Political Science 651 (version 3.2: 1 Apr 2009)
Positive Comparative & International Political Economy (P-C&IPE)
Winter 2009; Class Sessions Meet: Weds 18:00-20:00, Location: 5664 Haven Hall

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Course Description:
This reading list is intended to provide an introduction to and overview of modern political-economy research, specifically: the positive comparative and international political economy of developed democracies and developing countries. Its readings emphasize how domestic and international political configurations (institutions, structures, etc.) and events (elections, coups, etc.) systematically produce certain sorts of economic policies and on how these comparative and international contexts might condition the effects of the policy so made. In other words, the course takes political economy primarily to mean the politics and economics of macro and international economic policymaking, policy, and outcomes, more so than (at least) three other broad areas of inquiry also referred to as political economy: (a) the microeconomics of politics, which studies how self-interested, rational policymakers make choices in a institutionalized environment, employing the utility-maximization theories and game-theoretic tools of microeconomics; (b) normative political economy, which studies, alternatively, what economic policy should be enacted to produce ideal effects or what policy would be enacted under some set of ideal circumstances that may or will not obtain; or (c) the political consequences of economic outcomes wherein political effects are treated as outputs of (typically exogenous) economic causes, e.g., the impact of economic performance on presidential approval or voting.

Requirements and Grading:
We meet 2 hours on Wednesdays for some mixture of lecture and discussion of the week’s required readings. Although everyone is responsible for being prepared to discuss all of the material every week, some of the readings are technically demanding, and the list is quite long in many weeks: a combination that renders preparing yourselves individualistically virtually impossible. My previous experience has taught me that I simply cannot recommend strongly enough that you form a study group to divide the readings and assist each other in preparation, so I will require such cooperative behavior. For most weeks, I will assign reading(s), as much as possible by student choice, to individual students who will serve as our resident expert on that (those) reading(s). As a resident expert, your duties include (a) preparing a detailed outline of your assigned materials, complete with two or more well and carefully conceived discussion questions, for distribution to the class and to me, (b) presenting your material and starting discussion about it in class (5-10 minutes), and (c) being ready to field any questions from me or classmates about your assigned material. (Developing your skills in skimming material and learning from the summaries and presentations of others will also be important.) The outlines will be due (to me and to each other, by email) no later than late-night Monday. The discussion questions will follow (to me and to each other, by email) no later than late-night Tuesday. Lastly, each student will prepare a final research-paper on a topic to which the student and I will agree in advance. Approach these seminar papers with the full intent of producing publishable-quality work (eventually, at least) and start them as soon as possible. We will have individualized meetings about your final-paper ideas sometime around the semester mid-point. The “further suggestions” readings and the reference lists from them and the assigned readings may be good places to begin looking for material for your seminar paper, but you should feel constrained by them neither in the breadth of the topics covered nor in the depth of their coverage.

General Participation...20% Seminar Paper...40% Resident Expert Duties...40%

Due Dates: Our paper-proposal meetings will be scheduled sometime around March 9-10; the paper is due (to me, by

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1 Ideally, these outlines should be preceded by an old-format AJPS abstract (Theory:, Hypotheses:, Methods:, Results/Findings/Conclusion:); they must follow standard outline format (I,II,III,IV,...,A,B,C,...,1,2,3,...,a,b,c,...); your word-processor likely has a template; and they must be detailed enough for your reader to summarize the article (its main arguments, approach, findings, and conclusions) based only upon a reading of the outline (use my lecture-notes outlines as an example in this regard).

2 Please give considerable thought to these questions, and think of your material also in relation to the rest of the week’s readings in doing so. We would like to use your questions as the starting point for our discussion; in fact, consider this on-the-job training for graduate-seminar teaching. One helpful step in these directions is for you to have some responses to your own questions ready, at least sketched in your head if not more-thoroughly developed.

3 Treat these presentations very seriously also; consider them on-the-job training for professional presentations. Assume we, your audience, have read your outline and at least skimmed your material. Use the presentation to show us how the argument(s), model(s), and/or empirics work(s), and to raise some issues about the material (perhaps in relation to other readings that week and/or applications, critiques, and/or extensions) that seem important to you.

4 In other words, as the resident expert, you are pedagogically responsible for your assigned material.

5 “Late-night” means, at the very latest, in our inboxes when we wake the following morning, which we will assume to be 05:30.
email) late-night April 20. The resident-expert outlines are due (to me and to each other, by email) no later than late-night Monday. The discussion questions will follow (to me and to each other, by email) no later than late-night Tuesday.

