Far from being hostile to psychoanalysis, Bourdieu reckoned that there was no fundamental difference between his conception of the unconscious and Freud’s: ‘It’s the same thing: confronted with the unconscious action of dispositions we notice resistances, displacements, repression, negations…’

Although Bourdieu is often seen as “a theorist who will have no truck with Freudian psychoanalytic theory,” he seemed to recognize in the last decade of his life (1930-2002) that psychoanalysis was intrinsic to his own project. The pressure of the Freudian tradition was first revealed in his writing by the recurrence of the words “unconscious” – used both as adjective and as noun – and “misrecognition” (méconnaissance), a concept that received its most powerful formulation in the writing of Lacan. Bourdieu’s oeuvre accumulated a growing and ever more elaborate psychoanalytic vocabulary. His writing includes the following terms, all of them mainly associated with the Freudian tradition: projection, reality principle, libido, ego-splitting, negation (dénégation), compromise formation, anamnesis, return of the repressed, and collective phantasy; in his “Autoanalyse” (published in German in 2002 and in French in 2004), he uses the phrases “disavowal, in the Freudian sense” and “community of the unconscious.”

But Bourdieu’s relationship to this tradition was not untroubled. The conditions in which Freudian concepts appear in Bourdieu’s work can be understood partly in terms of the psychoanalytic concept of Verneinung or (de)negation. In his earliest studies of hystericists, Freud already recognized a particular kind of resistance to the deepest layers of repressed material in which the patient disavows memories “even in reproducing them.” Freud specified the process of Verneinung in a later paper: “the content of the repressed image or idea can make its way into consciousness, on condition that it is negated”; denegation involves “already a lifting of the repression, though not, of course, an acceptance of what is repressed.” The “intellectual function is separated from the affective process.” This allows the ideational aspect of the repression to be undone, accepted intellectually by the subject, and named, while at the same time the condemning affective judgment is retained. The subject still refuses to recognize the denegated object as an intrinsic part of herself.

In some writings, especially the earlier ones, Bourdieu rejects psychoanalysis outright. In Outline of a Theory of Practice, for example, psychoanalysis is reduced to a...
biological reductionism, completely ignoring Freud’s shift from the theory of childhood abuse in the early *Studies in Hysteria* to the theory of sexual fantasy that he developed in the course of his self-analysis. But his treatment of Freudian psychoanalysis more often takes the form of admitting Freudian terminology and even some psychoanalytic arguments into his texts while surrounding these passages with rhetorical devices that seem to condemn psychoanalysis. One of the most paradoxical aspects of this is that Bourdieu himself introduces the Freudian concept of *Verneinung*:

> What indeed is this discourse which speaks of the social or psychological world as if it did not speak of it; which cannot speak of this world except on condition that it only speak of this world as if it did not speak of it, that is, in a form which performs, for the author and the reader, a denegation (in the Freudian sense of *Verneinung*) of what it expresses?

As one commentator has observed, Bourdieu “does not seem to be able to refrain from borrowing certain of its concepts while repudiating the discipline altogether.” Bourdieu often appears to be trying to domesticate psychoanalysis, accepting its vocabulary while subtly redefining it in a more sociological direction, or else deploying its language in an almost decorative way while avoiding its substantive implications.

As a first example of the more complex strategy of denegation, consider first the following passage from *The Weight of the World*, which could easily have been written by a psychoanalyst:

> Such limitation of aspirations shows up in cases where the father has been very successful... But it assumes all its force when the father occupies a dominated position... and is therefore inclined to be ambivalent about his son’s success as well as about himself... At one and the same time he says: be like me, act like me, but be different, go away... He cannot want his son to identify with his own position and its dispositions, and yet all his behavior works continuously to produce that identification... 

Two pages later Bourdieu describes sociology and psychoanalysis as different, complementary approaches to the same object, thereby warding off the possibility of seeing the latter as intrinsic or internal to the former.

> This is not the place to question the relation between the mode of exploring subjectivity proposed here and that practiced by psychoanalysis. But, at the very least, it is necessary to guard against thinking of these relationships as alternatives to each other. Sociology does not claim to substitute its mode of explanation for that of psychoanalysis; it is concerned only to construct differently certain givens that psychoanalysis also takes as its object...

While expressing a desire for differentiation from psychoanalysis, this passage does not actually explain what the difference would be. Similarly, in *Masculine Domination*, Bourdieu reveals his debt to Freud immediately when he mentions that he is focusing on
the same Mediterranean cultural matrix emphasized by psychoanalysis. Where Freud
drew on ancient Greek myth, Bourdieu deploys Kabyle society as a “paradigmatic
realization” of the tradition he calls “phallocentric.” Striking an explicitly psychoan-
alytic tone, Bourdieu interprets masculine domination as being rooted in unconscious
structures that are centered on “phallonarcissism.” Bourdieu asserts that the “the link
(asserted by psychoanalysis) between phallus and logos” is “established” here.13 In his
discussion of the “somatization of the social relations of domination” in the process of
creating sexed bodies, the difference to psychoanalysis vanishes altogether:

The work of symbolic construction is far more than a strictly performative operation of
naming . . . it is brought about and culminates in a profound and durable transformation
of bodies (and minds), that is to say, in and through a process of practical construction
imposing a differentiated definition of the legitimate uses of the body, in particular
sexual ones, which tends to exclude from the universe of the feasible and thinkable
everything that marks membership of the other gender – and in particular all the
potentialities biologically implied in the ‘polymorphous perversity,’ as Freud puts it,
of every infant . . . .14

