REMAKING MODERNITY  Politics, History, and Sociology
EDITED BY

JULIA ADAMS, ELISABETH S. CLEMENS, AND ANN SHOLA ODELL

DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS  DURHAM AND LONDON, 2005
The Demise of Historical Sociology?

In a much-discussed essay, Zygmunt Bauman argued that American historiography, in its commitment to the narrative method, had lost some of its main ideas. However, according to its critics, historical sociology, which is not as preoccupied with the narrative method, has been able to develop a coherent theoretical framework that is compatible with the dominant metatheoretical position in postmodern American sociology. In this chapter, I analyze this position, which I call "historical sociological positivism.

I first examine the historical sociology of American sociology in the postwar period, and then look at the historiographic methods of American sociology since the 1980s. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the role of historical sociology in the present day.
Methodological Positivism defined

The intellectual formation I am calling methodological positivism concerns, first of all, a set of empirical assumptions about the nature of social reality, the possibility of its social explanation, and the role of the empirical method in the social sciences (see Bourdieu 1977: 80–81) on the distinction among three

1. Methodological empiricism
2. Empirical positivism
3. Methodological positivism

Methodological empiricism

This approach is based on a positivist methodology, which is characterized by a strong emphasis on the empirical or observational approach to knowledge. In methodological empiricism, the focus is on the collection and analysis of empirical data to test hypotheses and theories. This approach is often associated with the use of quantitative methods, such as surveys and experiments, to gather data. The goal of methodological empiricism is to establish empirical regularities and causal relationships in the social world.

Empirical positivism

Empirical positivism is a more radical form of empiricism that seeks to establish a direct connection between the empirical and the theoretical. This approach is often associated with the use of scientific methods, such as hypothesis testing and statistical analysis, to establish empirical evidence for theoretical claims. The goal of empirical positivism is to establish a direct connection between the empirical and the theoretical, and to use this connection to guide the development of new theories.

Methodological positivism

Methodological positivism is a more recent approach that seeks to combine the strengths of both methodological empiricism and empirical positivism. This approach is characterized by a focus on the empirical, but with a greater emphasis on the role of theory in guiding empirical research. Methodological positivism seeks to establish a direct connection between the empirical and the theoretical, but it also recognizes the importance of the role of theory in shaping empirical research. The goal of methodological positivism is to establish a more nuanced and complex understanding of the empirical world, and to use this understanding to guide the development of new theories.
### Table: Different Understandings of Social Science

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspective</th>
<th>Methodological Positivism</th>
<th>Critical Realism</th>
<th>Constructivcal Idealism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Epistemology</td>
<td>Positivism</td>
<td>Critical Realism</td>
<td>Constructivcal Idealism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>Positivism</td>
<td>Critical Realism</td>
<td>Constructivcal Idealism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Notes on Scientific Naturalism

- **Empiricism**
  - Natural and social sciences are distinct
  - Social sciences are objective
  - Hedonism

- **Nominalism**
  - Distinguishes natural and social concepts
  - Social sciences are scientific
  - Sociological idealism

- **Historicism**
  - Relativistic nomological model
  - Qualitative methods and experiments

As noted, the third constituent element of methodological positivism is its adherence to a strong version of scientific naturalism. "Naturalism" in this context refers not to aesthetics but to the philosophical assumption that the social world can be studied in the same manner as the natural one. Scientism is a more stringent variant of naturalism that "claims a complete unity" between the natural and social sciences (Bhaskar 1975: 84). Scientism is therefore closely linked to assumptions about ontology and epistemology, but it has additional implications for sociological methodology (row 4 in table 1) and ontology (row 2 in table 1). Due to the central role of quantification, experiment, and prediction in the natural sciences and because natural science is often incorrectly assumed by sociologists to be both empiricist and positivist, many social scientists have assumed that these are appropriate and feasible goals for their own work.

Sociological scientism had three consequential implications for social ontology. Scientism militates against the recognition of the concept, time, and space-dependency of social structures and practices. The notion of "concept-dependency" refers here to the claim that human practices and social structures do not exist independently of human theories about them. Social practices are not "brute facts" (Taylor 1975: ch. 13-15). Without taking the signifying dimensions of social practices into account, we literally cannot tell what sort of behaviors we are, as Geertz famously illustrated with his discussion of the indeterminate and context-bound meaning of cultural facts. **Table:** Different Understandings of Social Science

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspective</th>
<th>Methodological Positivism</th>
<th>Critical Realism</th>
<th>Constructivcal Idealism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Epistemology</td>
<td>Positivism</td>
<td>Critical Realism</td>
<td>Constructivcal Idealism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>Positivism</td>
<td>Critical Realism</td>
<td>Constructivcal Idealism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Notes on Scientific Naturalism

- **Empiricism**
  - Natural and social sciences are distinct
  - Social sciences are objective
  - Hedonism

- **Nominalism**
  - Distinguishes natural and social concepts
  - Social sciences are scientific
  - Sociological idealism

- **Historicism**
  - Relativistic nomological model
  - Qualitative methods and experiments

As noted, the third constituent element of methodological positivism is its adherence to a strong version of scientific naturalism. "Naturalism" in this context refers not to aesthetics but to the philosophical assumption that the social world can be studied in the same manner as the natural one. Scientism is a more stringent variant of naturalism that "claims a complete unity" between the natural and social sciences (Bhaskar 1975: 84). Scientism is therefore closely linked to assumptions about ontology and epistemology, but it has additional implications for sociological methodology (row 4 in table 1) and ontology (row 2 in table 1). Due to the central role of quantification, experiment, and prediction in the natural sciences and because natural science is often incorrectly assumed by sociologists to be both empiricist and positivist, many social scientists have assumed that these are appropriate and feasible goals for their own work.

