Qingdao as a colony: From Apartheid to Civilizational Exchange

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Paper prepared for the Johns Hopkins Workshops in Comparative History of Science and Technology, "Science, Technology and Modernity: Colonial Cities in Asia, 1890-1940," Baltimore, January 16-17, 2009
Now, dear Justinian. . . . Tell us once, where you will begin. . . . In a place where there are already Christians? or where there are none? Where there are Christians you come too late. . . . The English, Dutch, Portuguese, and Spanish control a good part of the farthest seacoast. . . . Where then? . . . In China only recently the Tartars mercilessly murdered the Christians and their preachers. Will you go there? Where then, you honest Germans? . . . Dear Justinian, stop dreaming, lest Satan deceive you in a dream!

Admonition to Justinian von Weltz, Protestant missionary in Latin America, from Johann H. Ursinius, Lutheran Superintendent at Regensburg (1664)¹

When China was ruled by the Han and Jin dynasties, the Germans were still living as savages in the jungles. In the Chinese Six Dynasties period they only managed to create barbarian tribal states. During the medieval Dark Ages, as war raged for a thousand years, the [German] people could not even read and write. . . . Our China, however, that can look back on a unique five-thousand-year-old culture, is now supposed to take advice [from Germany], contrite and with its head bowed. . . . What a shame!

KANG YOUWEI, “Research on Germany’s Political Development” (1906)²

Germans in Colonial Kiaochow,³ 1897–1904

During the 1860s the Germans began discussing the possibility of obtaining a coastal entry point from which they could expand inland into China. After German unification and the emergence of a German navy there was increasing talk of the need for a coaling station for the German East Asia Cruiser Squadron.⁴ Following the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895), German envoys Schenck zu Schweinsburg and von Heyking unsuccessfully petitioned China to provide Germany with a harbor. In 1896 Rear Admiral Alfred Tirpitz (called von Tirpitz starting with his ennoblement in 1900), commander of the East Asia squadron, visited Jiaozhou bay in the Shandong peninsula and wrote a memo calling for its occupation.⁵ The following year Tirpitz became state secretary for the Imperial Navy Department and began orchestrating the massive buildup of Germany’s fleet. At the end of November 1896, Wilhelm II instructed Admiral Eduard von Knorr “to
prepare a plan for the occupation of Jiaozhou Bay. It was now just a matter of time before Germany found a pretext to make the first move.

As in other German colonies annexed during the late 19th century, German missionaries paved the way to colonial conquest. Germany’s opportunity arose on November 1, 1897, when two of the Catholic missionaries from the Societas Verbi Divini or Steyl Mission were killed by supposed Boxers or members of the Dadao hui (Big Sword Society) in Juye County, southwestern Shandong. The Yihetuan, or “Boxers United in Righteousness,” were a martial arts group initially concentrated in northwest Shandong and the border regions of Zhili Province who joined the anti-Christian movement in 1899 and spread northward toward Beijing, provoking a response by the first international “coalition of the righteous” in the twentieth century. The Boxers would play an important role during Kiaochow’s constitutive period even though most of their activities were conducted far from the colony’s borders.

The German kaiser learned of the missionaries’ murder on November 6. The following day, after receiving assurance that the Russian tsar would not object to a German intervention, Wilhelm II ordered his East Asia squadron, under the command of Admiral Otto von Diederichs, to seize Jiaozhou Bay. The emperor was determined to put an end to what he called Germany’s “hypercautious [hypervorsichtige] policy in East Asia” and to show the Chinese once and for all, “with the most brutal ruthlessness,” that he was “not to be toyed with.” German battleships arrived in Jiaozhou Bay on November 13. The next morning about 500 troops landed on the shore, cut the telegraph lines, and occupied Qingdao. The town had been a seaport and fishing village since the Ming dynasty and had expanded into a small commercial center with sixty-five shops due to the recent garrisoning of Chinese troops and the completion of the road inland to Jiaozhou. Admiral Diederichs informed General Zhang Gaoyuan, commanding officer at Qingdao, that he had two days to evacuate his 1,600–2,000 troops from the town’s four barracks. Under instructions from the central Chinese government, General Zhang capitulated. Diederichs immediately set up a provisional occupational government in the local yamen (government building).

The negotiations with officials in Beijing lasted several months and took place under conditions specified by the Germans, led by Baron von Heyking. The Germans were able to insist that the negotiations take place in their own legation. An “atonement treaty” was signed on January 15, 1898; in it the Chinese government agreed that Li Bingheng, governor of Shandong at the time of the missionary murders, would never again be employed as a civil servant. China also agreed to contribute money for the construction of cathedrals at several sites in Shandong, including the village where the missionaries had been killed, and to attach banners to the churches proclaiming that they had been built by the Chinese emperor as reparation. The most important result of the negotiations was the “lease treaty” (Pachtvertrag) of March 6, 1898, which granted Germany sovereignty over the area it called “Kiautschou” for ninety-nine years. According to boundaries that were worked out by a commission during the coming months, the leasehold was an area of 553 square kilometers encompassing the village of Qingdao (roughly the same size as the city of Chicago today), several larger towns (Licun, Cangkou, Shazikou), and 275 tiny villages. Qingdao proper had only about seven to eight hundred inhabitants in 1897, not counting the Chinese soldiers stationed there. Another eighty to one hundred thousand lived in the rest of the leasehold. Since most of these people were extremely poor, their ability to choose whether to remain within the German territory or to move was severely curtailed. This is just one of the ways in which the Germans were able to immediately begin treating Kiaochow as a colony in the strict sense. After all, Southwest Africa was based on protection treaties that were
not understood by their African signatories as giving the Germans the right to settle there, but this did not stop the colonizers from treating that “protectorate” as an outpost of German state sovereignty.

The treaty also identified a fifty-kilometer buffer zone surrounding the colony. China retained sovereignty within this zone, but Germany reserved the right to deploy troops there and to participate in the regulation of rivers. More sweepingly, the Chinese agreed to “abstain from taking any measures or issuing any ordinances therein without obtaining the prior consent of the German government” (article 1 of the 1898 treaty). The most contentious sections of the treaty provided for the construction of two railways through Shandong Province by one or more mixed German-Chinese companies. Germany was also granted the right to mine for coal in a zone extending 15 kilometers inland along each side of the railway line.

Thus arose the first European colony that was located fully on the Chinese mainland. Other European powers seized the opportunity to gain their own mainland concessions or to formalize control over existing spheres of influence. Russia occupied and leased Dalian and Lüshun (Port Arthur) in March 1898, Britain leased Weihaiwei in Shandong in July 1898, and France leased Guangzhouwan in 1899. The Germans also sought to expand more deeply into Shandong Province, taking advantage of divisions within the Chinese governing elite and of the treaty’s vague language.

Kiaochow was administered directly by the German navy rather than the Foreign Office, an anomaly within the German colonial empire. The equivalent of the Schutztruppe (the colonial armies deployed in Germany’s African colonies) in Qingdao was the Third Naval Infantry Battalion, which was created specifically for the colony. The first Third Battalion troops arrived in Qingdao on January 26, 1898, led by Admiral Oskar Truppel (later von Truppel), who would play a central role as governor of the colony.

On April 27, 1898, Kiaochow was declared a German “protectorate” (Schutzgebiet), the standard term for a colony in German law at the time. Although this aligned Kiaochow with the general legal framework in force in the other overseas colonies, those laws said nothing about the specific regulations, decrees, and policies that would be implemented in any given colony. During the first year of the Kiaochow colony the governor’s authority was still limited, insofar as his decisions had to be submitted for approval to the naval authorities in Berlin before they could be published and enforced. Starting in 1899, however, prior approval from Berlin was required only for “the most important and far-reaching regulations.” Indeed, no locally adopted regulation was ever overturned by the Berlin authorities, even if Governor Truppel was eventually forced to adopt policies he opposed and was sacked in 1911 for continuing to resist them. This unusual infringement on the governor’s authority occurred in the context of a growing sense on the part of metropolitan German authorities that Kiaochow should be released from its colonial status. Colonial governors were always powerless when their colonies were being bargained away by the motherland for some greater diplomatic gain. It was not Kiaochow’s leasehold status that differentiated it from the other German colonies but the fact that it was located in China, whose place in German geopolitical calculations began to change in the years leading up to World War I. This change was due to Germany’s increasing isolation within Europe and Chinese anticolonial resistance. But in almost all other respects the Germans defined Kiaochow as a colony just like its colonies in Africa and the Pacific.

Native policy in Kiaochow was hammered out within a context of complex and changing geopolitical and economic considerations. Kiaochow continued until 1914 to serve as a coaling, repair, and shipbuilding station for the German navy, but officials did not see this as the colony’s
main purpose. Admiral von Knorr had already insisted in 1895 that a harbor in China would be worthwhile to the navy unless it was also an economic entrepôt. Japan’s military capacities advanced rapidly in the years immediately following the occupation of Qingdao, and the Germans recognized that Kiaochow could not be defended against Japanese attack. This was confirmed in 1914, when the colony was overcome by Japanese forces after just two months of fighting. Tirpitz agreed that Kiaochow would never flourish as a mere military base but had to become a trading entrepôt like Hong Kong. He also wanted the colony to become a showcase for the navy’s organizational skills as part of his maneuvering vis-à-vis the Reichstag and the kaiser to build up the navy. A memo from Kiaochow’s governor to the Naval Office in 1900 emphasized that “the existence of the colony has no justification if it does not become the home base for large German companies trading in the interior.” Special emphasis was placed in the colony’s first years on building the railway, opening coal mines, improving the harbor, and creating a naval shipyard, activities that were understood as profit-making enterprises servicing international as well as German clients. Qingdao was set up as a “free port,” modeled on Hong Kong, although this status was terminated in 1905. Customs duties were charged only for goods that passed through Kiaochow and entered Chinese territory or that were exported abroad.

But if broadly economic goals seemed to have primacy over military ones, the colony still did not correspond to theories that see imperialism as being fundamentally driven by private capitalist interests. The colonial state ended up running most of the key industries in Kiaochow, since German capitalists like Krupp and Siemens were unwilling to invest there. The urban commercial sector stayed mainly in Chinese (and increasingly, over time, in Japanese) hands. As a result, colonial native policy had to attend to the concerns of Asian businessmen. An exception was the Shandong Railway Company, which became “the only profitable and dividend-paying company that actually penetrated into the interior of Shandong Province.” It was in the hands of major German banks. German marines performed much of the original landscaping and early construction work in Qingdao.

Native policy in Kiaochow was constrained by the need to attract Chinese inhabitants, business, and workers, since there was never any intention of making Kiaochow into a settlement colony and its German population consisted mainly of navy personnel. Chinese labor was central to the construction of the harbor, government buildings, and railways, and in extracting coal from the German-owned mines. But no Chinese could be compelled to live or work in the colony, since it was surrounded by China, which still claimed the colony’s subjects as its own. Of course, it was not feasible for most of the nearly two hundred thousand people who lived within the leasehold at the beginning of the German period to move away, since they had families, temples, ancestral graves, land, and houses in the region. The colony was aided by the fact that it drew trade away from the town of Jiaozhou and the ports on Jiaozhou Bay which had been active trading centers before 1897. Economic activity in Shandong became more oriented toward Qingdao and the leasehold. The city’s population reached fifty-five thousand by 1913—an increase of 730 percent in seventeen years.

A more important influence on native policy than the sheer existence of China was the ability of the Chinese state to mount effective challenges to German practice within the colony. Germany became increasingly sensitive to Chinese demands after 1904, but even before that time a skillful provincial governor like Yuan Shikai could affect German behavior in the leasehold. Indeed, the entire colonial period was characterized by a struggle between the Germans and the Chinese state over the very definition of the new political entity. The governors
in Qingdao and the Germany navy High Command insisted on referring to Kiaochow as a “protectorate,” while Chinese officials in Beijing and Ji’nan (the provincial capital in Shandong) insisted on calling Kiaochow a “leasehold.” In article 3 of the original 1898 treaty the Germans had conceded that the Chinese emperor retained ultimate sovereignty over the Chinese residents of Kiaochow and was granting sovereignty to Germany only temporarily. The Chinese tried repeatedly to undermine the Germans’ interpretation of the treaty by suggesting that a Chinese consul and a state official be posted in Qingdao. The Germans countered Chinese efforts to compromise their sovereignty by granting a sort of leasehold citizenship to Chinese who were born in Kiaochow. These Kiaochow citizens were protected from extradition to China and retained a right to residence in the colony while traveling outside it.33

Kiaochow had a thoroughly colonial character. The new buildings that were included in the first city plan for German Qingdao in 1898 staked out the rudiments of a new state. These included the government building (completed in 1906), a temporary residence for the governor (replaced in 1907 by the more glorious governor’s mansion, which loomed over the European side of town; fig. 13), a military hospital, and the railway station (completed in 1901; fig. 1).34 By 1899–1900 the urban master plan included another crucial component of a colonial state—a prison for European prisoners—and this building was quickly completed, along with a second prison for Chinese (in Licun). No new military barracks were included in the original plan because the Germans were able to move their troops immediately into the buildings that had been left behind by the Chinese army, but they soon found these to be inadequate and replaced them.35

**Figure 1** Top, Railway station in Qingdao (ca. 1910), the final station of the Shandong railway. From *Ansichten von Tsingtau und dem Hinterlande* (n.p.: n.d., ca. 1910). Bottom, Facade of the contemporary Qingdao station (2005). Photo by the author.
Although these new buildings laid a symbolic claim to German sovereignty, a peculiar extension of the Chinese state was already present at the heart of the colonial city in the earliest plan—the headquarters of the Chinese customs office. Colonialism as I define it involves the transfer of sovereignty from locals to outsiders along with a politics of difference that consigns the locals to second-class status. But sovereignty is a continuum, not an either-or affair. In Kiaochow’s case the infringement on colonial sovereignty came partly from without, due to the unusual situation of an external state claiming sovereignty over a colony’s citizens—not unlike the West German stance toward the German Democratic Republic before 1990. The infringement in Kiaochow also stemmed from the fact that all colonial states rely on a rudimentary level of toleration and cooperation on the part of the colonized. As a result the colonized are able to gain some control over the ways in which colonial policy is implemented, which is the equivalent of saying that they can take back, or retain, some degree of sovereignty. It would be unrealistic to restrict the definition of colonialism to cases of pure foreign sovereignty. Chinese in Kiaochow laid claim to the state in this way to a greater extent than the inhabitants of Germany’s African colonies, and in doing so they gained incremental control over the state and actually began to “decolonize” it.

A second defining feature of modern colonialism is the rule of difference, which guides all colonial native policy in insisting that the colonized are incapable of governing themselves. Assumptions of fundamental Chinese inferiority and difference were inscribed into the original urban plan for Qingdao. There was a “villa district” with German street names, restricted to European residents. The governor’s provisional residence was located in this neighborhood, next to the home of the “commissary for Chinese affairs,” Dr. Wilhelm Schrameier, and the mansion of Captain Freiherr von Liliencron, the governor’s adjutant and commander of the Third Naval Infantry Battalion (fig. 2). Starting in 1899 the Qingdao master plan also indicated the location of a cemetery restricted to Europeans. The 1899 map also recorded the emergence of a new settlement of Chinese laborers at the site that would soon become the workers’ district, Taidongzhen (“east of the heights”); a second workers’ district known as Taixizhen (“west of the heights”) was added somewhat later. An industrial zone was already emerging along Jiaozhou Bay near the small harbor.
The neighborhood of Dabaodao (Tapautau) was also sketched into these initial city plans. Its streets’ simple grid pattern contrasted with the smoothly curving boulevards of the European district. The Germans called Dabaodao the “Chinesen-Stadt” (Chinese city) and created a cordon sanitaire that divided it from so-called upper Qingdao, although this buffer zone was quickly filled in with new structures. Despite its Chinese name, Dabaodao was designed from the start to become a mixed zone of commercial, industrial, and residential activities in which both Europeans and Chinese could live, work, shop, and own property. It was dominated by simple Chinese and European-style houses, shops, and businesses, along with some larger buildings like the Qingdao branch of the Ruifuxiang store on Kiautschoustrasse (fig. 3). Photographs taken in Dabaodao (fig. 4) during the German period often show a mix of people wearing European and Chinese clothing. This district’s in-between status was revealed by an ordinance prohibiting “screeching pushcarts” (kreischende Schiebkarren) in Qingdao, in order “to spare the European inhabitants of Tsingtao any unpleasant confrontation with Chinese culture.” This ordinance was extended to Dabaodao but not to the purely Chinese districts Taidongzhen and Taixizhen. The existence of this zone suggests that the boundaries between colonizer and colonized were already porous in the colony’s foundational period. From the very start Kiaochow revealed both the desire to maintain hierarchical difference and countless compromises and infringements on this rule.
My aim in the following section is not to provide a detailed history of every aspect of colonial government in Kiaochow. There are already several good studies of this colony. My focus is instead on native policy. For that reason I begin with the most striking features of German colonialism in Kiaochow, the strict segregation of urban space and of the legal system, and then turn to other aspects of social apartheid in Kiaochow, as well as the violence directed against the Chinese in the colony and Shandong Province between 1897 and 1905. These policies cohere into a common pattern, guided by an understanding of the Chinese that is strikingly consistent with the European and German Sinophobic discourse that had emerged since the later 18th century. Like the Ovaherero, the Chinese were treated as radically different and racially inferior. In contrast to the Ovaherero, however, they were not seen as amenable to cultural transformation, given their loyalty to an ancient culture.
Shaken, Not Stirred: Segregated Colonial Space and Radical Alterity during the First Phase of German Colonialism in Kiaochow, 1897–1904

In the words of a German newspaper published in China at the time of the annexation, the Chinese were “driven out” of old Qingdao. One of the first interventions by Admiral Diederichs was to forbid all land sales in the leasehold without his approval. Proclamations to this effect in Chinese were posted in the villages. Diederichs pressured county officials into giving him copies of the tax books, which he used, along with consulting local experts, to determine who owned each plot of land in the leased territory. Anyone who owned land the Germans thought they would need for their construction plans was forced to sell at prices determined by the Chinese cadastral surveys. The navy administration purchased enough land for the city and harbor, approximately two thousand hectares, or 3.6 percent of the entire area of Kiaochow. After drawing up an initial plan for Qingdao, the government held an auction in October 1898 to sell plots of land in the city that were not going to be used for official construction. According to one German businessman who participated in the public sale of land, it was “full of excitement” and “prices were driven up to three dollars the square meter.”

