Elections & Electoral Systems (GLM+)

I. Importance of Elections
   A. Practically
      1. Produce parl’s: legis. & exec. policymakers
      2. Determined who becomes part of political elite
      3. Bearing on the formation of governments
         a. Direct, especially in presidential systems
         b. Indirect, partic. in sys. characterized by coalition govts
      4. Focal point for activity for parties, citizens (often only activity)--input mechanism, interest groups
   B. Symbolically
      1. Legitimization of the political system
      2. Cit. means of partic., express opinion, evaluating
      3. Give cit’s feel of exercising choice (even if indiv’ly little wt)

II. General Matters of Importance Regarding Elections
   A. Suffrage Expansion
      1. Universal male typically by WWI
      2. Universal female typically by WWII except:
         a. BE, FR, GR, IT just after
         b. PO, SP, Swi. 1970’s (as late as 1991 in one Swiss canton)
         c. Any hypoth’s on late & early expands to full female suff?
      3. Voting age gen’ly ↓ 21 to 18 in postwar era (why)?
   B. Suffrage Restrictions
      1. Generally citizens only (but UK/IR)
      2. Prisoners & mentally ill usually excluded
3. o/w 18+ for most part & usu. if can vote can run

4. Registration: often govt’s responsibility, some places ind’s (implic’s?)

C. Turnout: gen’ly higher non-US, ↓ since 70± (implic’s?)

D. Timing of Elections: **Endogenous v. Exogenous**

1. Gen’ly, incumb govt can call elect when wants, subject to:
   a. Must be an election within X years (usually 4 or 5)
   b. Sometimes must call an election if fails a vote-of-confidence

2. Exceptions
   a. Presidents, where directly elected, usually fixed term
   b. FR: Parliament elects at President’s discretion
   c. US: Legislature fixed terms & elections as well
   d. NO & SZ: Fixed four-year election interval
   e. SW: Election every 3 years, but government may call before that--still would be an election in third year (don’t restart clock)

3. **Implications?**

E. Other Elections

1. All countries also have at least some local elections; offices so-elected vary greatly in their practical importance

2. EU every 5 years

3. Directly elected **Presidents**, (importance in *’s): Austria (½*), Fin (*), Ice (½*), Ire (½*), Port (*), Fra (*), US (**)--others appointed (usu. by legis) usu more *figure-headish* but can be somewhat import. (e.g., Ita ½*)

F. Other Voting--Referenda

1. Most freq’ly in Swi. (nearly ½ world’s referenda in SZ)
   a. ⇒ “voter fatigue?”
   b. ⇒ democracy by referendum? [Chaos Theorems]
2. Others employing it:
   a. Italy: Approx 1/yr--key ones on Divorce, Abortion, Election Law
   b. France: President may call one
   c. Most other places, at discretion of parliament & very rare
   d. California

3. **Issues over which referenda tend to called**
   a. Issues that cut across party lines
   b. Constitutional Issues
   c. Constitutional amendments require referenda in Denmark, Ireland, & Switzerland; optional in France & Italy
   d. Major & fundamental changes in nations “place in the world”
      (1) NATO or EC membership
      (2) Neutrality/Allegiance
   e. Moral/Ethical questions--esp. divorce & abortion in Cath ctrys
   f. **Why do you suppose there’s a rising use of referenda?**

III. Types of Electoral Systems

A. **DEF elect sys:** “mech’s that turn votes cast by people on elect day into seats to be occupied by deputies in parliament. The electoral system is what converts choices of voters into a legislature.” GLM (p. 274)

B. **Where do electoral systems come from?**
   1. “Determined by the political elite of the day, some of whose motivations may be partisan” GLM (p. 274)
   2. “designs reflect...constitution-makers’ values, their expects regarding the consequences of various arrangements, their often laboriously negotiated compromises” Powell (p. 66)
   3. Cultural/Historical Legacy: **See Powell Table 4.3 (p. 67)**
   4. Gen’ly **not** frequently tinkered with for electoral advantage, despite obvious opportunities
a. France & Greece (especially the latter) exceptional on this
b. Germany's famous 5% threshold
c. Recent Italian & New Zealand changes
d. French IVth to Vth transition

5. [If such a potent political engineering tool, why do you suppose it is so rarely manipulated?]
a. Why would those in power change system that put them there?
b. Parties uncertainty about future electoral position
c. Difficult to change (constitutions usually require super-majorities)
d. Relatively obvious opportunism when employed, may trigger negative voter-reaction
e. Sometimes imposed from abroad (e.g. Germ., Jap., It., Aust.)