Sociological scientism had three consequential implications for social ontology. Scientism militates against the recognition of the concept, time, and space-dependency of social structures and practices. The notion of "concept-dependency" refers here to the claim that human practices and social structures do not exist independently of human theories about them. Social practices are not "brute facts" (Taylor 1975: ch. 13-15). Without taking the signifying dimensions of social practices into account, we literally cannot tell what sort of behaviors we are, as Geertz famously illustrated with his discussion of the indeterminate and context-bound meaning of cultural facts.
voice or interpretation was less significant than standardized analytical tech-
iques and modes of representation that were reinforced by sociologists. The increa-
sing emphasis of the "hard science" practice of publishing articles with a
noting list of authors drawn from a large group. The distortion of autori-
ous style as subjective in both facts and reflexes formed part of the
reduction of sociology. 11

The combination of positivism, empiricism, and science in positivist
systematic study of the natural sciences led to the study of quantitative methods, however, as well
as other systematic studies, such as positivist and positivist

Finally, particular ways of representing the social textually and visually
tended to be associated with methodological positivism. Statistical and tabu-
lar forms of presentation are understood as preferable to textual; narrate-
ly or experimental forms of textual were widely dismissed as unsci-
entific. Just as vision itself was negated in twentieth-century thought and
diminished specifically within social theory (Jay 1993; Woodiwiss 2001),
visual forms and media (other than tables and statistics) were dismissed in
as an "editio de neant." The seemingly trivial but startling revealing example
of the scission of postwar sociological modes of representation is the way in
which the American Sociological Review (1938) has emulated "hard science"
journals by presenting its text as two tightly wrapped columns on each page.
A more general representational issue is the shift from books and book
chapters to short journal articles as the field's defining format. Ceteris par-
bus, short articles do not allow authors to develop complex narratives or
arguments that intertwine multiple strands of complexity. A final issue is the
marginalization of authored voice. The implicit message that individual

American Sociology's Postwar Refounding (Refound) and the Consolidation of Methodological Positivist Orthodoxy

One of the first issues that needs to be addressed in a reconstruction of the
genealogy of positivist orthodoxy in U.S. sociology during the postwar pe-
riod is the fact that many of its discursive and material institutional building
blocks were already in place before World War II. 12 Many of the nineteenth-
century founders of sociology were at the center of the natural sciences.
The specific cluster of naturalism, empiricism, and positivism had been
promoted by Comte, whose "hierarchy of the positive sciences" placed
mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, and physiology before "social
physics" (Comte 1925 [1850-1852]:101). 13 Spencer (1927) assumed that natu-
11 This section is a revised and expanded version of a chapter in my book "The Invention of History," 1984, 1.
12 These arguments are based on a broad examination of the histories of sociology and the histories of
the specific sciences that have informed sociology in the modern period. My book "The Invention of History," 1984, 1.
13 Margaret S. Maclean's use of the term "positivism" is a striking example of the differences between the
issues raised in the second edition and the first. (Footnote omitted.)
ral species provided a grid for transmogrifying different types of societies, and Durkheim (1895: 480) elevated science itself to an object of quasi-religious worship. The philosophical writings of Ernst Mach (1863), the godfather of logical positivism, were extremely important for early American sociology. Founders of American sociology such as Franklin Giddings drew on Mach's empiricism theory, according to which science and knowledge in general were tested entirely on sense impressions (see also Bansmer 1987: 72-75; D. Ross 1991: 227; Troeltsch 1908: 31-51). Karl Pearson, who promoted a positivist, empirist, and naturalistic understanding of the social sciences, was also influential. Pearson's 1902 The Grammar of Science was adopted by many of the first generation of American sociologists in their self-transformation from reformers and social evolutionists into social technicians (Bannister 1987: 151; G. Levine 1990). In that book, Pearson reproduced a sketch by Mach of the view from inside the scientist's head, looking out at the world, to illustrate the argument that sense perception was the sole source of knowledge (see fig. 3). Pearson also argued that science found its "fullest expression" in statistics (Bannister 1987: 151). The scientific naturalism of early founders of American sociology, like Giddings at Columbia University or Alphon Small at the University of Chicago, was explicit (Hobble 1975: W. E. O'Connor 1942; Vildisch 1974: ch. 5).

Positivist approaches were also actively promoted by the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Foundation during the 1920s and 1930s, under the guise of making sociology less theoretical and political and more scientific, applied, and similar to the natural sciences. Major grants were made to a number of sociology departments, the list of which is strikingly similar to the roster of top-ranking departments today (Bulmer 1982; Fishe 1994; D. Ross 1991).


Nevertheless, American sociology was epistemologically unsettled during the entire period from the Gilded Age to 1945, lacking any consensus about criteria for scientific authority and distinction. Many leading figures in early American sociology, including Sumner, Mead, Cooley, Veblen, Parsons, and Howard E. Becker, rejected some version of positivism. Non-positivists had a voice in the American Journal of Sociology (1875) and the ASR, which began publication in 1896. In 1939, the ASR carried a critique of Comtean positivism by the founder of an earlier version of critical realism, the philosopher Roy Wood Sellars (1936). The first two volumes of ASR also carried essays on cultural theory, psychanalysis, Lenin's theory of revolution, and the topic of "imagination in social science." Even the Sociological Research Association, an elite, invitation-only professional group that was formed in 1936 in response to battles within the American Sociological Society between "value-free" positivists and "humanistic" social activists, was itself divided between theoretical and more positivist wings (Bannister 1970: 194, 228). At the end of the 1930s, American sociology was not yet a "scientific field" in the Bourdieusian sense of the term—that is, it was a fragmented field, not one in which all actors shared a set of criteria, conscious or unconscious, defining scientific capital (Bourdieu 1986, 2000; S. P. Turner and Turner 1990: 75).

Parsons began his discussion of the positivist tradition in 1932 with the question, 'Why has it died?' Parsons (1932) also produced some of his most historical and non-positivist work in his wartime writings on Germany and Nazism. Ironically, this was the same year of anti-positivism in American sociology. In defiance of Parson's performative speech act, positivism came roaring back to life immediately after the war and soon came to dominate

Figure 1
American sociology. Indeed, it persisted as dox a until sometime between the late 1960s and the mid-1970s and still function as orthodoxy within the field today. How can we account for this rapid and overwhelming consolidation of postivist doxa?