The extant Chinese village was razed and its inhabitants dispossessed, and a new colonial city arose in its place. The Qingdao master plan disregarded the previous location of streets and buildings almost entirely. A “tent village” of workers that had sprung up near the site of the future Dabaodao district was dismantled, and even the dirt beneath the settlement was removed, since it was thought to be contaminated. Other nearby neighborhoods and villages that disturbed the planning of colonial urban space were “put to rest” (niedergelegt), in the revealing words of one of the navy’s surveyors in 1900, describing the village of Yangjiacun (just beyond Taidongzhen) which had grown rapidly as a settlement of people displaced from upper Qingdao.

Strict separation between Europeans and Chinese was the guiding principle of the urban plan. In 1899 one newspaper wrote that “Tsintau today is still Chinese in its external appearance” but “in a few months the impression our Asian colony makes on a stranger will be completely different.” According to one of the navy’s surveyors the goal was to produce a clear “demarcation of our territory from China.” As von Tirpitz noted later, “Thus we avoided being in direct touch with China.” The spatial vagueness of these statements is revealing. In reality, only the leasehold could be demarcated from China, since the city of Qingdao did not have a direct border with China, but at the same time, Kiaochow could not avoid “touching” China. The spatial demarcation was thus a doubly internal one, directed against the interior and the exterior Chinese Other. The internal Chinaman was necessary to the colony’s livelihood but he was also feared and disdained on “racial” grounds and as a potential agent of the Chinese government. An early German tour book claimed that Qingdao’s “greatest advantage compared to other Chinese coastal cities” like Shanghai or Tianjin was “that the Chinese settlement is separated completely from the European one.”

The European district, “upper Qingdao,” consisted mainly of large villas along the southern bays (Qingdao Bay and Clara Bay, now known as Huiquan Bay, to its east.). According to the building code only 55 percent of the land could be built up, and even today this district has large parks. The streets were wide, curving, and wooded and were named after German rulers. And “millions and millions of trees and bushes were planted” in the colony, since there was “one thing which the German has a very difficult time giving up” when he leaves home—his forests.
A green belt of trees was planted around the European zone, although in the spirit of segregation, none were planted in the Chinese section. The government even imported German trees and planted German grapes for wine. According to the boundaries specified in the *Chinesenordnung* (Chinese ordinances) of June 1900 Chinese were not permitted to live in the European neighborhood. It was impossible to exclude Chinese servants from residing there, but they were lodged in small “cooie houses” that were “strictly separated from the Europeans.” In addition to the architectural dualism, this absence of Chinese residents in the villa district led German visitors to write things like the following: “When I arrived in Qingdao and . . . looked around the train station a little, I was overcome by the feeling: you’re in a completely German territory here [*ganz auf deutschem Boden*]. This feeling accompanied me everywhere during my stay in Qingdao.” The German houses, hotels, and official buildings constructed in this period were almost exclusively German or European in style, although some details corresponded to a generic notion of “tropical” architecture. Some of these constructions were shipped to Qingdao from Germany. The governor’s first residence, for example, was a prefabricated “tropical house” (*Tropenhaus*). The military hospital was “constructed of pasteboard made in Germany.”

Dabaodao was where most of the colony’s better-off Chinese lived. The housing was not as luxurious as in the European zone, and the streets and buildings were more densely packed. Houses there often had two stories, in a style that was typical of middle and southern China and that is said to have reflected the presence of businessmen from the lower Yangtzi region and Canton. Some German bureaucrats and employees of the German merchant firms took up residence there as well. If Dabaodao was not as racially restrictive as the other districts, the official *Denkschrift* (Report) showed that the cultural distinction was reproduced internally there, by calling attention to the architectural distinction between European and Chinese “business premises” in the neighborhood (fig. 4). In a similar spirit, the railway stations built by the Shantung Eisenbahn Gesellschaft (Shandong Railway Company) were done in German style inside the colony (figs. 1, 5) and in partly Chinese style outside the colony.
Taidongzhen and Taixizhen were zoned exclusively for Chinese residence. As in Dabaodao, streets in these neighborhoods were laid out in a tight, “very functional and completely regular” grid pattern to facilitate police control. The German police station (fig. 6) stood in the middle of the district. Streets in Taidongzhen and Taixizhen were given “typical” Chinese names. As the colony’s “Chinese commissary,” Wilhelm Schrameier, remarked, the big firms in Qingdao needed large numbers of “cheap coolie houses” for their workers. Although the size of “coolie houses” and rooms in Taidongzhen and Taixizhen was controlled by German regulations, they “ignored the European style of construction and used the typical Chinese one” instead. More substantial houses were also built in these districts, often in the traditional northern Chinese style with enclosed courtyards. The harbor district, finally, had bland industrial buildings and functional housing for the apprentices attending the shipyard’s school (see fig. 7).

FIGURE 6 Police station in Taidongzhen District (German colonial period). From Lu and Lu 2005, p. 160.
The colony’s entire legal and administrative structure was also bifurcated, with separate arrangements for Western civilians (a category that included Japanese) and Chinese. Qingdao had an Imperial Court (Kaiserliches Gericht) throughout the colonial period. In 1907 a German Appeals Court was also established in Qingdao. It was independent from the consulate, which was controlled by the German Foreign Office. European businessmen and property owners could elect representatives to a Citizens’ Representative Council that advised the governor.

The legal treatment of the Chinese was guided by a mixture of German and Chinese law, with the latter being filtered through German interpretations. This was structurally similar to the approach used in colonies with oral cultures, where indigenous legal understandings were overcoded and mingled with European ones. A “Governor’s Order on the Legal Conditions of the Chinese” (April 15, 1899) set out the basic guidelines. As in other German colonies, civil or criminal cases pitting Europeans against “natives” were to be tried by Germans—in this case, by the Imperial Court. Any civil case involving only Chinese and in which the stakes were not sufficiently serious was to be judged by the German district commissioner according to his interpretation of Chinese law. The district commissioners were former translator trainees (Dolmetschereleven) and therefore did not need translators. They were instructed to conduct research on Chinese legal views by talking to village elders and local mandarins. They began translating German law into Chinese and the Qing legal code and Chinese imperial decrees into German, a project that was continued by the legal faculty in the Qingdao German-Chinese college in the following years. But while some elements of German law were introduced into the evolving system of jurisprudence, they were “explicitly subordinated to the law of the Chinese empire,” at least as that law was interpreted by the colonizers.
The result of this merging of two legal systems was that Chinese residents were placed in double legal jeopardy and could be punished for a wide array of offenses, while Europeans were not subject to punishment for Chinese crimes that had no equivalent in German law. Offenses for which Chinese could be punished included any activities the governor declared illegal (par. 5.1) or any that were illegal according to German law (par. 5.2)—with the exception of practices related to religion, ethics, and so on—as well as anything that violated public order (par. 5.3) or that was punishable according to Chinese law (par. 5.4). In civil suits involving only Chinese litigants, the governor could determine which German laws, if any, were applicable (par. 17). Legal proceedings and punishments were also adapted to local conditions as they were perceived by the district officials, producing a mixture of practices that did not fully correspond to either the German or the Chinese system. Thus, in a trial the accused was required to wear chains and to kneel before the judge with his head bowed, in an “analogy to Chinese legal hearings.” This procedure was retained in Kiaochow even after it had been abolished in China. The district commissioner was not required to keep a written protocol of the hearings or to explain his legal reasoning, but only to record his final verdict. The list of permissible punishments included flogging of male convicts with government-approved instruments (pars. 8 and 9), fines, forced labor, temporary or lifelong imprisonment, and execution, although the latter had to be approved by the governor (pars. 6, 10, and 14). Torture was forbidden, although Chinese prisoners reported that it was widely used, and decapitation was substituted for the Chinese punishment of dismemberment. But the Germans frequently employed variants of the cangue (wooden collar) even after the reform movement eliminated its use in China (fig. 8). The selective application of Chinese legal procedures is illustrated by the chief justice’s argument that parents, elder brothers, and guardians could all be punished for crimes committed by youths under the age of eighteen. The Germans amended this to specify that no relative could be punished for crimes committed by children younger than twelve.

FIGURE 8 Punishment of Chinese in Qingdao (German colonial period). From M. and D. Lu 2005, p. 162.
The relationship between the colonial government and its Chinese subjects was specified in some detail by the Chinese ordinances (Chinesenordnung) promulgated on June 14, 1900. The philologist and translator Wilhelm Schrameier was appointed as the first Chinese commissary (Chinesenkommissar), heading a “Chinese Bureau” (later called the Chinese Chancery). Qingdao was divided into nine urban districts, each of which had a Chinese district head and several Chinese inspectors. All of these Chinese subofficials were under Schrameier’s supervision.

The segregation of everyday life that was embedded in the city’s spatial layout and its legal system was enhanced by additional regulations. Europeans and Chinese in Qingdao were found in separate hospitals, schools, prisons, bordellos, graveyards, and chambers of commerce. The Chinese were allowed to visit Qingdao’s well-known beaches, but they had to use separate toilets there. Although Europeans could travel anywhere in the colony (and indeed, anywhere in China, as a result of the treaties concluded after the Opium Wars), Chinese were required to carry a lantern when they went out on the streets between 9:00 p.m. and sunrise and had to provide a “definite reason for being outside” if they were questioned. Although the Germans eventually agreed to let Chinese financiers participate in the mining and railway companies, there were no Chinese members on these companies’ boards of directors. Chinese were not permitted to join the elite Tsingtau Club or any of the other German social clubs. Children of mixed heritage were prohibited from attending the German schools.

Another important aspect of German activity during this period with implications for native policy was the aggressive campaign to extend German sovereignty beyond the colony’s borders. Although the ostensible motives behind this expansionism were to protect European missionaries and to defeat the Yihetuan and other forms of anti-Western militancy, the Germans seized any pretext to extend their military presence during the first seven years of the leasehold, as described by John Schrecker in his pioneering work on Chinese nationalism and German colonialism. More interesting in the present context is the fact that these military campaigns were conducted in a way that expressed aggressive disdain for the Chinese, especially for Chinese literati, antiforeigner secret societies, and symbols of Chinese tradition and religion. Early in 1898 German soldiers sacked the Confucius temple in Jimo and “damaged a statue of the great wise one,” bringing down upon themselves the “fury of the Chinese intellectuals,” including the leading reformer Kang Youwei. The next conflict exploded in November 1898 following an attack on missionary Stenz in the village of Jietou near Rizhao. This area lay outside the fifty-kilometer buffer zone. Nonetheless, the colonial governor, Captain Paul Jaeschke, sent Lieutenant Hannemann and translator Heinrich Mootz to investigate the incident. These two were allegedly attacked by a crowd in the village of Hanjiacun in Yizhoufu Prefecture on March 29, 1899. They opened fire and killed several Chinese. Jaeschke then sent an expedition of 160 men to the prefecture, where they destroyed Hanjiacun and another village, Baitianju. The German troops then proceeded to the larger neighboring town, Rizhao, where they occupied the yamen and demanded food and money from the local inhabitants. When the Germans left Rizhao five days later they kidnapped five mandarins as hostages and demanded the arrest of Stenz’s attackers and other concessions in exchange for the local officials’ release. The Ostasiatischer Lloyd, a German newspaper covering all of China, wrote after the completion of this campaign that “the Chinese offices are apparently already starting to understand that the German Government in Kiaochow cannot be toyed with.” The “scorched earth” strategy and
vituperative comments directed specifically against “literati” in Shandong are suggestive of the Sinophobia in European and German circles in the years surrounding the Boxer uprising.92 The next series of German military interventions in Shandong Province was sparked by protests against the construction of the railway from Qingdao to Ji’nan (the Jiaoji railroad).93 Early in 1899 the Germans began buying land and laying down rails. In the process they destroyed farmers’ irrigation systems, divided their fields, violated ancestral burial sites, and generally infuriated villagers, who responded by sabotaging the railway tracks and destroying offices of the Shantung Eisenbahn Gesellschaft.94 Germans killed three Chinese in a village that refused to pay a fine for stealing markers and beacons posted along the railway bed.95 German soldiers were stationed in Gaomi, the center of the unrest, and an expedition was conducted against Jiaozhou city.96 During the summer of 1899 various towns in the region began to arm and barricade themselves with help from Yihetuan and related groups.97 The Germans responded with a full-scale military campaign, under the leadership of Hauptmann Mauve, in which about fifteen Chinese were killed. The Ostasiatischer Lloyd reported proudly on the “furor teutonicus” of the German “brave knights” in Gaomi, boasting that “our firearms have so much power that the human head explodes completely when it is hit at less than four hundred meters.”98

During the height of the Boxer Rebellion large expeditions were sent out into the province from Qingdao. Early in 1900 one hundred villages south of the Shandong railway line banded together to resist the Germans under the leadership of the Dadao hui and Yihetuan. Protective walls were built around villages, German railway workers were taken hostage, and engineers were attacked.99 In October the Germans struck the villages of Kelan and Lijiaaying, which were supposedly harboring Boxers, and over two hundred Chinese were killed.100 In November German troops killed as many as five hundred villagers in Shawo (nowadays called Dujia) and burned the village.101 Permanent barracks, each large enough for two hundred soldiers, were built in Gaomi and Jiaozhou. The troops stayed in these towns until 1905. The stationing of troops “far beyond the ‘leasehold’ boundaries contradicted all of the contractual agreements that had previously been forced on China.”102

Accompanying this ongoing assault on Chinese sovereignty in the province was a fierce denigration of the Chinese. When the German soldiers occupied Gaomi in 1899, for instance, they moved into the academy (shuyuan) and burned valuable books from its library.103 During the occupation of Jiaozhou city the following year, German soldiers lived in the examination hall and temple.104 Similar things went on inside the colony’s borders. The Germans occupied a Taoist-Buddhist temple near the leasehold’s boundary and used it as a customs house.105 And while the Germans often described their use of the Qingdao yamen for official business as an act of necessity (see fig. 11), it was clearly part of the symbolic mise-en-scène of the conquest and specifically of General Zhang’s humiliation, which culminated in the latter’s suicide attempt. Daily life in Qingdao assumed an aggressive quality. In one incident a colonial bureaucrat struck a Chinese man with a whip for not moving off the sidewalk to let him pass.106 A Protestant minister remarked that European children in Qingdao quickly learned to act like little “masters” toward the Chinese, and that “some who would never dream of striking another when at home in Europe are often unable to . . . stop themselves from occasionally using a whip on people.”107

**German Native Policy in Kiaochow, Compared**

It may be useful to contrast native policy in early Kiaochow with native policy in other German colonies in the same period. Like the Ovaherero of German Southwest Africa, and unlike the inhabitants of German Polynesia, the Chinese were viewed first and foremost in terms
of their potential economic contribution to the colony. In contrast to the African Ovaherero, however, there was little interest in trying to refashion the Chinese culturally. As the official report (Denkschrift) on Kiaochow for 1899–1900 noted, “The guiding approach in native administration” was “to habituate the Chinese to the new conditions without effectively limiting the venerable autonomy of the family or their patriarchal living arrangements. We will not intervene in private Chinese affairs or the internal governance of their communal affairs, except to the extent required to assure public order and the security of the colony.”\textsuperscript{108} Thus, even though Max Weber and contemporary Sinologists were pointing to the Chinese family and Confucian doctrine as impediments to development, there was no attempt by the colonial government to eliminate Confucianism or transform the arrangements of the Chinese family. Chinese culture was seen as so deeply embedded and so all encompassing that Germans could not really imagine remaking the Chinese as abject copies of themselves, in contrast to Southwest Africa.\textsuperscript{109} Describing the Dabaodao district, a German navy priest wrote that “we don’t try to change the way the Chinese go about living,” although “we also won’t let them do whatever they want to.”\textsuperscript{110} This was closer to a repressive than to a “productive,” manipulative use of power. This approach to regulating a radically different culture characterized most of the German colonial interventions in Qingdao. As one of the colony’s judges wrote in 1903, colonial law should “avoid disturbing the ancient, deeply rooted, simple legal traditions of the natives as much as possible. Nothing contributes more to a fruitful and peaceful colonization than the maintenance of the old traditional customs and legal views of the people.”\textsuperscript{111} The main difference from Samoa, whose native policies were also oriented toward regulated difference, was the Kiaochow regime’s overarching hostility to the Chinese. By kidnapping the Rizhao mandarins and sacking the Gaomi shuyuan, the Germans focused on the specific symbols that had been reviled by Sinophobes as the “many sorts of learning which these parts of the world never heard of” (in the words of Daniel Defoe). But nothing was proposed to take the place of this detested culture, which was seen as unmovable.