C. Key distinctions between types of electoral systems

1. Primary Distinction: Proportional Representation (PR) vs. Plurality/Majority (P/M) systems
   a. Former stresses representation & concept of proportionality
   b. Latter stresses decisiveness & “accountability model”

2. Other key features [define each]
   a. District magnitude
   b. Degree of candidate vs. party voting (preference voting)
   c. Number of tiers
   d. Electoral formula (within the PR-P/M divisions)
   e. Thresholds
   f. Constituency pattern

IV. Plurality/Majority Systems

A. Historically, plurality was common sys. (through 19th C)

B. Single-Member Plurality (SMP) a.k.a. “first past post,” “winner take all” (UK, US, Can, N.Z.--pre-1993 change)
1. **Merits**
   a. Simplicity--for voters, parties, & all involved
   b. Also argued that:
      1. Produces majorities, & therefore decisiveness & accountability
      2. Since one rep./MP per district, fosters MP-constit. bond

2. **Criticisms**
   a. Unrepresentative/Winner may be disliked by a majority
   b. Encourages “strategic voting”
   c. Anti-small party, & .:, possibly, anti-minority (pol & soc min’s)

3. [Aside: plurality need not be conducted in single-member districts, multiple mem, winner take-all is possible, tends even more disprop. & even more likely to produce elected majorities; e.g., US Pres Elect Coll; India used to have multiple-member districts]

C. **Majority Systems:**

1. **STV: alternative or single-transferable vote (maj. version)**
   a. In use in Australia (some in France); used to be used in Illinois; was used more widely in US at one time
   b. Voters rank candidates; candidate with majority wins; if no majority, drop lowest contender & transfer his/her votes to those voters’ second choices; continue until someone has a majority
   c. Therefore, a Majority system

2. **Multiple-Round Majority Balloting:** e.g., French V\textsuperscript{th} Rep. system(s), many US local elections (called “run-off” elects)
   a. French V\textsuperscript{th} Parliament: Simple vote; if no majority, eliminate all candidates w/ <12.5% of vote; have another vote; plurality candidate then wins (often-called a plurality-plurality system)
   b. French V\textsuperscript{th} President: Simple vote; if no majority, drop all but top 2; second election will produce a majority winner (a plurality-majority, or “run-off” system)
   c. [Describe French party systems of IV\textsuperscript{th} & V\textsuperscript{th}; What do you suppose}
impact of Vth's electoral process & introduction of strong Pres has been on party systems & party behavior?

3. **Merits & Demerits of Majority Systems**
   a. Largely the same as SMP, but:
   b. Bit more choice usu. preserved b/c more parties usu. persevere (?)
   c. Less simple (and French version requires two trips to the polls)

V. **Limited & Cumulative Vote Systems not Discussed**

VI. **Proportional Representation (PR) Systems**

A. **The key feature of PR is the Multi-member district**
   1. Cannot divide 1 seat prop’ly, so PR requires mult seats/dist
   2. In fact, *proportionality of result* [DEF] tends to increase w/ number of seats per district (*district magnitude*)

B. **Key types of PR:**
   1. “List” systems
   2. STV systems (P.R. version, Ire. & Malta only current users)

C. **List Systems**
   1. Each party lists # of candidates usu equal to # seats in dist
   2. **List systems vary by**
      a. Formula
      b. Number of tiers
      c. Degree of preference voting
      d. Thresholds
      e. District magnitudes