Books Ordered for Purchase (AT SHAMAN DRUM):


Outline of the Course:

**Part I: Preliminaries & Background**

Week 1 (1/7): Introduction & Logistics; What is (Positive) C&IPE?
Week 2 (1/16): Basic Economic Theory for C&IPE (Part I)
Week 3 (1/21): Basic Economic Theory for C&IPE (Part II)

**Part II: The Building Blocks of Positive Political Economy**

Week 5: (2/4): Models and Tools for C&IPE (Part II)
Week 6 (2/11): Preferences, Collective Action, & Transaction Costs
Week 7 (2/18): Institutions: Perspectives, Approaches, & Theoretical Roles

**Winter Break:** No Class Meeting 2/25

**Part III: Alternative Views of the Central Conflict in C&IPE**

Week 8 (3/4): Credibility, Uncertainty, Information, & Time-Consistency: PE as a Technocratic Problem

**Part IV: Topics in Comparative & International Political Economy:**

Previously Prepared Topics (Further Alternatives Possible): Electoral & Partisan Cycles; Distributive & Redistributive Politics & Policy; Fiscal Policy (in a Global Economy); Monetary Policy (in a Global Economy); Trade Policy; Development & Growth; Reform & Transition; International Regimes, Cooperation, and Security

Weeks 11-14 (3/25, 4/1, 4/8, 4/13): Topics I-IV

**READING NOTES:** Throughout the syllabus, I have indicated the more-central readings in larger (11pt.) font and the less-central readings in smaller (9pt.) font in an attempt to help render these very demanding lists more manageable. I will also try to provide some guidance to reading by e-mail and/or in Reading Notes located at [http://www-personal.umich.edu/~franzese/PS651_Franzese_ReadingNotes.pdf](http://www-personal.umich.edu/~franzese/PS651_Franzese_ReadingNotes.pdf). I will try to update these Reading Notes weekly, and I may update the syllabus font-size variations indicating reading priority, and, indeed, the entire syllabus, throughout the semester. Stay tuned to announcements by e-mail and in class and check back here regularly.
Part I: Preliminaries & Background

Week 1 (1/7): What is (Positive) Comparative & International Political Economy?


PE Methodology:

Alt&Sh, Intro (Alt & Shepsle), Ch. 1 (Ordeshook), Ch. 6 (Riker), Ch. 9 (Olson).

PE of Development:

Alt&Sh, Ch. 2 (Bates).

BdM*S2, Ch. 1, pp. 3-35.

Ace&Rob, Ch. 1.

Macroeconomic/Developed-Democratic PE:

One closely, One more quickly: Drazen, Ch. 1, pp. 3-19; P&T, Ch. 1, pp. 1-14.


International PE:


Further Suggestions:


Hirschman, Albert O., Exit, Voice, and Loyalty.


Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions. See Franzese's Lecture Notes: www-personal.umich.edu/~franzese/Rogowski.CommerceCoalitions.pdf


Barry, Brian, Sociologists, Economists, and Democracy.


Lane, Jan-Erik and Svante Ersson, Comparative Political Economy, Introduction, Chs. 1, 2 (pp. 1-54).

Lange, Peter and Marino Regini, eds., State, Market and Social Regulation: New Perspectives on Italy, Introduction (pp. 1-25).


Week 2 (1/16): Introduction & Logistics; Basic Economic Theory for C&IPE

Core Concepts and Topics in Economic Theory for the Political Economist:

1. How markets work, and the efficiency of market exchange under competition
   a. Supply & Demand and Harberger Trangles (Deadweight Loss: DWL)
   b. Consumer & Producer Surplus and Rents
   c. Marginals (returns, utility, productivity, etc.), Returns to Scale, & Elasticities

2. Market Failures
   a. Market power: (Natural) Monopoly, monopsony, imperfect competition
   b. Positive & Negative Externalities
   c. Information asymmetry: credibility, moral hazard, adverse selection

3. (Neo)Keynesian & (Neo)Classical Macroeconomics, with Money
   a. IS-LM (Hicks):
      i. Aggregate Supply & Demand: AS=AD => Y=C+I+G+(C-M)
      ii. Quantity Theory of Money: MV= PQ
   b. Rational Expectations (Lucas)