German Qingdao in the first period thus represents a regime of native policy premised on the absolute difference of the colonized. It was focused on the external aspects of behavior, using threats of violence and material incentives rather than ideological insinuation. This is not to deny that the subjectivity of colonized was influenced, willy nilly, by the presence of a colonial state. Chinese workers adjusted to German managers’ demands, Chinese students adapted to their German teachers’ expectations, Chinese merchants altered their ways of doing business, and the Chinese theaters tailored some of their repertoire to a European audience.\textsuperscript{112} Other groups who can hardly have been immune to the foreign ideological formation include the “Chinese inspectors” under Schrameier’s supervision, the Chinese policemen, the Chinese military companies in German uniforms who were trained and commanded by the navy, and the village elders who agreed to advise district commissioners about legal cases and Chinese law.\textsuperscript{113} But these putative ideological changes were not the central focus of German policy. Equally important is the fact that the apprentices in the shipyard school and those in the public elementary schools took lessons in Chinese and Chinese history, rather than learning to recite the German equivalent of “nos ancêtres les Gaulois.”\textsuperscript{114} The Chinese businessmen in the colony sold Chinese goods; the actors performed Chinese plays. Without reintroducing the mind-body distinction that has been so successfully undermined in recent theories of social practice, we still need to acknowledge that the colonizers in Kiaochow were more concerned with what they saw as material practices and less oriented toward subjective transformations (as in German Southwest Africa) or cultural reproduction (as in German colonial Samoa). Naturally, the
Catholic and Protestant missions were focused on reshaping their Chinese followers’ subjective and spiritual life. But these Catholic missions were not part of the colonial state. The Protestant Weimar Mission was more intimately connected to the colonial regime, but it actually avoided most religious teaching (see below).

Of course, some Germans did claim that they were involved in a sort of civilizing mission in Kiaochow. One goal for the colony that was occasionally discussed was to lift China up, to contribute to its development, perhaps in order to make it a better trading partner for Europe. Some of those who accepted the thesis of Chinese stagnation believed that the solution was for China to adopt not just advanced European technology but also elements of European culture. Wilhelm Schrameier claimed that everything the Germans did in Kiaochow was aimed at “consciously influencing the Chinese.” An economic geographer who specialized in Kiaochow insisted that “the first German sailor entering a still undeveloped land” has already exercised an “educational influence on the population” by “broadcasting orderliness, cleanliness, and by using the German language.” According to a legal scholar, Kiaochow’s achievements would “serve as an example to the outsiders”—that is, to the Chinese—“who will then [attempt to] attain an equally high cultural level.” A German minister hoped that Germany would “show China the paths that will lead contemporary Chinese culture to the superior Christian-Germanic culture.” And a German travel writer in 1914 claimed that the Germans had “habituated the Chinese in Kiaochow to orderliness, cleanliness, and morals in just a single decade.” But all of these quotes are from the period after 1905. It was only then that there emerged a serious program intended to “influence the spirit and character” of the Chinese in the colony. By that time the entire context of this project had changed, and those who believed China was culturally underdeveloped were less influential in Kiaochow politics.

Early Native Policy and the Haunting of Sinophobia by Sinophilia

The central features of native policy in the first period, then, were rigorous segregation combined with aggressive hostility and a hands-off approach to cultural change. To account for this we need to consider the apotheosis of Sinophobia that occurred at the same time as the German occupation of Kiaochow. Germany was heavily involved in the joint expedition against the Yihetuan, contributing almost twenty-thousand troops to the allied forces and the “supreme commander,” Count Alfred von Waldersee. The most infamous incident in the German campaign is Kaiser Wilhelm’s July 1900 Hunnenrede (Hun speech) to the East Asian Expeditionary troops being dispatched from Bremerhaven to China on July 27, 1900, in which the emperor called on his soldiers to emulate “King Etzel’s Huns of a thousand years ago” and vowed that “no Chinese will ever again dare to look askance at a German.” Anxious to satisfy the kaiser’s call to “take no prisoners,” von Waldersee embarked on a series of harsh punitive expeditions against suspected Boxers and sympathizers in and around Beijing. Kiaochow was involved in the anti-Boxer campaign on several levels. In addition to the expeditions against supposed Boxers in Shandong Province, discussed above, the Third Naval Battalion sent several contingents of marines to Beijing in June 1900.

The views of China among many Germans stationed in Beijing and Qingdao during the second half of the 1890s echoed the kaiser’s hostility. The new German envoy Baron Clemens von Ketteler was not predisposed to be as Sinophobic as his predecessor, von Heyking, given his background as a translator trainee in Beijing and as a diplomatic translator there and in Canton. In May 1900, however, von Ketteler allegedly told the other European envoys that the
Boxer uprising signaled the onset of China’s partition. Given the hysterical atmosphere among those hoping for a second “scramble,” von Ketteler was immediately identified as an imperialist Sinophobe. He was reprimanded by the German Foreign Office, which never seriously entertained the idea of Chinese partition. During the Boxers’ siege of Beijing in 1900, before any Europeans had been killed, von Ketteler ordered German legation troops to open fire on a group of fifty to one hundred Boxers who were engaging in what the German press called “war dances” (Kriegstänze—presumably the martial arts from which the Boxers’ name was derived) near the legation building, and seven Chinese were killed. Von Ketteler also took potshots at Boxers from the walls of the German compound and personally beat a seventeen-year-old Yihetuan supporter who was captured and locked up in the Legation.

The descriptions of Chinese officials by the “conqueror” of Qingdao, Admiral Otto von Diederichs, were replete with racial slurs. The admiral identified various examples of what he called “scoundrelish behavior and the simplemindedness and superstition that accompanies it,” and of “the trickiness and unreliability of the yellow race.” Diederichs treated General Zhang Gaoyuan disdainfully as “a helpless weakling” and drew on the discourse of Oriental despotism in describing the “subservience” of the people of Jiaozhou and Jimo as a result of their habitual “fear” of the local magistrates.

Western propaganda in the context of the anti-Boxer campaign completed the process of bringing the Chinese under the sign of the generic racial “native” at the precise moment when the German colonial regime was taking shape. The official Amtsblatt (Gazette) for the Qingdao colony printed an article in 1901 that began with the words “there can hardly be a single human race that has a less romantic appearance than the Chinese.” The Chinese scholar and reformer Kang Youwei, who moved into Captain Liliencron’s former house in Qingdao in 1925, recognized that the Chinese “had at least been a half-civilized nation in the eyes of the west” before their defeat by Japan, but that afterward Europeans “put us on the same level as the Negro slaves in Africa.” A German vaudeville play from this period called Our Bluejackets in Jiaozhou began with the words “here among these Kaffirs”—using the South African generic epithet for “blacks” to refer to the Chinese. In another play called Boxer, members of the German expeditionary force capture a Chinese woman who speaks German and ask her whether she “might have been on display in the Panoptikum” in Berlin, since “the most savage sorts of people” could be seen there. The eminent founder of cellular pathology, Rudolph Virchow, invited the members of the Berlin Society for Anthropology, Ethnology, and Ancient History to view a group of Chinese who were being displayed at the Schumann Circus in Berlin in 1905. Viewing “Naturvölker” in zoos, circuses, and fairs was not unusual in this period; what was novel was the inclusion of Chinese.

A magazine associated with the German Navy League, Überall, is revealing with respect to the image of China in this period, which combined garden-variety Sinophobia with extreme belligerence. A 1901 report on “shipping along the Chinese coast” opened with the observation that “the entire economic existence of the Chinese presents not only stasis but often even regression.” Discussing a “revolt of Chinese coolies” in Samoa, the paper warned that if the Chinese dared to even touch a single white colonist, “well-suited trees and solid hemp ropes” would be found for them. The article concluded that these events in Samoa were “characteristic of the cunning and insidiousness of the yellow race.” A photograph of two Chinese boys in a 1899 issue of Überall was captioned simply “Two German Subjects,” even though there was no article on Kiaochow at all, suggesting that the Chinese per se were being imagined as German subjects.
The theme of “pestilential filth” had been a mainstay of Sinophobia since the mid-nineteenth century, and this idea was closely tied to “racial” distaste. Officials in Qingdao insisted that the segregation of the Chinese was motivated by hygienic concerns. The planners did not decide to create a system of sewage and running water for all Chinese residents of Qingdao, however, which presumably would have solved the main hygiene problems. This resembles the logic of the German’s uprooting the Duala people in Cameroon from their ancestral district and moving them kilometers away. They argued that this was necessary to keep Germans from being bitten by the malarial mosquitoes that were thought to arise inevitably in the presence of Africans. The alternative of clearing the malarial swamps and letting the Duala remain in their homes was not seriously entertained.139

Sinophobes were both fascinated with and repelled by the Chinese body, and as in the Khoikhoi and Samoan cases, this ambivalence was sexualized (even if less explicitly so that in the two other cases). A memo by one of the colony’s sanitary councilors justifying urban segregation veered off into a hallucinatory tableau of desire and deviance: “Close cohabitation in tight spaces, filth and vermin, and above all the disgusting sexual deviations indulged in especially by the Chinese male make such a measure absolutely necessary. Sodomy by inserting the penis into the cloacae of large geese and ducks . . . and also pederasty, sexual abuse of children of both sexes, and rape in its most shocking forms, are all on the agenda throughout China. . . . The Chinaman certainly excites our genuine admiration with his sedulousness and . . . with the power and agility of his beautiful, athletically built body. . . . But as soon as the sun sets, depravity takes over in the opium dens, the harbor gin shops, and the bordellos.”140 Unlike in the Samoan case, European gender stereotypes were less conventionally (or nonfetishistically) heterosexual in the Sinophobic worldview. Chinese women only rarely figured as lovers of Europeans in these fantasies; instead, Europeans focused on footbinding, reproducing shocking anatomical pictures of Chinese women’s feet.141 This literature contains the same mixture of the grotesque and the prurient found in the literature on Khoikhoi female sexuality. Freud argued in his essay on fetishism, written in the same period, that heterosexual European men often unconsciously elided the foot or shoe with the female genitals. But in the case of footbinding the fetish function was disrupted, since the deformed foot gestured precisely toward that genital mutilation (female castration) that fetishism was supposed to disavow (according to Freud). Figure 9, published in the anthropological journal Archiv für Anthropologie in 1871, contributed an additional mutilation of its own, severing the leg above the ankle.
There were few precedents for a program of attempting to remake Chinese culture along the lines of the acculturation program in Southwest Africa. Geographer Georg Wegener insisted that there was simply “no possibility of understanding between the two races.” Not even the missionaries believed that Chinese culture could be forcibly transformed by external forces. The dogged resistance by the Chinese state and people to Western imperialism made projects of cultural substitution seem implausible. Chinese arrogance may have been a Sinophobic theme, but it indirectly indexed real practices of resistance. The German writer Alfons Paquet wrote that “even the lowest of these yellow-brown people carries with him like an amulet the consciousness and the instincts of his people’s ancient culture.” Kiaochow’s chief engineer ended his report about a reconnaissance trip in Shandong Province with a list of “prominent characteristics” of the Chinese, which included the fact that they “consider us to be barbarians.” He concluded: “Each one of them is very aware of the Middle Kingdom’s ancient culture.” Theories of Asiatic despotism convinced Diederichs that the local authorities in Shandong “possess[ed] and exercise[d] an absolute authority over the people that none of our military commanders could ever attain with his own troops.” The Chinese were extremely unlikely to switch their allegiances.

German interventions during the initial segregationist phase of colonial rule in Kiaochow were interlaced with, or undermined by, strains of classical Sinophilia. Even the actions of the conqueror of Qingdao were haunted by Sinophilia. Admiral Diederichs asserted that Chinese workers, though driven mainly by fear, nonetheless had “a refined sense of justice.” The idea of a deeply rooted sense of justice putting limits on the ruling elite had been a central theme of early Sinophilia. Diederichs defended the use of flogging as punishment in an official report in February 1898 by referring to the authority of the “Chinese punitive specifications communicated by the Bureaucrat Koo of Jiaozhou,” suggesting at the very least a certain desire for legitimacy in Chinese eyes. Kiaochow’s first German newspaper, the Deutsch-Asiatische Warte, attacked the colonial administration for its alleged coddling of the Chinese and its “extreme sensitivity in favor of the Chinese population.” And indeed, the colonial bureaucrat who struck a Chinese with his whip for not moving from the sidewalk to let him pass, mentioned above, was berated by the governor, Jaeschke, who happened to be riding past on horseback at that moment. The Deutsch-Asiatische Warte commented that this was “characteristic of the kid-glove treatment of the natives as it is wrongly instituted by the offices here.” Colonial policy was not all of a single piece, even in the first decade.

After 1904 or 1905, the forces associated with Sinophilia increasingly placed their stamp on native policy. Where the founders of the colony had failed to propose any project for remaking the Chinese soul, Sinophiles like Richard Wilhelm hoped to penetrate the “soul of China” (the title of his famous book) and to coax it out of its seclusion.

The Seminar for Oriental Languages and German Sinology as a Conduit for Sinophilia

Sinophile ideas were actively represented in the colony by the translators and by various graduates of the Seminar für Orientalische Sprachen (Seminar for Oriental Languages). This seminar was a language-training institute at the University of Berlin, founded in 1887 with the central purpose of educating officials for the foreign service. Chinese was the language in
which the largest number of translators graduated from the seminar before 1918. Although most
of the Germans in the colony were associated with the navy, many of those bound for posts as
district officials, translators, and other civil and military positions had studied at the seminar.151
Academic Sinology, including the more pragmatic versions of it that proliferated at the Berlin
seminar, was a breeding ground for the more moderate approach to China that increasingly set
the tone for native policy in Kiaochow. Translators were present in the colonial administration
from the outset; translator Schrameier was the founder of the colony’s native policy. As the
Foreign Office and the German envoys in Beijing and Ji’nan shifted toward a friendlier stance
toward China, the views of the translators, Sinologists, moderate missionaries, and other
Sinophile groups in Kiaochow became increasingly influential in the day-to-day creation and
implementation of native policy.

The seminar was significant not just because its students learned some Chinese but
because it was not permeated by the Sinophobia that was standard in military and diplomatic
circles at the turn of the century.152 The seminar’s mandate, as it evolved in the years after 1887,
comprised not just modern Asian languages but also Swahili and other African languages (and
eventually European languages), as well as applied topics relevant to colonial service and trade,
such as tropical hygiene, colonial law, administration, history, and missionary work. The
seminar’s journal, Mitteilungen des Seminars für Orientalische Sprachen zu Berlin
(Communications of the Berlin Seminar for Oriental Languages, first issued in 1898)
comprised more than colonial and linguistic questions, just as the seminar’s teachers lectured
and wrote on a broader range of topics. Officially the journal’s purview encompassed “literature,
customs and mores, religion, legal views and institutions,” the “general historical and cultural
development of the specific peoples,” and “art and culture.” Although the editors specified that
contributions were supposed to connect these themes to “trade, missions, and German
colonialism,” this guideline was not strictly adhered to.153 Topics actually covered in the
Mitteilungen ranged from the reorganization of the Chinese army to the work of the neo-Daoist
philosopher Wang Chong.

The publications of most of the faculty, including Carl Arendt, the seminar’s director
from 1887 to 1902, “attempted to counter dominant prejudices and to evince understanding for
China.”154 Arendt was a former translator and secretary at the German legation in Beijing. He
lectured and published on modern Chinese history, edited the East Asian section of the
Mitteilungen, and argued against the theory that the Chinese language lacked a grammar.
Another typical figure at the seminar was Alfred Forke, who combined a respectful interest in
Chinese philosophy and high culture with distaste for some of the more mundane aspects of
everyday Chinese existence.155 Forke’s long account of a trip from Beijing to Xi’an and Luoyang
in 1898, for instance, contained none of the deprecating comments about the Chinese or advice
for dealing with the “natives” that peppered the travel narratives of Baron Ferdinand von
Richthofen, the geographer who first called German authorities’ attention to Jiaozhou in the 19th
century, and whose texts constructed the Chinese as an inferior subject race (Osterhammel 1987;
Steinmetz 2007, ch. 6). Forke “distanced himself” from the violent German occupation of
Kiaochow and criticized “Christian conversion at the point of a gun.”156 Erich Haenisch, a
student of J. J. M. de Groot and the first German Sinologist to write a Habilitation thesis, wrote
extensively, sometimes in the Mitteilungen, on China in the Mongol (Yuan dynasty) and Manchu
(Qing dynasty) periods and on the role of Confucianism in Chinese history.157 The seminar also
employed Chinese teachers and lecturers—perhaps one reason that de Groot scorned the
institution.158 One of these Chinese faculty members, Wang Ching Dao, published an article in
the *Mitteilungen* on “the Confucian idea of the state and its relationship to constitutionalism.”

It would be difficult to find a better example of early-twentieth-century transculturation in the German-Chinese milieu than this essay, especially in view of the role of German constitutional law (both directly and mediated through Japan) in the ongoing Chinese reforms of the era. Wang relied on German theorists such as Georg Jellinek, Hermann Rehm, and Hegel (although he criticized the latter’s interpretation of China, which was steeped in the Sinophobia of the 19th century European merchants in Asia), and discussed the work of China specialists Karl Gützlaff, Richard Wilhelm, Max von Brant, and Johann Heinrich Plath.

Even before the creation of the Seminar for Oriental Languages, the typical experiences of German translators during their linguistic training in Beijing were conducive to Sinophilia. The German envoys or ministers, by contrast, socialized mainly with other European elites. Each of the translator trainees had his own Chinese mandarin as a teacher, available to him throughout the day. Wilhelm Schrameier arrived in Beijing in 1885 and worked as a translator at the German consulates in Hong Kong and Canton and in the general consulate in Shanghai before taking up his post in the Kiaochow administration. According to Schrameier, the translator trainees in Beijing haunted the Chinese theaters and the antique stores, where merchants provided them with an “initial comprehensive introduction to Chinese art history.” Sinophilia had not been entirely suppressed. Such curiosity about Chinese culture would mark Schrameier and others like him as “subaltern” in the eyes of diplomats from the German nobility and militarists like Kaiser Wilhelm.

**Rapprochement: The Second Phase of German Colonialism in Kiaochow, 1905–14**

> A frivolous game with promises was played with China, which was treated … like a Negro state of secondary importance [*wie einen Negerstaat zweiter Güte*].

RICHARD WILHELM

By 1905 new institutions were beginning to be superimposed on the original apartheid-like infrastructure in Qingdao. These new policies embodied a program of rapprochement, syncretism, and exchange between two civilizations conceptualized as different but relatively equal in value. Although Kiaochow was often criticized for its military character during the early years, Oskar Truppel presided over what was essentially a demilitarization of the colony and what he called “a balancing of the differing [Chinese and German] ways of thought” during his governorship (1901–11). This “balancing” took place largely against his will, but not against the wishes of the higher German authorities in Berlin and Beijing or many of the lower-level civil servants in Kiaochow.