Scientific Capital, Modes of Regulation, and Ideological Resonance

Bourdieu's notion of the field (champ) is a useful starting point for analyzing postwar changes in U.S. sociology. A field contains diverse positions and viewpoints but is nonetheless clearly structured, such that certain positions are recognized by the dominant and the dominant alone as the most distinguished (see Bourdieu 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1988). Bourdieu notes that epistemological differences are a central axis of distinction within scientific fields, writing that "a survey on power in the scientific field could perfectly well consist of . . . epistemological questions alone" (1983:11). Certain methodological positions have more scientific capital than others, all other things being equal. All participants in a well-structured field recognize a common definition of scientific authority and competence, a hierarchy of distinguished and less distinguished positions, even as the dominant develop a somewhat perverse taste for their own domination. My argument, for which I can provide only partial evidence here, is that sociological scientific authority increasingly accrued to methodologically positivist positions during the postwar decades.

Unlike earlier anthropological notions of culture, this imagery of structured fields does not require any assumption of cultural uniformity. Unlike Gramscian hegemony, it does not suggest that alternative positions are unthinkable. Instead, it suggests that alternative valuations of heterodox positions are unworkable. Epistemological alternatives were never absent in postwar American sociology. Marxism, cultural sociology, and the sociology of science all had prewar precursors, and all of them continued to lead at least a de facto existence throughout the cold war period. It is also important to keep in mind that what counts as distinguished is field-specific. What counted as cultural capital within sociology certainly was not appreciated as such in the broader arena of American cultural life during the cold war. Positivism has had no eminent

15. In the field of psychology, by contrast, positivism already flourished during the war as a result of wartime policies like human factors, behaviorism was stronger than systemically rigorous positions within social psychology (Blackmore 1983).

16. Interestingly, Bourdieu is also citing American sociology here.
of the social. 17 To explain why certain visions of the social seem more intuitively reasonable than others, to understand why some intellectual challenges are able to converge and seize the imaginations of social scientists despite entrenched interests, habits, and the preferences of external agencies, we need to consider the overall context of social regularities. It is possible to argue that certain ways of seeing the social world are empowered in particular historical epochs by their resonance with that world without thereby reducing them to a simple reflection of some external reality (Peirce 1910; ch. 7).

This suggests that we need a theory of the aspects of the social worlds that are most relevant to social epistemology. We also require a theory that is able to make epistemic distinctions within the broad period of capitalist modernity, if social structures are to account for social epistemologies, given that the latter have changed and evolved over the timeframe designated as "modernity" and "capitalism." Regulation theory is one of the few social perspectives able to fulfill both of these requirements. The distinction between Fordism and post-Fordism within this framework (see below) underscores the theory's goal of periodizing analytically within the broader epoch of capitalism. Regulation theory has also emphasized the influence of systems-level regularities on subjectivity and culture (Hardt and Negri 2000; Harvey 1989, 1996; Hirsch and Roth 1986; Steinhart 1994a, 1994b, 1994c). We can extend this to the investigation of systems-level effects on spontaneous social epistemologies.

My argument does not reduce to a reflexionist theory of social perception in which ideologies are understood as reified or as partial, mutually or inverted images of reality. A mere "real" or "camera obscura" approach would involve the absurd claim that post-Fordist restructuring is leading social actors to become spontaneous regulation theorists if we assume, for the sake of argument, that regulation theory best captures these ongoing social changes. Instead, as theorists such as Macionis (1984) and Boudon (2001) have argued, contemporary social transformations are more likely to be expressed in subjective forms such as feelings of epistemically and depthlessness. By arguing that positivism and post-structuralism are the spontaneous social epistemologies of the Fordist and post-Fordist eras, respectively, for instance, one is not claiming that these are adequate forms of knowledge.

The connection between social epistemology and Fordism should not be understood as a difference between a dependent cultural realm and an independent cultural one but as a relationship of resource between two different forms of practice. Resource suggests formal and structural homologies rather than any sort of direct mimesis. Regulation theory avoids a reifying language according to which Fordism or post-Fordism would be reducible to brute material or narrowly economic practices (Jessop 1990).

The concept of modes of regulation is centered on rates of profit and exploitation, but it encompasses an entire array of patterned cultural, social, spatial, temporal, and political practices as well. It is this broader aspect of Fordism and post-Fordism that are most relevant to explaining the fluctuating degrees of plausibility of positivist and non-positivist epistemologies in sociology. Social knowledge may register the shifts in these regulatory modes in oblique and indirect ways. To take a simple example, social crisis may be more resonant with epistemologies that emphasize discontinuity than with epistemologies insisting on repeated, general social laws (Bourdieu 1977; 1984, 1985, 1984, 1986b). By attending to the changing modes of regulation and social localization, it is possible to prioritize the waxing and waning influence of spontaneity social epistemologies.

The determinants of sociologists' social epistemologies can be historically described as being external or internal to the scientific field. In explanations of the development of science, the adjective "external" has typically been used to refer to all influences on science that do not relate to the intellectual question of the fit between theory and object (Breslau 2001; R. A. Hall 1963). I draw the boundary between internal and external influences at a different point, with the inside encompassing subfields, disciplines, universities, research institutions, and funding agencies. The outside then refers to other social-cultural factors that influence science, as well as branches of the government concerned with science. 18 This is not to deny that each of these separate levels may have its own distinctive fieldlike properties. But the sociology of sociology has not paid enough attention to the extra-scientific sources of social epistemologies, focusing instead on intra-scientific dynamics and on interventions by government and private funding agencies (Almond 1991; Fisher 1993; S. P. Turner and Turner 1993; H. Bass 1997). The impact of broader social structures on sociologists' epistemological leanings—a field of inquiry suggested by Marx and Engels in The German Ideology (1845) —has been left largely unexamined.

The Bourdieusian theory of fields and scientific capital, combined with a regulation-theoretic sociology of social knowledge, allows us to move beyond the usual focus on material banishments and sanctions in explaining

17 While the present chapter supplements Bourdieu's approach via a theoretical account of means-end social pattern of socialization, elsewhere I have reconstructed Bourdieu's underlying theory of subjectivity in psychological terms (Steinhart 2002, 2003, forthcoming b).