Bourdieu takes as a given Freud’s analysis of infantile sexuality and ego-analytic
arguments about the denial of “the female part of the male” and “severing attach-
ments to the mother.”15 Whereas Bourdieu had reframed sociology as socio-analysis
in some of his earlier works, here the hyphen is dropped altogether in favor of socioan-
alysis, which points even more insistently to a psychoanalytic template.16 At the same
time, however Bourdieu begins this text with one of his characteristic defensive moves,
categorizing psychoanalysis tout court as “essentialist” and “dehistoricized.”17 He only
acknowledges late in the book that his current topic is home turf for psychoanalysis,
writing that

researchers, almost always schooled in psychoanalysis, discover, in the psychic ex-
perience of the men and women of today, processes, for the most part deeply buried,
which, like the work needed to separate the boy from his mother or the symbolic
effects of the sexual division of tasks and times in production and reproduction, are
seen in the full light of day in ritual practices.18

With respect to the centrality of “sexual attributes and acts” in Kabyle society, Bourdieu
notes that there is “a danger of misinterpreting their deep significance if one approaches
them in terms of the category of the sexual in itself,” a comment that may be directed
against a biological version of psychoanalysis (in fact, psychoanalysis and Freud’s own
writings are completely divided on the relative weight and precise form of biological
determination).19 Psychoanalytic theory has long been concerned with the same
problem that Bourdieu sets out to explain here, namely, the ways in which masculine
domination is historically reproduced as a dehistoricized form. The meaning of the
psychoanalytic expression “the unconscious does not have a history” underscores the
ways in which the past is constantly being “actualized” within the unconscious through

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the “return of the repressed” and other mechanisms. It expressly does not mean that
the unconscious takes the same form everywhere or that it is eternal because of some
biological foundation.\textsuperscript{20} Likewise, for Bourdieu, the habitus is historical – a “product
of all biographical experience” – while presenting itself in an \textit{eternalized} form.\textsuperscript{21}

Bourdieu’s strategy allows him at least to discuss Freud’s ideas openly and to give
them names, even if he often takes back with one hand what he has given with the
other. His treatment of Lacan is a different matter entirely. Bourdieu’s writing exhibits
a strenuous avoidance of Lacan and Lacanian theory.\textsuperscript{22} Indeed, Slavoj Žižek’s remark
about the “curious detail” concerning the missing names of Lacan (and Louis Althusser)
in Habermas’ book \textit{The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity} applies with equal force
to Bourdieu. According to Žižek, Habermas mentions Lacan “only five times and each
time in conjunction with other names.” Similarly, when Bourdieu utters the name of
Lacan it is in a constricted or distortive fashion. In \textit{The Rules of Art}, Bourdieu dis-
misses Lacan as a sort of intellectual punster, while backhandedly acknowledging his
importance, writing that “the intellectual play on words [is] found in its legitimate
form among the noblest authors of the day – such as Jacques Lacan.”\textsuperscript{23} Bourdieu jus-
tified his exclusion of Lacan from his study of the French academic nobility (\textit{Homo
Academicus}) by pointing out that Lacan “did not hold an official position in the uni-
versity” – although Lacan had lectured at the University of Paris and, in the 1960s,
at the \textit{École Normale Supérieure}.\textsuperscript{24} Yet Bourdieu also characterized Lacan as having
“\textit{great importance in the field}” and as being allied “socially and symbolically . . . to
Lévi-Strauss and to Merleau-Ponty.” Lacan’s nobility and centrality to the field would
seem to subvert Bourdieu’s general claim that intellectual capital receives its certifi-
cation or consecration from the state.\textsuperscript{25} Bourdieu’s avoidance of Lacan is thus prob-
lematic because so many of Bourdieu’s ideas are based on, or require integration with,
psychoanalysis (especially the Lacanian version).\textsuperscript{26} Of course, the writings of a thinker
as wide-ranging as Bourdieu can be mined for any number of theoretical influences.
But the relationship between Bourdieu’s theory and psychoanalysis is, I believe, more
profound and productive than has been recognized, even if it is often a relationship that
only emerges after the fact or in the \textit{futur antérieur} (future perfect), as in: Bourdieu will
(always) have been a psychoanalytic thinker. But this will have happened very much
against his own resistance.

Starting in 1975 Bourdieu’s publications featured Lacan as the source of a revealing
anecdote concerning the “distressed complaint of the Jew to his pal”: “Why do you
tell me you are going to Cracow so I’ll believe you are going to Lvov, when you
really are going to Cracow?” According to Bourdieu, this subterfuge was used by
Heidegger “to encourage the belief, by proclaiming what he is really doing, that he
is not really doing what he has never stopped doing.”\textsuperscript{27} Bourdieu’s reliance on Lacan
for this deceptively incidental anecdote, often repeated, seems itself to be an effort to
encourage the belief that Bourdieu is talking about Lacan to show that he is not really
talking about Lacan, not really presenting a theory that only makes sense when it is
reconstructed in terms of Lacan’s ideas. This strategy differs from \textit{Verneinung}. Freud’s
concept of fetishism perhaps best captures this combination of a “refusal to recognize

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the reality of a traumatic perception” combined with an oblique acknowledgment of that disturbing state of affairs. In Bourdieu’s case the disturbing realization is the extreme relevance of Lacan for his own project.28

Lacan provides the key to understanding two of Bourdieu’s most significant and most ambiguous concepts, *symbolic capital* and *habitus*. These concepts will remain enigmatic until their psychic foundations are revealed.29 To accomplish this we also need to turn to the other postwar French theorist who was also handled dismissively by Bourdieu, or simply repressed: Louis Althusser.30 One of Althusser’s most fruitful ideas was a form of reading he called “symptomatic” (*symptomale*), which “divulges the undivulged event in the text it reads, and in the same movement relates it to a different text, present as a necessary absence in the first.” This reveals “the paradox of an answer which does not correspond to any question posed,” perhaps because the current theoretical problematic or paradigm did not allow it to be posed, as Althusser suggests, but also perhaps because the questions were more actively repressed or disavowed by the author.31 If we fail to excavate these misrecognized and disavowed foundations of the concepts habitus and symbolic capital, they will continue to suffer the force of an anti-psychoanalytic *displacement* onto a seemingly arbitrary and random array of disparate theoretical terrains.