The expansion of the German military presence outside Kiaochow was linked to a sneering distaste for Chinese culture and a refusal to treat the Shandong provincial authorities as equals. When Shandong governor Zhou Fu announced his intention to visit Qingdao in 1902 Truppel’s immediate response was that this was “barely believable.” But Zhou Fu did visit Qingdao (and later moved to the colony). Richard Wilhelm recalled this event as having put an end to the “antagonistic atmosphere” by demonstrating “that more could be achieved on both sides by mutual trust and goodwill.” The most important result, according to Wilhelm, was that “the two cultures came into contact.” Truppel soon reciprocated, visiting Zhou Fu in Ji’nan,
and his visit was turned into a grand ceremonial event. Soon after Zhou Fu’s replacement as provincial governor in November 1904 by Hu Tinggan (who was replaced in turn by a young nationalist, Yang Shixiang, early in 1905), the German troops pulled back into Qingdao, abandoning their garrisons in Gaomi and Jiaozhou. In 1910, a photograph appeared in the *Berliner Abend-Zeitung* with the caption “The children of the two governors playing together,” which seemed put Governor Truppel and the Shandong governor Sun Baoqi on an equal footing (fig. 10). Photographs were taken of German colonial governors meeting other Shandong governors and state officials in which they posed as equals.

The 1905 accord on the withdrawal of German troops back into the leasehold from the province happened concurrently with a German movement toward policies of cultivating “cultural-political relationships, especially with the educated Chinese upper strata.” In 1905 the colony’s chief justice, Dr. Crusen, proclaimed in a public lecture in Qingdao that “the so-called fifty-kilometer zone in Shandong is not a [sphere of influence] and is destined to remain Chinese forever.” One of the other early signs of change had been the creation of the Chinese Committee in Qingdao in 1902. Between 1902 and 1910 the twelve members of this committee were selected by Chinese merchants from the three provincial guilds (*huiguan*) active in Kiaochow: the Jiyan guild, representing merchants from Shandong and Tianjin, the Sanjiang guild, representing the lower Yangtzi region; and the Guangdong guild, made up of merchants from Canton. After 1910 the governor himself selected four representatives (Vertrauensmänner) from these guilds—two from the Jiyan guild and one each from the
Sanjiang and Guangdong guilds. Although this was a step backward in terms of representativeness and Chinese influence, the idea was that the *Vertrauensmänner* would eventually become part of the advisory committee to the governor, which had hitherto consisted exclusively of Europeans. A Chinese chamber of commerce was also created in 1909.

In 1904 a colonial bank director publicly praised Truppel for making the Chinese “what they should be, namely, fully equal citizens [Bürger] of our colony.” This was certainly an exaggeration: the Chinese did not have equal rights, and the dualistic legal system remained in place until the end of the German colonial period. Still, the colony was moving in the direction of greater legal and cultural equality. When the Qing dynasty was toppled in the 1911 Xinhai revolution, many upper-class Chinese scholars and ex-officials streamed into Qingdao from around the country. Several wealthy Chinese residents of Qingdao had German wives. Partly as a result of the fact that “racial mixing” was occurring at a high social class level, but also due to the liberalizing trend in German-Chinese relations, the ban on Chinese residence in the European district was partly lifted. After 1912 there were very few areas in Qingdao that were off limits to elite Chinese. Some rich Chinese began to vacation on Qingdao’s beaches alongside European tourists. In 1914, a law was passed stipulating that any Chinese could live in the city’s European district with the permission of the governor and the approval of three-fourths of the Citizen Representative Council. Although mixed marriage was being banned and children of mixed marriages were being deprived of their German citizenship precisely at the same time in other German colonies, children of mixed Chinese and German heritage in Kiaochow retained the possibility of being treated legally as Germans (even if there was still discrimination in colonial civil society). Laws forbidding mixed marriage were never seriously entertained in Kiaochow. Instead, discussions of the topic of mixed marriage in the German East Asian press were focused on the Chinese government’s ban on Chinese students marrying foreigners while studying abroad. From the perspective of German colonialism in Africa or the Pacific, this reversal seemed incredible. Although some Germans living in Qingdao campaigned against the admission of qualified Chinese students to the German gymnasium, the colonial administration defended their presence, defying settlers, as in Samoa.

German buildings also began to combine Chinese and European design elements, and a few were done in a fully Chinese style. During the early years of the colony any direct association of German and Chinese architecture was strictly a matter of temporary necessity or a gesture of symbolic domination. Thus, the Qingdao *yamen* building was occupied (fig. 11) as a show of power and because the Germans initially wanted to concentrate their efforts on other construction projects, but the main German administrative building that was completed in 1906 was done in an almost completely German style (fig. 12). Other aspects of early architecture were generically “colonial” or “Oriental” without being specifically Chinese. The veranda, for instance, was a characteristic feature of German villas and public buildings in Qingdao. The governor’s mansion (fig. 13), completed in October 1907, had verandas whose exotic or decorative function was indicated by the fact that “some of them could not even be entered from the rooms behind them.”
FIGURE 11 German officials preening in front of occupied Qingdao yamen, from Admiral Diederichs’s photo album. From BA-MA-Freiburg, Diederichs Papers, vol. 45. (Courtesy of BA-MA-Freiburg.)

FIGURE 12 Headquarters of the German colonial administration (Gouvernements-Dienstgebäude), completed 1906. Photo by the author, 2005.
The countryside villa of the colony’s chief justice, Dr. Crusen, had a small “Chinese temple” on its grounds. A photo of the interior of another colonial judge’s home from the period shows a Chinese-style standing-screen wall in one of the rooms. A scholarly study of Chinese architecture was undertaken in 1906 by Ernst Boerschmann, who had first been sent to China in 1902 as a civil engineer for the German troops occupying Beijing. He spent a good deal of time in Qingdao. Boerschmann was given a leave of absence from the army to travel in China from 1906 to 1909, and his study was financed by the German and Prussian governments. He was convinced of the “greatness of Chinese culture” and set out to study the “most impressive buildings in the most important, religiously significant places and in the centers of spiritual and economic life, just as we would do in the study of our own culture.” Boerschmann believed that religious and philosophical texts were the highest expression of China’s culture and that they were “revealed in Chinese art, especially in architecture, with a precision that has not been attained by our own artistic creation.” The fact that German government agencies were now promoting the study of Chinese architecture rather than knocking down Chinese walls with cannonballs was part of a rather abrupt change in goals and prevailing ethnographic representations in this period.

The sheer presence of stylistic hybridity does not yet reveal the meaning to the Germans of the inclusion of Chinese architectural elements in Qingdao buildings. For example, the massive gargoylelike dragon above the main entrance of the governor’s mansion (fig. 14) was perhaps meant to invoke “Viking” or European gothic dragons rather than Chinese ones. It is not a repeated motif, however, but a singular one. Furthermore, the dragon seems to rise like a ship out of the pattern of waves carved into the granite eves, and it faces west rather than east. This strengthens the sense of the dragon as being closer to Zheng He (the mythical Chinese...
navigator) than James Cook. These peculiarities of the design, combined with the very anomaly of including a dragon—whether European or Chinese—in a twentieth-century German structure, indicate that processes of transculturation had penetrated the heart of the colonial state. Both of the mansion’s architects were part of the colonial government and therefore responsible for the regime’s self-presentation. One scroll-shaped painting inside the governor’s residence seemed to show Qingdao in an earlier period, unsullied by European colonialism (fig. 15). The Mecklenburghaus Convalescent Home (fig. 16), built in 1903, combined Chinese roof elements and columns with German Fachwerk-style heavy wooden beams and stone.

A final example of architectural syncretism is the Tsingtau-Klub, completed in 1911, which contains a traditional “spirit wall” (yingbi, literally, “shadow wall”) at the entrance. Like bridges shaped in the zigzag form, these walls were believed to keep malevolent sprits at bay; more positively, the yingbi was a plastic expression of metaphysical ideas, of the “thought of eternity,” also often represented by a mirror. The German wall in question is made of blue porcelain tiles that recall the colors of the Temple of Heaven in Beijing and decorative walls inside the Forbidden City. The overall design of the Qingdao wall resembles that of traditional spirit walls such as the one in figure 17 from the Fa-Yu Temple on Putuoshan (普陀山) Island, with the larger mirrorlike image in the center flanked by symmetrical rows of smaller rectangular
ornaments on both sides. Whereas the central images in the great spirit walls often depicted a “powerful mythical animal resembling a tiger in . . . extremely stylized and bizarre form,” the German ghost wall inside the Tsingtau-Klub had a stylized German eagle at its center and a fireplace. The existence of a German “spirit wall” is more than ironic, since Chinese were prohibited from joining the Tsingtau-Klub until quite late, and also in light of the European predilection for punishing China for its “decades of high-walled exclusion” of foreigners.192

Other examples of the emerging approach to native policy were found in the sphere of education.193 A “German-Chinese school” had already existed in the early years of the colony, but the classes were held in German and the aim was to accustom students to “discipline” and to train translators for the navy and the government.194 In 1905 the government opened the first of twenty-seven Chinese grammar schools in the colony.195 Instruction was carried out by two groups: Chinese teachers who had gained a reputation in the villages for their Confucian learning and German missionaries from the General Evangelical-Protestant Missionary Association (Allgemeiner Evangelisch-Protestantischer Missionsverein), or “Weimar Mission.”196 This was one of three Protestant missions operating in Kiaochow, in addition to the Catholic Steyl Mission. The Weimar Mission was a liberal, nationalist, “high church” association, founded in 1884 by theology professors and pastors who wanted to “distance themselves consciously from the dominant ‘Pietistic’ strand of the [Protestant] missionary movement” in Germany.197 Rather than emphasizing conversion to Christianity, the Weimar Mission pursued a classical Jesuit strategy of seeking influence through the educated Chinese elites. In practical terms this meant that the Weimar missionaries focused their teaching of the children of the higher Chinese social classes on secular topics, networked with Chinese literati, and translated “the best of European and American literature” into Chinese. The Chinese grammar schools in the colony relied on the standard five-year Chinese elementary school curriculum, supplemented by German language instruction during the last two years.198 In a significant gesture of cultural reconciliation, given
the fraught history of Christianity in China, the curriculum contained no religious material at all.199

The Weimar Mission’s most significant activity in Kiaochow was the creation of the Qingdao German-Chinese Seminar (Deutsch-Chinesisches Seminar), a Gymnasium for adolescent boys. The seminar was headed by Richard Wilhelm, the future Sinologist and Weimar Republic intellectual. The seminar trained Chinese teachers for the colony’s elementary schools. Shandong governor Zhou Fu also decreed that graduates of the seminar could take the exam to enter the provincial university in Ji’nan.200 The instructors for Chinese, math, physics, and chemistry classes were Chinese; Germans taught German language and history. The school gained an excellent reputation, and Chinese officials and wealthy families sent their sons there.201 As in the grammar schools, there was no religious instruction and Christian holidays were not celebrated.202

Richard Wilhelm defended the idea of a mainly Chinese curriculum devoid of Christian teaching, arguing that cultural exchange should not be reduced to the simple transfer of European “machine culture” or even the “proven truths of European science,” but should entail “an appropriation of our thinking and inner life, both religious and scientific,” with all of its “contradictions and insufficiencies.”203 For Wilhelm, Chinese was “one of the most significant literary languages,” a “cultural oeuvre and an educational means . . . of the highest sort,” without which China’s admirable “state and culture would be unthinkable.” Rejecting the Sinophobic claim that Chinese was linguistically primitive, Wilhelm described the Chinese script as “the containers into which a highly gifted people has placed its entire mental labor and the best works of its soul for millennia.” Just “a few of these characters taken together,” he marveled, “express an entire worldview with wonderful simplicity.” Wilhelm spoke approvingly of one “German in Shandong who stuck his young son into a Chinese village school, in which he learned the discourses of Confucius, the famous teacher of the Chinese, just like any Chinese youngster.” The “enemy” in Wilhelm’s view was “not Confucianism, but the alienation and despiritualization of Chinese humanity due to a superficial European education.”204 According to the recollections of one of the Chinese teachers at the seminar, Wilhelm often presided over early morning gatherings in which he discussed the ethical teachings of Confucius, Mencius, and Christianity. Wilhelm also elaborated an entire program of cultural synthesis and exchange that had a different accent from that of the more blatant “cultural imperialism” being proposed by figures like Karl Lamprecht and the former settlement commissary in Southwest Africa, Paul Rohrbach.205 After being introduced to Chinese culture by Richard Wilhelm, Rohrbach helped create a Gymnasium for girls in Qingdao, the “Schu-Fan” (Shufan) School in the Taixizhen district.206 The Schu-Fan School’s curriculum, like that of the German-Chinese Seminar for boys, was part Chinese and part German and was oriented toward the children of the local Chinese elite.207

The most dramatic illustration of the shift in native policy is the creation of the Qingdao German-Chinese college (Deutsch-chinesische Hochschule).208 The college was first proposed to the Navy Office in 1905 in a plan that was signed by the acting governor of Kiaochow but probably written by the Commissary for Chinese affairs, Wilhelm Schrameier, who was influenced by discussions with Richard Wilhelm.209 Schrameier envisioned a unified school system in the colony reaching from the elementary to the college level. His ultimate goal was for these schools to “influence the Chinese spirit and character in an all-encompassing manner and to become the mechanism for permeating the entire province, the Shandong hinterland that depends economically on Qingdao, with German knowledge and German spirit.”210 At this early
stage of discussion the college was construed as having an entirely German curriculum; Chinese material would be treated in the elementary schools. The German envoy to China, Count Arthur von Rex, proposed the idea of a German-Chinese university for Qingdao in 1907, and Navy Secretary von Tirpitz immediately endorsed the idea of “an educational institution on a larger scale in the interest of our influence in China.” Von Tirpitz broke with the segregationism that had hitherto prevailed in the colony and moved in the direction of cooperation with the Chinese government, writing:

It seems particularly important for the viability and especially the desired political effectiveness of the planned educational institutions that from the start the Chinese central government as well as the most important provincial governors are enlightened about the goals and advantages of the planned institutions and thus become interested in the latter; that they allocate appropriate student material and as far as possible assume responsibility for the recognition of the examinations taken in Qingdao and the subsequent advancement of the students. In the same sense I would see it as admissible and even desirable that the responsible Chinese offices be involved in the creation of the curriculum, etc., from the start. Von Tirpitz emphasized the need to include a law faculty in the proposed university, since he expected that “the most direct political influence” on China would emanate “precisely from this school.” At this early stage von Tirpitz also seems to have imagined the school’s curriculum as entirely Western. A memo by Count von Rex in early 1908 concerning the strong demand for Western education in China noted that “the entire population wants to civilize modernize itself.” The fact that the verb “civilize” was crossed out in the original memo suggests that von Rex had second thoughts about whether China was not in fact already “civilized.” This marked a significant difference from his predecessors von Ketteler and von Heyking, who had insisted that China was barbaric. The change in “ethnographic” perceptions was accompanying changes in native policy and was occurring at the highest levels of German government.

The initial aim guiding these discussions was to orient Chinese elites toward Germany. The timing on the German side corresponded to a more general movement toward ideas of a “cultural mission” to achieve German geopolitical ends. The German initiative was also related to ongoing reforms within the Chinese educational system that made such an intervention seem more plausible—specifically, the educational reforms written by education minister Zhang Zhidong that were introduced in 1904–5. The ancient Beijing-centered system of repeated examinations of candidates’ knowledge of classical texts to assess their qualification for state service was starting to give way to a nationwide system of universities that would each control their own admissions and grant academic degrees.

Many of the institutional aspects of von Tirpitz’s original plan were eventually realized. But the equilibrium between German and Chinese elements in the school’s actual constitution represented a shift in the direction of Chinese interests and some openness on the German side to cultural métissage. The contours of the college on its opening day in 1909 contained elements of the program of “cultural synthesis and exchange” championed by Richard Wilhlem and other German intellectuals at the time and reflected the reform ideas of Zhang Zhidong, who supported the project and whose office had conducted the negotiations with the Germans. During discussions with Germany in the months leading up to the official negotiations, Zhang Zhidong insisted that instruction in the “purely Chinese sciences” be carried out by Chinese teachers but also said that Chinese higher education in general should be “reorganized according to German models and rely on German teachers.” After the Hundred Days Reforms in 1898, Zhang Zhidong had coined the phrase “The old [i.e., Chinese] learning is the substance—the new
[Western] learning is the vehicle.” This was a specific adaptation of the Confucian slogan *tiyong* (體用), or “essence and practical use,” from the reformist self-strengthening movement. This meant that “Chinese learning should remain the essence, but Western learning should be used for practical development.” The German-Chinese College in its final form corresponded much more closely to this Chinese project than had been the case in the original German plan: the mechanical arts and natural sciences were taught exclusively in the “Western” mode, while the cultural sciences—law and economics—were a mixture of Chinese and European approaches.