18 Examples of such external sources would include philanthropists and patrons in the USA, scientists in sixteenth-century society, and the social role of the "gentleman" in (Guyan 1990) study of the same period.
the dominance of methodological positivism and the timing of its consolida-
tion. We can now understand how the intellectual raw materials of meth-
odological positivism could have existed for many decades before becoming
dominant. Fordism may have lent credence to methodological positivism,
but it did not create it.24 By the same token, the post-Fordist mode of
regulation that is currently being consolidated resonates with norm positivist
forms of social knowledge production without having grown rise to those
forms, and it may help explain the stepwise and piecemeal dissolution of
positivist data in recent years.25

24 For a similar argument about the U.S., see John M. Buechler, "The Emergence of Formalized
Practice: The Formative Years of the American Planning Association," Planning Research 10, no. 2 (1982):
222-234.
25 See R. A. Shoemaker, "The Emergence of a 'Post-Fordist' Model of European Economic

The Postwar Conjecture and Positivist Social Science

The postwar period saw an enormous rise in resources for social science
research from the state sector (Featherman and Vinovskis 2001; Gieniewicz
Leading
sociological figures, from Isakoff Parsons to Philip Hauser, understood
this conjecture as an opportunity to establish sociology more firmly as a
discipline. This would require epistemological convergence, however.
The direction of this convergence was suggested initially by the National
Science Foundation (1957), which made funding available to sociologists provided
they were willing to generate "social laws" and predictions (Hauser 1946: 382).
Parsons wrote a paper in 1948 for the Social Science Research
Council that argued that "the same philosophical principles that guided the natural
sciences were at the heart of the social sciences" (Klauser and Ickes, ed.
1988: viii). In 1954, the NES mandate was expanded to include the social
sciences. Conditions were laid out defining which sociologists would be
permitted to receive funding (Alpert 1944, 1952a, 1952b; 1957; see also Lund-
berg 1947). The first condition was "the criterion of science" specified to
mean the "convergence of the social sciences" (Al-
pert 1964: 66). Sociologists were cautioned that access to future funding depended
"largely on their capacity to prove themselves by their deeds" (p. 660). During the years 1945-1949, the proportion of articles in science, more,
and Social Forces acknowledging outside sources of funding was 27.4 percent;
by 1960-1964 this figure had risen to 51.2 percent (McCutcheon 1972: 288).

The positivist camp was strengthened by other institutional factors (Feath-
erman and Vinovskis 2001). The wartime mobilization brought social scien-
tists into the ambit of the state (Kleiman 1961: ch. 3). After the war many
new recruits were brought into sociology from government agencies and
hard science disciplines, tending to reinforce methodological positivism
(S. E. Turner and Turner 1990: 86-88). Another critical factor was the rise of
freestanding research institutions such as the National Opinion Research
Center in Chicago and the Institute for Social Research at the University of
Michigan (Featherman 1988). These new research institutes were often physically
separated from the extant sociology departments, but they were still able to intervene in the ongoing re-definition of the discipline's identity.

The scope of these postwar ambitions was expressed in a 1948 paper by
Paul Lazarsfeld that C. Wright Mills (1959: 90-91) quoted extensively. Stu-
dents were to stop studying "the history of institutions and ideas" and focus
on "the concrete behavior of peoples" and contemporary events—an em-
pirical preference. Lazarsfeld called for "studying social situations and
problems which repel themselves rather than those which occur only once"—a direct restatement of the positivist definition of science as the
search for constant conjunctions. Methodologically, sociology was to cease
being an armchair activity practiced by "the individual observer" and to
become more like "organized, full-fledged empirical science" (p. 4).

What explains this powerful surge of methodological positivism after
World War II? While some of the influences were internal to social science—the
influx of funding and recruits oriented toward a natural science model,
the creation of freestanding centers of "abstracted empiricism" (Mills 1959: ch. 3)—other factors were external. The positivist position was en-
couraged, first, by an association of anti-scientific irrationalism with the rise of
Nazism and Soviet totalitarianism. Adorno and Horkheimer's 1944 Dialectic of
Enlightenment (1986) had moved dialectically from a Heideggerian critique of
positivism to an explanation of anti-Semitism and Nazism. In the context of
the wartime triumph of science and the postwar confrontation with the
Soviet Union, however, it became more difficult for anti-fascists to criti-
cize the spirit of modern science itself. Indeed, it was widely argued that it
was precisely the lack of a modern scientific culture that had contrib-
ted to fascism. Suspicion was now cast backward retrospectively onto the entire
men positivist tradition, running from Hegel and the German Romantics
through to Marx, Dilthey, Nietzsche, and the critical theorists of the inter-
war period. This was doubly damaging to anti-positivist arguments, since
most of these thinkers had emerged from the German-speaking context and
could therefore be linked, if only by a vague sort of "guilt by association,"
with German exceptionalism and hence with Nazi ideology.26, 27

26 See A. R. Shoemaker, "The Emergence of a 'Post-Fordist' Model of European Economic
27 See R. A. Shoemaker, "The Emergence of a 'Post-Fordist' Model of European Economic
The process of formalization of power structures, in a post-capitalist context, has led to a redefinition of social roles and responsibilities. The rise of the "corporate state" and the "neoliberal" paradigm has further accentuated the power dynamics within society. The "triumph of the market" has not only affected the economy but also the social fabric, leading to a shift in values and priorities. The "cultural turn" in sociology, as advocated by Habermas, highlights the importance of understanding the symbolic and communicative aspects of social interactions in the postmodern era. The challenge for sociologists is to reframe theories and methodologies to address the new social formations and their implications for power and inequality. The "globalization" discourse, on the other hand, brings into focus the interconnectedness of events across borders, requiring a broader perspective in sociological analysis.

In conclusion, the sociological approach to the study of power and social relations is essential in understanding the complexities of modern society. By examining the power dynamics within and between systems, sociologists can provide insights into the social, economic, and political implications of these structures. The ongoing debates and discussions within the field reflect the dynamic nature of sociological inquiry, constantly evolving to meet the challenges of the contemporary world.
The third implication of Fordism for sociologists' spontaneous social philosophy relates to its synchronization of the scale of activities within the contours of the nation-state. As Jessup (1990) and other regulation theorists have argued, Fordist organized economic development and economic flows mainly within and between national states. Neil Brenner (1998) demonstrates that Fordism effected a relative reduction in levels of uneven development within the contours of the national territory. The resulting formalized nature-state space as the fundamental frame, or container, for social practices made it easier to believe that social events actually did occur in constant conjunctions. By contrast, the idea of social regularities is much less plausible where each type or dimension of social practice has a different spatial reach and location, as is increasingly the case under "globalizing" post-Fordism, with its myriad spatial reshufflings (N. Brenner 1998; S. Graham and Marvin 2001). Fordism's geosocial character was thus conducive in myriad ways to methodological positivism.