Bourdieu’s treatment of several other concepts illustrates the rather systematic way in which his work simultaneously approaches and distances itself from psychoanalysis. One example that is closer to Lacan than Freud concerns the concept of the “imaginary.” In *Pascalian Mediations* Bourdieu insists that “we are very far from the language of the ‘imaginary’ which is sometimes used nowadays.”32 In a particularly dogged example of never pronouncing that accursed name, Bourdieu refers in his footnote not to the obvious intertext for the idea of the Imaginary – Lacan’s writings, which introduced and developed the concept in the first place. Instead, his translator (seemingly in collusion with Bourdieu) refers in a footnote to the more idiosyncratic use of the concept of the imaginary by Castoriadis, which the latter developed partly in an act of theoretical suppression of the father-figure Lacan.33 Another concept that Bourdieu deploys while attempting to sever it from its psychoanalytic moorings is phantasy/fantasy.34 In *Language and Symbolic Order* (1981), he writes:

> in all cases of *camouflage through form* . . . the tabooed meanings . . . remain misrecognized in practice; though present as substance they are absent as form, like a face hidden in the bush. The role of this kind of expression is to mask the primitive experiences of the social world and the social *phantasms* which are its source, as much as to reveal them.35

Bourdieu also introduces the core Freudian idea of the “social libido which varies with the social universes where it is engendered and which is sustains (*libido dominandi* in the field of power, *libido scienti* in the scientific field, etc.).”36 And consider the passage from *Weight of the World*, quote above (p. 446), where Bourdieu discusses the father’s ambivalent messages to the son.
Similarly, in psychoanalysis, the young boy’s first symbolic identification is with the imago of the father, but the Oedipal structure makes this identification fundamentally impossible: “there issues forth an impossible double command: to be like the father, but not to be like the father with respect to his sexual power.” According to Freud, the relationship of superego to ego is not exhausted by the precept “‘You ought to be like this (like your father),’” but “also comprises the prohibition: ‘You may not be like this (like your father).’” Freud was of course less explicit than Bourdieu about the difference between situations in which the parents occupy “a dominated position” and those in which the parents are “very successful.” Sociology generally pays more attention to social class and other dimensions of inequality, which is why it needs to be integrated into psychoanalysis (and vice versa). But Freud does allude to the centrality of social class in generating psychic variations, for example in his discussion of the “family romance,” where an older child’s “imagination becomes engaged in the task of getting free from the parents of whom he now has a low opinion and of replacing them by others, who, as a rule, are of higher social standing.”

At the most general level, Bourdieu’s theory of subject formation focuses on the internalization and embodiment of hierarchical social relations, and the ways in which socialized individuals actively reproduce those social relations. This model closely tracks the psychoanalytic concern with the individual’s interiorization of social history (Freud) and incorporation into the Symbolic order (Lacan). But the relationship between the two theoretical formations goes beyond this. One of Bourdieu’s more remarkable openings to the logic (as opposed to simply the language) of psychoanalysis occurs in the section of Pascalian Meditations (1997) where he addresses the genesis of subjects suited to operate competitively in social fields. In a discussion of the transition from self-love to a “quite other object of investment,” one that “inculcate[s] the durable disposition to invest in the social game,” Bourdieu articulates a scenario that was described by Freud as the Oedipal story and by Lacan as the entry into the Symbolic:

Sociology and psychology should combine their efforts (but this would require them to overcome their mutual suspicion) to analyse the genesis of investment in a field of social relations, thus constituted as an object of investment and preoccupation, in which the child is increasingly implicated and which constitutes the paradigm and also the principle of investment in the social game. How does the transition, described by Freud, occur, leading from a narcissistic organization of the libido, in which the child takes himself (or his own body) as an object of desire, to another state in which he orients himself towards another person, thus entering the world of ‘object relations’, in the form of the original social microcosm and the protagonists of the drama that is played out there?

Bourdieu locates the motor of this shift in the “search for recognition,” which brings his interpretation even closer to the reading of Freud offered by Lacan (and more
recently by Slavoj Žižek), a reading based on Hegel’s theory of recognition in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. But note that Bourdieu refers to *psychology* here rather than psychoanalysis. He could hardly have been unaware of the polarization between Lacan and “psychology” (as well as with mainstream psychoanalysis). Althusser had praised Lacan for rejecting *homo psychologicus* and argued that psychology was “the site of the worst ideological confusions and ideological perversions of our time.”