The ability of the Chinese to codetermine the college’s form and content also resulted from an evolution in German interests. The Germans wanted the Chinese to bear a large portion of the college’s budget, and this gave Zhang more leverage in the negotiations. German geopolitical strategy was also beginning to favor a more accommodating approach to the Chinese government. The enhanced power of the translators and Sinologists in the colony and in German China policy more generally was reflected in the selection of Sinologist Otto Franke to conduct the negotiations over the German-Chinese college. This assignment was significant in light of Franke’s criticism of Baron von Heyking’s aggressive style in his discussions with the Chinese government in 1897–98 concerning Kiaochow’s annexation. Franke was given quite a bit of leeway in these negotiations and agreed to allow the Chinese authorities to select the students and the Chinese teachers for the school. When Zhang argued that the school should have a Chinese codirector, Franke responded that this contradicted his instructions, but the two sides agreed that the Chinese Educational Ministry could post a permanent representative at the school. Franke endorsed the idea that the college’s goal was not to transform its students into artificial Germans or “characterless cultural hermaphrodites.” The blueprint that eventually emerged from these discussions included a mixed Chinese and European curriculum. The Chinese side insisted that the school’s official (and not too mellifluous) name would be Advanced School of Special Sciences of a Special Type (Hochschule für Spezialwissenschaften mit besonderem Charakter, or Tebie gaodeng zhuaxue). The inclusion of the adjective “special” (besonders/tebie) signaled that it was not going to be given the same status as the Imperial University in Beijing, but also that it was elevated in some respects above the other provincial Chinese universities. Although the Germans had hoped that the degrees granted by the Qingdao college would be recognized as equivalent to those of the Imperial University, Franke conceded that graduates would have to go to Beijing to earn the highest literary degree qualifying them to become officials. Governor Truppel objected vigorously to allowing the Chinese such influence over the school, but he was unable to change the agreed-upon plan. Franke received strong backing against Truppel from Admiral von Tirpitz and the German envoy in Beijing.

When the Qingdao college finally opened in October 1909 it combined a general five- or six-year preparatory lower school with an advanced school for graduates of the Gymnasium. Chinese courses at the lower-school level included language, literature, classics, geography, ethics, and history; at the college level, Chinese law and ethical philosophy were offered. Western disciplines taught at the lower school included German language, natural sciences, introductory philosophy (psychology, logic, and epistemology), and health lessons, based on Western rather than Chinese medicine. The upper school was divided into four specialized disciplines: law and political economy (*Staatswissenschaften*), natural sciences and engineering, agriculture and forestry, and medicine. Physics, chemistry, medicine, and engineering were all based mainly on Western science. The law and political economy section, however, was more
syncretic. Religious teaching, that is, European religion, was excluded from the curriculum, and religious “propaganda” was banned from the college.\textsuperscript{227} In his internal comments on the first draft of the German proposal, Zhang Zhidong had commended the “absence of missionary activities” and recognized that “the fact that . . . Chinese knowledge will have an established place in the school’s teaching already differentiates . . . the German school from others that have been created by foreigners.”\textsuperscript{228}

The German-Chinese college brought German and Chinese teachers together in a setting that suggested a civilizational exchange rather than colonialism. According to the colony’s official annual report, “young people [should] not lose touch with their own literature and culture. . . . The young men should be educated to love their fatherland . . . but also to appreciate German culture and to develop their country according to these values.”\textsuperscript{229} At the school’s opening ceremony in 1909, speakers from both sides endorsed the idea of combining the best of their two cultures. A toast was raised to the Chinese emperor, the “national anthem” of the Qing Empire was sung, and the school’s German director proclaimed that “all of the cultural peoples [Kulturvölker] are linked by a common bond” and should “share their discoveries.” Here the Chinese were unambiguously (re)inscribed into the dominant pole of the German racial-anthropological binary. The imperial German and late Qing dynasty flags flew side by side in front of one of the school’s provisional buildings (fig. 18).\textsuperscript{230}

The Germans set out to reshape China but ended up with a school that more strongly resembled an open-ended cultural “joint venture.”\textsuperscript{231} In the process, many Germans gained a clearer sense of the differences among their aims in China. Richard Wilhelm and Otto Franke wanted China’s encounter with the West to take place on the basis of its own inherited traditions. This pointed beyond colonialism altogether, since it no longer insisted on a rule of hierarchical difference. “Cultural imperialists” like Paul Rohrbach, by contrast, believed that influencing China would require a “reconstruction and reconstitution of Chinese culture through a synthesis of Confucian and Occidental cultural elements.” Rather than building on Chinese tradition, this
approach would necessitate an “internal confrontation with Confucianism.” Rohrbach’s conception was compatible with a rule of hierarchical difference, although it would have represented a step away from the severe segregationism that dominated colonial policy in the initial period. Both cultural exchange and “internal confrontations” leading to a German-dominated synthesis required the colonizers to approach Chinese culture hermeneutically, even if the latter approach was compatible with continued colonial rule.

There is a difference between policy and implementation, however, and the college could have moved in several different directions. One of these was respectful exchange and translation, a process of bidirectional transculturation that would no longer privilege the European side. Another possibility was that the school would come to embody a bid for cultural hegemony and acculturation into a German-controlled synthesis. Finally, there might have developed syncretic cultural processes that actually favored Chinese teachers or nationalist reformers, as Zhang Zhidong hoped.

The activities in the college’s Law and Economy Department suggest that several of these possibilities coexisted. On one level, this department conformed to the translation-and-exchange model championed by Otto Franke and Richard Wilhelm. The law students studied both Chinese and European law. The department published the *German-Chinese Legal Journal (Deutsch-chinesische Rechtszeitung)*, which carried a column by the Chinese chief judge of Shandong Province on important legal decisions from all over China. At the same time, the department of law and political economy published a series of Chinese translations of German law. This section and its journal also began to promote a synthesis of Chinese and German forms. One of the school’s law professors, Kurt Romberg, wrote that the Chinese “have created eternal values for all of humanity” in the area that “Kant called practical reason” and that these were legal “treasures” that China “should not be allowed to keep for itself.” Like Leibniz three hundred years earlier, he thus suggested that Europe had something to learn from China, that cultural exchange was reciprocal. What the West, and especially the supposedly less materialistic Germans, could offer China was “methodological techniques” and “legal forms.” But these empty forms had to be “filled” with Chinese contents. This was a paraphrase of the *tiyong* principle, from the pen of a colonial German. Such syncretism would contribute to an “orderly state” and an effective legal system in China, Romberg concluded. And at this point, “consular jurisdiction and foreign barracks” would, he forecasted, become superfluous. This demonstrated that the open-ended cultural processes unleashed by institutions like the German-Chinese college could move away from the rule of difference toward processes of transculturation that no longer privileged the colonizers.

An even more striking example of the erosion of hierarchical binarism was the Confucius Society (*Konfuzius-Gesellschaft*), founded by Richard Wilhelm. Although this was not an official government institution, Wilhelm played a central role in the colony’s school system and was widely regarded as one of the most influential Germans in Kiaochow. The exalted stature of the society’s Chinese members, many of whom were high-ranking ex-officials and scholars who had supported the Qing regime and who moved to Qingdao after 1911, meant that the club’s activities had broader implications. The goal of the Confucius Society was to stimulate intellectual discussions in which “German and Chinese culture and science can enter into fruitful exchange,” according to Wilhelm. The society’s guiding principle, which Wilhelm described as the only possible foundation for “genuine relations between the Orient and Occident,” was an “exchange of the highest achievements of the spiritual heroes of both cultures.” The challenge facing the society’s Chinese members, in Wilhelm’s view, was weighty: to rescue the traditional...
principles and treasures of Chinese culture, which were in great danger. Many of these treasures had been “crudely destroyed during the storms of the [1911] revolution.” One of the society’s central goals was therefore to create a library “for the collection of Chinese treasures,” but World War I broke out just as the building was completed. Unlike Augustin Krämer and other ethnologists and Orientalists at the time, Wilhelm did not pillage the most valuable artifacts of a culture under siege but instead tried to make sure they were protected in China.

Explaining the Shift in Native Policy

The period after 1905 represented a fairly dramatic shift in native policy, accompanied by more positive portrayals of the Chinese both in Germany and in Kiaochow. Before asking about the reasons for this development we need to consider the possibility that the colonial regime before 1904 was already based on mixed principles, despite its seemingly thoroughgoing racialism. The partial reliance on Chinese law in Chinese trials led inexorably to mixed legal forms, even if the people in charge were Germans. The chief justice of Qingdao, Dr. Crusen, summarized the legal system as a “unique, half German and half Chinese form.” But allowing such cultural-political interpenetration, even within the repressive context of the law, could open the floodgates to uncontrollable cultural change. A legal dissertation written in 1911 defended the German reliance on Chinese law with reference to “the respect for an ancient culture that has shown a high degree of competence and development in all areas, including legal science.” What is remarkable here is not just the assumption that China was a developing rather than a stagnant country or the expression of respect, but the reappearance of the resonant Sinophile idea of an admirably ancient culture. This bears little resemblance to the arguments and emotions associated with German efforts to preserve customary law in Samoa or among the Namibian Rehoboth Basters. Such justifications for the preservation of Chinese elements in the colony’s legal system had not been widespread when that system was first created. These elements were initially retained for more pragmatic reasons. The harsh penalties of Chinese law were seen as a useful deterrent. But even though legal syncretism did not necessarily reflect any real appreciation of Chinese culture, the daily activities of the district commissioners required that they immerse themselves in Chinese law, and this inevitably oriented them toward a more “hermeneutic” approach to the colonized culture.

Three factors have been proposed as explanations for the shift in German policy starting around 1904: economic pressures, Chinese resistance, and German military and foreign policy considerations. The second and third are significant in accounting for the timing of the move away from the early regime of harsh segregationism, but they cannot explain the form of the policies that took its place. Economic considerations tell us very little about either the timing or the form of this shift. German capitalists in China criticized the Kiaochow colony as too militaristic and statist and called for its liberalization. But this did not necessarily imply more liberal native policies. In fact, newspapers associated with German economic interests in China, like the Ostasiatischer Lloyd and the Deutsch-Asiatische Warte, more frequently criticized the Kiaochow government for its overly lax treatment of the Chinese. In any case, German residents had only “extremely limited possibilities of truly influencing the decisions of the governor” through the strictly advisory Citizens Council.

One might hypothesize that economic considerations influenced the changes in less direct ways. The Kiaochow colony had been evaluated by the navy and Foreign Office from the very beginning in terms of its economic potential, which referred above all to its contributions to trade. The navy’s scorched earth policies in the colony’s hinterland in 1899–1900 provoked
protests by some German business interests that “Germany doesn’t gain anything in the end if the railroad moves through wastelands devoid of human beings and steams past ruined towns and villages, proclaiming the ‘triumph of culture.’” If this continued, Germans would soon be the “most hated foreign devils.” Schrameier later recalled that the colonial government had reacted too harshly during the Boxer period and that the Chinese had nearly fled the colony, which would have been an economic disaster. The point is that these policies were pursued nonetheless during the initial years. It is unclear why economic considerations should have become more important after 1904.

Another possible “economic” explanation would focus on the fact that trade within the colony was largely in Chinese hands. The shift toward a more congenial native policy may have been related to the fact that the colony’s economic life depended not just on attracting and retaining a Chinese labor force but also on promoting Chinese-owned businesses. Yet even these considerations could not specify whether the colonizers would pursue a policy of assimilation, guarantee a “separate but equal” status for the Chinese, or engage in some version of cultural synthesis. What changed after 1905 was more than simply a relaxation of earlier restrictions or an agreement to listen to the colony’s Chinese residents.

All studies of Kiaochow have emphasized the impact of resistance and cooperation (or “collaboration”) on the colonial regime. The sheer presence of the Chinese state represented a crucial difference from the other German colonies. Starting with Yuan Shikai, governor of Shandong in 1900–1901 (and later the first president of the Republic of China, from 1912 to 1916), provincial authorities in Ji’nan worked with great success to contain the Germans in Kiaochow by undercutting German mining activities in the province, opening up Ji’nan as a “self-opened mart” (zikai shangbu), reminding the Germans of the colony’s limited (ninety-nine-year) life expectancy and its status as “leasehold.” But previous studies have not connected resistance and collaboration to the transformation of native policy inside the colony. Hans-Christian Stichler suggests that since the Boxers and other movements (including the 1911 Xinhai revolution) did not openly challenge the Kiaochow administration, the Germans basically had a free hand within the colony. In several cases when the Chinese directly challenged policies inside the colony, they were unsuccessful. When the government created the Chinese Committee in 1902, for example, Chinese merchants asked to be allowed to work directly with Shandong provincial officials. This was vetoed by the German legation in Beijing. In 1910, the Shandong governor asked Germany to help him conduct a census of the leasehold, again insinuating China’s partial sovereignty over Kiaochow. The governor, Captain Meyer-Waldeck, responded that the Germans alone were responsible for this.

This is not to suggest that Chinese resistance around native policy was always ineffective. When Sun Yat-sen came to Qingdao in 1912, the students at the German-Chinese college threatened to leave the school if they were not allowed to meet him on the school’s premises. Local merchants threatened to leave the colony if they were not permitted to meet Sun. The Germans capitulated. Chinese envoys to Samoa and Berlin were able to end the flogging of Chinese workers in Samoa.

Native policy was also affected by the evolving profile of German geopolitical strategy. Both the navy and the Foreign Office were increasingly oriented toward improving relations with China in order to secure a possible ally as Germany became isolated inside Europe. The result was an approach to China that resembled the Americans’ “open door” policy, insofar as it backed away from any suggestion that Germany wanted to infringe on Chinese sovereignty. This change in strategy led to an acute struggle over the direction of China policy between the
Steinmetz, Qingdao/Jiaozhou as a colony

administration of Kiaochow, on the one hand, and the Foreign Office, German legation, and secretary of the navy, on the other. The Foreign Ministry “moved rapidly to restrict the influence of the naval government in Qingdao to the Leasehold’s borders,” going so far as to set up a separate consulate in Ji’nan in order to create a counterweight to its own colony in the same province. The aims of the movement for “cultural imperialism” tended to overlap with the new geopolitical strategy when it came to China.

Geostrategic considerations thus influenced colonial native policy by urging powerful actors in the Foreign Office and the navy to censure Truppel when he resisted reforms and to shift power to a different set of Germans in Kiaochow. As a committed colonialist, Truppel recognized that granting the Chinese nearly equal status in running the college was, from a colonial standpoint, a “Begriffsverwirrung” (category mistake) and an “injury to German sovereignty in the protectorate.” He rebuked the navy and the Beijing legation, insisting that the time was “not yet ripe for China to jointly govern any aspect of the colony.” A university jointly run by the Chinese could easily take on the character of a purely Chinese school. And the Chinese were not the colonizer’s partners but rather “our charges [Schutzgenossen], our subjects.”

THE IMPORTANCE OF ORIENTALISM

If the first phase of colonial native policy was based on the Sinophobia that crystallized in the era leading up to 1897 and the Boxer uprising, the second phase fell back on a version of Sinophilia whose main contours had emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Indeed, Sinophilia made a powerful comeback more generally after 1900. This was generated partly by revulsion against Kaiser Wilhelm’s populist anti-Asian slurs and the atrocities committed in the German campaign against the Boxers. Venerable Sinophile tropes had been hovering just below the surface even in some of the most blatant examples of “yellow peril” discourse in the latter decades of the nineteenth century, as shown in the previous chapter. Karl May’s Et in terra pax, the story that represented a complete reversal in that best-selling author’s representation of China, appeared in a lavishly illustrated three-volume collection called China that was published in the immediate wake of the suppression of the Yihetuan. The second volume was given over entirely to a 450-page treatment of “The Troubles, 1900/1901” by a German lieutenant, detailing all aspects of the military expedition. The most notorious aspects of the Germans’ intervention were celebrated here in patriotic style, including the participation of the gunboat Iltis in the destruction and storming of the Dagu fort at the mouth of the Beihe River in June 1900 and the “cleansing” (Säuberung) of Yihetuan supporters in Zhili Province outside Beijing by members of the East Asian Expeditionary Force. The contributors to the first volume, which dealt with Chinese culture and history, were mainly missionaries, military officers, consuls, university professors, and a navy surveyor who had studied Jiaozhou Bay before the 1897 annexation and had published a crudely patriotic book on the colony. But the third volume, entitled “Narratives, etc., from and about China,” included not only May’s novel and other literary texts by Germans but also translations of Chinese novellas. In this respect the three-volume compilation resembled Du Halde’s Description de la Chine, the pinnacle of Jesuit Sinophilia. Another coffee-table book on the campaign, Deutschland in China, included picturesque color images of Chinese scenes. An image of Count von Waldersee at his desk in the Beijing Winter Palace (figure 19) is an interesting example of the multivocality of discourse on China. On the one hand, this illustration is a record of official looting. Von Waldersee’s usurpation of the place of the Chinese mandarin or empress resembles in this respect the occupation of the Qingdao yamen (fig. 11) and other
instances of pillaging in the wake of imperialist invasions. On the other hand, the image identifies von Waldersee with his Chinese environment, turning him into a cryptomandarin and symbolically reversing the direction of usurpation. One visual axis connects von Waldersee’s blue uniform and the large, blue, patterned vase behind him. There is a reverse echo of the figure-ground pattern of the medals and buttons adorning von Waldersee’s uniform in the figure-ground pattern of blue decorations on the white vase. Some of the patches on the vase also resemble the iron cross on von Waldersee’s chest. A second axis runs between the calligraphic tablet hanging on the upper-left-hand wall, von Waldersee’s hands, and the open inkpot on the desk. This depiction of von Waldersee contrasts sharply with the image of the aggressive Teutonic “Hun” (e.g., fig. 20). Von Waldersee could even be confused with a Confucian scholar leaning meditatively over his desk, his delicate hands engaged in an activity that recalls Chinese calligraphy.

