any original cultural uniqueness due to exposure to the west; and (3) the recoding of even those features of Chinese culture which had been praised in the earlier literature as having always in fact been inferior. Each of these arguments represented a direct response to, and an inversion of, aspects of the Sinophile discourse.

The racialization of the Chinese was accomplished in a series of moves over the course of the 18th and 19th centuries. The Chinese had traditionally been located among the upper links of the Great Chain of Being, but by the later 18th century, race theorists, craniologists, and physical anthropologists began to include China in their purview. Carl von Linné's System of Nature (1735) had included the Chinese within the human category of Homo/Monstrous, describing them telegraphically with the words "head conic." Significantly for our purposes, Linné grouped the Chinese with the "Hottentots," considered by many Europeans at the time as the epitome of debasement. By the middle of the 19th century, the shapes of Chinese skulls and facial angles were being correlated with moral failings like "cunningness" (Goltz, 1858, pp. 89, 95). Carl Gustav Carus, who argued that not just brain size but also the color and inner "constitution" of the skin and the racially-distinctive shape of the hand helped explain differences in intelligence, compared the Chinese to a "herd" with a
"certain mediocrity of the soul" (1849, pp. 59–60, 62). In all European languages, the Chinese changed from "white" to "yellow" in the 19th century (Dennel, 1992). Many late 18th and 19th-century German writers followed Buffon in speaking of a "Mongol" race, which was described by Blumenbach in 1775 as an "extreme degeneration[] of the human species." An extremely influential Sinophobic text during the nineteenth century, John Barrow's *Travels in China*, described the Chinese in explicitly racial terms. In his *Travels in Southern Africa* (published before the Chinese narrative, although the actual travels were later), Barrow discussed alleged physical similarities between the Chinese and the Khoikhoi, and moved from there to speculations about their shared origins (1801, Vol. 1, pp. 277–283). German translations and discussions of Barrow often included an engraving comparing Chinese and Khoikhoi faces. Herder introduced his discussion of China in *Ideas for a Philosophy of the History of Mankind* (1784) in the context of his argument that the "shape of head and brain, of body and nerves" shapes the "entire destiny of man." Herder's entire discussion of this question opened with a contrast between Asia and what he called the "wellformed nations." The raciological approach was critical in wrestling the Chinese away from their status as a Kulturvolk and realigning them with the catalogue of epithets associated by Europeans with Africa.

The depiction of the Chinese as mimic men received its initial impetus from the publication in 1748 of George Anson's best-selling *Voyage Around the World*, which was translated into German in 1795. Commodore Anson's account of his five-month stay in Macao and Canton was structured as a point-by-point refutation of "jesuitical fictions" (Anson, 1974, pp. 368, 236). He drew on merchants' accounts to paint a portrait of the Chinese as deviously manipulating European cultural ignorance. Dishonesty, artifice, falsehood, and corruption were key traits (*Ibid.*, p. 351). In a passage widely cited by later writers, Anson described the tricks supposedly used by Chinese merchants, such as stuffing ducks full of gravel to increase their weight (pp. 355–356). In addition to trickery, the Chinese were mimics, whose skills lay mainly in "imitation" (*Ibid.*, p. 367). For Herder, Chinese education represented little more than training in "manners" (*Manieren*). He also declared the Chinese and their language to be "artificial" (1985, p. 285).

Montesquieu's *Spirit of Laws* was the fount of the literature in which positive aspects of China were recoded as negative. While intellectuals and Jesuit missionaries had described China as the land of the philosopher-king, Montesquieu made China into a prototype of despotism and tyranny. Where the Jesuits had applauded China for its stable conservatism, the new modish opinion reversed this judgment, condemning Chinese civilization as static or
declining. While the absence of a hereditary nobility and sharp class distinctions pleased the Sinophiles, it was repugnant to the Sinophobes. John Barrow complained that China had no nobility and that property brought nothing, while learning guaranteed employment and power (1805, p. 259). Reversing Justi’s earlier juxtaposition of the European and Chinese court societies, Barrow portrayed the Chinese court as *materially impoverished* rather than thrifty. Where the Jesuits had sought to find common ground between Christianity and Confucianism, Barrow insisted that Chinese religious beliefs not only “appear absurd and ridiculous” to us, but are equally “inexplicable by the people themselves who confess them.”

Baron von Richthofen condemned the learned Chinese Mandarins, who were praised by the Sinophiles, as “conceited and supercilious” (Richthofen, 1907, Vol. 1, p. 18). The exam system, which had been seen as the centerpiece of a meritocracy, was now treated as a sham. Cornelius de Pauw, a Dutchman at the Prussian court who was Frederick the Great’s main local informant on things Chinese (and a counterweight to Voltaire), repeated most of Anson’s criticisms and denied that Chinese culture had ever been of much value (Pauw, 1774, Vol. 1, p. 8). This image of a frozen or decaying society was repeated in German writing on China well into the 20th century by theorists as diverse as Herder, Hegel, Marx, Weber, and Wittfogel.

None of these writers had yet formulated specific recommendations for practical colonization. Although Herder had criticized China’s coastline for its shortage of inlets and bays (1885, p. 284), echoing the complaints of frustrated European merchants in China, and described Asia as “a sleeping marmot” (*Muemeltier*) that would soon be killed off by the European “robbers or merchants” travelling the globe (*Ibid.*, p. 289), he was ostensibly opposed to colonialism (Taylor, 1994). German writers began to elaborate specifically colonial scenarios involving China following the first and second Opium Wars (1839–1842, 1856–1860) and the founding of Hong Kong. One of the most influential German champions of an explicitly colonial approach to China in the decades leading up to the annexation of Qingdao was Baron Ferdinand von Richthofen. Richthofen accompanied the first Prussian Embassy to the Chinese Emperor in 1860, and returned to China in 1868 to travel for four years, scouting out sites for future mines and ports in 13 of the 18 Chinese provinces. Richthofen’s travel diaries are the best source for reconstructing his specifically colonial perspective (*Osterhammel, 1987; Richthofen, 1907*). Noting at the very beginning of his diaries that “I was prepared for disappointments all around,” Richthofen reveals the extent to which he was predisposed to view China through the filter of the Sinophobic discourse (Richthofen, 1907, Vol. 1, p. 23). Unlike earlier German writers, Richthofen
worried openly about the racial "danger" China posed for Europe, predicting that the "Chinese will flood the world and outnumber all other races" (Ibid., p. 55) - an early articulation of the discourse of the "yellow peril" that emerged in full force at the end of the century. Through the use of specific vocabulary and images, Richthofen's text assimilated the Chinese to other colonized peoples. The Chinese were referred to throughout the diaries as natives (Eingeborenen), and this category was juxtaposed to an equally undifferentiated category of "whites." Richthofen objected to the European missionaries' adoption of Chinese clothing, food, and other customs as a "descent to the customs of a lower race," insisting that missionaries should "assume a superior standpoint to the native in every respect."

European and German discourse on China continued to evolve during the years immediately preceding the annexation of Qingdao, with the colonizing/racist approach reaching something of crescendo in the final years of the century. The diaries of Elisabeth von Heyking, wife of the German Consul in Beijing during the German annexation of Qingdao, convey the mixture of imperialist designs on China and a colonial-racist view of the Chinese that became prevalent during the 1890s. Her view of the Chinese is clear: "whatever the Chinese might have been before, today they are nothing but dirty barbarians, who need a European master and not a European ambassador!" (Heyking, 1926, p. 205). Nor were these epithets restricted to lower-class Chinese. She quoted her husband as describing the Chinese officials he met as "forbidding, staring masks" (1926, p. 191).

These racist representations did not completely displace Sinophilic ones. My reading of the major 19th-century German anthropological, geographical, and travel journals and popular magazines suggests that the Chinese continued to be represented as an advanced or exotic civilization through the 19th century, though less frequently than before, and often defensively. Elsewhere the Chinese were granted junior status among the "civilized" nations (Steebs, 1766, pp. 174-175) or within their own sphere. An article in the German ethnographic/anthropological journal *Globus* drew an explicit racial and colonial parallel between the Europeans and Chinese positions in their respective spheres, arguing that there were three races in China (black, brown, and yellow) and that the (yellow) Chinese civilized their own "savage" neighbors just as the Europeans civilized theirs (Garnier, 1875). By the 1890s it was not unusual to see China referred to as a "half-civilized society," as one influential Berlin Sinology Professor put it in 1892. *Globus* generally described the Chinese as a Kulturvolk that was "just behind the Europeans in the scale of intellectual development." Another mediation of the two positions accorded equal status to the Chinese elite while using the Sinophobic tropes to describe the unwashed masses. Some writers rejected the game of evaluating cultures according to
a universal standard altogether — a slightly different strategy than that taken by those who had argued that the Chinese had good political and moral values while Europe had good science. Already in 1845, Heinrich Berghaus argued that what the Chinese consider beautiful is ugly to Europeans, and vice-versa (1845, p. 32).219

The multivocality of the discourse on China gave Germans the ideological resources to reverse their evaluations from one moment to the next. Friedrich Müller argued in his 1873 General Ethnography (Allgemeine Ethnographie) that China “could not be compared to the West, much less measured by its standards, due to its completely heterogeneous character,” but in the 1879 second edition he proposed a synoptic overview of the various human races as “moments in a general process of cultural development,” in which China and Japan were positioned just behind the Mediterranean peoples (Müller, 1873, p. 54; Idem, 1879, pp. 74–76). A striking example of a 180-degree turnaround from negative to positive depictions involves the best-selling German author Karl May, who published three novels on China.220

Representations of China also fluctuated within individual texts, another symptom of discursive formations that are not fully hegemonized. The anthropologist Oscar Peschel argued in 1867 that the Chinese were in a sense superior to Europeans (Peschel, 1867); but in The Races of Man (Völkerkunde), published several years later, he insisted that “it is everywhere noticeable that the Chinese do not advance beyond a certain grade of intellectual development (1876, p. 374).”221 These examples suggest two different scenarios in which observers or texts are likely to deploy multiple codes: (1) cases like China, in which no code was completely hegemonic; and (2) individuals writing against a hegemonic code, like Le Vaillant and Kolb on the Khoikhoi.