The importance of the spatial organization of capitalism and social life more generally for the social sciences can also be seen in the division between the putatively non-normative social science disciplines and the supposedly scientific fields of area studies. Although spatial scale was relative and varied within the capitalist core countries (and the East European socialist states) during the Fordist era, it remained less so in the so-called Third World. Seemingly continual changes in the location of international borders were one aspect of peripheral spatial uncertainty. The naturalness of the nation-state as the obvious scale for economic, political, and cultural practices was continually called into question in the Third World by international labor migrations and anti-systemic movements (pan-Arabism, pan-Africanism, communism) that partly transcended national boundaries. The nation-state was not only too small to capture the main dynamics of the periphery; it was also too big. Social activities in the periphery often seemed to be more local in their focus, and economic development continued to be more uneven within nation-states. These differences undergirded the division between area studies and the generalizing, supposedly context-free social sciences. Prediction seemed less conceivable in a Third World because Fordism was absent or only partially instantiated there (Lipietz 1985). Other factors played a role in staving off positivist dominance within area studies, including the pervasive view of the non-West as less rational and more cultural; this was conductive to lexicentric methodological approaches (see Bierstedt 1994; G. Steinmetz 1995). Present forms of social science knowledge that promised to fold the non-West into a generalizing explanatory framework were not entirely lacking, of course, especially where U.S. economic and security interests were at stake.

In sum, while the Fordist state directly subsidized positivist regimes of social knowledge, Fordism as a mode of social regulation and way of life provided sustenance to the positivist social imaginaries.

Sociology Becomes a Full-Fledged Field

The outcome of this postwar conjuncture was that U.S. sociology had become a well-structured field by the early 1960s. Despite differences of taste or viewpoint, all of the players in a field agreed on common stakes and legitimate definitions of field-specific capital. Reputational, social, and economic capital in sociology tended now to accrue to more positive positions. Plurality in positivist methodological positions began to function as a field-specific form of scientific capital. Even those who rejected positivism often collaborated in its rise to prominence. Talcott Parsons, who had forcefully opposed positivism in the 1940s (and who is currently associated with an anti-postmodern stance of social theory) accommodated it to the new doctrine. Those who did not conform often eschewed influence within influential sociology departments (Abbott 1990).

A system of rules that guided the creation of knowledge, the channeling of resources, and the inscription of boundaries within sociology and against other disciplines was thus institutionalized. The initial period of consolidation in the 1940s and 1950s was still characterized by occasional skirmishing over foundational questions, but by the early 1960s these
affirmation. Critical sociology would thus not appear to be as susceptible to recuperation as the neo-Marxist and feminism of the 1960s and 1970s. The idea of "domestication" is too simple and sweeping to describe what happened to the earlier critical movements in U.S. sociology. First of all, none of these developments was internally homogenous. Not even during the heyday of multivariate Marxism and quasi-experimental historical sociology in the 1950s and 1960s did historical sociologists adopt the positivist approach en masse. Furthermore, many books and articles that seemed to adopt a discourse that was superficially positivist were punctuated by moments or latent levels that were less positivist. Second, we have to distinguish these critical movements' conditions of emergence and early reification from their subsequent trajectories. In more recent years, for instance, Marxist sociology has reincorporated itself through the lenses of post-structuralism, semiotics, narrative analysis, and Lacanian psychoanalysis and rediscovered the anti-positivist traditions of the Frankfurt school. Gender and queer studies, both influenced by Foucault, have emerged out of feminist sociology, and there has been some reappraisal among sociological feminism, post-structuralism, and psychoanalysis. Cultural sociology is moving beyond its earlier restrictive focus on so-called cultural objects, with some practitioners returning to the hermeneutic tradition and others embracing the approaches of Bourdieu of Birmingham-style cultural studies, all of which were formerly found mainly in Europe and Britain. The new visual sociology (Woodside 2011) breaks with the early frameworks emphasis on text, number, and diagram.

The Historical Turn in Sociology

The wave of historical sociological research that began in the 1970s had a handful of antecedents during the postwar period, including Bendix (1955), Lipton (1959), Moore (1966), Roth (1959), Smelser (1959), Swanson (1960, 1967), Tilly (1969), and Wallerstein (ed. 1969). But historical sociology was not recognized as a distinct subfield in this period. The 1970s carried almost no historical articles between 1971 and 1972 and historical sociologists such as Smelser never before the end of the war (in 1944 and February 1945). Only at the end of 1970s did sociology start opening up to intellectual traditions and methodological strategies associated with the field of history. The importance of this opening should not be underestimated. Historians...
approaches had been defined as antithetical to sociology since the late-nineteenth-century Methodologie. Even during the interwar period, few American sociologists were as historically oriented as European sociologists like Weber and Elias.18

Since there was only a handful of American sociologists who could be "recovered" for the historical opening in the 1970s and early 1980s, courses in historical sociology typically contained a large proportion of European "classics" and works by historians. One result of the lack of an indigenous tradition, paradoxically, was a greater willingness to read works written before or outside of American sociology's positivist culture. And these external sources provided crucial resources for thinking positively. Although Weber had insisted on what critical realists call the concept dependency of social practice—the unavoidable hermeneutic dimension of social analysis—this had been lost or suppressed in the American translation of his work. Some of the discussions around culture, language, and practice that were beginning among historians in the 1970s and 1980s, for instance (e.g., Sewell 1980), seeped into sociology.

Historians offered sociologists important lessons about the historicity of conceptual categories. This was especially visible in work on class formation. Sociologists tried to make sense of E. P. Thompson's insistence that social class was not some simple material structure but rather something that "happens when some men, as a result of common experiences . . . feel or articulate the identity of their interests as between themselves, and as against other men" (1966: 9).