My goal here is not to analyze the reasons for Bourdieu’s strategies of denegation and disavowal of Freud, and certainly not to “psychoanalyze” Bourdieu. Nor am I arguing that Bourdieu was “influenced” by psychoanalysis or that my own interpretation emerges from a closer reading of his texts. Instead, my aim is to sketch the lines for a reconstruction of his theory, focusing on the two core concepts. It would be possible, of course, to mount a socio-psycho-analysis of the sources of Bourdieu’s complex strategies of embrace and repulsion with respect to psychoanalysis. One place to start would be the remarkable document published first in German translation in 2002 as *Ein soziologischer Selbstversuch* – roughly, “a Sociological Self-Experiment.” Two years later the French version appeared under the original title, *Esquisse pour une auto-analyse*, which could be translated as *Outline for a Self-Analysis*. Bourdieu notes on the first page that he is offering “some elements for an auto-socioanalysis.” This sentence marks the first shift away from the psychoanalytic connotations of “autoanalysis” in the title (the most famous example of a self-analysis being Freud’s own). Bourdieu then writes:

> Adopting the view of the analyst, I obligate (and authorize) myself to attend to all of the traits that are pertinent from sociology’s point of view, i.e. that are necessary for sociological explanation and comprehension, and only those.\(^43\)

Since this text is presented as something other than an autobiography, Bourdieu does not begin with his childhood, parents, and ancestors. Instead the narrative moves directly into the social-symbolic thick of things, that is, to Bourdieu’s years at the Ecole Normale Supérieure. Bourdieu writes:

> To understand means first to understand the field with which and against which one was made [*avec lequel et contre lequel on s’est fait*]. That’s why, running the risk of surprising a reader who perhaps expects me to begin at the beginning, that is to say, by evoking my earliest years and the social universe of my childhood, I have to follow proper method and first examine the state of the field at the moment when I entered it, around the 1950s.\(^44\)

The following pages summarize the “collective fantasm” and “community of the unconscious” at the ENS during the 1950s. Following the strategy of denegation discussed above, Bourdieu returns again and again to a psychoanalytic language but then moves the discussion immediately onto a properly “sociological” terrain. Indeed, the rest of this first section of the *Esquisse* seems to provide an answer to a question that Bourdieu’s text has not asked, namely, the question concerning his own refusal...
of psychoanalysis. In summarizing the state of the field at the ENS in this period, Bourdieu depicts the dominant pole as organized around Sartre and existentialism and the dominated grouping as based initially among the marginal outsiders who founded the history of sciences (Bachelard, Caliguilhem, and Koyré – authors with “popular or provincial origins, or strangers to France and its intellectual traditions”) and later among the “leaders of the anti-existentialist revolution in philosophy” who were “the most distant from the core of the academic tradition, like Althusser, Foucault, and some others.” Bourdieu summarizes this latter group as having proposed a “philosophy without a subject,” and reminds his readers that social scientists – Durkheim in particular – had already made similar arguments a century earlier. But psychoanalysis was orthogonal to the dominant polarization in the postwar field of the ENS and the French intellectual field more generally, even if the Lacanian version was clearly allied with the anti-humanism that Bourdieu embraces here. Since both Althusser and Lacan have thus been implicitly allied with Bourdieu, he immediately engages in one of his defensive maneuvers by turning abruptly to a second moment, namely, the French intellectual field in general during the 1970s. Here a new axis of distinction strategies pits Althusser, Foucault, and the other “nephews of Zarathustra,” along with psychoanalysis, against sociology and the social sciences. Psychoanalysis was allied with “spiritualism,” and “more precisely, with Catholicism,” and was situated “on the side of the most noble and pure intellectual activities.” Lacan is singled out and criticized for combining “the obscurities and audacities of a Mallarmé and a Heidegger.” While this may illuminate Bourdieu’s distaste for Lacan, it cannot explain his failure to engage systematically with Freud, who was neither Catholic nor “noble” within his historical context of anti-Semitic Vienna, and whose writing style is crystalline and “scientific.”

It would be easy to read Bourdieu’s strategies as stemming from a simple desire to differentiate his “social-scientific” theoretical approach from others in the field. But his continual return to and disavowal of psychoanalysis has an obsessive quality, suggesting that he knows, but does want to know, how it might inform and transform his own theory. The next section of the *Autoanalyse* finds Bourdieu revisiting his origins in rural Béarn, after describing his research in Algeria. Bourdieu describes this “return to the origins” as being accompanied by a “return of the repressed, but a controlled one.” The need to control that experience is connected to “the emotional atmosphere” and the “very painful” interviews he conducted. What is also being “controlled” here is the familial story, which would bring Bourdieu even closer to the theory that takes the family as its privileged object. This story is finally broached near the end of the book. Two psychoanalytic concepts structure this discussion, without being named as such. The first concept is ambivalence. Bourdieu interprets his entire stance toward intellectual life under the heading of a feeling of “ambivalence” toward the scholarly institution rooted in the “lasting effect of a very powerful discrepancy (décalage) between elevated scholarly consecration and humble social origins.” For psychoanalysis, ambivalence refers to “conflicts in which the positive and negative components of the emotional attitude are simultaneously in evidence and inseparable, and where they constitute a non-dialectical
opposition which the subject, saying ‘yes’ and ‘no’ at the same time, is incapable of transcending.” The second concept, guilt connected to the Symbolic Order, brings us to Lacan. Bourdieu narrates his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France, in which he analyzed the phenomenon of the inaugural ritual itself, as a “psychological solution constituting a challenge to the symbolic order.” His lecture was accompanied by a “sense of guilt toward [his] father who had just died a particularly tragic death.” Bourdieu seems to understand this sense of guilt as being rooted in the “transgression-treason” against his social class of origin, but Lacan might read the sense of guilt as also intrinsic to the entrance into the Symbolic Order per se, and especially to any “challenge” to that Order that must necessarily always operate on that Order’s terms as long as it is to remain culturally legible.