We can detect the pressures of Sinophilia even in the texts and activities of Germans who were ostensibly committed to more racist or colonizing view of China. Texts that set out to criticize Chinese culture were often infused with elements which undercut the intended message, and individual Germans who tried to strike an arrogant colonial posture in their daily interactions with the Chinese often unwittingly found that their self-presentation was being permeated by gestures and signifiers pointing in different directions.222 Richthofen’s diaries, discussed above, are paradoxical in that their consciously colonialist stance was constructed around the mimicry of the authoritative posture of a Chinese mandarin, as Jürgen Osterhammel has pointed out. Richthofen “travelled by horse, cultivated an aura of unfailability, commanded a servant, did not lift a finger himself, and punished immediately on the spot,” ironically playing the “objective cultural role of a member of the indigenous upper class” (Osterhammel, 1987, p. 179). Without assuming that Richthofen’s diaries
accurately mirror his daily interactions in China, the fact that he partially plays
the role of the Mandarin — without dressing like one — is suggestive of the
power of the Sinophile discourse.

Von Richthofen was of course an academic "German Mandarin," in Ringer's
(1969) sense, by the time he published his diaries. He was also a scion of
Prussian aristocracy whose career was shaped by his inherited proximity to
power. As an academic he was drawn toward the Jesuit-derived Sinophilia,
which emphasized a hermeneutic understanding of China. He may also have
formed an imaginary identification with the image of the Chinese Mandarin
during his travels in China. Moreover, during the period of these travels,
Richthofen's professional future was far from secured. Identification with
Chinese elites might seem redundant for a member of Prussia's old political
elite, if it were not for the mounting challenges to the nobility's social
preeminence. Imaginary identifications could be organized around fantasies of
defending ones social standing as well as fantasies of class exaltation. However,
Richthofen also gravitated toward Sinophobia. His combined criticism of, and
identification with, China relates to this "contradictory class location."223

Such hybridization can also be detected in the actions of the most vigorously
colonialist of the German missionaries in late-19th century Shandong province,
Bishop Anzer of the Steyler Mission. Anzer's approach to his class dilemma
was distinctive, partly due to his more humble origins. His father was a peasant
and butcher (Kuepers, 1974, p. 21, n. 1; Bautz, 1990, pp. 195–196). As an
arrivé even within the dominated world of the Bildungs Bü rger, Anzer was
poorly positioned to assert the distinctive ethnographic virtues of that class. But
his views of the Chinese went far beyond the simple lack of curiosity about
"heathen" beliefs which Todorov suggests was typical of missionaries in colo-
nial settings. Anzer's explicit goal was to humiliate the Chinese and to provoke
an incident that would give Germany an excuse to intervene militarily in the
province. His search for recognition in the eyes of the culturally dominant
German Other drove him toward the harsh Sinophobia associated with the most
powerful sectors of German society at the time, with people like the von
Heykings and Kaiser Wilhelm. Yet like his Jesuit predecessors and the
missionaries criticized by Richthofen for descending into the "customs of a
lower race," Anzer wore Chinese clothing from the beginning of his stay in
China, became fluent in Chinese, ate Chinese food, and adopted other elements
of a Chinese lifestyle. Most revealingly, Anzer struggled to attain official
recognition as a Chinese Mandarin, and by 1902 he had attained the rank of
Mandarin first class (Gründer, 1982, p. 288).224 Even as he seemed to disdain
China, Anzer was simultaneously motivated by an imaginary identification with
the imago of the Chinese Mandarin. This identification was not at all fungible
on European cultural "markets." But neither was his Sinophobia, which was too clumsy to be taken seriously by most of the Germans in China, who looked down on Anzer as something of an embarrassment.

Even as they tried to convert or conquer the Chinese, then, some Germans were being culturally converted themselves. This hybridizing approach differs radically from the stance of the Germans in Southwest Africa. Aside from General von Trotha's hysterical identification with Herero "cruelty," there was almost no movement by individual Germans toward Herero culture. Ambivalent relations to Chinese culture, including identification with Chinese images, were based in the multivocality of the European and German discourse on China.

Such self-hybridization also foreshadowed the shift toward policies of cultural exchange, the emergence of a "multivocal" colonialism, within the Qingdao regime. The complex precolonial practical-discursive formation around China meant that divergent colonial policies were possible, as long as the bearers of a given perspective were present in the colonial administration. Initiatives for a move toward policies of cultural exchange were based among the university-trained Sinologists in Qingdao and the Foreign Service personnel with career paths in the translating branch of the foreign service. The tone was increasingly set within the administration by men like Dr. Schrameier, a Sinologist and long-serving Commissioner for Chinese Affairs in the colony. 225 A German Consul in China later recalled this shift in the center of gravity away from what he called the "more effective" consular service personnel to the "professionals" (Fachleute) and career translators (Dolmetscherlaufbahn). He accused the latter groups of having undergone a process of "Sinification" due to their "long stay in the country." 226 It is clear, however, that a "long stay" alone was not sufficient to "Sinify" a colonial official (or to "Africanize" or "Samoanize" him in other colonies). Little change was observable in the ethnographic views of long-serving German officials in Southwest Africa or Samoa. More significant was the prior socialization of the "sinified" Germans in places like the Seminar für Orientalische Sprachen (a language-training institute for foreign service candidates) and the Sinological Seminar at the Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität in Berlin (Ruland, 1973, p. 54). Many China specialists in Germany continued to defend the venerable Sinophile discourse — despite the association of some of the great names in German philosophy, including Kant, Herder, Hegel, and Marx, with the Sinophobic strand.

4. CONCLUSION

This paper has argued for two differing forms of "precoloniality," one of them a form of historical persistence, the other a spatial displacement. Precolonial
ethnographic representations persisted into the colonial period and continued to limit and overdetermine the operation of social, psychological, and political mechanisms in shaping colonial native policy. Although I have criticized Said and his followers for drawing too direct a line from Orientalist discourse to colonialism, my account circles back repeatedly to the crucial level identified by Said. “Precoloniality” also refers to the “return of the repressed” from the (German) metropole in the colonial setting, within the subjectivities of officials. Germans escaped from a society fraught with intra-elite struggles for power and distinction, only to find themselves fighting the same battles in the colonies.

I began this article with an observation about the striking differences in the analysis of what is ostensibly the same object, colonialism, within the social sciences and cultural studies. Against one-sidedly social-scientific approaches, I have argued that racial ideologies shaped German colonial native policy in ways that are not strictly derivable from the interests of the colonizers, the activities of the colonized, or other “brute” material factors emphasized in the social science literature. These “materialist” concepts do successfully express something about a crucial determinant of the (colossal) state, but indirectly: they need to be reformulated by embedding them within contemporaries’ systems of meaning.

Colonial discourse theory can also be faulted for ignoring the mediating linkages between racial and ethnographic discourse and colonialism, via the subjectivities of the colonizers and colonized, and through the state itself. Postcolonial theory (especially Bhabha, 1994) has started to fill in this missing psychic level and to disrupt the closed circuit of discourse theory. The analysis of ethnographic discourse in this article suggests that divergent perceptions of the same non-western culture were linked to different groups of Europeans. Moreover, in order for a particular strand of ethnographic/racial discourse to shape colonial policy it needed to have an effective social “bearer” within the state. The presence of the “Sinological party” inside the Qingdao administration allowed the older, dominated strand of discourse to reemerge and begin shaping colonial policy. In Samoa, by contrast, the bearers of a dissonant understanding of native culture – the settlers around Deeken – were actively excluded from local policymaking.

Both the discursiveist and “brute materialist” approaches are unable to explain why specific social groups and individuals were attracted to particular views of the colonized. One reason for these patterned affinities is that Germans imported their metropolitan class tensions, their intra-elite struggles for cultural distinction, into the overseas colonial realm. Bourdieu’s theory of fields and cultural
capital can illuminate these "symbolic" processes. The colonial state emerged as a field with its own specific properties, including specific stakes (control over the definition of the colonized and of native policy) and a field-specific definition of cultural capital: ethnographic acuity. Like the general metropolitan German field of power in this period, however, the field of the colonial state was unsettled. The traditional nobility, bourgeoisie, and educated cultural sectors vied for control of the definition of cultural distinction.

A second reason for colonizers' attraction to particular visions of the colonized is located in processes of imaginary identification. The European understanding of overseas colonies was particularly conducive to the proliferation of fantasmatonic identifications. Unlike the symbolic projects of class distinction, these identifications were oriented less toward autrui than to internalized ideal egos. Identifying with an image of the colonized could not be expected to yield fungible cultural capital. These identifications depended on the particular unconscious desires and wishful fantasies of each colonizer, and were thus more individually variable than the symbolic strategies of distinction. Identifications centered variously on fantasies of class mobility or vengeance against challengers; other fantasies reaffirmed a threatened social status. Colonizers' fantasmatographic identifications would be of little interest if it were not for the highly undemocratic and hierarchical nature of colonial regimes, which meant that an official's fantasy life could have far-reaching consequences for the colonized.

Social explanation is necessarily complex and multicausal, bringing together a variety of different theories in explaining events. Each theory takes as its topic a specific abstract mechanism or object, such as "imaginary identification" or "fields, habitus, and cultural capital." The fact that social reality is an open system in which the effects of causal mechanisms cannot be "shut off" as in a laboratory experiment (Bhaskar, 1979, 1997) means that conjunctural forms of explanation are unavoidable and "covering laws" are unattainable (Steinmetz, 1998). Yet sociology continues to be hypnotized by an often unacknowledged adherence to an epistemology of parsimonious covering laws. Sociologists have an uneasy relationship to theoretical constructs, which tend to be either reified as thing-like entities or dismissed as meaningless fictions (Steinmetz, 2001). My account of the colonial state in this article has tried to illustrate one strategy for historical analysis that resists these pressures, by interweaving diverse theoretical-causal mechanisms in explaining colonial policy. At a different level, this article is a plea to break down the epistemologically indefensible barriers between theoretical approaches centered on cultural discourse, psychic processes, social class, and politics.
NOTES

1. *Native policy* as defined here encompasses all interventions by the colonial state into the culture of the colonized, all efforts to shape, define, and reproduce native practices and identities. For reasons discussed below, native policy was the heart of modern colonial governance.