The opening to historiography also promised to make sociologists more aware of the horizontal openness of the social and hence of the ubiquity of conjunctural and contingent causality. Drawing a set of methodological lessons from this first period of historical sociology, the sociologist Philip Abrams (1987: ch. 2) recognized the special significance of the category of contingency. In a direct refutation of the distinction between a supposedly "idiographic" historiography and a more "nomothetic" sociological sociology, Abrams (1987: 195–196, 1972, 1986) pointed out that the individual event was armenable to sociological explanation, even if this explanation involved a plurality of mechanisms operating in a contingent conjunction. As Abrams noted, "what is unique about an event is the conjunction of elements it embodies" (1982: 197). During the same period, Norbert Elias's (1988) proposal for a "figurational sociology" translated a central epistemological lesson from the field of history into sociology by arguing for "figurations" rather than "invariant laws." 19

Somewhat later, historical sociologists began to discuss narrative employment as a distinct and sometimes privileged means of presenting complex historical contingences and representing the heading together of the meaningful and material aspects of social life.20 From historians such as Louis Mink (1987), they learned about the unique cognitive and interpretive contributions of narrative forms, understanding the importance of reading beneath the textual surface for "the content of the form" (Hayden White 1978, 1987) or the text of "memorization" (Bennett 1986). This helped historical sociologists to understand the simplifying accounts of narrative that had been profited in earlier decades by positivist philosophers—arguments that reduced complex narratives to a series of simple factual statements or nomothetic generalizations (e.g., Hempel 1965; Mandelbaum 1961; Nadel 1979 [1949: ch. 13]).

These lessons about the historicity of concepts, the concept-dependency of social practice, contingency, conjunction, figurational analysis, and narrative ran up against American sociology's entrenched positivism. During the foundational period of positivism, figures like Lasswell had insisted on the necessary distinction between history and social science and between idiographic and nomothetic knowledge. Even Parsons, despite his critique of positivism, empiricism, and scientism, insisted again and again on the distinction between "the historical and the analytical sciences" (1937, vol. 2: 794–796). Rather than learning from historiography, many positivist sociologists assumed that they had lessons to provide historians. An entire lesson of time was elaborated to keep "idiographic" history at arm's length. Work that paid too much attention to the meaningful dimensions of social practice was referred to as "truth washing," "broody-goosey," "fuzzy," "soft," "parasitical," "airy-fairy," and, unluckily, "poetry." Writing that attended to sequence and conjunction was often dismissed as "journalism" and "just so stories.

How was the "second wave" of historical sociology related to broader de-
developments in the discipline and society at large. Periodization is crucial here. Dissertations and books began to appear in numbers sufficient to speak of a "second wave" of historical sociology only at the end of the 1970s. Some sociologists became more historical during the 1970s. The Formations of National States in Western Europe (G. Tilly, ed.), published in 1978, was not organized around the search for a uniform model of state formation but offered instead a series of seriating concepts. Wallerstein's The Modern World-System (1974) may have presented its arguments in a less positivist mode, but its complex historical narrative undermined any simple monocausal argumentative structure. Indeed, the so-called waves of research in historiography seem to be as referent to as much to episodic formations as to generations or individuals. But a serious boost in historical sociology began only after a half-decade of sociocognitive crisis in the United States, a period that saw the unraveling of the Fordist mode of regulation and a post-war ‘radar’ of American imperialist projection overseas (Steinmetz 2000b). In this respect, and in contrast to the earlier neo-Marxist and feminist movements, historical sociology was faced with a mainstream episteme whose sociopolitical conditions of support were already beginning to crumble. The patterned Fordist regularities of time, subjectivity, and space, which had rationalized sociologists' positivist worldview in earlier decades, were disappearing. Under these conditions, timeless sociological laws—statements of regular conjunctions of social events—seemed inherently less believable. With respect to more immediate supports for positivism, the state and private foundations also were scaling back their demands for social science research in the late 1970s and 1980s, in contrast to the full-fledged welfare-warfare state clientele that social scientists had experienced during the 1960s.

As with the earlier wave of critical sociology in the 1960s, there was a structural parallel during the late 1970s and the 1980s between the historical turn in sociology and social movements in society at large. This was the era of a generation that had arrived "after the revolt" (R. Mohr 1992), too late for the optimistic upheaval of the 1960s. These social movements unfolded in a period of double digit unemployment and academic retracement, behind the paradoxically historicist slogan, "no future." As Louis Menand remarked, the "economic value of a college degree began to fall" around 1975, and "the income differential between college graduates and high school graduates dropped from 61 percent to 48 percent" over the decade (2004: 4; compare E. A. Duffy and Goldberg 1998; Leimann 1994). This period also saw a shift from the more united politics of the 1960s to a political fragmentation that consisted of a "revolutionary subject," to the fragmented politics of the shifting coalitions, continually rearticulated identities, and nominalizing "make-like" forms of protest (Hardi and Negri 2000: 57-58; Laclau and Mouffe 1989).

These social and political developments were paralleled by a turn within sociology toward more conceptual ways of thinking about social change. The decline of triumphalist social narratives of progress that resulted from the economic recession, the energy crisis, Watergate, the U.S. loss of the Vietnam War, and the splintering of the left was echoed intellectually not just by a post-modernist "suspension of grand narratives" (Foucault 1984 [1977]), but also by sociologists' turn toward history. The grand narrative of sociology's own unfolding as a cumulative science had become as unconvincing as the modernization theorem and Marxist meta-narratives of social development. The turn toward history thus represented an embrace of anti-teleological and ironic modes of thought—even if historical sociologists sometimes took detours through historical methods and meta-narratives that historians already considered outdated. The turn to history also meant that sociologists were seeking rapprochement not with one of the "harder" sciences, as had been the case during each of the discipline's earlier phases, but with a more humanist discipline. History had not crossed the largesse of the "post-historical" Fordist science-and-security state and had produced some of the harshest critics of sociological scieneces during that period. Despite the severe turn to the historical turn, however, a period of domestication set in quite quickly, as noted by Giddens (1990). The epistemological disruptions coming from the new historical sociology were countered by efforts to make the subtitle conform with existing conventions. This involved, first, forcing historians research back into the proscenium box of the covering law format. Methodological discussions within historical sociology were dominated for years by single-mechanism explanations or models in which a single interaction term was repeated...
Despite these recuperations, however, historical sociology was not completely reconciled with methodological positivism. Some sociologists from the so-called second wave continued to relate in unexamined ways to historicity and historicists to take seriously ideas such as constructivism, context, narrative, persistence, and culture. Studies of working-class politics by historical sociologists in this period, for example, were often culturally or semiotically oriented (see Ammons 1981; Callanan 1982; Sewell 1996).