FIGURE 19 Field Marshall Count Waldersee at His Desk in the Beijing Winter Palace. (from Deutschland in China 1902).
As the writings of Confucius and Mencius started to become better known in translation, some modern intellectuals followed Richard Wilhelm in abandoning imperialist claims to superiority. A book by the Chinese intellectual Ku Hung-Ming, *China’s Defense against European Ideas*, appeared in German in 1911. Ku had studied in Edinburgh and Leipzig and had served as secretary-interpreter to Viceroy Zhang Zhidong. After the Xinhai Revolution he taught English literature at Beijing University.\(^{260}\) *China’s Defense* was translated into German by Richard Wilhelm and had an introduction by Alfons Paquet, the publicist, travel writer, playwright, and supporter of Martin Buber’s version of Zionism, who had spent six months traveling in China, including Qingdao, and who had met Ku Hung-Ming in Shanghai.\(^{261}\) As a guest of Shandong governor Zhou Fu in 1902, Ku had met members of the Kiaochow colony’s delegation.\(^{262}\) Ku was also part of Richard Wilhelm’s circle in Qingdao.\(^{263}\) Later Ku was nominated by Wilhelm and others for the post of “first scholar” at a planned Richthofen Institute in Beijing.\(^{264}\) As Paquet wrote in his introduction to one of Ku’s collections of essays, the Chinese writer urged Europeans to acknowledge the connection between racism and the colonizer’s “ecstasy of domination.” According to Pacquet, Ku described the Yihetuan as “misguided and betrayed, but still brave Boxer chaps (*brave Boxerburschen*).” Like Zhang Zhidong, Kang Youwei, and other nationalist reformers before 1911, Ku embraced Confucianism as a means of warding off imperialism (even though that tradition was personally foreign to him). Most significant in the present context was the fact that this description of the Boxers as “brave chaps” was published in Germany just a decade after Kaiser Wilhelm’s “Hun speech” and the murder by Yihetuan sympathizers of Baron von Ketteler during the siege of Beijing.\(^{265}\)
The main lineaments of native policies in Kiaochow thus resonated with traditional and reemerging Sinophilia. Just as Sinophobia had been a calculated and point-by-point refutation of Sinophilia, the new policies in Kiaochow seemed to be a deliberate reversal of those of the earlier period. They took for granted that China was an advanced civilization on a level equal to that of Europe. Opening these floodgates within a colonial context pointed beyond European claims to sovereignty and supremacy, beyond colonialism.

FANTASIES OF EXALTATION: SUBALTERN STUDIES ON THE SIDE OF THE COLONIZER

Wherever there was a German colony . . . the most varied occasions were useful for holding Germans together: *we passed over all class differences.*

ADMIRAL VON TIRPITZ

The shift in native policy was thus propelled by economic and geopolitical considerations and by Chinese resistance; the first decade of the twentieth century also saw the (re)emergence of a distinctive strand of ethnographic discourse. This does not mean that elite class conflicts internal to the colonial state and imaginary identifications across the colonizer-colonized boundary were unimportant in China. If figures like Otto Franke and Richard Wilhelm had not been available, the powers in Berlin pressing for a more accommodating stance toward China would not have been able to change colonial practice in Kiaochow so readily.

The center of gravity of the ongoing creation and implementation of native policy was gradually relocated. The first period was dominated by the governors—Captains Carl Rosendahl, Jaeschke, and Trupp—and overseen by von Tirpitz and the navy. In the second period the focus moved from the top military personnel toward men who followed the translator career path within the German Foreign Office and toward navy personnel who had undergone preparation at the Seminar for Oriental Languages. The most sensitive political positions for native policy in the colony were staffed by “philologists.” Translator Wilhelm Schrameier was the colony’s Chinese commissary for twelve years, from 1897 to 1909. The district commissioners in Qingdao and Licun, men like Heinrich Mootz and Emil Krebs, had gone through the language immersion training in Beijing. The Kiaochow government paid a special bonus to “all military and civilian personnel who passed a language exam,” and many of them spent some time at the Seminar for Oriental Languages in Berlin before shipping out to Qingdao, or took Chinese lessons once they were in the colony. The Weimar Mission schools brought teachers to the colony who were overwhelmingly Sinophilic. Although some of the Germans who came to teach at the German-Chinese college were technical specialists with no special interest in China, others entered through the translating and Sinological paths. Sinologist Ferdinand Lessing, for example, a pioneer in the study of Mongolian culture and linguistics, Buddhism, and Chinese art, taught at the college and directed its library’s Chinese collection. He “studied law and Oriental languages in Berlin and earned a diploma in Chinese at the Seminar for Oriental Languages (1902–5) before going to China in 1907, after a brief stint at the [Berlin] Ethnological Museum.” Lessing exemplifies the circulation between the Sinological milieus in Germany (especially Berlin) and official and semiofficial positions in Kiaochow. He was also involved in a strike against the German-Chinese college when its director, Georg Keiper, tried to enforce a set of “school ordinances” drafted by Governor Truppel that these professors saw as infringing on their academic autonomy.
Truppel’s approach had fallen into disfavor with the navy and the Foreign Office by this time. Admiral von Tirpitz directly “criticized the behavior of Truppel, whose attempts to gain influence over the school triggered the conflict.” Truppel was a narrow-minded, traditional military man, but his personal papers show little evidence of the nasty racism of von Heyking or von Trotha (the engineer of the genocidal war in German Southwest Africa in 1904). Rather, it was Truppel’s stubborn commitment to the first model of colonial governance introduced in Kiaochow that made him fall into disfavor. The translators and “men on the spot” who were imbued with one or the other version of Sinophilia now began to shape policy at all levels. The centrality of culture and education to this new alignment in native policy reflects the increased importance of the bildungsbürgerliche fraction of the trichotimized German elite within Kiaochow policymaking. A German diplomat who was in Beijing from 1906 to 1908, Artur von Kemnitz, recalled this shift in the center of gravity of the colony’s governance away from what he called the “more effective” consular service personnel to the “professionals” (Fachleute) and career translators, members of the translator career path (Dolmetscherlaufbahn). Von Kemnitz argued vehemently that “China hands” and “specialists” were “useful only as advisers” but that only “diplomats with comprehensive global experience” should be the “responsible bearers of German policy.” Von Kemnitz accused the latter groups of having undergone a process of “Sinification” (Verchinesung) due to their “long stay in the country.” The examples of Governor Truppel and Sanitary Councilor Kronecker make it clear, however, that a long stay in China was not sufficient in and of itself to “Sinify” anyone. Instead, certain Europeans were already prepared to be Sinified before they arrived in China. In part this involved preparation in places like the Seminar for Oriental Languages, where Sinophile discourse could be internalized. Equally important were the symbolic and imaginary projects common to many members of the middling educated classes. For many German Bildungsbürger, like Richard Wilhelm and Alfons Paquet, the image of the Chinese mandarin whose learning put him in charge of a meritocratic but absolutist state possessed an almost irresistible appeal.

Officials who were more secure in their personal class position seemed to recognize the social aspirations that undergirded much of German Sinophilia. The extremely class-conscious von Heykings sneered at Germans who showed any interest in Chinese culture. Otto Franke observed that elites in the Foreign Office wanted to have lawyers making the important decisions rather than the “subaltern spirits” who “worried about such irrelevant things as Oriental languages.” Wilhelm Schrameier’s failure to be promoted to a higher position than Chinese commissary within the foreign service was attributed to the prejudice against translators. Governor Truppel fulminated against “Sinified” German bureaucrats who threatened to undermine the hierarchical distinction between Chinese and Europeans. When the director of the Chinese Customs Office in Qingdao, Ernst Ohlmer, wrote a memo in 1905 calling for German cooperation with America and China in order to stave off Japanese expansion, Truppel accused Ohlmer of being “more Chinese than the Chinese bureaucrats.” This insinuation that translators and other go-betweens with the Chinese were prone to going native is indicative of the ongoing symbolic struggle among colonial Germans. The fact that Ohlmer was an arrivé from very modest background conditions, but one whose overall power as a customs official equaled Truppel’s, fueled the flames.

To understand the connections between individual social class “projects” and Sinophilia we can look more closely at two men involved in the shift after 1905, Otto Franke and Richard Wilhelm. Franke had graduated from the Berlin Seminar for Oriental Languages, published in its
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journal, and gone through the standard Foreign Office translator traineeship in Beijing. In 1909 he was appointed to the first German chair in Sinology at the Hamburg Colonial Institute (the precursor of Hamburg University, which was founded in 1919). Like the Berlin seminar, the Hamburg institute’s curriculum involved the training of colonial administrators. After the war Franke held the prestigious Sinology Chair at Berlin University (1923–31). Franke was later called the “most prominent Sinologist in Germany.”

Franke distanced himself explicitly from overt racism against the Chinese, which he suggested was the province of the traditional German elites. In 1888 Franke began his career as a translator with the German consular service in China. In 1896 he found himself working under the unpleasant Baron von Heyking in Beijing. Franke disparaged officials who were ignorant about China and all who believed in the “yellow peril” and exhibited an “artificially heightened race feeling.” He observed that both von Heyking and his novelist wife saw the Chinese as “dirty, cowardly, retarded, and disgusting.” As a translator during the negotiations over the annexation of Qingdao, Franke strongly disapproved of von Heyking’s arrogant manner. Franke preferred to associate with intellectuals, academics, and other Sinologists while he was abroad and later in his career. During a posting to the German consul general in Shanghai, Franke attended sessions of the local branch of the Royal Asiatic Society.

In addition to these symbolic distinction strategies oriented toward other Europeans, Franke seems to have cross-identified with Chinese elites. Except for some Catholic missionaries, few Germans dressed in traditional Chinese clothing after 1900. Identification took different forms. Franke recognized that the traditional Confucian ideas were so powerful that “even the first Christian missionaries who lived in China in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries could not escape their influence.” Like these “learned Jesuits,” Franke himself seems to have been “overcome by the wisdom of Chinese antiquity.” He claimed to have been more interested in gaining the respect of “educated Chinese” than of other Germans.

Franke’s pronounced resentment vis-à-vis the traditional German elites sheds a different light on this entire complex. In his memoirs Franke recalls his own proud refusal to follow the “typical custom of waiting indefinitely in the antechamber” in order to meet an official in the Prussian Ministry of Culture, and speculates that his pride cost him a teaching post in that case. Just a few pages earlier in his memoirs Franke reports on Prince Chun’s refusal to perform three kowtows to Kaiser Wilhelm during his “atonement mission” to Berlin after the Boxer Rebellion. The requirement that Europeans perform the kowtow before the Chinese emperor had been a source of sharp conflict since the Macartney mission in 1793. Franke’s identification with Prince Chun seems to have been based on the same mixture of cultural pride and humiliation that he associated with the Chinese—a mixture that was also typical of the symbolic and imaginary identifications of German Bildungsbürger.

Richard Wilhelm (fig. 21) provides a second example of the uses of China by Wilhelmine Bildungsbürger in their symbolic class maneuvering. Wilhelm worked as a missionary and teacher in Kiaochow from 1899 to 1919, and, like Franke, he became a renowned Sinologist in Germany in the 1920s. Most interesting in the present context is Wilhelm’s profound identification with the imago of the Chinese scholar-gentleman. Like Solf and Franke, Richard Wilhelm staked out a distinguished class position that was defined by the possession of rare cultural knowledge and noble acquaintances which clearly differentiated him from the crass commercial bourgeoisie. This symbolic effort was doubled by a set of imaginary identifications. Even if Wilhelm did not dress in traditional Chinese mandarin clothing—something that was already going out of fashion even among the Chinese literati with whom he
liked to associate—he called those costumes “gorgeous” and “imposing.” Carl Jung thought that Wilhelm had acquired a Chinese habitus by the time he returned to Europe in 1920. Hermann Hesse insisted that “if you look at Wilhelm’s picture for a longer period of time, you become aware of the fact that his friendly smile is very Asiatic . . . playfully expressing all of the nuances between archness and sarcasm, like the stories, legends, and anecdotes of the great wisemen of old China.” In his death notice for Wilhelm in 1930, Hesse called him “chinesisch-weise” (wise like a Chinaman) and “the mandarin, the most Chinese European of our era.” As Jung wrote, Wilhelm became “a pupil of a Chinese master of the old school and . . . an initiate in the psychology of Chinese yoga.” Wilhelm’s recollections of Qingdao were filled with praise for friends like the former education minister in Ji’nan, with his “thorough mastery of Chinese literature,” and for the other “distinguished representatives of the old culture” whom he met regularly after 1911. One Qingdao acquaintance was especially important to Wilhelm: Lao Naixuan (fig. 22), a former magistrate and member of the national board of education who moved to Qingdao and worked with Wilhelm on his famous translation of the Yi Jing. Although Wilhelm’s published account did not bother to give his mentor’s biography or even his full name, referring simply to “my reverend master Lao,” it did mention that Lao Naixuan’s own teacher’s family had been “closely related to the descendants of Confucius.” The implicit suggestion was that Wilhelm himself was an indirect descendent of Confucius. Wilhelm received a mandarin button (fourth class) from the Chinese emperor and earned the rank of Daotai (circuit intendant). He compared his meetings with Chinese literati after 1911 to the “high-water marks in Chinese history when scholars and artists met, as, for instance, the meeting of the scholars in the Pavilion of the Orchards” described by the calligrapher-poet Wang Xizhi in the fourth century. In his 1914 article on the Qingdao Confucius Society Wilhelm compared his own efforts to save treasures of Chinese art and literature from the ravages of the Chinese revolutionaries and foreign capitalism to the work of Confucius, who had toiled to preserve the “highest and worthiest products of the Chinese spirit” in the face of the “torrent of destruction” unleashed by the first Chinese emperor (the Qin king, Shi Huangdi), who burned the scholars’ books and was also said to have buried the scholars alive. Even more revealing of the cross-identifications at play was the fact that Wilhelm moved immediately from the historical repression of scholars by the Qin Emperor to the contemporary threat, which he identified as “the invasion of the crude, materialist sides of European-American civilization.”

FIGURE 21 (left) Richard Wilhelm; FIGURE 22 (right) Lao Naixuan (from R. Wilhelm 1926, facing p. 160).
Wilhelm’s work and writing was enthusiastically devoted to “intellectual and spiritual exchange” and “synthesis.” He was memorialized in 1930 by Carl Jung as a “mind which created a bridge between East and West and gave to the Occident the precious heritage of a culture thousands of years old.” Wilhelm’s Sinophilia stood firmly in the tradition of Jesuits like Johann Adam Schall von Bell and Jean-Baptiste Du Halde, despite his Protestant background. His criticism of Europe was conservative, or, rather, a kind of conservative modernism. His aim vis-à-vis Europe was not to eliminate “machine culture” but to limit its claims to total hegemony.

Conclusion

The contours of the new native policies that were emerging in Kiaochow after 1905 can be explained in terms of the details of Sinophile discourse and the internal dynamics among different sectors of the colonizers, specifically, the symbolic and imaginary identifications of the middle-class translators and Sinological Bildungsbürger. The immediate impetus for this shift in policy was located at the level of global power alignments. The local result was that by 1914, native policy in Kiaochow had become a highly contradictory formation. On the one hand, social life was still largely segregated in the hospitals, schools, and clubs, and the legal system remained dualistic. At the same time, there was some residential desegregation, economic life in the colony was increasingly dominated by the Chinese and Japanese, the schools were promoting cross-cultural exchange, and people like Richard Wilhelm were bridging the cultural gap, at least in the realm of high culture. The Tsingtau-Klub responded to criticism after 1906 by allowing Chinese to play tennis there. Germans and Chinese attended local theatrical events together (Fig. 23).
If things had continued this way, Kiaochow might have eventually lost its colonial character altogether. The Japanese conquest of the colony in 1914 made this future unknowable. The Germans of Qingdao became prisoners of the East Asian state whose subjects had been elevated into the category of “white” in German colonial law.\textsuperscript{305} The German overseas empire ended almost as abruptly as it had started. And unlike the German colonies in Africa, those in the Pacific and Asia did not become the object of serious efforts of reannexation during the Nazi era. Qingdao was lost forever to the Germans, even if the built environment of what is now the central city continues to carry the traces of its European colonial past (Figure 24).

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure24.jpg}
\caption{The former Germania (later Tsingtao) brewery at number 56 Dengzhou Lu (formerly Hauptmann-Müller-Straße), now the Qingdao beer museum. The slogan on the side of the museum reads, “Tsingtao beer can give you passion and happiness.” Photo by the author, 2005.}
\end{figure}
REFERENCES


Additional references:


NOTES

1 Translated from the German text in Grössel 1891 by J. A. Scherer (1969, pp. 100–102).
3 The Germans referred to the leasehold as the Kiautschou protectorate. To avoid confusion I will use the older English-language transiteration Kiaochow (rather than Jiaozhou) to designate the German leasehold in the 1897 boundaries. I will use Jiaozhou (the transcription of 胶州 in the contemporary Pinyin system of Romanization) when referring to the city that fell inside the fifty-kilometer zone but outside the boundaries of the Kiaochow leasehold. (The city known as Jiaozhou in the colonial period is now called Jiaoxian). The name Qingdao (青岛) refers here not to the entire colony but rather to the city where the colonial government was headquartered, which was the place of residence for most Europeans in the colony. The Germans called that town Tsintau during the first year of their leasehold and Tsingtau later on; in English it is known as Tsingtao. The colonial city was located on Jiaozhou Bay and was constructed on the site of an ancient Chinese village (also called Qingdao) and recently built Chinese army barracks, which were razed by the Germans. On the history of the Chinese army base at Qingdao, which had been built after 1892, see Zhang Shufeng 1991.
4 Schrecker 1971, pp. 5–9.
7 Esherick 1987; Cohen 1997.
9 Zhang Shufeng 1991; also Lu and Lu 2005, p. 11, which reproduces rare photographs of Chinese village life during the first year of the German occupation of Qingdao.
12 The treaty is reprinted in Leutner 1997, pp. 164–68; also in Mohr 1911, pp. 1–5. A photograph of the Yanzhou cathedral, built as reparation for the Juye incident, is reproduced in Stenz 1924, p. 9.
13 Matzat 1998a, p. 106.
14 British Hong Kong, a model for the German planners of Kiaochow, was initially restricted to Hong Kong island: the New Territories that are joined to the Chinese mainland were leased from China to Britain, along with 230 other offshore islands, in 1898, in the wake of Germany’s land grab in Qingdao. Macao, across the Pearl River estuary.
from Hong Kong, had long existed as a Portuguese colony but was also located mainly offshore. A third island, Taiwan, had been ceded to Japan following the first Sino-Japanese War in 1895.