4. Public Finance:
   a. Ramsay Rule & Elasticities
   b. Tax-smoothing

5. Growth:
   a. Growth Accounting
   b. Solow Growth Model
   c. Endogenous Growth Theory

6. International Trade (& Finance)
   a. Comparative Advantage (Ricardo):
      i. HORSS: Heckscher-Ohlin, Rhybcsinsky, & Stolper-Samuelson (mobile factors)
      ii. Ricardo-Viner (specific factors)
   b. Balance-of-Payments (BOP) Accounting
   c. Purchasing-Power Parity (PPP) & Interest Parity
   d. Tariffs, Quotas, & VER's

(Lecture Notes: http://www-personal.umich.edu/~franzese/PS651.FranzeseHays.BasicEconNotes.pdf)

(Core Readings Listed Under Week 2; Suggestions on Econ Phil / PE Econ Ideas Below)

Classics in Socio-Politico-Economic Philosophy:

- Heilbroner, Robert L., The Worldly Philosophers; see “Guide to Further Reading” also.
- Parsons, Talcott, Introduction to Weber, Max, Economy and Society.
- Heilbroner, Robert L., Teachings from the Worldly Philosophy.
- Ricardo, David, Principles of Political Economy (esp. ch. 7 “On Foreign Trade”).
- Marx, Karl, Das Kapital, The Communist Manifesto, etc.
- Weber, Max, Economy and Society.
- Weber, Max, General Economic History.
- Weber, Max, “Class, Status, and Party”
- Schumpeter, Joseph, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy.
- Hayek, Friedrich, The Road to Serfdom (Routledge).

Some Newer Classics:

- Sen, Amartya Kumar, On Ethics and Economics (Blackwell).
- Sen, Amartya Kumar, Resources, Values, and Development (Harvard).
- Sen, Amartya Kumar, Poverty and Faminities (Clarendon 1981).

- O fer, Claus, Contradictions of the Welfare State.
- van den Doel, Hans, Democracy and Welfare Economics.
- Silk, Leonard, The New Economists. (Tries for moderns what Heilbroner did for classics.)

Research on Politics of Economic Ideas: Going From Theory/Ideology to Policy/Politics:

- Hobsbawm, Eric, Politics for a Rational Left (Verso).
- Goldstein, Judith and Robert Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy, esp. pieces by Ikenberry and Garrett and Weingast.
Week 3 (FRIDAY: 1/21): Basic Economic Theory for C&IPE

(LECTURE NOTES: http://www-personal.umich.edu/~franzese/PS651.FranzeseHays.BasicEconNotes.pdf)


Further Suggestions:


John Stiver’s Syllabus for Economics 242 at the University of Connecticut: http://www.sp.uconn.edu/~jstiver/Eco242/syllabus%20242.htm
Part II: The Building Blocks of Political Economy


From Political Science:

**Morrow, James D.** 1994. *Game Theory for Political Scientists,* on:
- Median-Voter Theorem (Black-Downs) and Nash Bargaining, pp. 104-116.
- Legislative Bargaining (Baron-Ferejohn), pp. 149-156.


**Franzese, R.** 2003. *Lecture Notes on Coalition Models:*

From Economics:

**Ace&Rob.** Chs. 4-5, “Democratic Politics” & “Nondemocratic Politics”, pp. 89-172.

**P&T.** Ch. 2-3, “Preferences and Institutions” and “Electoral Competition,” pp. 15-68.


Further Suggestions:


Diermeier, Daniel, models of coalition government:


Ordeshook, Peter. *A Political Theory Primer.*

Ordeshook, Peter. *Game Theory and Political Theory.*


**Week 6 (2/11): Preferences, Collective Action, Transaction Costs**

Preferences:


Collective Action:


Transaction Costs:

- **Alt&Sh**, Chs. 3 (Milgrom & Roberts), 7 (North), 8 (Tullock): pp. 57-89, 182-194, 195-211.


Further Suggestions on Income Distribution (an important component on “interest structure”):


Further Suggestions on Collective-Action, Transaction Costs, & Rent-seeking:

- Lane, Jan-Erik and Svante Ersson, *Comparative Political Economy*, Chs. 8, 9 (pp. 190-228).
Week 7 (2/18): Institutions: Perspectives, Approaches, and Roles

Institutional Approaches:

Hall, Peter, Governing the Economy, ch. 1. [Lecture Notes: http://www-personal.umich.edu/~franzese/ps641_hall.pdf]


Endogenous Institutions?

Putnam, Robert D., with Leonard, Robert, and Nanetti, Raffaella Y., Making Democracy Work, Princeton UP, 1993, chs. 1,4,6 (pp. 3-16, 83-120, 163-86).