3. **Formulas: Two Basic Types**
   a. **Largest Remainders (Quotas) Methods** (Hare, Droop)
   b. **Highest Averages (Divisor) Methods** (d'Hondt, Sainte-Lague, & Mod. SL, Imperiali--Defunct Italian system)
c. See Blais & Massicotte Tables 2.1 & 2.2 for examples

d. Basics:
   (1) **Highest Averages**: divide votes for each party by series of divisors, allocating seats one-at-a-time then dividing that party’s vote by next divisor, each stage awarding seat to party w/ most votes (so-divided)
   (2) **Largest Remainders**: divide total votes in dist by # seats (*Hare Quota*) or # seats +1 (*Droop Quota*). That’s a quota (Q). Each Q votes for party buys it a seat. When no party can “buy” any further seats, remaining allocated to parties w/ “largest remainders,” one for each until gone

e. Relative Proportionality (roughly)
   (1) *Imperiali* > *SainteLague* & *Hare* > *Droop* > *ModifiedSainte Lague* > *d’Hondt*
   (2) But, district magnitude considerably more important determinant

4. Tiers:
   a. Especially in small to moderate district magnitudes (e.g., 6 the average in Spain), considerable disproportionality can remain
      (1) Option 1: Larger districts (Finland, Portugal, Luxembourg > 12 avg., Netherlands & Israel whole country is one district)
      (2) Option 2: “Higher tiers” in electoral process to smooth deficiencies

b. Fixed vs. Variable 2nd-Tier allocation
   (1) Fix: Den (20%), Ice (20%), (25%), Nor (5%), Swe (11%), Ger (50%)

   **Fixed Number of Second-Tier Seats**: Set aside to be allocated so as to move district-level results as close as possible to national-level proportionality...
   (e.g. Vote Shares: Red=30%; White=40%; Blue=20%; Green=10%
   District-level Results in Seats: Red=25%; White=42%; Blue=19%; Green=5%)
   ⇒ Allocate set-aside seats to try to make 2nd row match the first
   ⇒ Larger 2nd-Tier proportion seats set-aside produces more proportionality
   (2) Variable (Austria, Belgium, Greece)

   **Variable Number of Second-Tier Seats**: All votes for all parties not used in winning seats at dist level pooled at regional or national level for another round of PR allocation (not nec. by same formula)

5. Thresholds:
   a. **Primary features designed to limit proportionality & in particular limit small parities. Why?**
      (1) Self-interest on the part of larger parties
      (2) Concern that unmitigated proportionality ⇒ proliferation of small
parties ⇒ difficulty forming stable governments

(3) Aim to exclude extremists (e.g., Germany’s 5% rule)

b. Examples:

(1) Germany’s famous 5% rule

(2) Swe 4%; Austria 4% or 1 seat; Neth .62% (almost meaningless)

(3) Greece--PASOK has manipulated threshold relentlessly “loaded” or “reinforced” PR--as high as 17%, removed for 1989-90 (3 ele’s), 3% by New Dem in 1990 ⇒ Very good ex of electoral-law manip

6. Preferential vs. Non-Preferential List: Who decides which of parties’ listed candidates gets seats party has won?

a. Non- Preferential or “straight” list

(1) Relatively rare: FR (‘86), GE, IT (since ‘94, for PR seats), PO, SP

(2) Party orders its candidates & their allotted seats go in order

b. Preferential List--Many variations

(1) IT (until ‘94): Voters give up to 3-4 preferences, voters’ prefs. decide who gets seats--can choose party’s default ordering though. This sys received much blame in Italy for “clientelistic” politics & corruption (“vote-buying”) that prevailed

(2) Finland--Voters obliged to choose one candidate

(3) Switzerland & Luxembourg--As many preference votes as seats, can cross party lines in preferential ordering (panachage)

(4) Denmark--Party discretion as to how to list

(5) In some cases, party default very hard to override though nominal pref option exists--BE, AU (pref. intro’d in ‘71, restrictive, changed in ‘92 purportedly to more effective choice), NE (parties will usually demand any “preferenced-in” cand cede his/her seat to party order), NO, SW