15 Other than Portuguese Macao, British Hong Kong, and Japanese Taiwan, there were no actual colonies in China before Kiaochow (the French Indochinese Union was located in countries that had long been free of Chinese rule), even if there were dozens of treaty ports and foreign settlements with varying degrees of extraterritoriality. On this entire complex of infringements on Chinese sovereignty see Cordier 1901–2, vol. 3, chap. 23; Grünfeld 1913; and Fairbank [1953] 1969.

16 See the imperial decrees from 1898 in Mohr 1911, pp. 6–7. The codification of German colonial law started in 1886, culminating in the 1900 “Schutzgebietgesetz” (Law on German Protectorates); see Das Schutzgebietgesetz . . . Textausgabe mit Einleitung, Anmerkungen und Sachregister (Berlin: Mittler, 1901).

17 Seelemann 1982, p. 87; also p. 106 n. 123; Schrecker 1971, p. 60.


20 See Tirpitz 1919, vol. 1, p. 91, for a summary of this view.


23 The shipyard built and repaired ships and made everything from boilers to “masts for the telegraph lines between Tibet and Peking” (Seelemann 1982, p. 273).

24 Schrecker 1971, p. 73; Stichler 1989, pp. 238–45.

25 Schrecker 1971, p. 74.

26 Mühlhahn 2000, p. 143.

27 See, for example, the comments in the government’s annual Denkschrift for 1898–99, p. 27: “Compared to last year, conditions have improved slightly with respect to the small Chinese businessmen. Businessmen from other districts have moved here.”


30 Of course, this does not differentiate Kiaochow fundamentally from colonies in Africa and the Pacific. Colonial armies were generally unable to prevent populations from emigrating to neighboring territories in this period. In 1904, at the height of the genocidal war in Southwest Africa, many Ovaherero were able to resettle in Bechuanaland; others slipped past German guards unnoticed and reentered the colony (Steinmetz 2007: ch 3). Samoans traveled to Tonga and Fiji as they pleased, disregarding the German colonial government’s requirement that they apply for permission to do so.

31 During Kiaochow’s colonial era this part of Shandong became economically more active than the previously dominant areas in the province’s southwest around the Imperial Canal, even if modern industry was completely absent in the province (Mühlhahn 2000, p. 40–61).

32 Matzat 1998a, p. 106.

33 Crusen 1913.

34 The 1898 city plan also included a slaughterhouse (completed 1906) and Protestant and Catholic churches, both of which were eventually built in slightly different locations. A provisional Protestant church (Governementskapelle) was completed by December 1899, and the Steyl Mission headquarters, which could hold three or four hundred people for services, was completed in 1902; see Lu and Lu 2005, pp. 168–70.

35 New barracks for two divisions of the Third Navy Battalion were already mentioned in the Denkschrift for 1898–99, p. 27.

36 Steinmetz (2008).

37 Stoler 2006.


39 Seelemann 1982, p. 70.

40 Streets in Dabaodao combined the names of towns in Shandong Province with the German word Strasse, such as Kiautschoustrasse.

41 Mohr 1911, p. 130; Klein 2004, p. 319.

42 Overviews of colonial government in Kiaochow are given in Schrecker 1971; Seelemann 1982; Stichler 1989; F. Huang 1999; and Mühlhahn 2000. Other significant studies are Zhang Yufa 1982; Biener 2001; Liu Shanzhang
Steinmetz 2007, ch. 6.


45 Matzat 1985, p. 7; Schrecker 1971, p. 66.

46 Diederichs also convinced thousands of villagers to sign “right of preemption” (Vorkaufsfrecht) agreements in exchange for payments equal to twice the amount of their annual taxes. This money was then deducted from the sales price if and when the German government decided to buy the land. When some villagers tried to charge “unreasonable” prices for their land, the government issued a decree authorizing expropriation of land through purchase (Schrecker 1971, p. 67; Schrameier 1914, pp. 2–10).


48 Other land was given to groups such as missions that were “adjudged to serve the public interest” (Schrecker 1971, p. 71).

49 Bigelow 1898, p. 580.

50 There were in fact numerous cases of typhus and intestinal disease among the Germans during the first years of the occupation. See Eckart 1997, pp. 465–66.

51 Deimling 1900, p. 57. Yangjiacun had been described just a year earlier by a German official as “a pretty Chinese village.” See Heinrich Mootz, “Die Namen der Orte in Deutsch-Shantung,” Nachr. aus Kiatuschou, Beiblatt zum “Ostasiatischen Lloyd,” special ed., June 26, 1899, p. 2. Two years after this article appeared, in a book on “place-names in German Shandong” the same author (Mootz 1901, p. 9) referred to Yangjiacun in the past tense.


53 Deimling 1900, p. 50; Tirpitz 1919, vol. 1, p. 103. According to von Tirpitz, the town itself was walled in as a “Boxer protection,” but he must have been speaking metaphorically. In actuality there were no city walls, since this would have resembled traditional Chinese cities.

54 Behme and Krieger 1906, p. 97. At the same time, according to this guidebook, “the life and activities of the Chinese offer an interesting spectacle” for the European tourist (ibid., p. 99).

55 Godshall 1929, p. 124. Today, however, these same streets seem narrow and picturesque in comparison to the wide grid pattern typical in most Chinese cities.

56 Weicker 1908, p. 82; also Berensmann 1904, p. 596. Chinese who damaged trees in the colony could be sentenced to forced labor and up to fifty lashes (Mohr 1911, pp. 151–52). For a programmatic argument about this aspect of German colonization, see “Der Nutzen der Aufforstung” in Der West-östliche Bote, vol. 1 (6–7, March–April 1914), pp. 184–89.


58 Chinese investors were allowed to buy land and to build in the European zone, and as discussed below, upper-class Chinese were allowed to live there after 1911.

59 Kronecker 1913, p. 8.

60 Schweitzer 1914, p. 136.

61 The first generation of large “villa” houses was built without basements and with other peculiarities that turned out to be disadvantageous in the Qingdao climate (Kronecker 1913, p. 8).

62 Deimling 1900, p. 56; Warner 1994, p. 292; see also Bigelow 1898, p. 580.

63 Biener 2001, p. 103.

64 Weicker 1908, p. 67.

65 Schrameier 1914, p. 27.


67 Japanese were treated like Germans and other “nonnative foreigners” in German colonial law in general and in Kiaochow in particular. This was especially important in Qingdao given the large commercial presence of the Japanese. See Mohr 1911, p. 61 (par. 2 of 1900 decree “Legal Affairs in the German Protectorates”).

68 Seelemann 1982, p. 94.

69 Schrecker 1971, p. 61; Stichler 1989, pp. 93–94.

70 Mann and Roberts 1991; Mommsen and Moor 1992.

71 Reprinted in Mohr 1911, pp. 72–77.
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72 Hoffmann 1907, p. 76. In principle the district commissioners initiated all cases involving only Chinese, but they were supposed to forward to the Imperial Court any case that reached a certain level of seriousness. The Kiaochow colony as a whole was divided into two large districts, one urban and one rural, each of which had its own district commissioner (Weicker 1908, p. 111).


75 Crusen 1914, p. 137.

76 Ibid., p. 137.

77 Hövermann 1914, p. 64; Klein 2004, p. 323.

78 This stipulation was similar to the one governing criminal jurisdiction in German East Africa, Togo, Cameroon, and Southwest Africa, where the District Commissioner could independently order flogging, fines, and imprisonment with forced labor but required the governor’s order for the death penalty.


80 Mühlhahn 2000, p. 264.

81 Crusen 1914, p. 138.


83 Kronecker 1913, pp. 17–81; Mühlhahn 2000, p. 259.


85 Stichler 1989, p. 149. Chinese railway and mine workers were also separated from non-Chinese workers (ibid., p. 150).


87 Felber 1994, p. 166.

88 See telegrams from German legation in China (von Heyking) to Foreign Office, January 16 and February 23, 1899, PA-AA, R 18239 (no pagination). Stenz had been with missionaries Nies and Henle when they were murdered in 1897.

89 Chinese officials first argued that the crowd consisted simply of curious onlookers and later claimed that it was a voluntary militia created to fight banditry in the region.

90 Tirpitz to Foreign Secretary von Bülow, March 28, 1899; his telegram to von Bülow of April 4, 1899; telegram from Tsunghi (Zongli) Yamen Beijing, April 8, 1900; protest letter from Chinese Envoy to von Bülow, April 20 1899; Tirpitz to von Bülow, April 20, 1899 (specifying that Hanjiacun was “completely destroyed” but that the smaller village of Baiqianju was only “half destroyed”); all in PA-AA, R 18240–18241. See also the report by Lieutenant Hannemann from April 7, 1899, on the destruction of Hanjiacun, BA-MA-Freiburg, RM 3, vol. 6778, pp. 211–12; and Stichler 1989, 128–32; Mühlhahn 2000, 307–13.


92 See Tirpitz’s comments on the “oppositionally oriented literati [Litteraten]” in his telegram to the kaiser, April 7, 1899, PA-AA, R 18241.


101 Mühlhahn 2000, pp. 129–39; Admiralstab der Marine 1903, p. 210. As Richard Wilhelm noted in his November 24, 1900, report on the destruction of Shawo, the Boxers did not instigate the movement, which was directly provoked by the construction of the railway (in Leutner 1997, p. 287).

102 Stichler 1989, p. 218.

103 See Mühlhahn 2000, p. 120, and the letter from the magistrate of Gaomi, Ge Zhitan, to the pro-Boxer Shandong governor, Yu Xian, from July 13, 1899, in Leutner 1997, p. 277.


105 See S. Wilhelm 1956, p. 93, with a report on Richard Wilhelm’s second trip into the interior during his first year in Kiaochow (1899–1900).


108 Kiaochow Denkschrift for 1899–1900, p. 27 (my emphasis).

109 This is my only disagreement with the excellent study by Mühlhahn (2000), who emphasizes the Germans’ alleged efforts at “manipulative acculturation.” The “cultural imperialism” that emerged after 1905 partook of a different imaginary, one that was not Sinophobic and not really colonial. “Acculturation” in this later period in, for instance, the Qingdao German-Chinese college, can no longer even be seen as particularly “manipulative.”

110 Weicker 1908, p. 49.

111 Köbner 1903, pp. 6–7.

112 Seelemann 1982, p. 425. See the account of German soldiers attending a Chinese theater in Qingdao, in Lindenber 1900, vol. 2, pp. 364–65. Figure 7.21, though unidentified, seems to be from a performance at a Qingdao theater.

113 For photos of Germans training Chinese troops in Qingdao, see BA-MA-Freiburg, Nachlass Diederichs, vol. 45, p. 30r; and Lu and Lu 2005, p. 154.

114 “Nos ancêtres, les Gaulois” was a French colonialist slogan (and the title of an ironic poem by Leopold Sédar Senghor) according to which French colonial schools taught African children that they were descended from Celtic Gauls. This did not mean, of course, that French colonialism was trying to make Africans into Frenchmen; see Ha 2003.

115 Schrameier 1910, p. 809.

116 Wilhelm Berensmann, quoted in Mühlhahn 2000, p. 64.

117 Hövermann 1914, p. 2.

118 Weicker 1908, p. 110.

119 Schweitzer 1914, pp. 152–53.

120 The actual text of this speech, quoted here, was suppressed by the German government at the time but has been verified and reconstructed by Soesemann (1976).

121 Sharf and Harrington 2000, p. 211.

122 BA-MA-Freiburg, RM 3, vol. 6782, especially “Denkschrift: Lage im Hinterlande von Kiautschou,” October 4, 1900, pp. 80–97; and BA-MA-Freiburg, RM 51, vol. 7. The first Qingdao contingent, led by Premierleutnant (First Lieutenant) Count von Soden, left the colony at the beginning of June 1900, and two further companies departed in the second half of June to assist Edward Seymour’s troops in Tianjin (Stichler 1989, p. 172).

123 P. Fischer 1994.


126 Diederichs’s description of a visit to the Zongli Yamen was almost identical to those of von Heyking and E. Wolf 1901, pp. 52–55: “Five or six gentlemen sat with partially stupid facial expressions” (“Die Besetzung von Tsingtau am 14.XI.1897,” BA-MA-Freiburg, Diederichs Papers, vol. 24, p. 11).

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128 Ibid., p. 24. Diederichs had somewhat friendlier things to say about the local officials in neighboring villages; see his report “Lage an Kiautschou Bucht,” from February 15, 1898, BA-MA-Freiburg, RM 3, vol. 6697, p. 229r.
129 Two striking examples of this are the coffee-table books on the allied campaign, Kürschner 1901 and Deutschland in China 1902. Despite their patriotic, militaristic style of presentation, however, neither of these books was entirely univocal (see below).
135 There is a huge and repetitive literature on the sordid Völkerschauen; for example, Benninghoff-Luhl 1986.
138 Überall 1 (3, 1899): 40.
140 Kronecker 1913, pp. 11–12.
141 See, for example, Welcker 1870, 1872; Stricker 1871; and Virchow 1903. British and French anthropologists were no less fascinated by footbinding. For psychoanalysis footbinding can be interpreted as a form of fetishism, which for Freud was not homosexual but an alternative way for men to fend off “the fright of castration at the sight of a female genital” without becoming homosexual as a result ([1927] 1963, p. 154). Freud interprets footbinding as “mutilating the female foot and then revering it like a fetish” (p. 157).
142 Wegener 1904, p. 54.
143 Pacquet 1911, p. vi.
146 Ibid.
147 Ibid., p. 229v.
148 Quoted in Seelmann 1982, pp. 81–82.
150 Sachau 1912; Ruland 1973, p. 54; Morgenroth 1990. In 1936 the Seminar for Oriental Languages was transformed into an Auslandshochschule (School of international studies), and in 1940 that school was merged with the Hochschule für Politik to constitute a full-fledged department of international studies at Berlin University (Morgenroth 1988: 715).
151 Hövermann 1914, p. 27. Lists of SOS graduates and their job placements are given in Mitteilungen des Seminars für Orientalische Sprachen zu Berlin, starting in 1899. Seelmann (1982) overemphasizes a programmatic split between a Sinophile Foreign Office and a Sinophobic navy. The German envoys Brand, Heyking, and Ketteler all pushed a Sinophobic and imperialist line, but none of them came up through the navy. The change in policy that Seelmann attributes to the new German envoy to China Count Arthur von Rex (1906–11) cannot be traced to a policy line characteristic of the German foreign service per se.
152 The renowned Chinese historian and Sinophile J. J. M. de Groot was not part of the SOS, although he published in its journal. De Groot arrived in Berlin in 1912, taking up the first regular German university appointment in Sinology. An exception to the Sinophilic faculty of the seminar’s faculty was Wilhelm Schüler, who had been a missionary in Qingdao and Shanghai before receiving a teaching post at the seminar in 1914. Schüler’s book on China and Shandong was published by the Qingdao branch of the German Colonial Society and contained no criticism of German colonialism; see Schüler 1912, pp. 347–63; and Leutner 1987, p. 41–43.
154 Leutner 1987, p. 41.
156 Leutner 1987, p. 43, citing an article by Forke from 1914.
157 Bauer 1967, p. 207; Haenisch 1905. In Haenisch’s work the entire debate between Sinophobes and Sinophiles has already been left behind.

51
158 On the hiring of these Chinese teachers, see BA-Berlin, DBC, vol. 656; for their names, see the *Mitteilungen*, vols. 7, 1 (1904: I–II); 8, 1 (1905: I–II); 11, 1 (1908: I–II); 14, 1 (1911: I–II); and 15, 1 (1912: I–II).

159 C. Wang 1913.

160 It is worth noting that German envoy Max von Brandt (1874–93), who served in Beijing before the recrudescence of Sinophobia at the end of the century, was less imbued with that ideology than his successors Gustav Schenck zu Schweinsberg (1893–96), Edmund von Heyking (1896–99), and Clemens von Ketteler (1899–1900). In the heat of the most Sinophobic and colonialist moment von Brandt published an interesting book entitled *Chinese Philosophy and State Confucianism* (1898).


162 Matzat 1985, p. 4.

163 Wilhelm 1928, p. 367.

164 For a representative depiction of Kiaochow as a militarized colony in the early period, see Bigelow 1898, p. 585. The quote is from a report signed by the acting governor rather than Truppel, but its content makes it clearly identifiable as the product of the latter (Imperial Government of Kiaochow to von Rex, BA-Berlin, DBC, vol. 1258, p. 217v).


166 R. Wilhelm 1928, p. 166.


170 Stichler 1988, p. 117.


172 Kiaochow Denkschrift for 1901–2, p. 23. Stichler discusses the committee as part of the German administration in terms of “collaboration” and a “comprador” class; conversely, Mühlhahn 2000, pp. 271–73, includes it under the category of Chinese strategies of resistance. Both views are partially correct but incomplete.


175 Mohr 1911, p. 21.


177 “Festive Speech of Bank Director Homann on the Occasion of the Onset of Governor Truppel’s Vacation, November 6, 1904,” BA-MA-Freiburg, Truppel Papers, vol. 59, p. 3.


183 The Prinz-Heinrich Hotel on the Kaiser-Wilhelm Ufer, built around 1900, was decorated on its eastern facade “with the Chinese character ‘shou,’ meaning long life” (Warner 1994, p. 268).

184 A Danish journalist who visited Qingdao in 1910 described the city’s German villas as being built in a “German-Oriental style” (“Schanghai und Tsingtau,” *Ostasiatischer Lloyd*, March 11, 1910, p. 253).


187 BA-MA-Freiburg, Truppel Papers, vol. 79, p. 3v, photo “Partie auf dem Lauschan.”

188 BA-MA-Freiburg, Truppel Papers, vol. 79, p. 17v, photo “Oberrichter Wilke und Frau in ihrem Zimmer.”


191 Town planning and architecture had been sensitive to issues of compass directions in China much longer than in Germany, of course. In the planning of Qingdao, Germany applied the grid pattern only to the Chinese districts; in
the European district the course of streets and avenues conformed to the lay of the land and meandered in an effort to avoid the spread of windblown dust and to make a non-Chinese impression.