Ronald Ammons’s 1981 book was organized around a cultural-Marxist theoretical framework of hegemony and was methodologically similar to the work of social historians. Callanan (1982) and Sewell (1996) were organized around historical sociology and methodological discussions in cultural anthropology and social history. A background outside the mainstream of American sociology may have been the differentia specifica in some of these cases. The subfield of class formation was also protected from positivism to some extent by the fact that many influential books in the subject, even during the 1960s and 1970s, rejected functionalism (compare Gouldner 1960; Thompson 1966; Willis 1977), in contrast to research on topics like state formation or social policy.

The Unsettled State of Historical Sociology Today

The cluster of social changes signaled by the concept of post-Modernism has tended to push sociologists’ spontaneous social epistemologies away from the assumptions of positivism. The sheer accumulation of critical movements within sociology, furthermore, has helped to preserve the vision of a less positivist discipline. Yet entrenched disciplinary interests and habits continue to pull in the opposite direction. This straining in opposing directions produces multi-accidental and internally contradictory texts and unexpected epistemological hybrids.

A recent attempt to take stock of comparative historical analysis by Blau and Rueschemeyer (1995) underscores the persistence of methodological individualism (Sewell 1996) in historical sociology, despite its much less positivistic background (see Sewell’s own comments on this in Sewell 1980). At the same time, Sewell has a member of the Sociology Department at the University of Michigan, between 1965 and 1970 (with an appointment in history, as well) Callanan was appointed to sociology department at the University of Chicago and New York University. Ammons moved to the University of Michigan with Charles Tillman. As noted above, both have been important figures in the development of historical sociology. Their work became increasingly oriented toward historical and historical sociologists. Now and through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, their work became increasingly oriented toward historical and historical sociologists. Now and through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, their work became increasingly oriented toward historical and historical sociologists. Now and through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, their work became increasingly oriented toward historical and historical sociologists. Now and through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, their work became increasingly oriented toward historical and historical sociologists. Now and through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, their work became increasingly oriented toward historical and historical sociologists. Now and through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, their work became increasingly oriented toward historical and historical sociologists. Now and through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, their work became increasingly oriented toward historical and historical sociologists. Now and through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, their work became increasingly oriented toward historical and historical sociologists. Now and through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, their work became increasingly oriented toward historical and historical sociologists. Now and through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, their work became increasingly oriented toward historical and historical sociologists. Now and through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, their work became increasingly oriented toward historical and historical sociologists. Now and through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, their work became increasingly oriented toward historical and historical sociologists. Now and through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, their work became increasingly oriented toward historical and historical sociologists. Now and through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, their work became increasingly oriented toward historical and historical sociologists. Now and through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, their work became increasingly oriented toward historical and historical sociologists. Now and through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, their work became increasingly oriented toward historical and historical sociologists. Now and through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, their work became increasingly oriented toward historical and historical sociologists. Now and through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, their work became increasingly oriented toward historical and historical sociologists. Now and through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, their work became increasingly oriented toward historical and historical sociologists. Now and through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, their work became increasingly oriented toward historical and historical sociologists. Now and through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, their work became increasingly oriented toward historical and historical sociologists. Now and through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, their work became increasingly oriented toward historical and historical sociologists. Now and through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, their work became increasingly oriented toward historical and historical sociologists. Now and through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, their work became increasingly oriented toward historical and historical sociologists. Now and through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, their work became increasingly oriented toward historical and historical sociologists. Now and through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, their work became increasingly oriented toward historical and historical sociologists. Now and through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, their work became increasingly oriented toward historical and historical sociologists. Now and through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, their work became increasingly oriented toward historical and historical sociologists. Now and through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, their work became increasingly oriented toward historical and historical sociologists. Now and through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, their work became increasingly oriented toward historical and historical sociologists. Now and through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, their work became increasingly oriented toward historical and historical sociologists. Now and through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, their work became increasingly oriented toward historical and historical sociologists. Now and through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, their work became increasingly oriented toward historical and historical sociologists. Now and through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, their work became increasingly oriented toward historical and historical sociologists. Now and through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, their work became increasingly oriented toward historical and historical sociologists. Now and through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, their work became increasingly oriented toward historical and historical sociologists. Now and through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, their work became increasingly oriented toward historical and historical sociologists. Now and through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, their work became increasingly oriented toward historical and historical sociologists. Now and through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, their work became increasingly oriented toward historical and historical sociologists. Now and through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, their work became increasingly oriented toward historical and historical sociologists. Now and through the
The first part of Mahoney and Ruebush's definition of 'comparative historical analysis' is an epitaph to pensar over time (2007: 8). This
seems to be a classic example of an essay out of a book.

The process of development here is one of exploration and discovery, a process that creates new knowledge and understanding. It involves the formulation of hypotheses, the collection of data, the analysis and interpretation of the results, and the synthesis of findings to develop a coherent explanation. The goal is to provide insights into the causes and consequences of historical events and to offer explanations that are both comprehensive and nuanced. The study of comparative historical analysis is deeply intertwined with the broader field of history, providing a framework for understanding the complex interactions of political, social, and cultural forces that shape human societies.

The current retreat of the 1st world society may be a temporary setback, but it is also an opportunity for reflection and renewal. By examining the past, we can gain a deeper understanding of the present and prepare for the challenges of the future. The process of historical analysis requires patience, perseverance, and a willingness to engage with complex and often contradictory evidence. But through this process, we can identify patterns and trends, and develop a more nuanced understanding of the human experience.
The key term in the history of psychological research is the concept of "correspondence." This concept has been central to the development of psychological theories, and it has been used to explain a wide range of phenomena, from the relationship between the mind and the brain to the nature of thought and consciousness.

The history of psychological research has been marked by a number of significant developments, including the development of the field of psychology itself, the rise of the behaviorist movement, and the emergence of cognitive psychology. These developments have been shaped by a number of key figures, including Sigmund Freud, B.F. Skinner, and Noam Chomsky.