2. The verb "to treat" helpfully suggests both the treatment of a subject in an artistic or literary work and more practical treatments, such as medical ones. I assume that both ethnographic discourse and colonial policy are simultaneously material and representational practices, albeit of different sorts. Terms such as "discursive practices" or "discourse-practices" would be more precise but are too cumbersome. I will therefore continue to juxtapose ethnographic discourse and colonial policy, asking the reader to avoid thinking of the former as somehow more ideal and the latter as strictly material.

3. Despite the often-noted institutional weakness of most colonial states, the significance of the creation of formal state apparatuses in colonized peripheries cannot be underscored enough. As Marshall Sahlins comments, the "advent of the colonial state" is the "moment of domination" that is "most marked in historical consciousness rather than the first appearance of the White man or the earlier period of 'contact'" (1993, p. 16). Like all other forms of state, the colonial state is a permanently operating, coercion-wielding apparatus exercising "clear priority in some respects over all other organizations within substantial territories" (Tilly, 1990). Our definition need not require that these states attain or even seek acceptance or legitimacy among the conquered population (the Weberian "legitimacy" criterion). More modestly, all states — including colonial ones — do seek some sort of acknowledgement of their separate existence and their distinctiveness from other institutions and from the rest of "society" (see Mitchell, 1991, 1999). The colonial state is also a kind of "local state," similar in some respects to subnational political units such as cities: it is clearly tied to the invading metropolitan power but also partially autonomous from it. I will discuss below the other distinctive definitional component of the colonial state, which concerns the specific manner in which the invaders justify to themselves their subjugation of the colonized and the type of policies which flow from this assumption.

4. See Steinmetz (1993) for a discussion of these arguments and Foucault's reconsideration of the state in his later writings. The relative lack of interest in the state within colonial cultural studies may also reflect its traditional disciplinary distance from fields like political science, sociology, and history. This is starting to change; see for example, Comaroff (1998) and Hardt and Negri (2000).

5. I develop this argument in more detail below. My particular reading of imaginary identification is based on the work of Lacan, Lagache, Laplanche and Pontalis. My account of the specifically colonial dilemma, however, is mainly indebted to Bhabha, as will become evident below. See note 42 for a discussion of the difference between my account of colonial identification and Bhabha's, which relies mainly on the concept of fetishism.

6. Southwest Africa included the areas known to Europeans as Damaraland and Hereroland, along with part of Ovamboland in the North and the Caprivi strip reaching to the Zambezi River in the Northeast. Its German-era boundaries were nearly identical to those of today's Namibia.

7. German Samoa consisted of the western islands of precolonial Samoa (Upolu & Savai'i) which make up the present-day nation state of Samoa.
8. The current population of Qingdao is over two million. The German government referred to their Chinese colony in Shandong as Kiautschou, after the bay (Kiautschou is rendered as Jiaozhou in contemporary pinyin spelling; its current name is Qingdao). After the initial unsettled period the Germans settled on Tsingtau as the spelling of Qingdao.

9. German colonies before 1914 also included Togo, Cameroon, and German East Africa (today’s Tanzania, Rwanda & Burundi), the northern half of Papua New Guinea, and most of Micronesia. The best overview of this colonial empire is Grün der (1985); in English, see Smith (1979).

10. Both Zantop (1997) and Berman (1998), for example, focus on questions of the exceptionalism of German colonial discourse, although neither systematically investigates non-German discourse, making it difficult to assess the validity of their claims. The theme of German colonial exceptionalism dates back to the campaign to justify the post-WWI British takeover of the German colonies; see Union of South Africa (1918).

11. It is likely that a similar pattern of inter-colonial variations would be uncovered in a study of British colonies located in areas construed by Europeans as culturally similar to these three German colonies. Specifically, British policy in Fiji or in Samoa’s neighbor Tonga could be compared to German Samoa; British treatment of the Khoikhoi in the Cape Colony to German treatment of the Southwest African Khoikhoi; and British practices in Hong Kong to German ones in Qingdao.

12. Of course, solid evidence for this hypothesis has to await further comparative research. One of the few explicitly comparative colonial studies is Miles (1994), which explores the long term effects of French and British colonialism in Niger and Nigeria, respectively. But Miles’ excellent study does not demonstrate that French and British colonial practices in general fell into these patterns.

13. The RMS’ biggest theater of operations was the northwestern Cape colony and Southwest Africa. In 1870 Fabri had helped set up a Mission Trading Company in Southwest Africa (see Esterhuyse, 1968, pp. 12–13). Fabri went on to organize the West German Association for Colonization and Export and to hold various leadership positions in the German colonial movement, including a term as Vice President of the German Colonial Association (see Bade, 1975).

14. As Kennedy writes, “Apia was quickly built up into the Godeffroy center for their Polynesian commercial operations” (Kennedy, 1974, p. 6). A Hamburg consulate was created in Apia in 1861, and after 1864, the new Godeffroy agent in Samoa, Theodor Weber, “came up with idea of drying the coconut in the islands and then shipping the copra to Europe, where the oil was extracted” (Ibid., p. 101). Kennedy estimates that Godeffroy and other German firms had a larger share of Oceanic trade than the British in this era. The Godeffroy company (later reconstituted as the German Society for Trade and Plantations, or DHPG) was the dominant European economic force in Samoa from the middle of the 19th century onwards.

15. Samoa Weekly Herald March 3, 1900, “Hoisting of the Flag.” The U.S. took over the eastern islands Tutuila and the Manu’a group, which still make up American Samoa today.

16. Richthofen became a major contributor to German representations of China and played a direct role in Germany’s official colonial policy; see below.

17. See C. Rust (1905, p. 196) for photo of three unclothed Herero hanged from a tree; for other photos reminiscent of the antebellum U.S. south, see Auer (1911, p. 113) and Vigne (1973, p. 25).

19. The ‘Oloa movement was also the prelude to the more threatening movement *Man* of 1907. See Hempenstall (1978, ch. 1); also BArch Koblenz, Solf Nachlass, Vol. 30, pp. 148–175, “Statement by Lauaki FK. before Imperial Amtmann Williams of Savai’i, as to the origin of the ‘Oloa’.”

20. See for example, “Panem et circenses!,” *Samoaische Zeitung*, April 15, 1905.

21. Many indigenous government workers were fired, and the Governor used the occasion to replace the Malo with a group of salaried appointees.

22. See the report on native law in Samoa by District Judge Imhoff, in BArch Berlin/New Zealand, AGCA 6051/0462, Title XVII A 1 Part 4, p. 156; also Müller (1962). The fluctuating status of China within German discourse and policy, along with pressure from the Chinese Consul in Apia, eventually forced the colonial Governor to agree that the equation of a “highly developed Kulturvolk [Chinese] with the Samoan native . . . seems anomalous” (BArch Berlin, RKA, Vol. 5588, letter from Solf, January 28, 1911, p. 4 verso). In 1912 the Chinese in Samoa were made legally equal to whites (or “foreigners”), exempting them from flogging; *Samoaisches Gouvernements-Blatt*, Vol. IV, Nr. 21, January 6 1911, p. 71.

23. Hiery (1995) characterizes German rule in Samoa as *simple* preservationism; my differences from this should become apparent.

24. For Solf’s often repeated claim, see his interview with *The Evening News*, Sydney, April 8, 1901.

25. See BArch Berlin/New Zealand, AGCA 6051/0440–0443, Title VII 14; also Moses (1973).

26. The alienation of Samoan soil had proceeded apace from mid-century until 1889, when the Berlin Conference on Samoa put a halt to further land sales outside of Apia, where most Europeans lived. Leases of land were limited to forty years. The new German administration reinforced these existing regulations after coming into power.

27. Schultz-Ewerth was fluent enough in Samoan to compose his own communications with native officials; Solf relied on his translator Charles Taylor, discussed below.


29. See BArch Koblenz, Solf Nachlass, Vol. 20, p. 45, for one example of the banning of what was considered a “bad custom,” namely, the power of elites to drive people out of their homes. See also BArch Berlin/New Zealand, AGCA 6051/0460. Title XVII A 1 Part 2, p. 183, for Solf’s *Poloa‘iga* (Order) in Sept. 1901.

30. Hiery (1995) takes the German officials at their word, arguing that they were simply preserving Samoan custom. This ignores not only the banning of certain customs but also the more subtle transformations introduced by codification. Other writers on Samoa make the opposite mistake, underestimating the colonizers’ genuine ambition to preserve “noble savagery” (see Meleisea, 1987). Hiery’s book is very rich empirically but recalls an older style of colonialist historiography which credulously accepts
colonizers’ statements at face value and eschews any psychological or political analysis of their subjectivity. One marvels at Hiery’s conclusion: “it is a ‘command (Gehor) of historical honesty to recall that German colonialism saved many more lives than it took” (Ibid., p. 249). As the perhaps mythical U.S. army colonel said during the Vietnam war, “we had to burn the village to save it.”

31. Sharf and Harrington (2000, p. 211). The German engagement in the anti-Boxer war is best known for the “Hunnenrede” (Hun speech) with which Kaiser Wilhelm sent off the East Asian Expeditionary Force who sailed from Bremerhaven on July 27, 1900. The Kaiser called on the troops to emulate the “King Etzel’s Huns of 1000 years ago,” and intoned that “no Chinese will ever again dare to look askance at a German.” The actual text of this speech, quoted here, was suppressed by the German government at the time, but has been verified by Soesemann (1976).


33. BArch Freiburg, Nachlass Truppel, Vol. 59, p. 3.

34. The very expansion of the Chinese population and of Chinese-owned commerce in the colony provides another indication of the difference between Qingdao and Southwest Africa. Where Southwest Africa suffered proportionately huge population losses in the war, Qingdao grew from just a handful of fishermen and soldiers in 1897 to 53,000 people by 1913.

35. Even in Southwest Africa, official policy did not correspond closely to settler interests. Many settlers turned against the harsh conduct of the war in 1904 when they realized it was depriving them of their labor force. Once diamonds were discovered in the colony in 1908, the state put mining interests ahead of settler-farmer interests.