D. Single-Transferable-Vote (PR version)

1. Very Rare (relatively new): Ire., Malta, & N. Ire. (since ‘72)

2. Seeks prop., but not assume opinions org’d on party lines

3. Mechanics:

   a. Voters rank candidates listed (+: relatively small magnitudes req’d)

   b. Droop Quota calculated
(1) Anyone over quota is elected & remaining votes allotted to voters 2nd pref’s (e.g. 100 first prefs, quota=75 ⇒ elected, 25 votes transferred to 2nd pref’s in prop to 2nd pref’s of these 100 voters)

(2) Continue until no-one exceeds quota, then eliminate candidate with the fewest votes, transfer his/her votes, & continue

(3) Continue until number of seats in that district are allocated.

4. **Merits (argued)**
   a. More information on voter preferences revealed
   b. Not constrained by party lines
   c. Votes can’t harm favored cand ⇒ no incentive to vote strategically
   d. Allows voter input at polls on which tendencies within the party to expand/contract (via ranking)

5. **Demerits (argued)**
   a. May weaken party disc. [Aside: debate on party cohesion]
   b. May induce vague positioning from candidates--as much incentive not to be disliked as to be liked almost
   c. Disproportionality b/c small district magnitude (too complicated to have large lists of candidates to rank)
   d. GLM’s read of Evidence:
      (1) The Ireland case seems to support a & b, but Malta does not
      (2) IR & MA not much different than others in practice on c
      (3) ⇒ GLM are advocates of STV-PR

VII. **Assessing the Impacts of Electoral Systems**

A. **The Simple Standard Story**
   1. Pluralist/Majoritarian ⇒ Disproportionality, but largest 2 parties take all or nearly all seats & ∴ sys ⇒ stable maj govts
   2. PR ⇒ Proportionality, but parties proliferate & ∴ sys ⇒ coal. govts, fractionalized & polarized legis, & ∴ unstable govts
   3. Obviously, not quite so simple, but broad outline is roughly correct (i.e., evidence supports)
B. Many **other questions**, however

1. Which affords better **constituency representation**?
2. Which offers better **access to political & social minorities**?
3. **Redistricting/gerrymandering** opportunities & incentives?
4. [etc.--see Powell, Blais, & Massicotte,...]

C. **GLM’s Assessment on 6 possible effects of elect sys**

1. **Proportionality**--absolutely no doubt PR $\Rightarrow$ more; in fact, tight relation with District Magnitude (see pictures)
2. **The number of parties in legislature (parliament usually)**
   a. Effective (size-weighted) vs. raw number of parities
      Taagepera & Laakso ($n^* =$ Effective number parties, $n$=raw number parties, $P_i$=Party $i$’s share of seats/votes): $n^* = |\Sigma_i(1/P_i)^2|^{-1}$
   b. Number of parties in legislature or the number of parties contesting elections? Any way you slice it, **PR $\Rightarrow$ more parties**.
   c. **Why?** (direct, mechanical effects) Non-PR $\Rightarrow$ big bonus to large parties $\Rightarrow$ fewer parties, esp. fewer effective parties, in legis. (indirect, psychological, strategic effects) Non-PR $\Rightarrow$ strategic voting & strategic entry or not of parties
   d. **Some counter-evidence**
      (1) Several countries: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Norway had multiparty before PR
      (2) The number of parities in Austria reduced after 1919 switched to PR
      (3) Malta nearly pure 2-party but a PR system
      (4) $\Rightarrow$ **PR does not always cause proliferation of parties, more necessary than sufficient condition**
      (5) GLM: “PR systems will give parliamentary expression to a multiparty system if other factors, such as the number of political or social cleavages, cause voters to create one I the first place, but PR does not by itself bring a multiparty system into being”
   e. Most fractionalized parliaments: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Netherlands, & Switzerland all have PR
3. **Coalition or Single-Party Government?**
a. Again no doubt the **broad outlines of the simple story are correct**: Single-party-majority governments in 10% of cases in PR while 60% of plurality/majority

b. Again, many **exceptions**
   1. Minority governments have occurred in UK & elsewhere in P/M systems
   2. Single-party govts have occurred in Germany & other PR systems
   3. four key parties in France (usually compete as 2-party coalitions)

c. **Tradeoff: Clarity of responsibility vs. accuracy of elect message**

4. **Constituency Representation**
   a. Could argue that single rep per dist facilitates constituent service
   b. Could counter that multiple representatives/district helps ensure at least one of your political persuasion to approach
   c. **What little evidence available shows no discernible relationship**

5. **Backgrounds of Parliamentarians:** [What features of various electoral system might affect probability of female and/or minority candidates being elected? Evidence is that PR raises female representation in parliament.]