Despite Bourdieu’s rapprochement with psychoanalysis at the level of his language and occasionally at a more systematic theoretical level, he never acknowledged the implications of Freud or Lacan theory for his own theoretical approach. He did not recognize that Freudian/Lacanian theory could help him to avoid the problem of “sociologism,” that is, of reducing the process of the “incorporation” of the social into the individual to a mere “conveyor belt for, or simple reflection of,” logics of social power. Psychoanalysis offers a much richer array of concepts for analyzing the idiosyncratic sense that different individuals make of shared social conditions and the paradox of unconscious agency and unconscious “strategy.” In the rest of this paper, I want to focus on the core Bourdieuan concepts of symbolic capital/symbolic violence and habitus, and to suggest how these can be rounded out through an engagement with Lacan and Freud.

**Symbolic Capital and the Lacanian Symbolic**

Psychoanalysis is well-suited for analyzing the transformation of originally symbiotic subjects into agents equipped with the desire to compete in social “fields” – agents who identify with parental figures and can sublimate, in Freud’s terms, or submit to the demands of the big Other in the field of the Symbolic, in Lacan’s terminology. Lacanian theory allows us to reground Bourdieu’s concept of *symbolic capital* in Lacan’s notion of the *symbolic order* and in the related dynamics of *recognition* and *misrecognition* that are so central to symbolic identification. The symbolic in Lacan is the realm of language, difference, metonymy, and the Law, an arena of socially sanctioned, official *ego ideals*. The relationship of the subject to the symbolic is thus a relation of “dependence on the Other, locus of signifiers.” Symbolic identification is linked to an ego-ideal (*Ichideal*), which “constitutes a model to which the subject attempts to conform.” In Lacan’s later writings, symbolic identification is understood more specifically as identification with *the place from which we are observed*, the location from which we “look at ourselves so that we appear to ourselves likeable, worthy of love.” The “demand of the *Ichideal,*” according to Lacan, thus “takes up its place within the totality of the demands of the law.” The ego-ideal for Lacan is the “position of the subject within the symbolic, the norm that installs the subject within language.”
According to Lacan subjects seek to recognize the normative injunctions of the symbolic order, and they seek to be recognized by those who issue these injunctions. There is a dialectic of recognition between the Subject or Law of the Father and the subject who is inducted into the Symbolic Order, recalling the master-slave dialectic in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. In his Jena Realphilosophie Hegel observes that “in recognition, the self ceases to be this individual,” and he adds that “Man is necessarily recognized and necessarily gives recognition... he is recognition.” In Kojève’s famous summary of Hegel’s Phenomenology, “all human, anthropogenetic Desire – the Desire that generates Self-Consciousness, the human reality – is, finally, a function of the desire for ‘recognition’.”

Although Pascalian Meditations begins to pose as a problem the individual’s reorientation from narcissism to an orientation toward recognition from others, and to see this transition as a precondition for the operation of the competitive “field,” Bourdieu never acknowledged the relevance of the Lacanian Symbolic for his analysis of “symbolic domination.” But why did Bourdieu feel the need to complement his category of “cultural” capital with “symbolic” capital? None of his other categories take this doubled form. Of course, other influences are named: Bourdieu refers to Durkheim as a sociologist of symbolic forms and attributes to Cassirer the idea that “symbolic form” is the equivalent of forms of classification. Bourdieu first defined symbolic capital as capital “insofar as it is represented, i.e., apprehended symbolically, in a relationship of knowledge.” This suggests that “symbolic” is simply another word for the semiotic. Several years later, however, Bourdieu noted that symbolic capital is “cultural capital which is acknowledged and recognized... in accordance with the categories of perception that it imposes”; it “is the power granted to those who have obtained sufficient recognition to be in a position to impose recognition.” By the time he wrote Pascalian Meditations (1997) Bourdieu had connected the topic of symbolic capital directly to the “search for recognition,” and he seemed to make the crucial (Hegelian) observation that it is not only the dominated but also the dominant who depend on the “esteem, recognition, belief, credit, confidence of others.” Symbolic capital, he suggested here, can be perpetuated only so long as it succeeds in generating a system of mutual interdependence in which all the actors in the field depend on recognition from all of the others and grant all of the others recognition – even if this is recognition of an inferior (or superior) status.

Or at least, that is what Bourdieu almost said. The passage quoted above locates the motive behind the emergence of social subjects and symbolic violence in what Bourdieu calls the “search for recognition”:

Absorbed in the love of others, the child can only discover others as such on condition that he discovers himself as a ‘subject’ for whom there are ‘objects’ whose particularity is that they can take him as their ‘object.’ In fact, he is continuously led to take the point of view of others on himself, to adopt their point of view so as to discover and evaluate in advance how he will be seen and defined by them. His being is being-perceived, condemned to be defined as it ‘really’ is by the perceptions of
Symbolic capital enables forms of domination which imply dependence on those who can be dominated by it, since it only exists through the esteem, recognition, belief, credit, confidence of others.67

But while Hegel posits a reciprocity or universality in the search for recognition, in Bourdieu the hunger for recognition is located mainly on the side of the dominated. This is undercut somewhat in Masculine Domination, where we are told that manliness “is an eminently relational notion, constructed in front of and for other men” in a kind of field of men.68 For the most part, however, Bourdieu instinctively falls back on a populist political vision that prevents him from noticing that his own concept of symbolic capital requires a universalization of the desire for recognition to all of the players in a social field. The dominated may develop a “taste for necessity,” preferring their own (dominated) tastes to those of the elite. But they recognize the dominant as holding more valuable cultural capital, that is, dominated and dominant recognize the same principle of domination. The dominant are granted recognition not just by their elite peers but also by the dominated participants in the field. In Hegel’s words, lord and bondsman “recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another.”69 Where this is not the case – where the dominated and dominant fail to recognize shared definitions of distinction – there is an ongoing struggle over the “dominant principle of domination.”70 Fields can be unsettled; practices may fail to cohere in field-like ways.71