36. The two governors of Southwest Africa whose earlier careers had been in the army, Curt von François and Theodor Leutwein, pursued a less culturally destructive policy than their successors, Friedrich von Lindequist (1905–1907), a former judge in the colony, Bruno von Schuckmann, and Theodor Seitz, who were not career military men. On Curt von François (Governor from 1890–1894), who had served as a geographer on Wissmann’s African explorations, and Leutwein (discussed below), see Gann and Duigman (1977, pp. 249–250) and P. Leutwein (1934). I discuss these men in more detail below, and in my forthcoming book.

37. The German decision to seize the Dualas’ land in the center of the Cameroonian city of Douala did not occur in response to an uprising, but itself provoked the first movement of resistance among the Duala; see Austen (1977), Austen and Derrick (1999, pp. 128–137), and BArch Berlin, RKA, Vol. 4428–4429. Similarly, the Maji-Maji rebellion in German East Africa (1905–1907) was sparked by grievances connected to a government scheme to grow cotton using forced labor (Sunseri, 1993).

38. As Gewald notes, Herero had been involved in the colonial army from its inception, and some even fought against other Herero in the 1904 war (1999, pp. 204–205). Herero served in the army in even greater numbers after the war. This collaboration is a good example of ethnographic perception’s capacity to ignore obvious empirical evidence; according to nearly all Germans the Herero were idle and uncooperative.
39. This theme has emerged rather unsystematically in recent studies of particular colonial settings. As Wolfe (1994, p. 167) remarks, the elaboration of this approach has been impeded by the prevalence of older "‘handmaiden of colonialism’-style analyses in which anthropology figures as inertly determined by colonizing imperatives" — that is, as an effect rather than a cause of colonial policy. An example of the older approach in the German context is Gothsch (1983).

40. Some early modern literature on the Cape Khoikhoi, for example, adopts a code of relativism, in which the colonized appear as simply different from the Europeans. The relativistic view of the Khoikhoi received its first important expression in a long essay by the Cape settler Grevenbroek from 1695 (Grevenbroek in Schapera, 1933). A much more influential relativizing treatment of the Khoikhoi was Peter Kolb’s Present State of the Cape of Good-Hope, first published in German in 1719 and subsequently translated into French, English, and Dutch. Pratt (1992) notices that much of Kolb’s text is structured as a series of rectifications to standard descriptions of the Khoikhoi, employing a revalidating code which denies or minimizes difference. Other sections of Kolb’s text reveal a more relativist perspective, however (1968, pp. 39-40, 48, 87, 320). Coetzee (1988, pp. 12-34) ignores both aspects, assimilating Kolb to the generic "Discourse of the Cape."

41. See Stockey (1987); Fabian (1983); and the discussions below of European images of the Khoikhoi and Samoans.

42. My discussion here of indeterminateness is inspired by Bhabha’s crucial discussion of mimicry, without fully adopting his model. Bhabha usefully calls attention to the spaces for resistance opened up by structures of mimicry (1994a), but does not explain the strategies colonizers employ to produce these structures. I also find Bhabha’s use of the psychoanalytic theory of fetishism (1994c) unconvincing, since it suggests that mimicry simultaneously disavows and acknowledges difference. As I hope to show, some colonial discourses were centered on difference while others emphasized similarity, but none of them were involved in disavowing difference in the ambivalent manner characteristic of fetishism (see Freud, 1963).

43. German historians have fiercely debated the question of whether the Kaiserreich was dominated by the traditional aristocracy or the rising industrial and commercial bourgeoisie (see Blackbourn & Eley, 1985; Steinmetz, 1997). Some have also emphasized the "peculiar" influence of the educated middle class, the German Mandarins, within the Kaiserreich (Ringer, 1969). Although I have argued elsewhere for the increasing structural impact of capitalism on metropolitan German state policy during this period (Steinmetz, 1993), this is separate from the question of specifically cultural power. At this point in the argument I am taking at face value the phenomenological impressions of contemporary German actors, whose own disagreement on the definition of cultural capital suggests that the field of power in Imperial Germany was indeed unsettled.

44. In another article I explain why this particular form of cultural capital came to define the modern colonial field (Steinmetz, forthcoming).

45. Other writers have also analyzed the role in colonial rule of what is variously called affect or emotion (Stoler, 1997; Adams, 1994), ecstasy (Fabiun, 2000), or desire/fetishism (Bhabha, 1994a; McClintock, 1995; Young, 1995).

46. Attention to the psychic level can also explain why subjects in culturally dominated positions develop what Bourdieu calls a "taste for necessity."
47. See Bourdieu (1986) and (1996). Toril Moi (1994) combines Bourdieuian and psychoanalytic approaches in a brilliant analysis of Simone de Beauvoir, but she does not integrate the two theoretical optics.

48. See the controversial article by the late Namibian historian Brigitte Lau (1995), whose stance of historiographic debunking and source criticism seems to mask a latent desire to disavow the Herero national trauma. Krüger’s (1999) interesting study of the Herero takes an opposite approach, ignoring the period before the 1904 war and thereby elevating the war into the founding moment of Herero and German colonial history.

49. Freud already recognized that identifications need not involve explicitly erotic catexes (Freud, 1921; Padel, 1986).

50. See also the special issue of *La Psychanalyse* 8 (1964) on “Fantasme, Rêve, Réalité” and, for a recent overview, Levy and Inderbitzin (2001).

51. This is the source of the confusion in Althusser’s (1971a) famous “ISA” essay, which associates ideological interpellations entirely with the imaginary order. Althusser speaks of ideology as constituting the subject’s *imaginary* relations to his real conditions of existence. This is appropriate insofar as the imaginary is the realm in which the subject seeks images of wholeness to cover up his constitutional fragmentation. “Ideology” is thus construed as a form of practice and subjectivity characterized by a fictional wholeness. At the same time, Althusser fails to acknowledge that this imaginary process takes place under the domination of the symbolic order— even though he gives the example of the subject’s “the little subject” to the “Other Subject” employs the Saussurian notation system (S/S) adopted by Lacan in his seminal essay on the symbolic (Lacan, 1977b). Many of the examples of ideological apparatuses discussed by Althusser are actually linguistic in nature. More importantly, only by reference to the Symbolic order can we understand why the subject takes certain images as imaginary mirrors and not others. Althusser recognized this domination of the imaginary by the symbolic in his essay on “Freud and Lacan” (1971b, p. 210).

52. According to Bourdieu, the coherence of a subject’s strategic practice is guaranteed by the habitus. But what guarantees the unity of the habitus? Individual biographies contain multiple and often contradictory appropriations and inheritances of different forms of capital; put differently, the series of their identifications is extremely heterogeneous. The sense of unity or oneness lies in imaginary identification. Bourdieu argues that the habitus is corporeal. Lacan makes a similar argument, here following Freud closely, that the ego is produced first of all on the body’s surface. The mirror phase involves above all a bodily image, and most of the later examples of imaginary identifications are also corporeal. An imaginary body image is thus the ground for the unity which Bourdieu calls “habitus.” In short, the habitus is associated with imaginary identifications, while distinction strategies are related to symbolic identifications.

53. See Zizek (1989, p. 107); Julien (1995, p. 51); Lagache (1961, p. 41) for examples of divergence between ego ideal and ideal ego. The existence of the mass media and other ideological systems may lead to convergence in imaginary identifications, but two people in the same sociological location may also pursue different ideal egos as a result of their particular psychobiographies.

54. The German aristocracy was heavily represented among military leaders in the colonies and among the Governors of the three largest German colonies (German East Africa, German Southwest Africa, and Cameroon), mainly because these colonies were seen as militarily problematic. The German Navy, which administered Qingdao, was the least aristocratic arrived branch of the German military.
55. The upper echelons of the German army continued to be dominated by traditional noble values, even as officer recruitment became more bourgeois. Middle-class officers were admitted under the condition that they identify as a "nobility of temperament" (Adel der Gesteunung), in Kaiser Wilhelm's revealing phrase (Craig, 1955, p. 235; Kehr, 1977). The administration of colonial affairs was located until 1907 within the German Foreign office, and was initially closely tied to the diplomatic service. Diplomacy was of course originally an eminently aristocratic arena, but in Prussia-Germany, as elsewhere in Europe, the number of educated experts within the diplomatic corps increased over the course of the 19th century. Yet the most important decision-making positions, those of the representational diplomats, remained largely in the hands of nobles. The diplomatic service in 1909 was said to have 70 officials from the ancient nobility (Uradel), 25 from the older Briefadel (nobility by letter-cachet), 35 from the modern Briefadel, and 9 bourgeois (Philippi, 1985, p. 63; Preradovich, 1955). The growing influence of the translating branch within the Qingdao colonial administration (which was closely connected to the German Consulate in Beijing) was resisted by the more aristocratic representational branch (see below).

56. Cannadine (2001) has suggested that the British "projected" their own status hierarchy onto their colonies, but he does not analyze the different cultural and psychic uses to which the colonized were put by different types of Britons.


58. Johannes Fabian has also pointed out that many European explorers in 19th-century Africa were in fact "drugged" by opiates or alcohol (2000, p. 67). Fabian believes that travelers reached a state of "ecstasy" which allowed "leaps of imagination" and "acts of identification" with Africans (2000, p. 199). Although I am also arguing that certain aspects of the colonial situation produced an unusual psychological state, this did not lead to an accurate perception of the colonized but to identifications with the *imago* of the colonized. As Lacan insists, imaginary identification is *projective*. None of this provides epistemological guarantees.

59. Here I cannot go into the ways in which non-European practices and ongoing events were able to disrupt established ethnographic views; I deal with this in a separate paper (Steinmetz, 2001) and in my forthcoming book on German colonialism. The general argument is that disruptions of ongoing ethnographic discourse cannot be understood as the implosion of an unfiltered reality into the text, but should be thought in terms closer to Kuhn's (1970) image of the paradigm shift. One requirement for a shift in ethnographic viewpoint is the availability of an alternative code, preferably one associated with socially acceptable groups, admired groups with cultural capital. Ethnographic observers, confronted with radically incommensurable evidence, may well seek an alternative framework, but they cannot rummage about freely in culture as if it were a clothes closet or a tool-kit. Wittgenstein, who introduced the image of language as a tool-box (1983, pp. 6, 11), always insisted that language was fully embedded within "forms of life."