6. **Gerrymandering possibilities & incentives:** much more effective (& so used) in Plurality/Majority than PR.

7. **GLM state that differences in econ perform show little relation to differences in elect systems. This misleading:**
   a. Economic *policy* varies quite a lot (& predictably) by elect sys,, esp. insofar as they produce different types of governments
   b. Some evidence that econ perform varies by electoral system too

VIII. Blais, André & Louis Massicotte, “Electoral Systems,” in LNN, eds., Comparing Democracies

A. Describes the Various Types of Electoral Systems
   1. Plurality/Majority/Proportional Representation
   2. Magnitude
3. Tiers
4. Thresholds
5. Selection of Candidates

B. (Positive) Political Consequences

1. Positive Effects: Psychological (strategic) & Mechanical
   
a. Psychological:
      (1) P/M/PR & the number of parties
      (2) Electoral System & ideology / cohesion
      (3) Electoral System & strategic voting
      (4) Obvious impact in plurality elections: Gunther (1989) found supporters of small parties less likely to vote for them in districts of smaller magnitude—make sense? what’s the logic here?
   
b. Mechanical
      (1) vote-seat proportionality
      (2) number of parties (raw v. effective number)
      (3) Duverger’s Law
      (4) Lijphart finds: Plurality ⇒ about 2.0 effective parties, Majority ⇒ about 2.8, PR ⇒ about 3.6
      (5) threshold effects too

2. Other Important Results
   
a. Ordeshook & Shvetsova find: relationship between # parties & ethnic heterogeneity increases with district magnitude
   
b. presence/absence of parl maj: Lijphart: Plurality ⇒ majorities 93% of cases, Majority ⇒ 50%, PR ⇒ 20-30% depending on threshold

C. Normative Disc: positive thry, evid., & debates inform

IX. Lots of simple regressions follow in PS 441/460

X. Lijphart, *Electoral Systems and Party Systems*
   
A. Four basic properties of electoral systems
   
   1. Electoral formula
a. Majoritarian (plurality/majority) & P.R.  
b. Different forms of proportional representation

2. District magnitude
3. Electoral threshold
4. Assembly size

B. Ancillary properties

1. Ballot structure
   a. “categorical” (w/in party only) v. “ordinal” (cross-party voting poss)
   b. Rae’s hyp: ordinal ballots allow more parties, but found opp

2. Malapportionment
   a. Irregular voting populations per district
   b. May therefore systematically favor certain parties
   c. Empirically tends to take the form of rural over-representation

3. Presidentialism
   a. Shugart–if pres direct elect & leg elect concur’ly, 2-prty tendency
   b. Evidence favorable, does it extend, however, to semi-pres. sys?

4. Apparentement
   a. Possibilty of linked lists
   b. Should favor small parties & so counter some disprop. effects

C. Basic methodology

1. Unit of analysis
   a. Electoral system–sets of essentially unchanged election rules under which on or more successive elections are conducted
   b. Elections under the same electoral system are regarded as repeated observations of the operation of a single electoral system

2. Dependent variables
   a. Disproportionality
   b. Degree of multipartism
c. Production of (parliamentary/legislative) majorities
3. Independent variables: properties of the electoral system
4. Strategies of empirical evaluation
   a. Comparable cases (within-country, longitudinal): [adv’s & disadv’s]
   b. Cross-sectional comparison: [advantages & disadvantages]