Lacan offers a solution to this problem. Lacan borrows the notion of “desire” (Begierde) from Hegel, “who argued that desire was the ‘desire for another desire’. “72 Bourdieu’s notion of symbolic capital is based on the premise of reciprocal demands for recognition by all actors in a field – recognition of the variable cultural positions, habituses and tastes, and recognition of their hierarchy.73 But why should the dominant partner in a hierarchical relation seek recognition from the dominated other? The answer is that both dominant and dominated are subjects of an encompassing system that is itself structured around a hierarchical system of recognition: the Symbolic order. Individuals are inducted into the Symbolic in a posture of subordination to the principle that Lacan calls the big Other – that is, “the anonymous symbolic structure” of Law and language.74 Within this law “is established and presented all human order, i.e. every human role.”75 Every future member of the “ruling class” enters this system of symbolic recognition in a subordinate status, just like every member of the dominated class. As Judith Butler observes, every individual is presumed guilty before the rule of the Law/the Symbolic order, and needs to “acquit” himself, declare his innocence, and be “tried and declared innocent.”76 The subjectivity of even the future bourgeois subject is structured by desire for the Law’s recognition. The Law is coterminous with the Symbolic and the social; the dominated members of a social field are just as integral to this system of expectations and offers and denials of recognition as are the dominant.77

What we have then are two axes of recognition and misrecognition. On the one hand there is the axis along which the Law confronts the “infinity of individuals.”
Althusser, who reframed Lacan’s symbolic order as the system of ideology, described ideology as

*speculary*, i.e., a mirror structure... the Absolute Subject occupies the unique place of the Centre, and interpelles around it the infinity of individuals into subjects in a double mirror-connexion such that it subjects the subjects to the Subject, while giving them... the Subject in which each subject can contemplate its own image.⁷⁸

Among the “infinity of individuals,” however, are diverse social classes and groups, each of which can “contemplate its own image” in the social mirror of the other classes and groups. The Symbolic order demands recognition from the subject and grants him a sliver of recognition in the guise of the policeman’s call: “Hey, you there!”⁷⁹ The dominant and the dominated both demand recognition of their respective tastes and practices. These tastes and practices differ from and reciprocally implicate one another. Recognition is also doubled by misrecognition, both with respect to the subject’s overarching relationship to the Symbolic Order and with respect to its relationship to other classes and groups in the social fields. This is a relation of misrecognition insofar as the image offered up for the purposes of ego-formation and identification is always generated elsewhere, outside the subject, and it is always an inverted, reversed, or otherwise distorted representation of the real. This is a relation of misrecognition insofar as the dominated tend to embrace their own condition of domination, and insofar as the dominant believe that their tastes and practices are genuinely superior in an absolute, transcendent sense.

There is a paradox in the desire among dominated groups for the approval of, or recognition by, those who dominate them, and neither Bourdieu nor Hegel makes sense of this paradox. Bourdieu called attention repeatedly to crucial contribution to social reproduction of the “taste for necessity” or *amor fati*. By failing to account for this taste, however, Bourdieu ran the risk of functionalism. By contrast, psychoanalytic theory offers an explanation of the way in which the desire for submission emerges from the very genesis of the subject. It emphasizes the contradictory demand to be both like and unlike the Father. Psychoanalysis offers a definition of the masochist as one who “locates enjoyment in the very agency of the Law which prohibits the access to enjoyment,” suggesting another account of this desire for recognition – one that is always controversial because it is so damaging to a different sort of *amour propre*.⁸⁰

Lacan’s theory of the Symbolic Order thus sketches out some of the “microfoundations” or better, the “psychofoundations” which permit the operation of the Bourdieuan fields and govern the production of subjects suited for operating in those fields. The subject’s ineluctable entry into the Symbolic explains the desire to have one’s cultural capital recognized as well as the recognition by others of that capital (either as exalted or as paltry). The “social libido” that Bourdieu invokes without ever defining (thereby leaving it open for recuperation by biological reductionism) needs to be thematized within this wider theoretical framework.
Habitus and the Imaginary

A second key concept in the Bourdieuian theoretical lexicon is *habitus*. This concept has been praised for overcoming the mind-body and objectivity vs. subjectivity dichotomies that have been so deeply engrained in western philosophy. The habitus is also attractive as a concept because of its putative integrative power: Given the vast array of fields of practice in which individuals participate and the historical layering of experiences and moments of socialization, corporeal and psychic integration must be seen as an achievement rather than taken for granted. Bourdieu initially mobilized the idea of habitus to make sense of this seemingly magical integration of the disparate experiences that make up a biography.\(^{81}\) In *The Weight of the World* he turned to the question of the habitus that is internally contradictory and fragmented. In his “self-autoanalysis” he summarized his own experience as giving rise to a “cloven habitus (l’habitus clivé), inhabited by tensions and contradictions.”\(^{82}\) But while “postmodern” theory does not do justice to the fact that many people suffer from a fragmented sense of identity rather than reveling in it, Bourdieu’s theory tends to make the opposite error, underestimating the travails of integration. Most importantly, no matter how often Bourdieu restated his definition of habitus he never seemed to come any closer to explaining how and why this integration occurs, and why it sometimes fails.