60. For an example of the equation of nomadism with instability, see Schwabe (1899, p. 248). Nearly a century later, Deleuze and Guattari (1986) drew on the same set of meanings but simply reversed the normative evaluation, celebrating the nomad.

61. Theodor Leutwein was Landeshauptmann of the colony from 1894 to 1899 and the first Governor of Southwest Africa from 1899 to 1905. The position of Landeshauptmann had referred historically to the head of a self-administering Prussian province.
62. I am less interested in the origins of this discourse of noble savagery with one author or the other than with its existence as a coherent trope in the 19th century. Cooper’s novels were wildly popular in Germany and went through more than a dozen German editions between 1829 and 1910. They provided an extremely elaborated set of images of the male noble savage.

63. See the discussion of Kaiser Wilhelm’s “Hun speech” in note 31. Schwabe came to Southwest Africa to participate in the Schuttruppe (colonial army) and was later appointed head of the military-administrative station at Swakopmund (Schwabe, 1899, p. 102).

64. Dove was sent to Southwest Africa in 1892 by the German Colonial Society (GCS) and the German Colonial Society for South West Africa to carry out meteorological and cartographic tasks and investigate the country’s economic potential, and he accompanied the Schuttruppe on missions (see Schwabe 1899, with Dove’s first report, pp. 374–383). Dove also became the local representative of the GCS’ Settlement Society, wrote two travel narratives (1896a, b) on Southwest Africa, and published a collection of South African stories.

65. Even settlers converged on this description of the Khoikhoi as noble savage warriors during the “Leuteein” decade. The settler O. Seidell, whose memoirs were written in 1897, emphasized the Witboois’ “Last Mohican” characteristics, including their “inborn craving for liberty” (1898, p. 14), and concluded that Hendrik Witbooi had become a “loyal subject” (Ibid., p. 17).

66. Schwabe (1904–1905, p. 222; my emphasis). Schwabe’s later book on the Herero and Khoikhoi wars returned to his earlier description (Schwabe, 1907, pp. 316–317), but this was safely after the military destruction of the Witboois.

67. Silvester and Erichsen (op cit.) cite Fred Cornell (1986), a British diamond prospector who described the concentration camp and the feeding of prisoners’ bodies to the sharks.


69. Bhabha mentions the “indescribable” habits of the Hottentots as an example of “proliferating difference” that escapes the colonizers’ surveillance (1994a, p. 112). This is simply incorrect. The emphasis on “indescribable” Khoikhoi habits occurred during the early modern decades of colonial contact, not during the modern colonial era. It is also significant that these supposedly “indescribable” habits were in fact described in great detail. During the era of Khoikhoi “hybridity,” writers began to focus more on Khoikhoi mimicry than on these indescribable habits, some of which – to the extent that they had actually ever existed – had already disappeared from the Khoikhoi repertoire.
70. See Raven-Hart (1967, pp. 119, 130, 23, 45, 175) and Wurffbain (1931 [1686], Vol. II, p. 137).


72. According to Robert Gordon (1992, p. 6), Bushmen were a "Lumpen" category consisting of those indigenes who "failed to conform." The British missionary Joseph Tindall repeated the theory that the Bushmen "sprang from poor Hottentots" in 1856 (Tindall, 1856, p. 25). See also Philip (1969 [1828], Vol. II, p. 2). James Prichard, author of the influential Researches into the Physical History of Man (1813), extended the language of "degeneration" to the existing thesis of Bushmen as offshoots of the Khoikoi (Stocking, 1973, p. lxxxviii). A view of Bushmen as "noble savages" which is so widespread today only began to emerge at the very end of the 19th century, adumbrated in the work of Passage (1997 [1896–1898]).

73. The view of the two as fundamentally different can be found in throughout the 19th century, in Lichtenstein (1811–1812, p. 143), Holub (1881, Vol. II, p. 468), and Cape of Good Hope (1885, p. 43). On the porousness of the boundaries between the two categories even in the 19th century see Rose (1829, p. 111), who slips from Bushmen to Hottentots. Bayer (1909, p. 186) mentions an argument he had with another German officer about this question in 1904. The confusion about the status of the Khoikoi within 20th-century South African racial categories, their ambiguous relationship to the category of "colored," only perpetuates this legacy.


75. In 1858, Hugo Hahn wrote that he "shuddered to think of the Namaqua's future," fearing that they were "past recovery" (1884–1885, p. 1117; in English in the text). As with Hahn's musings on the Herero, his speculations about the doomed Namaqua have an eerie quality in light of later German colonial policies.

76. The Renish missionaries’ hostility to Jonker led them to help the Herero rise up in a "war of liberation" against Afrikander domination in the early 1860s (Andersson 1987–1989, Vol. 2, pp. 236–248). This marked the beginning of the end for the Afrikander Orlands.


79. E.g. Burchell (1853 [1822–1824], Vol. I, p. 50); G. Thompson (1868 [1827], Vol. I, p. 2); see also Patrick Cullinan’s “1818. M. le Vaillant recalls.”

80. As Lovejoy (1955) pointed out, Rousseau characterized the “Hottentots” as presocial primitives who had not advanced to the third stage of human development, which he preferred, and which was “precisely the stage most of the savage peoples known to us have reached” (Rousseau, 1888, p. 39). But even if Rousseau did not equate the state of nature with noble savagery, these two concepts were elided by his readers (as Lovejoy also noted), and it is this trope, rather than the more correct reading of Rousseau, which is significant here. Indeed, Le Vaillant not only tried to revalidate the Khoikhoi but was such an admiral of Rousseau that he named his son Jean-Jacques (Bokhorst, 1973, p. 11).


82. Theo Hahn was the son of a South African missionary (but not related to Hugo Hahn), who had studied African languages at Halle University with the linguist Von der Gebelentz. He then returned to Great Namaqualand, where he wrote several articles and a book on Khoikhoi culture. Like the writings of Kolb and Le Vaillant, Hahn’s texts were multivocal, and included the code of noble savagery. It is telling that less conventional ethnographic voices like Kolb, Le Vaillant, and Theo Hahn were unable to sustain a single non-hegemonic code throughout their texts. For an interesting recent example of the discourse of the Khoikhoi as noble savage see J. M. Coetzee’s boyhood memoir, in which a “Hottentot” boy is described as having “kept all his life to the path of nature and innocence” and is characterized by “swiftness of foot or skill of hand” (1997, p. 61).

83. Leutwein grew up in and around Freiburg, while Solf earned his Abitur in Mannheim in 1881 (See BArch Koblenz, Solf Nachlass, Findbuch, p. 3, “Lebenslauf”; Bley, 1996, p. 4, note 3; P. Leutwein, 1934).

84. See Leutwein’s (1898, 1898/99) defense of his more moderate approach. Von François was a member of the (non-titled) nobility and the son of General-Major Bruno von François, a hero of the Franco-Prussian war.

85. With respect to imaginary identification, Leutwein clearly enjoyed his position as the “chief” of a noble group of Witbooi warrior-savages between 1894 and 1904.


87. See Bley (1996, pp. 58–59); BArch Berlin, RKA, Volume 2100, p. 103 (Agreement on borders) and 105ff, Leutwein’s report from January 19, 1895 on Lindequist’s work on the southern border of Hereroland.

88. BArch Berlin, RKA, Volume 2100, Leutwein’s report on conditions in Hereroland and on strengthening the Schuttruppe, October 31, 189, p. 162.


90. For one account of the sale of land from a Herero chief to a German farmer, see Rust (1905, p. 447ff).

92. BAarch Berlin, RKA, Volume 2100, Leutwein to Missionar Viehe, October 22, 1895, p. 166 verso.
93. BAarch Berlin, RKA, Volume 2100, Leutwein to Missionar Viehe, October 22, 1895, p. 167 verso.
94. See Denkschrift über Eingeborenen-Politik und Herero-Aufstand in Deutsch Südwestafrika (1904, p. 1) and Bley (1996, pp. 23–25). The hope was that the Berg Damara would become available as laborers for the Germans.
95. There is some similarity between this argument for continuity between cultural eliminationism and genocide directed at the Herero and Goldhagen’s (1996) similar claims about German anti-Semitism before and during Nazism. But Goldhagen’s schema does not distinguish between what I am calling positive and negative assimilation. Applied to the present case, this would glide the difference between the missionary’s program or postwar policy and General von Trotha’s Vernichtungsbefehl.
97. Some Herero began replenishing their herds of cattle through illicit deals with German settler farmers before 1914 in exchange for services (Gewald, 1999, p. 235). My concern is with the main thrust German policy, not with factors undermining policy, which are always present.
98. In 1908, the new colonial Governor von Schuckman ended the war imprisonment of the Hereros and limited the cases in which Herero could be allocated to a specific employer. See BAarch Berlin, R 1002, Vol. 2591, p. 9, Decree of January 18, 1908.
99. Windhuker Nachrichten April 5, 1906, quoted in Bley (1996, 223); my emphasis.
100. In Anglophone historical writing, “volkish” is the accepted translation for the untranslatable German adjective “völkisch,” which combines the cultural emphasis of the word “ethnic” with the biological connotations of “racial,” and whose usage was associated historically with the German nationalist right and eventually the Nazis.
102. One anthropologist has insisted that “the reason for wearing the uniforms is not in imitation of the European colonialists” (Hendrickson, 1992, p. 132). Hendrickson traces the connections between the Herero troop ceremonies and earlier practices of okyanbere, visiting the “fathers” at their graves, and celebrations of Herero heroes. But Hendrickson accepts at face value the statements of her Herero informants that they “were the clothes of their bosses” because “if you wear the clothes of your enemy, the spirit of the enemy is weakened” (Ibid., p. 238). Yet the Herero do not seem to have adopted the signifiers of their Khoikhoi enemies before or after their liberation from Jonker Afrikaner, suggesting that the changes after 1904 had a fundamentally different quality. Clearly the problem is a theoretical one which turns on the conceptualization of subjectivity and culture, and cannot be resolved in strictly empirical terms by reference to actors’ self-interpretations. There is also evidence that Herero women had been shifting from their traditional clothing to long Victorian-style dresses and other European modes before the war, but this seems to have intensified afterwards (see Rust, 1905). The fact that the Herero adopted the signifiers of the Germans but not of the Khoikhoi, and that they only did so en masse after the devastating defeat of 1904, seems to me to be a crucial point. To ignore these aspects of the historical context hardly seems an injustice to the Herero, as some have suggested. A more nuanced position is offered by
Werner (1990), who acknowledges the peculiarity of adopting the clothing and customs of the aggressor while also stressing the troop societies’ functions for mutual aid and as a vessel for resistance during the 1920s and ‘30s. Gewald insists, quite over-dramatically, that the depth-psychological studies “have done what the German colonial state so anxiously hoped for but failed to do: rob the Herero completely of independent action and thought” (1999, p. 5). One wonders whether the opposition of historians to the “pathologization thesis” might not reflect a well-intended but theoretically naive desire to ally oneself with the (post)colonized, if not an unconscious desire to downplay the profound damage caused by German colonialism.