D. Summarizing the conclusions:
   1. Of dep vars, disprop. best explained by elect-sys properties
   2. Strongest explan fact. across all depvars: effective threshold, a combination of district magnitudes & legal thresholds
   3. Impact of elect system on multipartism more modest (but there) than that on disproportionality
   4. Ditto for effect of other ind vars rel. to effective thresholds

E. Patterns/Empirical Regularities
   1. Majoritarian systems
      a. Plurality more common than maj (Fra 2-ballot & Austral. AV sys)
      b. Almost exclusively 1-mem dist’s (no multi-mem plur sys remain)
      c. Given single-member districts, # districts invariably very large
      d. Naturally exclude small parties, so legal thresh exceedingly rare
   2. PR systems
      a. Far the most common system (about 3/4 of all democracies)
      b. d'Hondt divisor formula is far the most common w/in PR systems
   3. More “general patterns”
      a. All elect systems fairly proportional b/c of chosen district mag’s
      b. Reason for two-tier districting gen’ly to combine close constit contact of small dist mags at lower level w/ proportionality at higher; indeed lower-level magnitudes much lower
      c. Legal thresh usu. applied in large upper levels; legal thresh rarely raise effective thresh to level of those systems w/o legal thresholds
d. Large countries have larger assemblies (duh); cube-root rule

4. Effective thresholds—roughly determined by dist mag (or exactly legal threshold if latter is higher)

a. Three problems in determining it
   
   (1) \( \exists \) lower thresh (lowest vote share that could \( \Rightarrow \) seat) \& upper (lowest that assures a seat)

   (2) Such thresholds also depend on formula \& number of parties competing

   (3) Number of parties, magnitude, etc. \& therefore effective threshold can vary from district to district

b. Roughly equal to the larger of

   (1) Legal threshold or

   (2) Approx.: \( T_{\text{eff}} = \frac{50\%}{M} \) (where \( M = \text{magnitude} \))

   (3) Except in plurality, single-member where it’s 35\% by assumption

5. Other central issues

a. Two- \& multiple-tier systems

   (1) Increasingly used, \& usually accompanied by legal thresholds

   (2) re: proportionality effects, 2\(^{nd}\) tier dominates if many seats at that level

   (3) [What about in terms of other effects?]

b. Intermediate systems

   (1) Jap’s SNTV/LV: more limited the vote, more it approximates Ire’s STV

   (2) Greece’s “reinforced” PR: 4-tier system with increasing thresholds \( \Rightarrow \) considerable large-party bonus

c. Mixed Systems

6. Links among the dimensions

a. \( T_{\text{eff}} \) much higher in majoritarian than PR, but not systematically higher in less proportional PR formulas

b. Assembly size somewhat positively correlated with PM/PR dichotomy, again not so with various PRs

c. Assembly size \& \( T_{\text{eff}} \) slightly positively correlated, not within PR systems alone though

7. Dynamics
a. Changes to/from PR/PM extremely rare (Fra; recently Ita & NZ)
b. More broadly, changes in systems (as defined by Lijphart) w/in
country about 2.5/ctry over postwar era; range from 1-6/ctry
c. Which countries change:
   (1) No change: US, Can, Fin, Switz, Bel, Ire, Lux, Port, Sp, UK
   (2) Moderate Δ: Austria, India, Jap, Austral, Costa Rica, Ice, Neth, Den, Ger
   (3) Major Δ: Fra, Gre, Israel, Malta, Nor, Swe, & recently It & NZ
d. Large (>20%) changes in assembly size also rare
e. Other Trends:
   (1) Toward two-tier
   (2) From d'Hondt to more prop. PR systems
   (3) Raise/install legal thresholds
   (4) [note way first two counter-acted by last]

F. The dependent variables
   1. Disproportionality
      a. Various summary statistics devised for measuring deviation
         between seat allocation & vote shares
      b. Lijphart’s preferred: \( LSq = \left[ \frac{1}{2} \sum (v_i - s_i)^2 \right]^{0.5} \)
      c. Notes
         (1) Differing notions of prop, some of which embodied in diff elect sys
         (2) National proportionality depends on a range of things beyond district-
             level formulas & magnitudes [such as...]
         (3) These measures are of absolute not relative disproportionality
      d. For many purposes not raw disproportionality that matters but
         relative tendency to favor large parties
      e. [interesting alternative: regress party seat shares on vote shares,
         compare coefficient to one]
   2. Party system
      a. Key distinction is two-party v. multi-party
      b. More generally, number of parties
(1) But what to do about widely varying size of parties (some negligibly small, but “how negligible?”)