Here again, Lacan provides a crucial missing link, a picture of a mechanism that can help to elaborate the concept of habitus. Just as the Lacanian concept of the Symbolic Order makes sense of the subjective dynamics underpinning Bourdieuian symbolic capital, so the Lacanian concept of the Imaginary illuminates the subject’s phantasmic ability to integrate disparate experiences and identifications such that identity and practice do not always appear disjointed. A cluster of linked Lacanian concepts – the mirror stage, the bodily ego and ideal ego, and imaginary identification – suggest a possible solution to this problem.

The starting point for human individuals is not a Hobbesian condition of competitive individuality but a state of symbiotic helplessness with no clear boundary between inside and outside, self and other. According to Lacan, this primordial experience is connected to a fragmented body image, which reappears in adult fantasies of the “body in pieces” along the lines of the “return of the repressed.” Lacan discusses the production of a “succession of phantasies that extends from a fragmented body image to a form of its totality that I call orthopaedic.” Similarly, Freud had written that “the ego is first and foremost a bodily ego; it is not merely a surface entity, but is in itself a projection of a surface.”\(^{83}\) Habitus in Bourdieu thus appears as a sociological reworking of the psychoanalytic concept of a roughcast “bodily ego.” Lacan writes:

Whatever in man is loosened up, fragmented, anarchic, establishes its relation to his perceptions on a plane with a completely original tension. The image of his body is the principle of every unity he perceives in objects . . . .Because of this . . . all the objects of his world are always structured around the wandering shadow of his own ego. They will all have a fundamentally anthropomorphic character . . . . Man’s ideal unity, which is never attained as such and escapes him at every moment, is
evoked at every moment in this perception. . . . The very image of man brings in here a mediation which is always imaginary, always problematic, and which is therefore never completely fulfilled.84

The key word here is imaginary. For Lacan, the initial identifications that constitute the subject begin with the mirror phase, when the watery subject – the hommelette or man-omlette – identifies with the totalizing and alienating external image of itself. This need not be a literal reflection in a mirror but can also be the image or even the voice of another human, perhaps a mother or caretaker.85 The core structure of specular identity in the realm of the imaginary is this sense plenitude and wholeness. Imaginary identification is identification with an image that Lacan (following Freud) calls the ideal-ego (Idealich), that is, an image “in which we appear likeable to ourselves . . . representing ‘what we would like to be’.86 The earliest imaginary identifications in the mirror phase provide a template for later ones that are similarly characterized by a striving for wholeness.87 The notion of imaginary identification can be connected to the overarching psychoanalytic concept of phantasy/fantasy. Fantasy scenarios express a conscious or unconscious wish. Imaginary identification is one site for such wishful scenarios.88

Lacan illustrated some of these ideas with the experiment of the phantom flower bouquet and the concave mirror. The flowers in the vase are a real image, but also an illusion, like a rainbow; for Lacan this suggests misrecognition of the real. Moreover, as the diagram suggests (Figure 1), the phantom bouquet can only be perceived from a specific position or “subject position.” The Subject (indicated by the letter “S” and the eye) is precipitated by this setup. Similarly, the “human subject only sees his form materialized, whole, the mirage of himself, outside of himself.”89

Although Lacan initially located imaginary identifications in the mirror phase, he soon realized that the imaginary was not a separate stage or realm but rather a dimension of subject-formation that is dominated by the symbolic. In Althusser’s words, the “imaginary . . . is stamped by the seal of Human Order, of the Symbolic.”90 The imaginary is a realm of signifiers, like the symbolic. The Symbolic Order channels subjects toward specific images for imaginary identifications, yet the subject continually slips from symbolic identifications back into imaginary ones. Although neither realm is more “estranged” than the other, the imaginary offers forms of identification that deny difference, estrangement, and the loss of symbiotic plenitude; they disavow their debt to the Other. The imaginary is thus a sort of estrangement from the “inevitable estrangement” of the Symbolic.91 There is a perpetual “oscillation of the subject” between ideal egos and ego ideals.92

My suggestion is that the sense of embodied “ideal unity” that is expressed in bodily “habitus” is generated in the realm of the Imaginary and imaginary identifications. Bourdieu alludes to this when he writes that “habitus of necessity operates as a defense mechanism against necessity.”93 This comes very close to the psychoanalytic ideas of fantasy and the ideal-ego. But this also explains why a “cloven” habitus is just as likely as a unified one. Habitus is an ideological effect that is threatened by the Real
and the Symbolic. The Imaginary is forever overcoded by the Symbolic, which pushes against integration and toward fragmentation and difference. All of this is haunted by the repressed memory of the “body in pieces.”

“Why, in short, such resistance to analysis?”94

I was constantly saying to myself: ‘My poor Bourdieu, with the sorry tools you have, you won’t be up to the task, you will need to know everything, to understand everything, [including] psychoanalysis . . .’95

Loïc J.D. Wacquant . . . asked Bourdieu about his position regarding psychoanalysis and why he hadn’t pushed it further. Bourdieu responded that he would have needed a second life [to do this].96

I have been more interesting in sketching a possible reconstruction of Bourdieu than in analyzing the reasons for his allergic relationship to Lacan, an avoidance that I have argued was damaging to his theory. Lacan’s combination of “nobility,” externality to the academic field, and his disregard for rational scientific discourse were obviously distasteful to Bourdieu. A deeper reason, however, can be found in Bourdieu’s statement that “Sociology does not claim to substitute its mode of explanation for that of psychoanalysis; it is concerned only to construct differently certain givens that psychoanalysis also takes as its object.”97 If Bourdieu had explored this relationship in more depth he might have seen that they were not alternatives, but that psychoanalysis filled some of
the lacunae in his own theoretical approach. His sociology did not so much construct the same object in a different manner as to construct it inadequately. Bourdieu’s signal contributions, including the concepts of habitus and symbolic capital, can profit from further interaction with psychoanalytic theories of the imaginary integration of bodily imagery and symbolic recognition and misrecognition. This short essay is only a first attempt.