103. The percentage of Herero who had converted to Christianity before the war was extremely low, no more than six percent (Gewald, 1999, p. 196; J. Irle, 1908, p. 345; Deutsches Kolonialblatt, 1904, p. 74). Although the mass baptisms after 1904 occurred in part because the church offered a substitute for national solidarity (Bley, 1996, p. 257), they also entailed an abandonment of Herero tradition.


106. In *Berichte* (1880, p. 42); *Rheinische Missions-Trakteat*, Nr. 58 (1894, p. 7). The trope of cruelty is repeated in the non-missionary literature as well (e.g. Dove, 1896, p. 74), and dominated the literature generated in the context of the Herero war (e.g. Erffa, 1905, pp. 55–71). Francis Galton, the future eugenicist, arrived in Walvis Bay in 1850 and stayed in Southwest Africa until 1852. Galton discussed the “Damara” (Herero) at length and concluded that they alone among the native groups should be enslaved (1855, p. 229).

107. See the diary of the missionary Brincker, discussed by Förster (1905).


109. In letters written to his parents during the war, Burkhart von Erffa (1905, pp. 70, 76) called the Herero “beasts” and “black devils.”

110. The fact that the first treaty between the Germans and the Herero, signed in 1885, guaranteed that Germans would respect the “existing customs and ways in the region belonging to Mahéero” does not mean that the Germans changed their view of the Herero. Instead, as Leutwein repeatedly pointed out, the Germans basically had no power at all in the colony until 1894, when the Schutztruppe finally became large enough to defeat Witbooi and other indigenous leaders (1912, pp. 11–12). In other words, the real German view of Herero could only be turned into policy after the mid-1890s; the 1884–1894 period was in many ways still proto-colonial, the colonial state still a glimmer in the eye of Heinrich Göring, the colony’s first Landeshaupmann.


112. German soldiers mutilated their Herero enemies corpses’ and violated their graves, according to Krüger (1999, p. 105ff) – supposedly because the Herero did. One participant claimed that the Germans forced Herero women to clean the skin from the severed heads of dead Hereros in order to send the skulls back to Berlin for study. See Krüger (1999, p. 114; citing *Meine Kriegserlebnisse in Deutsch-Süd-West-Afrika* [1907]).
113. Scheulen (1998, p. 76) is thus mistaken in asserting that the early image of the Herero during the German colonial period was “positive.” I provide more evidence for the repetitive, homogeneous nature of this discourse in my forthcoming book.

114. Even if the Social Democrats in the German Reichstag spoke out against colonial “outrages” and voted against colonial budget appropriations, they did little to counter German representations of the colonized, focusing mainly on “the current negative rentability of the colonies and the disproportionately high public outlays for them” (Margner, 1988, pp. 76–77; see also Schröder, 1968, 1973; Hyrkkanen, 1986).


117. Fischer received his Dr. med. and Habilitation in Anatomy and Anthropology at Freiburg and became a Professor there in 1914. He is best known as the as co-founder, in 1927, of the Kaiser-Wilhelm Institut für Anthropologie, menschliche Erblehre und Eugenik. See Gessler (2000).

118. This section is titled “Ergology of the Rehoboth Bastards.” Ergology is the study of work’s effects on the mind and body.

119. Along similar lines see also Hindorf, who noted that the Bastards were “a useful element” in the colony but added that the “future belongs to the whites alone, especially the Germans.” “Denkschrift, betr. das südwestafrikanische Schutzgebiet,” Berichtsjahr 1893/1894, RT, Band 162, 9th Leg – Per., Session 2, Anlage 89, 1894–1895, p. 449.

120. The 1905 ban on marriages between whites and Southwest Africans, which included the Rehobothers, did not contradict this solution (see Bley, 1996, pp. 212, 217–218; Wildenthal, 2001, p. 94). For it was the stable mixture of blood, not the continuing addition of new white blood, which was the centerpiece of the colonizers’ definition of the Rehobothers. Colonial Minister Solf insisted that the Bastards themselves were opposed to mixed marriage. See BArch Koblenz, Solf Nachlass, Vol. 34, “Tagebuch über die Dienstreise S. Ezellienz des Herrn Staatssek. Dr. Solf nach Südwest – Süd, u. Ostafrika 27 Mai bis Okt 1912,” p. 7, visit to Rehoboth on July 1, 1912.

121. See “Denkschrift, betr. das südwestafrikanische Schutzgebiet” for 1893–1894, in RT, Band 156; 9th Leg – Per., Session 2, Anlage 48, p. 358.

122. This impression of Samoan’s radical difference is shared by the otherwise opposing portraits offered by Margaret Mead (1928) and Derek Freeman (1996). For Mead, what mattered was Samoans’ supposedly unfettered sensuality; for Freeman, it was their seemingly archaic obsession with hierarchy and their grim formalism.

123. BArch Berlin, RKA, Vol. 3061, Fono in Sataua, July 15 1901, p. 57. The passage in the elliptis reads “as far as such customs lead to Christianity and enlightenment.” Although Solf often insisted that Samoan culture was to be Westernized in the long-run, this was not the focus of his policy discourse but usually added as an afterthought.

124. Letter from Mata’afa to all Samoans, October 10, 1900, in BArch Koblenz, Solf Nachlass, Vol. 20, p. 291.

125. See BArch Berlin, RKA, Vol. 3061, pp. 65–82, reports on Fonos in July 1901; also Samoanische Zeitung, Sept. 14 and Sept. 28, 1901, “Report of the Faininusi Sili Auelua on his Excellency the Governor’s journey to Palaulu and Satupaiarea.”

126. BArch Berlin/New Zealand Archives, R 1004/AGCA 6051/0463, Title XVII A 1, Part 5, pp. 6–14.

128. Of course the attempt to protect tradition – preventing the Samoans from becoming individualized proletarians by using Chinese labor – ultimately contributed to changes in custom. Relations between Samoans and Chinese were often strained. On official resistance to the individualization of the Samoan worker, see the comments of Erich Schulz in NZNA, AGCA 6051/0435. Title VI 28 part 1, p. 61 (March 8, 1914, Schulz to Obshhr).


130. BArch Berlin, RKA, Vol. 3061, Solf’s report of 28 July, 1901 on Fono with groups in Savai’i; p. 55; BArch Koblenz, Solf Nachlass, Vol. 20, Sept 16, 1901, p. 45; NZNA, AGCA/0466. Title XVII A 2, document no. 106. Along similar lines, the second governor commented that “the government has always desired and treat (sic) it as a trust bequeathed to them to keep up all good traditions of Samoai” (my emphasis); NZNA, AGCA/6051/0463, Title XVII A 1 Part 5, p. 13.

131. According to Salea (n.d.), the state “even went so far as totally to reshape the fa’alupega of all Samoa, the ceremonial greetings that united Samoa since before the first Papalagi.”

132. Most important were the ta’ia’i itu, who were supposed to be more independent of the tulafale than the traditional chiefs (see *Samoanische Zeitung* August 25, 1905, p. 1). They proved not to be independent enough and were folded into the restructured the Fono of Faipule in 1905.

133. Solf succeeded in passing a law banning marriages between Germans and Samoans in 1912 (a similar ban was extended to the other colonies), despite the opposition of the majority of lower-level officials as well as settlers). Yet despite some provocative statements on half-castes, he did not seem to be obsessed with white “racial purity,” but was driven by his program of preserving the imagined Samoan purity and particularity. Intercultural “half-castes” challenged this program of freezing a separate Samoan culture. A similar motive stood behind his goal of eventually removing Samoans from Apia. While morally reprehensible from a standpoint of human rights, these policies are explicable in terms of a mentality that was fixated on preserving difference.

134. Taylor had been educated in Germany and served as assistant-secretary to Solf and advisor to the Lands and Titles Commission (Salea, n.d.). The colonial archives are full of Taylor’s translations of Samoan and English documents and his interpretive comments to Solf on fa’a Samoa.

135. Eugen Fischer, as a consistent racial eugenician, took pains to insist that half-caste Samoans should also be treated as natives (1913, p. 303), but his opinion did correspond to colonial policy in Samoa. Of course, his book was published one year after passage of the law that banned mixed marriage in Samoa, eliminating the possibility of additional legal half-castes (see below).


137. NZNA, AGCA 6051/0435. Title VI 28 part 1, letter of March 8, 1914, from Schultz to Obshhr, p. 61.

138. The Berlin Samoa Act of 1889 had created a Land Commission, which operated between 1891 and 1894; the commission created in 1903 by the German colonial
government added intra-Samoan disputes over traditional titles to the commission's purview. Erich Schultz-Ewerth educated himself in Samoan customary law and presided over the German-era office, working with Samoan advisers (Schultz-Ewerth, 1911).

139. The inexorability of these processes can perhaps best be seen in the haunting and hilarious portraits of late colonial and postcolonial Samoa by the Samoan writer Albert Wendt.