(2) Solution is effective number of parties:
   (a) Effective number of elective parties: \( Ne = \frac{1}{\sum \frac{1}{v_i}} \)
   (b) Effective number of parliamentary parties: \( Np = \frac{1}{\sum \frac{1}{s_i}} \)

c. \( Ne \) always larger than \( Np \), and/but highly correlated

d. \( Ne \) & \( Np \) conceptually & theoretically different things
   (1) \( Ne \) affected entirely by the “psychological” (expectational) effects of electoral systems
   (2) \( Np \) affected by both “psychological” & “mechanical”

e. Other key property is generation of parliamentary majorities
   (1) Possible electoral outcomes (exhaustive, not exclusive list)
      (a) earned majority
      (b) manufactured majority
      (c) natural minority
      (d) artificial minority
   (2) We’ll measure two things
      (a) Tendency to produce parl. maj where electoral maj absent (ManMaj)
      (b) Tendency to produce parl. maj (whether manufactured or earned) (Maj)

(3) [interesting fact: US has had 100% congressional majorities, only 8.7% manufactured; UK has had 92% majorities, all manufactured. What produces the difference do you suppose?]

f. A key problematic in all of this: what counts as a party?

G. So what?

1. Prop⇒ hypoth’d link b/w electoral system & party system

2. Simple empirical relationships:
   a. In full 27-country sample:
      (1) Corr(LSq,Ne) = -.11
      (2) Corr(LSq,Np) = -.45 **
      (3) Corr(LSq,Maj) = +.58 **
      (4) Corr(LSq,ManMaj) = +.63 **
   b. In PR-systems sample:
(1) Corr(LSq,Ne) = -.02  
(2) Corr(LSq,Np) = -.29 *  
(3) Corr(LSq,Maj) = +.42 **  
(4) Corr(LSq,ManMaj) = +.41 **

3. Why is relationship w/ # parties as weak as it is, esp. with Ne? [don’t exaggerate this Q, relationship certainly exists]
   a. Bi-directional causality [Ne→+Disprop, Disprop→-Ne]
   b. Psychological–parties don’t ever have to leave electoral arena
   c. Multiple other factors involved here (e.g., geog. concentr. support)
   d. Somewhat statistical artifact: sys performing oddly (producing too many or too few parties relative to designers’ aims) will tend to be the ones changed. Lijphart’d definition of an elect sys, ∴, will tend to over-count amount of ctry-time in which relationships running in odd directs occur. E.g., US plurality, single-member produces around Np=Ne=2; partly b/c of this, never changed. That’s one case in Lijphart’s counting. Greece’s less than proportional PR system was still producing too many parties for leadership’s taste, so changed several times to raise bar. That’s several cases by Lijphart;’s counting. In actuality, the US 1 case around 20-25 elects, each Greek case=very few elects

4. Why eNpp so much more responsive to electoral system than eNep? Why eNep appears basically unaffected in fact in this longitudinal analysis?
   a. Takes time for expectational effects to come on line; politicians presumably know the expected effects of electoral systems, voters have to work them out
   b. Historicity–2 (effective) party sys won’t become 3 over-night, etc.
   c. Uncertainty regarding electoral support for various potential new parties, or over who is going to lose out under new rules, & whose support is now vulnerable—“winner’s curse” leads to excessive net entry of parties as rules change
   d. Spurious/endogeneity: when do electoral rules change? Isn’t it likely that the same conditions which trigger electoral law
change are likely to be producing party system changes?
e. Periods of time being compared are usually so long that its questionable whether these are reliably controlled cases–too much else is also changing. On other hand, this “too much else” ought to net out on average across some number of such comparisons.