NOTES


3. Of course Freud did not invent the term unconscious, but he gave it is distinctive contemporary definition and connotations; see Nicolas Rand, “The Hidden Soul: The Growth of the Unconscious in Philosophy, Psychology, Medicine, and Literature, 1750-1900,” American Imago 61 (2004): 257-80.


5. J. Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis, The Language of Psychoanalysis (New York: Norton, 1973), 262. Verneinung means both “negation” and “denial” in everyday German, and as Laplanche and Pontalis suggest, it is this dual set of meanings that may give the original Freudian usage some of its force.


12. Ibid., 512, my emphasis.
16. Ibid., 3. See de Gaulejac, “De l’inconscient chez Freud,” for a discussion of Bourdieu’s “therapeutic” orientation, which is less familiar in the Anglo-American context than his “combat sport” orientation.
17. Bourdieu, _Masculine Domination_, viii.
18. Ibid., 81-82, my emphasis. Strangely, most of the reviews of this book have ignored the obvious psychoanalytic subtext and intertexts. One review that does discuss the psychoanalytic dimension bemoans it, arguing that it is “even more unfortunate...that Bourdieu, like many other sociologists, refers freely to psychoanalysis as a basis for some of his sociological interpretations concerning identity, while the much more plausible and scientific explanations from evolution theory remain completely foreign for him.” J.P. Roos and Anna Rotkirch, “Habitus, Nature or Nurture? Towards a paradigm of evolutionary sociology,” paper presented in the European Sociological Association Conference, Murcia, September 23-28, 2003; online at http://www.valt.helsinki.fi/staff/jproos/habitusmurcia.htm.
28. For Freud, fetishism is characterized by the simultaneous acknowledgement and disavowal of the perceived absence of the woman’s penis (“castration”). Fetishistic practice, like all forms of ambivalence (see below, note 49), is characterized by the ability to think two contradictory things at once. Similarly, Homi Bhabha theorizes colonial consciousness and practice in terms of fetishism; in this case the colonizer both recognizes and disavows cultural difference; skin color becomes the “fetish” that both alludes to this difference while drawing attention away from it. See Freud, “Fetishism,” _Standard Edition_, vol. XXI (London: Hogarth, 1963 [1927]), 149-157; Laplanche and Pontalis, _The Language_, 118; and Homi K. Bhabha, “Of mimicry and man: The ambivalence of colonial discourse,” in _The Location of Culture_ (London: Routlege, 1994), 85-92.

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29. Of course my reading here is more a reconstructive one, not a story of recovering repressed origins or of a Heideggerian unconcealing.


44. Ibid., 15.

45. Ibid., 22, 23, 24, 26; Bourdieu refers here to his article with Jean-Claude Passeron, “Sociology and Philosophy in France since 1945: Death and Resurrection of a Philosophy without Subject,” *Social Research* 34, no. 1 (1967): 162-212.

46. Bourdieu, *Esquisse*, 27, 30, naveen


53. This will seem like a startling claim only for those who have restricted themselves to Freud’s more schematic overviews of his theory or approached psychoanalysis through the work of hostile critics. But even the various case studies in Freud’s earliest work on hysteria reveal an enormously wide array of symptoms among his women patients; see Freud and Breuer, *Studies in Hysteria* (New York,
1982). Even the distinction between the positive and negative Oedipus complex in Freud’s mature theory points to different alternative paths that people can take in response to identically structured social predicaments. Moreover, Freud’s concept of working through “characterizes the role of the patient in analysis” and is conceived of not as an analytic technique but as “the labor of the patient” in recognizing and overcoming resistances. M.J. Sedler, “Freud’s concept of working through,” The Psychoanalytic Quarterly 52 (1983): 73-98.

54. Jeffrey Alexander argues that Bourdieu’s habitus theory differs from psychoanalysis because the former fails to understand the social self as empirically autonomous and differentiated from others; Fin de siècle social theory: relativism, reduction, and the problem of reason (New York: Verso, 1995), 144-45. This point is well-taken with regard to the specific ego-analytic and Anglo-American psychoanalytic traditions that Alexander discusses – Klein, Erikson, Kohut – but does not hold for the version of psychoanalysis that was most influential and “noble” in Bourdieu’s French milieu, namely, the Lacanian version. Thus Klein may well have “initiated a psychoanalytic tradition that emphasized the body, the breast and the body ego [as] reference points from which the self must differentiate, not as mirror-images with which the self is identified,” but the misrecognition involved in “mirroring” is one of the fundamental concepts of Lacanian psychoanalysis.

56. Laplanche and Pontalis, The Language, 144.

66. Bourdieu, Pascalian Mediations, 166.
67. Ibid., 166.
68. Bourdieu, Masculine Domination, 53.
71. On the question of settled and unsettled fields see my essay “Precoloniality.”
76. Butler, The Psychic Life of Power (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 118. Butler is reconstructing Althusser’s theory of ideology, which as she points out is entirely framed within the Lacanian theoretical universe of the Symbolic and Imaginary orders.
77. For a memorable evocation of the way in the dominant actors in a (colonial) field are driven by the desire for the recognition proffered by the dominant players, see George Orwell’s story “Shooting an Elephant.”
79. Ibid., 174.
80. Žižek, The Plague of Fantasies, 35.
82. Bourdieu, Ésquisse, 127. Bourdieu also addressed divided habituses in his early work on the Algerian Kabyle.

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