192 On the Tsingtau-Klub wall see Warner 1994, p. 262; and Biener 2001, p. 105; neither author comments on the irony of the club’s spirit wall. On the use and meaning of spirit walls in Chinese elite architecture, see Boerschmann 1911–14, vol. 1, pp. 41–45; and in vernacular architecture see Knapp 1989, p. 171. Seelemann 1982, p. 422, mentions the ban on Chinese membership in German clubs in Qingdao; the first quote is from Boerschmann 1911–14, vol. 1, p. 42; the second quote is from Hevia 1992, p. 315.


195 See the remarks by a former Chinese teacher in the colony (Luan Baode 1982), and the comments in “Denkschrift über Einrichtung chinesischer Schulen im Schutzgebiet,” BA-Berlin, DBC, vol. 1258, p. 45v.


198 Weicker 1908, p. 190; R. Wilhelm n.d., p. 8.

199 The government-run naval dockyards school trained Chinese apprentices, who were drawn from the provincial villages of Shandong. They were given instruction in Chinese and examined in technical matters as well as Chinese history and geography (Seelemann 1982, p. 376).


201 Luan Baode 1982.


203 R. Wilhelm n.d., p. 10. As Leutner (1997, p. 431) points out, the idea that religious lessons should be voluntary was also accepted by Bishop Anzer and the Steyl missionaries when they set up their middle schools in Yanzhou and Jining in 1902. But the Catholic missions, in Kiaochow and elsewhere remained committed to the goals of Christian instruction and conversion.


206 See Mogk 1972, p. 162; F. Huang 1999, pp. 170–71; Blumhardt n.d.; and the Schu-Fan School’s first year’s report, in BA-Berlin, DBC, vol. 1259, after p. 265. Rohrbach was employed briefly by the Weimar Mission as a propagandist (Mogk 1972, p. 162). Gründer (1982, p. 314) interprets both Rohrbach and Wilhelm as trying to extend German influence over China through schooling, medicine, and scientific pursuits. This is too sweeping, in my view, in light of Wilhelm’s already skeptical approach to German colonialism in his November 24, 1900, report on the German devastation in the Gaomi region (reprinted in Leutner 1997, p. 287). Rohrbach, by contrast, did not hesitate to speak of the “yellow race” (1912, p. 23). Asking rhetorically whether the Chinese “are actually a Kulturvolk in the true and profound sense of the word,” he answered that China was “‘barbarous’ in an objective sense.” Rohrbach also endorsed the thesis of Chinese stagnation (1909a, pp. 3, 11). Such tropes are not found in Wilhelm’s writings.

207 Blumhardt n.d.

208 The college has been discussed by Kreissler (1989, pp. 131–38); see also Tsingtau Neueste Nachrichten, October 26, 1909, p. 2; and August 1, 1913, p. 2; Mou Le 1914; O. Franke 1911b, 1954; Schrecker 1971, pp. 244–45; Luan Baode 1982; Stichler 1989, p. 252–91; and Mühlhahn 1999, 2000.

209 See Stichler 1989, p. 255; and Matzat 1998b, p. 80, for the assessment of the document’s authorship. As Matzat points out, Acting Governor Jacobson was an “unknown lieutenant commander” who was replacing Commander Funk, who was himself representing the absent Governor Truppel. The memo’s detailed discussion of European schools elsewhere in China makes it unlikely that anyone in Qingdao other than Schrameier could have written it, as do the nearly identical formulations in a memorandum signed by Schrameier in 1908 (BA-Berlin, DBC, vol. 1258, pp. 29–47). This issue of authorship supports my general argument about the social basis of the Sinophilic turn in native policy: Schrameier came from the translating corps, a milieu that was more respectful of China than the military. The fact that he had enough influence to write a memo of this importance is indicative of the unacknowledged power of the translators and kindred groups within the local colonial state.

All quotes from von Tirpitz to von Bülow, October 4, 1907, BA-Berlin, DBC, vol. 1258, pp. 3–4r; and von Tirpitz, October 23, 1907, in ibid., p. 7. For von Rex’s endorsement, see von Rex to von Bülow, May 5, 1907, BA-Berlin, R 901 (Foreign Office), vol. 38930, p. 3.


Report from May 22, 1908, by Kiaochow governor Truppel on discussion with Zhang Zhidong on May 3, BA-Berlin, DCB, vol. 1258, p. 110v; Otto Franke to RMA, June 24, 1908, reporting on Zhang’s counterproposal to the Germans at the onset of the official negotiations, ibid., p. 137.


See the report on Zhang’s initial bargaining points in the memo of February 25, 1908, BA-Berlin, DBC, vol. 1258, p. 25r. These included the idea that “the Chinese lessons have to be presented according to the specifications of the [Chinese] Ministry of Education, which should also select the instructors.”


Specifically, graduates who wanted to enter the Chinese civil service would still have to go to Beijing to take the national examination, but they would not have to take any additional courses there. See the statutes of the Qingdao college and accompanying memo from Otto Franke, August 7, 1908, BA-Berlin, DBC, vol. 1258, pp. 184–95. As with most aspects of the German colony, this reading of the college’s name was also open to different interpretations on the Chinese and German sides. The Germans referred to the school simply as the “German-Chinese college,” while the Chinese colloquially called it the Heilan University, after the name of the district in which the school was built (Leutner 1997, p. 470 n. 36). The city’s official plaque on the main building of the college (which is currently occupied by the railway administration) calls it the Dehua Daxue, a direct translation of “German-Chinese University.” The doubling of the word special in the school’s full title also deserves comment. At the onset of negotiations the adjective “special” referred only to the sciences that would be taught there—Franke referred to the “University for Special Sciences” (Hochschule für Spezial-Wissenschaften); see Franke’s report to RMA of June 24, 1908, BA-Berlin, DBC, vol. 1258, p. 138. By August 7 of that year, at Chinese insistence, the phrase “of a special type” had been added to the school’s name; see von Rex to Zhang, August 7, 1908, BA-Berlin, DBC, vol. 1258, p. 182; also Zhang’s report to the Chinese State Council, August 8, 1909, in Leutner 1997, p. 463.

See Franke to RMA, July 18, 1908, BA-Berlin, DBC, vol. 1258, p. 161; and Deutsch-chinesische Hochschule 1910, pp. 26–27.


“Die Eröffnung der Deutsch-Chinesischen Hochschule,” Tsingtauer Neueste Nachrichten, October 26, 1909, pp. 6–7. The college’s main teaching building was not completed until 1912, and this photo is from Truppel’s photo album for 1910–11.
In fact, the plaque currently visible in front of the main building of the former college, placed there by the Qingdao Tourism Bureau’s Cultural Relics Department in 2000, calls the school a German-Chinese “joint-run program.” Mühlhahn (2000, p. 254) emphasizes the disciplinary aspects of the German cultural schooling policy. As I argued above, this is not specifically colonial; indeed, the model he applies here was proposed by Foucault in an analysis of Europe. To call all disciplinary strategies colonial is to stretch that adjective to the breaking point or to render it strictly metaphorical.

Rohrbach (1912), pp. 19–20. A more ambiguous figure is Alfons Paquet, discussed below.

See the Law School curriculum in Deutsch-chinesische Hochschule 1910, p. 10; also the memo by the Law Department of November 1911, in BA-Berlin, DBC, vol. 1259, p. 281.

These were called the *Chinesisch-deutsche Gesetzsammlung* and were published in Qingdao.

Romberg (1911), pp. 23, 25. Romberg also insisted that the “culture” that Germany had to offer was not merely “a series of technical skills—which were in any case already partly familiar in China, even if they were not being used.” In a veiled jab at American and British materialism, he asked whether “the crude behavior of the foreigners . . . [does not] do more to spoil ethical values than to create them among the Chinese who are chained to them?” Romberg concluded by comparing the struggle between Chinese neotraditionalists like Ku Hung-Ming (1911) and Kang Youwei and the Chinese “Western-oriented fanatics” to the “dispute between humanism and the so-called realists in Germany” (ibid., p. 26).

For a list of the members of Wilhelm’s Confucius Society see Forssman 1979, pp. 102–3. These included Zhou Fu, the former Shandong governor.

R. Wilhelm 1914, pp. 248, 251, 250; see also 1928, p. 179.

John Schrecker (1971, pp. 62–63) argues that the role of the district commissioner, especially in the rural district, was close to that of the Chinese *zhixian* (district magistrate), who also combined administrative and judicial functions. But the district commissioner in Germany’s other colonies was also entrusted with “far-reaching powers” (Gann and Duignan 1977, p. 70), including judicial ones. Only a more careful investigation of this question would allow us to determine the extent to which the self-understanding of the rural district commissioner in Kiaochow was shaped by the local Chinese elite.

Crusen 1914, p. 134.

Karlowa 1911, p. 25.


Stichter 1989, p. 94.


Seeleemann 1982, p. 484; Mühlhahn 2000, p. 169. Klein (2004, p. 322) argues that Kiaochow’s administrators decided to loosen the restrictions on Chinese residence in the European district because they were impressed by the financial power of the Chinese immigrants to Qingdao after 1911. This may help explain that particular decision, but it does not account for the broader shift in native policy after 1904.

Schrecker (1971) and Mühlhahn (2000) frequently invoke Chinese resistance, but both authors locate it outside the colony proper. When discussing policies in the colony’s schools and workplaces, Mühlhahn emphasizes Foucauldian discipline rather than resistance, and Schrecker emphasizes German efficiency.


Ibid., p. 107.


See local Chinese newspaper clippings sent by Consul Merklinghaus from Ji’nan to DBC, October 6, 1912, BA-Berlin, DBC, vol. 1259, pp. 257–79; and Kiaochow governor Meyer-Waldeck to DBC, October 26, 1912, ibid., pp. 282–87.

The 1905 Russo-Japanese war also made Germany more interested in finding alternative partners in the global periphery (Seeleemann 1982, pp. 445–46; Stichter 1989, p. 234). According to Trumpener (1968, pp. 14–16), Germany was not actually seriously cultivating the Ottoman Empire as a “natural ally in the foreseeable future” before 1914, but the two countries were plunged into a hasty alliance on August 2.
Indeed, Chancellor von Bülow had already used the expression “open door” (in English) in describing German aims in China during the height of the Boxer uprising (P. Fischer 1994, p. 351). On the interpretation of American imperialism as anticolonial and epitomized by the “open door” approach see W. Williams 1959; Steinmetz 2005e.


Truppel to RMA, August 31, 1908, BA-Berlin, DBC, vol. 1259, p. 35r, on “Chinesenschule.”


The storming of the Dagu fort was condemned by European envoys in Beijing and by Social Democratic leader August Bebel in the German Reichstag as a “declaration of war” (Michael 1986, p. 151). Even some of the admirals of the powers present at a war council on June 15 voted against storming Dagu (Herrings 1903, p. 47). For a recent treatment of these campaigns see Hevia 1992.


Of course, this image is also sensitive to the public presentation preferred by von Waldersee himself. The frontispiece of von Waldersee’s published memoirs, for instance, depicts him holding an open book rather than a sword (Waldersee 1923, vol. 1).

Paquet 1911, pp. xi–xiv; 1912, pp. 290ff. Paquet wanted to turn Qingdao into a “place of self reflexion, of spiritual work, of thinking in the Far East” and called for a German at the head of the Beijing legation “with deep knowledge of China, both a statesman and an intellectual.” Paquet stylized China as a “communistically organized empire” presenting a model for a German “synthesis of absolutism and socialism” as a European “middle empire,” against the British and American systems (Paquet 1912, pp. 304, 317; 1914, pp. 59, 61; see also Koemen 2003, p. 685). In the 1920s Paquet wrote a number of plays, including the proto-Brechtian Fahnen, that were directed by Erwin Piscator at the Berlin Volksbühne.


R. Wilhelm 1928, p. 183.

Communication by German legation in Beijing to chancellor, BA-Berlin, DBC, vol. 655, pp. 40–45, April 16, 1914.

Paquet 1911, pp. iv, vii.


Seelemann 1982, p. 361, also discusses a split between Sinophobes and Sinophiles in Kiaochow but sees the former as merchants and petty bureaucrats and the latter as administrators. Although this seems correct with regard to the German merchants, it does not capture the divisions among the colonial state’s personnel.


Weicker 1908, p. 111.


Leutner 1987, p. 50.

Lessing taught at Beijing University and the Medical College in Mukden (Shenyang) before returning to Berlin in 1925 for an appointment at the SOS. From 1935 until his retirement Lessing taught at the University of California at Berkeley (Lessing and Walravens 2000).


Mühlhahn 2000, p. 249.

Truppel was elevated to the nobility by Kaiser Wilhelm shortly after his demission as governor in 1911 and became a member of the Aufsichtsrat (supervisory board) of the Shandong Railway Company the following year (Stichler 1989, p. 86).

The metropolitan German elite at the end of the 19th century was divided into three competing fractions; the traditional aristocracy, the rising bourgeoisie, and the university-educated middle class, or Bildungsbürgertum. As I have argued in detail (Steinmetz 2007, 2008), this three-way competition in the metropolitan field of power was transferred into the colonial state field, where imported holdings of cultural capital underwent field-specific transformations. The specific symbolic capital of the colonial state field was ethnographic capital, a supposed capacity to understand native culture and character.

Von Kemnitz to Foreign Office, March 12, 1917, and minute from March 2, 1917, both in PA-AA, R 2167, no pagination (Deutschland 135, Nr. 15). On the Dolmetscherlaufbahn see the 1888 “Notiz,” reprinted in Sachau 1912, p. 51.

Von Kemnitz to Foreign Office, March 12, 1917, PA-AA, R 2167, no pagination (Deutschland 135, Nr. 15).

O. Franke 1954, p. 98.
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280 Ibid., p. 68.
282 Mühlhahn 2000, p. 163. See Schrecker 1971, pp. 75–77, for an explanation of the Imperial Maritime Customs Office and its role in Qingdao. The fact that a German was in charge of it was something the Germans had insisted on in the original leasehold negotiations. But Ohlmer was regarded suspiciously as “a representative of China” and as “a Chinese official” from the start (ibid., p. 77). During his time in China Ohlmer accumulated a significant collection of porcelain (see Wiesner 1981).
283 Stichler 1989, pp. 81–82.
284 Theunissen 1947, p. 277.
285 O. Franke 1911a, p. vi; 1954, p. 98. Franke later recalled having felt especially happy during a period spent with a “homogeneous circle” of journalists at a Cologne newspaper (1954, p. 113).
286 O. Franke 1906, p. 163.
287 O. Franke 1954, p. 117. On the demand that Prince Chun perform a kowtow, see ibid., p. 111; and Hetze 1987. On the 1793 kowtow conflict during the Macartney mission, see E. Pritchard 1943; and Hevia 1995a.
288 Franke’s memoirs were written before Germany’s defeat in World War II but were not published until 1954, after his death in 1946. His narrative of Prince Chun’s atonement mission may therefore have been overdetermined by the “humiliations” of Germany in the Versailles Treaty and World War II, but there is no textual evidence for this reading either here or in his other post–World War I writing.
289 Wilhelm does not seem to have considered it necessary to distance himself from the German nobility. Unlike Franke he was not confronted in his daily missionary work with embittered aristocrats clinging to their last bastion of power in the military and foreign service.
290 R. Wilhlem 1928, p. 167.
291 Hesse 1956, pp. 131–32.
292 Hesse 1930.
293 Jung 1966, p. 55. In 1930 Wilhelm was asked to lecture on yoga at a congress of German psychotherapists (ibid., p. 60).
294 R. Wilhlem 1928, pp. 169–70.
296 R. Wilhelm 1928, p. 181.
297 Ibid., p. 170.
298 R. Wilhelm 1914, p. 249. But see Bodde 1986, pp. 71–72, 95–96, on this infamous and possibly mythical execution.
299 R. Wilhelm 1914, p. 249.
300 Jung 1966, p. 53. After returning to Germany in 1920, after twenty years in China, Wilhelm befriended Jung, Hesse, Buber, Keyserling, Paquet, and other Asia enthusiasts. He taught at Beijing University between 1922 and 1924, and from 1924 until his death in 1930 at the university in Frankfurt am Main, where he founded the Sinological Institute. His works on Chinese philosophy and his translations of the Yi Jing and other Chinese classics into German are still valued and still in print. European views of China had come full circle by the 1920s; Jung had discovered that “our unconscious is full of Eastern symbolism,” and he attacked even more vehemently than Wilhelm the “European materialism and cupidity” that were “flooding China” (Jung 1966, p. 59). Chinese thought, according to Jung, had “set in the soil of Europe a tender seedling, giving us a new intuition of life and its meaning, far removed from the tension and arrogance of the European will” (ibid., pp. 60–61). Kolonko (1997) attributes the entire shift in the “German view of China from negative to positive in the twenties” to Wilhelm’s translations and writings. Judging by Hermann Hesse’s own enthusiastic writings on China, the contents of his personal library, and his comments on Wilhelm’s importance, this view is partly correct (Hsia 1974).
301 Despite the overwhelmingly positive assessments of Wilhelm by his intellectual contemporaries and in the present (e.g., Sun 2003), Wilhelm’s belief that China and Europe belonged to two different historical periods (1928, pp. 234–35) was certainly oversimplified. China was also capable of producing its own “mechanical culture,” for instance. Although Wilhelm may have led a sort of “double existence” (Gerber 2003, p. 174) as a member of both the colonial and local Chinese elites, the fact that he retained a Chinese “boy” need not be seen as a contradiction, since service relations were hardly un-Chinese.
302 Seeleemann 1982, p. 422.
This unlabeled photograph from Truppel’s collection seems to represent a scene at one of the local Qingdao theaters, possibly the one in Dabadao.

From BA-MA-Freiburg, Truppel Papers, N 224, vol. 80 (photo album), p. 29 recto. (Courtesy of BA-MA-Freiburg)