H. Bivariate & Multivariate Analysis

1. Bivariate Correlations: 5 dependent variables with...
a. ...electoral formula in Table 5.1 (p. 96)
b. ...T_{eff} in Table 5.2 (p. 99)
c. ...AS in Table 5.3 (p. 101)

2. Multivariate by regression in tables 5.9 & 5.10 (pp. 108-9) across all systems & table 5.11 (p. 112) in PR systems only

3. Basic conclusion:
a. Some support for expected effects of all three dimensions
b. T_{eff} the main factor (n.b. that it subsumes the PR/PM distinction which is itself a very strong predictor)
c. Disproportionality is the dependent variable most completely explained by electoral system

I. Impact of 4 ancillary properties of electoral systems

1. Ballot structure: categorical (within-party voting only) v. ordinal (potentiality of cross-party voting)
a. Douglas Rae’s hyp that ordinal ballot allowed voters’ mandates to be distributed across a larger number of parties, therefore might cause “micro-fractionalization” & contribute to greater eNep
b. Rae found no supp for his hyp: “my theory is absolutely wrong”
c. Lijphart extends the hypothesis to eNpp & disproportionality
   (1) ...to eNpp because relatively obviously fewer (more) parties competing in elections should mean fewer (more) winning seats
   (2) ...to disproportionality because, for a given set of electoral rules, more parties produces more disproportionality
d. Lijphart finds that...
(1) ...these hyp’s supported in higher $T_{eff}$ systems (8%+) but opp in low $T_{eff}$

(2) ...categorical $\Rightarrow$ consistently more manu maj than ordinal, cet par

(3) ...controlling for $T_{eff}$, a switch from categorical to ordinal appears to lower the frequency of manufactured majorities by 14-5%

2. Malapportionment: diff # voter /representative across dists

a. Gallagher: since this leads directly to over- or under-representation of some voters, hypothesizes that contributes to disproportionality

b. Lijphart finds no empirical supp for that hypothesis. Explanation:
   
   (1) Malapp. Highly correlated w/ single-mem plurality, once control that (or $T_{eff}$ more generally), no relationship b/w Malapp & disprop is found
   
   (2) Impact of malapp depends very heavily on the geographical distribution of party support relative to the distribution of voters/rep–favors some smaller parties like Scottish National Party, Plaid Cymru, Australia National Party while it disfavors others

   c. Better questions, then, might be where does malapp arise, who benefits from it, & why?

3. Presidential government & elections

a. Shugart & Carey: when president is powerful, elected by plurality rather than majority (why?), & elected simultaneously with legislature, it provides an impetus toward bipartism

b. Lijphart finds that, among systems with similar $T_{eff}$, presidential systems are... ...than non-presidential
   
   (1) ...less disproportional...
   
   (2) ...smaller eNep & eNpp...
   
   (3) ...higher frequency of manufactured & earned majorities... [with one exception: US high earned, yes, but few manufactured, why?]

   c. However, these conclusions based on only US & Costa Rica

   d. Lijphart attempts to extend to all popularly elected (powerful or not) presidents, finds no empirical support for that broader set

4. Interparty electoral links:

a. At least three modes by which such links can be achieved
   
   (1) apparentement:
(a) parties overtly & explicitly linked lists
(b) SZ, IS, Neth, SW 1948, NO 1945 & 1985

(2) Transferable votes (STV or AV):
(a) parties can urge voters to list some other party’s or party’s ‘cands second
(b) Australian & Irish parties often do; Maltese usually do not

(3) French 2-ballot maj implicitly allows for something quite like this (and quite often used so)

b. Hypothesis: since favors small parties, should reduce disprop & increase (reduce) eNep, eNpp, (manufactured & earned majorities)
c. Only consistent effect found is on disprop., others may be there but not much evidence

J. Grand sum findings: Tables 6.2 & 6.3, though perhaps understate strength of conclusion in favor of the elect formula & AS links eNpp. Remains broad conclusion that $T_{eff} =$ main factor & Disprop $= $ most completely determined