140. BArch Koblenz, Solf Nachlass, Vol. 27, "Denkschrift" (1906), p. 68.

141. BArch Koblenz, Solf Nachlass, Vol. 28, p. 2 (letter Solf to Pasarge, October 29, 1906).


143. Schultz-Ewerth published on Samoan customary law (1905, 1906, 1911); Solf published a pamphlet on "Natives and Settlers in Samoa" (1908), composed the annual Official Report ("Entwicklung des Schutzgebietes Samoa"); in BArch Koblenz, Solf Nachlass, Vol. 27), and wrote various unpublished studies of Samoa, including "Der Aufstand auf Samoa" (BArch Koblenz, Solf Nachlass, Vol. 30, pp. 114-134; no date).

144. Discussing a "revolt of Chinese coolies" in Samoa, the paper warned that if the Chinese dared even to touch the whites, "ropes and trees" would be found. The article concluded that "these events are characteristic of the cunning and insidiousness of the yellow race." Überall, vol. 10, 10 (1907/1908), p. 811. Representations of China are discussed in detail in the next section.

145. An article on "Diplomatic negotiations" (rather than "conflicts") with the Samoan chiefs was accompanied by pictures of naked girls; see Überall, Vol. 3, 1 (1900/1901), pp. 665-666; also Ibid., Vol. 3, 2 (1900/1901), pp. 1355-1356; and Vol. 4 (1901/1902), pp. 797, 799.

146. See also the poster for the exhibition "Unsere neuen Landsleute. Ausstellung Samoa," bound with copy of Marquardt (s.d.) bound by Berlin Staatsbibliothek.

147. Solf recognized that "this harmless people can turn into a very dangerous, savage one." BArch Koblenz, Solf Nachlass, Vol. 30, "Der Aufstand auf Samoa," p. 115.

148. Williams framed his Narrative of Missionary Enterprises in the South Sea Islands (1837) as a refutation of Lapèrouse and of the explorers Otto von Kotzebue and Bougainville (Kotzebue had repeated some of Lapèrouse's judgments). Four decades after La Pérouse, a British writer still spoke of the "known ferocity" of the inhabitants, yet still praised Samoa as the "finest group in the Pacific" (Nightingale, 1835, pp. 92, 72).

149. We find the first German-language representations of Samoa after the arrival of the Hamburg-based Godeffroy company in 1857. Dr. Eduard Graeffe, a Godeffroy employee, was paid to travel the Pacific and study the islands, collecting objects for Godeffroy's ethnographic museum in Hamburg, editing an ethnographic journal (Journal des Museums Godeffroy), and writing articles on Samoa. The travelogues of George and Johann Forster, who accompanied Captain Cook on his second voyage, which were well known in Germany, did not include a description of Samoa. Moreover, as one anonymous reviewer of this article pointed out, 1. Forster's views of Oceania "were not Rousseauian. This suggests that the influence of the Forsters on German views of Oceania may have been less important and lasting than is sometimes suggested. At
the same time, the descriptions of the Tahitians by the Forsters and Cook emphasize naturalness, grace, beauty, hospitality, and other central features of the evolving formula of Oceanic noble savagery which later became associated with Samoa as Tahiti became "corrupted" by missionaries and capitalism (Forster, 1996, pp. 154–155, 195; Cook, 1993, p. 39–44). Böh (1876, p. 426) believed, for instance, that "Cook's impressions during his first visit to Tahiti were essentially the same as ours during our visit to Samoa." As in the discussion of the image of the Khoikhoi, I am using the term noble savagery to describe a general trope which emphasizes a set of valorized "primitive" qualities of a given ethnic group, and not to signal any specific debt to Rousseau.

150. Along similar lines, see von den Steinen (1886, p. 222).

151. In the South Seas was published in Leipzig in 1901. Although A Footnote to History was not translated into German, it was infamous in Germany. The Berlin Staatsbibliothek owned a copy of the 1892 English edition.


153. Stevenson's words were prophetic: he died in Samoa in 1894.


155. Stevenson reports giving one of his Samoan workers the "heavy end of my whip over the buttocks" (1895, Vol. I, p. 201).

156. Various European officials experimented with forms of native policy during the period of "proto-colonialism" in Samoa. One example is William T. Pritchard, who became Acting British Consul at Samoa from 1856 to 1858. (Pritchard was later appointed as the first British Consul to Fiji). Pritchard had come to the islands with his father when the latter was expelled from Tahiti by the French and was appointed as the first British Consul in Samoa. As one of the first non-missionary Europeans to develop and publicize a strategy for regulating the Samoans, Pritchard fils set a bench-mark which we can follow through into the discursive practices of the German colonial governors. Most significantly, Pritchard believed that the "application of [the natives'] old traditions is almost more effective than volumes of the most eloquent exhortations" in order "to gain my ends" (W. Pritchard, 1866, pp. 68, 90). Pritchard used specific Samoan idioms and folk tales in his efforts to regulate the Samoans (Ibid., pp. 96–97, 103), a practice Solf developed into an art form.

157. According to my colleague Tom Trautmann, a gandhabba, in one of the Prakrit languages descended from Sanskrit and spoken in North India in post-Vedic times, is a divine, bird-like singing creature of Buddhist mythology. The gandhabba Pancasikha is described in Mahabharata (1960), Vol. II, pp. 103–106. Tom Trautmann, personal communication.

158. See NZNA, AGCA, Title XVII B 2, Solf speaking to people of Alataua, Satapaieta, July 18th, 1901.

159. For example, one of Solf's Samoan translators, Thomas Troed, had arrived in Samoa in 1857 and had served for many years as British Vice-Consul (see Watson, 1918).


162. In 1902, Solf corresponded with the linguist Hugo Schuchardt of the University of Graz, whom he had met at a Orientalist Conference in Vienna in 1886. In one letter Schuchardt spoke of the way in which "our fantasies" are "taken captive" by descriptions of "the beautiful Samoan women" (die schönen Samoerinnen), Letter from Herr Hofrath Schuchardt to Solf, n.d. (1902), in BArch Koblenz, Solf Nachlass, Vol. 24, p. 28, verso.
164. The words "bloody" and "Nigger" are in English in Solf's text. BArch Koblenz, Solf Nachlass, Vol. 27, p. 66.
165. Solf accused Deeken of abusing his workers and having a "high death rate among his Chinese, complaints about wage reductions, and brutal treatment by him and his overseers, and unregistered deaths" (BArch Koblenz, Solf Nachlass, Vol. 25, p. 63, Telegram, May 1, 1904, to Berlin). On the jail term and extradition, see Ibid., p. 101, Telegram, June 6, to Berlin, and pp. 97–98, letter of Sept. 28, 1903 to Foreign Office; and Ibid., Vol. 24, pp. 6–7, Stuebel to Solf, Jan 7, 1904.
166. Solf was equally concerned to distinguish himself from the crude ways of the settlers in Samoa and from nobles like Heyking. See BArch Koblenz, Solf Nachlass, Vol. 16, pp. 71–73, Solf to Heyking, Sept. 4, 1890. The hostility between the two men can be seen in the letter Heyking wrote to Solf in January 1891 accepting his resignation and telling him he would never work in the Foreign Office again (Ibid., letter from Heyking to Solf, January 15, 1891, p. 275).
167. Comments to people of Palaui in Samoaische Zeitung, Sept. 28, 1901, "Report of the Falaautusi Sili Auelau on his Excellency the Governor's journey to Palaui and Satupaitea."
170. Hiery (1995, p. 32) speaks of the "owners' pride" (Stolz des Besitzers) among Germans in Samoa but does not analyze the class projects lying behind this. One needs to attend to the class dimensions of collecting (Bourdieu, 1984) to understand how certain classes pit their own version of colonial "owners' pride" against others' versions.
171. BArch Koblenz, Solf Nachlass, Vol. 20, letter from Solf to Dr. Siegfried Genthe, Feb. 22, 1900, p. 134.
172. See Wildenthal (2001: 122–127) for a different interpretation of Solf's ban; see also note 133.
174. Diederichs' description of a visit to the Zongli Yamen was almost identical to those of Heyking and E. Wolf (1901, pp. 53–55): "Five or six gentlemen sat with partially stupid facial expressions." BArch-Militärarchiv Freiburg, Nachlass Diederichs, Vol. 24, p. 11.
176. See BArch-Militärarchiv Freiburg, Nachlass Diederichs, Vol. 24, p. 24, for Diederichs' description of Zhang as "a helpless weaking," etc.
177. Amtsblatt für das Deutsche Kiautschou-Gebiet, May 11, 1901.
178. Deimling used the German term niedergelag in describing this village's fate (1900, p. 57).
179. The design of the worker settlements of Tapautau and Yang tschia te'un followed a Shanghai style; see Artelt (1984, p. 27ff.).
180. Weicker (1908, p. 82); Schweitzer (1914, p. 151); Berensmann (1904, p. 596).
182. Photo in BArch Freiburg, Nachlass Truppe, Vol. 62, p. 12, recto ("Ansicht der neuen Lehrlingsansiedlung am großen Hafen.").
184. *Tägliche Sonder-Beilage der Berliner Abend-Zeitung, Bilder vom Tage*, July 16, 1910, p. 3. Truppe’s papers suggest that his relations with Zhou Fu were quite friendly; see BArch-Militärarchiv Freiburg, Nachlass Truppe, Vol. 33, Truppe’s correspondence with Zhou Fu (Tshouf) from Sept. 1903 through February 1908. On Zhou Fu, who governed Shandong from May 1902 until the end of 1904, see Schrecker (1971, p. 151).
186. See photo of the Governor’s mansion in BArch-Militärarchiv Freiburg, Nachlass Trupper, Vol. 80, p. 11 recto; even more distinctively syncretic were some of the new railway stations.
190. This was the only public school in China at the time directed and financed in common by the Chinese together with a foreign government (Kreissler 1989: 138). The starting endowment for the School consisted of 40,000 Marks from the Chinese Education Department and 600,000 Marks contributed by the German government. The yearly expenses of 40,000 Marks were to be paid by the Chinese government (Mou, 1914, p. 24).
192. The opposition between Kulturvölker ("cultural" or civilized peoples) and Naturvölker ("natural" or primitive peoples) became ubiquitous in German scholarly writing during the second half of the 19th century (the categories are still used by some German writers). Most 19th-century formulations emphasized a distinction between culture, civilization, and beauty on the side of the Kulturvölker, vs. their opposites. More specific definitions contrasted abstraction with sensuality (von den Steinen, 1889), or intentional vs. unintentional processes of consciousness (Vierckrundt, 1896). In the view of Waiz and other German anthropologists, the categories of Natur- vs. Kulturvölker did not correspond to categories of race; a race was seen as containing many Völker (Waiz, 1877, Vol. 1, p. xiv).
193. The more important features of these discourses are not captured by "love" and "hate," as we will see; these terms serve here only as place-markers. There is by now a large literature on classical, that is, precolonial, German Discourse on China. See Aurich (1935); Debon and Hsia (1985); Debon (1994); Fang (1992); Goellwitzer (1962); Hsia (1985); Jacobs (1995); Li (1992); Loh-Loh (1982); Pigulla (1996); Rose (1981); Schuster (1988); Selden (1942); and Tscharner (1939).
194. Versions of Marco Polo’s narrative text appeared in German as early as 1477; new editions appeared in German in the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries.
195. Several editions of Ricci’s writings appeared in German during the 17th century, as did writings on China by other Jesuit missionaries, such as Giacomo Rho and Fermo Guererro.