The correspondence between psychological theory and empirical research has been a central concern of psychologists from the outset. This correspondence has been a matter of debate among psychologists, with some arguing that psychological theory is too detached from empirical research, while others argue that psychological theory is too closely tied to empirical research.

The key question in the history of psychological research is whether psychological theory and empirical research are independent of each other. This question has been a matter of debate among psychologists, with some arguing that psychological theory and empirical research are independent of each other, while others argue that psychological theory and empirical research are interdependent.

The history of psychological research has been marked by a number of significant developments, including the development of the field of psychology itself, the rise of the behaviorist movement, and the emergence of cognitive psychology. These developments have been shaped by a number of key figures, including Sigmund Freud, B.F. Skinner, and Noam Chomsky.
In the figure, I have emphasized the importance of social regulation in the reproduction of inequality. The figure shows how different social groups are affected by the same social regulations. The figure also highlights how social regulation is not just another means of social control, but an integral part of the social order. The social regulation is not only about controlling behavior, but also about maintaining social order and stability. The figure further shows how social regulation is not only about controlling behavior, but also about maintaining social order and stability. The figure also shows how social regulation is not just another means of social control, but an integral part of the social order. The social regulation is not only about controlling behavior, but also about maintaining social order and stability. The figure further shows how social regulation is not just another means of social control, but an integral part of the social order. The social regulation is not only about controlling behavior, but also about maintaining social order and stability. The figure also shows how social regulation is not just another means of social control, but an integral part of the social order. The social regulation is not only about controlling behavior, but also about maintaining social order and stability. The figure further shows how social regulation is not just another means of social control, but an integral part of the social order. The social regulation is not only about controlling behavior, but also about maintaining social order and stability. The figure also shows how social regulation is not just another means of social control, but an integral part of the social order. The social regulation is not only about controlling behavior, but also about maintaining social order and stability. The figure further shows how social regulation is not just another means of social control, but an integral part of the social order. The social regulation is not only about controlling behavior, but also about maintaining social order and stability. The figure also shows how social regulation is not just another means of social control, but an integral part of the social order. The social regulation is not only about controlling behavior, but also about maintaining social order and stability. The figure further shows how social regulation is not just another means of social control, but an integral part of the social order. The social regulation is not only about controlling behavior, but also about maintaining social order and stability. The figure also shows how social regulation is not just another means of social control, but an integral part of the social order. The social regulation is not only about controlling behavior, but also about maintaining social order and stability. The figure further shows how social regulation is not just another means of social control, but an integral part of the social order. The social regulation is not only about controlling behavior, but also about maintaining social order and stability. The figure also shows how social regulation is not just another means of social control, but an integral part of the social order. The social regulation is not only about controlling behavior, but also about maintaining social order and stability. The figure further shows how social regulation is not just another means of social control, but an integral part of the social order. The social regulation is not only about controlling behavior, but also about maintaining social order and stability. The figure also shows how social regulation is not just another means of social control, but an integral part of the social order. The social regulation is not only about controlling behavior, but also about maintaining social order and stability. The figure further shows how social regulation is not just another means of social control, but an integral part of the social order. The social regulation is not only about controlling behavior, but also about maintaining social order and stability. The figure also shows how social regulation is not just another means of social control, but an integral part of the social order. The social regulation is not only about controlling behavior, but also about maintaining social order and stability. The figure further shows how social regulation is not just another means of social control, but an integral part of the social order. The social regulation is not only about controlling behavior, but also about maintaining social order and stability. The figure also shows how social regulation is not just another means of social control, but an integral part of the social order. The social regulation is not only about controlling behavior, but also about maintaining social order and stability. The figure further shows how social regulation is not just another means of social control, but an integral part of the social order. The social regulation is not only about controlling behavior, but also about maintaining social order and stability. The figure also shows how social regulation is not just another means of social control, but an integral part of the social order. The social regulation is not only about controlling behavior, but also about maintaining social order and stability. The figure further shows how social regulation is not just another means of social control, but an integral part of the social order. The social regulation is not only about controlling behavior, but also about maintaining social order and stability. The figure also shows how social regulation is not just another means of social control, but an integral part of the social order. The social regulation is not only about controlling behavior, but also about maintaining social order and stability. The figure further shows how social regulation is not just another means of social control, but an integral part of the social order. The social regulation is not only about controlling behavior, but also about maintaining social order and stability. The figure also shows how social regulation is not just another means of social control, but an integral part of the social order. The social regulation is not only about controlling behavior, but also about maintaining social order and stability. The figure further shows how social regulation is not just another means of social control, but an integral part of the social order. The social regulation is not only about controlling behavior, but also about maintaining social order and stability. The figure also shows how social regulation is not just another means of social control, but an integral part of the social order. The social regulation is not only about controlling behavior, but also about maintaining social order and stability. The figure further shows how social regulation is not just another means of social control, but an integral part of the social order. The social regulation is not only about controlling behavior, but also about maintaining social order and stability. The figure also shows how social regulation is not just another means of social control, but an integral part of the social order. The social regulation is not only about controlling behavior, but also about maintaining social order and stability. The figure further shows how social regulation is not just another means of social control, but an integral part of the social order. The social regulation is not only about controlling behavior, but also about maintaining social order and stability. The figure also shows how social regulation is not just another means of social control, but an integral part of the social order. The social regulation is not only about controlling behavior, but also about maintaining social order and stability. The figure further shows how social regulation is not just another means of social control, but an integral part of the social order. The social regulation is not only about controlling behavior, but also about maintaining social order and stability. The figure also shows how social regulation is not just another means of social control, but an integral part of the social order. The social regulation is not only about controlling behavior, but also about maintaining social order and stability. The figure further shows how social regulation is not just another means of social control, but an integral part of the social order. The social regulation is not only about controlling behavior, but also about maintaining social order and stability. The figure also shows how social regulation is not just another means of social control, but an integral part of the social order. The social regulation is not only about controlling behavior, but also about maintaining social order and stability. The figure further shows how social regulation is not just another means of social control, but an integral part of the social order. The social regulation is not only about controlling behavior, but also about maintaining social order and stability.