197. Justi’s 1762 *Comparisons of European with Asian and other Supposedly Barbaric Governments* was composed partly as a rejoinder to Montesquieu’s highly influential thesis of Chinese despotism.

198. The reasons usually given for this change include the end of the Jesuit mission and European merchants’ complaints about barriers to trade. See Appleton (1951); Lach and Kley (1965–1993); Kley (1971); Eitembé (1988); Berger (1990); Jandesek (1992), and Spence (1998).


200. Carus linked skin color to intelligence with a loopy empiricism according to which “the finer organization of the skin is crucial for mental development, since the skin is the first and most general sense organ” (1849, p. 21). Hence the darker skin of the “night peoples,” with its “stronger sedimentation of carbon [!] and cruder organization,” had epistemological implications. This supposed disadvantage applied to a lesser degree to East Asians and the “dusk” (*Dämmerung*) peoples of the New World. Carus (ibid., p. 58) drew on Samuel George Morton, the American craniologist and polygenist who had measured the volume of several Chinese skulls and found them to be larger than Africans’ and Americans’ but smaller than Europeans’ (Gould, 1994, p. 85). Peschel (1876, p. 456) also referred to Morton.

201. Blumenbach, as summarized by Bendyshe (in Blumenbach, 1865, p. xi). For a later use of Blumenbach see Ranke’s (1894, p. 208) diagram, in which the European is located at the center with other races arranged around it at different distances. As in Blumenbach’s scheme, the Americans and Malaysians are the closest to the core and Mongols and Blacks more distant. For other German uses of Blumenbach and the term Mongols (or “Mongolians”) see Maukisch (1836); Goltz (1858, p. 13); Hoffmeister (1882).

202. Barrow was the founder of the Royal Geographical Society (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1991, p. 93). He later travelled in the Cape Colony during the first period of British control there (1795–1803), and was personal secretary to the new colonial governor, Lord Macartney. Barrow had already accompanied Lord Macartney on the first English embassy to the Chinese Emperor in 1793 and 1794. His China travels were published in 1805 and quickly translated in German.

203. This image appears in Barrow (1805, pp. 52–53), a translation of his *Travels in China*, and on the cover of an installment of E. A. W. Zimmermann’s *Tuschenbuch der Reisen* on China (Zimmermann, 1810). Barrow’s aim in recording the travels of the Chinese embassy, announced at the beginning of the book, was to help the reader determine which rank the Chinese hold “in the scale of civilized nations” (1805, p. 431). Much of what Barrow saw in China was anticipated by Anson, Pauw, and other 18th century critics. In his *Travels in Southern Africa* Barrow had called the Chinese the “most civilized and ingenious . . . of the human species” (1801, Vol. 1, p. 282), but this was in the context of criticizing the “Hottentot nation.”
204. Montesquieu’s Spirit of Laws was translated into German four years after its original publication. As Jonathan Spence points out, Daniel Defoe had already negated “virtually every previously described positive aspect of China” in part two of Robinson Crusoe, which was rushed to press in 1719 (Spence, 1998, p. 67).

205. Barrow also criticized the Chinese for “torpid mental powers”; cruelty and a lack of human compassion; “tastelessness in architecture, theater, music, and painting,” and a language that was “poor.” Summing up, “the general character of the nation is a strange compound of pride and meanness, of affected gravity and real frivolousness, or refined civility and gross indecency.”

206. Indeed, a novel by the bestselling German author Karl May, Der Blaurote Methusalem (1889), contains a vicious satire of the Chinese system of examinations used to qualify candidates for advancement to Mandarin status.

207. For a popularized version of the stagnation thesis, see Maukisch (1836, pp. 173–174). Others preferred the figure of decay or stagnation. According to Christoph Johann Adelung, in his Versuch einer Geschichte der Kultur des menschlichen Geschlechts, classical China had been one of the few cultivated parts of the non-European world (1800, p. 415). But like France, China had lost its culture by exceeding the optimal level of cultivation.

208. Richthofen eventually went on to found and chair several geographic institutes and societies and to serve as Rector of the University of Berlin. When Germany annexed Qingdao in the 1890s, Richthofen was a member of an official committee of academics and industrialists that advised the government on colonial policy, the Kolonialrat.

209. Richthofen initially praised the Zhoushan (Chusan) archipelago at the entrance of Hangchow Bay (1907, Vol. I, p. 44; Engelmann, 1888, p. 10), but turned his full attention to Jiaozhou by 1882; see Richthofen, 1898.

210. The rest of this paragraph draws mainly on Osterhammel’s brilliant analysis.

211. In an exhaustive survey of 19th-century English, American, Russian, French, and German publications on China, Heinz Gollwitzer found that the trope of the “yellow peril” emerged in the context of the Sino-Japanese war of 1894/1895 (1962, pp. 43–44). Gollwitzer also traces 19th-century antecedents of this theme to labor agitation against Chinese workers in California, Australia, and the Cape Colony.

212. Chinese defeat in the Sino-Japanese war further encouraged the western powers to envision a new round of infringements on Chinese sovereignty.

213. Heyking was also a successful novelist specializing in tales of romance that were sometimes set in overseas colonial locales.

214. Other diary entries repeat the description of the Chinese as “barbarians” (Ibid., pp. 207, 215) and advocate partition (Ibid., p. 199). The idea of partitioning China, while widespread among Germans in China at the time and serious enthusiasm of Kaiser Wilhelm himself in 1900, was not endorsed by the Foreign Office officials, who realized that German trade had more to lose than to gain from such a move (Michael, 1986). The ubiquity of the partition trope in German discussions nonetheless reveals the starkly aggressive colonial attitude at the turn of the century.

215. The renowned German anthropologist Gustav Klemm defended China’s “wonderful form of government, wise laws, advanced moral institutions, in sum, its China’s unique culture” and argued against the widespread prejudices about China (1847, p. ii). Klemm concluded on an anti-imperialist note, observing that it was no wonder
214 GEORGE STEINMETZ

the Chinese viewed Europeans as barbarians in the wake of the first Opium War, and
daring that it was no longer the Manchus who threatened China but "Christian Germanic
Europe" (Ibid., p. 510). Klemm was Director of the Royal Library in Dresden.
218. It is important to stress that this was a further elaboration of the original
Sinophobic discourse, whose main authors, from Anson through to Heyking, focused
their attacks precisely on Chinese officials, merchants, and other elites.
219. Berghaus combined this relativistic comment with standard racist social-
evolutionary remarks, such as his description of the Chinese language as "stuttering"
and primitive (Ibid., p. 72).
220. Zeichen des Drachen (1880–1881/1893); Der Blau-rote Methusalem (1889);
and Und Friede auf Erde! (first published in 1901, as Et in terra pax). The first two
novels were permeated by the typical negative tropes of 19th-century German
Sinophobia, with Chinese characters depicted as deceptive tricksters and Chinese culture
as a sham. The narrator of Et in terra pax (1901), however, begins his travels with a
self-reflexive passage about the ways in which prejudices prevent the traveler from
making anything but the most superficial observations. The racism of an American
missionary is explicitly portrayed as a form of mental illness, and "race-mixing" is
viewed positively.
221. The most complex and subtle working through of these contradictory meanings
of China can be seen in one of the most famous German novels of the 19th century,
Theodor Fontane's Effie Briest (1894). The "Chinaman" figure suggests both a sexually-
charged positive difference of exoticism, and a threatening, negative difference that
recalls the Sinophobic discourse of authoritarian patriarchy, decay, and death.
222. Ferdinand von Richthofen referred to the "western and eastern Kulturvölker"
(cited in Gollwitzer, 1962, p. 200). In the introduction to his massive five-volume work
on China, Richthofen set out to encompass the Sinophile discourse rather than trying to
ignore or refute it. China on the one hand "presents us with the picture of a splendid
accomplishment of the human spirit," according to Richthofen, and yet it is "precisely
the purified perspective from the comparatively higher standpoint of European civilization
which allows us to pay just tribute to this culture" (Richthofen, 1877).
223. I am adapting the Wright's (1979) suggestive term to the Bourdieuan under-
standing of class as a subjective and cultural phenomenon that is based partly on
the distribution of material assets but not reducible to the latter.
224. Anzer was assisted in his first move up the Chinese hierarchy by Max von
Brandt, the German Consul in Beijing who preceded von Heyking. See Brandt (1901,
Vol. 3, p. 77); also Bornemann (1977).
225. See Weicker (1908, p. 110) and, for a list of Schrameier's numerous publica-
tions, Matzat (1986).
226. Kienitz to Foreign Office, March 12, 1917, in microfilmed copies of German
Foreign Office documents: Auswärtiges Amt, Abteilung (Political Division),
Deutschland, No. 135; 15, n.p. (from microfilms of German Foreign Ministry Archives).
227. A further complication is that the "mechanisms" of the human sciences
themselves exist only in complex, overdetermined forms and not in separated and
isolated form. An epistemology of "parsimonious" explanation is thus even less defensible in
the social sciences than in the natural sciences, where causal mechanisms can at least
plausibly be construed as existing in ontological separation from one another.
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Precolonyiality and Colonial Subjectivity


GEORGE STEINMETZ

Precoloniality and Colonial Subjectivity


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