Endogenous Institutions & [their Epistemological Challenge]:


Further Suggestions: [THIS LIST COULD OBVIOUSLY BE EXTENDED TREMENDOUSLY]


Part III: Alternative Views of the Central Conflicts in C&IPE

Week 8 (3/4): Credibility, Time-Consistency, Uncertainty, Information (Technocratic PE)


Roundtable:


Further Suggestions:

[Large literatures exist on “time-consistency, credibility, and commitment” (some of which appears below in the ‘topical applications Part IV’), “uncertainty & information” in policymaking, and “policy learning” or “policy laboratories”, but this section is new to this syllabus & I have not yet developed a further-readings list.]


**Roundtable:**


Further Suggestions:

[There are large literatures on agency, accountability, corruption, and rent-seeking (some of which appears below in ‘topical applications Part IV’), but this section is new to this syllabus & I have not yet developed an extensive further-readings list. In lieu of that, I give you the following…]


…From Acemoglu, Banerjee, & Duflo, MIT Econ 14.773, “Political Economy of Institutions and Development”:


Week 10 (3/18): Power, Privilege, & Partisanship ("Us Citizens vs. Them Citizens")


**Hibbs**. (review Chs. 1-5) Chs. 6,9, pp. 185-210, 280-326. ([Lecture Notes](http://www.umich.edu/~franzese/ps343.Hibbs.pdf))

**P&T**. Ch. 5, “Partisan Politicians,” pp. 97-114.

**Ale&Ros**, *Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy*:

Chs 1-2: Intro & models of policy divergence (42pp.)
Chs. 3-4: Theory of (voters’) institutional balancing, & the midterm cycle (68pp.)
Chs. 5-6: Divided government, and incumbency & moderation (40pp.)
Chs. 7-8: Partisan cycles, & a model of PE of US (43pp.)
Chs. 9-10: Ec growth & partisan cycles in U.S.; extension to parliamentary democracies (55pp.)


Further Suggestions:

[The literatures on partisanship, “heterogeneity” (as Drazen entitles the core of this view), and conflict of interest in political economy is absolutely massive, but this section as such is new to this syllabus so I have not yet developed an extensive further-readings list for this week per se. However, a great many of the readings from the topical modules emphasize and elaborate this view, as it represents the traditional core of PE…]
Part IV: Topics in C&IPE: Weeks 11-14 (3/25, 4/1, 4/8, 4/13)

We will select 4 from among the Topical Modules that follow, taking the opportunity to update those we choose. We can also discuss substituting expanded coverage of some topic from above, or from among these modules, or from student or my own alternative suggestions for one of these modules. The previously prepared modules listed below are: Electoral & Partisan Cycles; Distributive & Redistributive Politics & Policy; Fiscal Policy (in a Global Economy); Monetary Policy (in a Global Economy); Trade Policy; Development & Growth; Transition & Reform; International Regimes, Cooperation, & Security

Week II (3/25): Distributive & Redistributive Politics & Policy


Further Suggestions: [Many, many more cites could go here.]

Week 12 (4/1): Development & Growth

BACKGROUND/REVIEW:
RE1: Drazen, Ch. 11, “Factor Accumulation and Growth” pp. 457-525.

Further Suggestions: [Note, this suggestion list over-represents “inequality & growth”; that was once the narrower focus of the module.]
   Bagchi, Amiya Kumar, The Political Economy of Underdevelopment.
Boeno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Hilton L. Root, eds. 2000. Governing for Prosperity. Yale UP.


Chenery, Hollis, Redistribution with Growth, 1974.


Lipton, Michael. Why Poor People Stay Poor, esp. 13-24, 44-71.


Mankiw, N. Gregory, Macroeconomics, ch. 4.


Symposium on the State and Economic Development in J Ec Perspectives 4(3), articles by Bardhan (Intro, pp. 3-7), Kreuger (9-23), Datta-Chaudhuri (25-39), Westphal (41-59), and Fishlov (61-74).


**RE1:** *P&T*, Ch. 12 “Capital Taxation” pp. 305-44.

**RE2:** *P&T*, Ch. 13 “Public Debt” pp. 345-372.

**RE3:** *Drazen*, Ch. 10 “Inaction, Delay, & Crisis” pp. 403-54.


**RE5c:** José Antonio Cheibub. “Presidentialism, Electoral Identifiability, and Budget Balances in Democratic Systems,” *American Political Science Review* 100(3):353-68.


**The Debate on International Exposure, Government Size, & Fiscal Convergence**

**RE7:** Pick Any Three of...


**RE8:** Pick Any Three of...


*Further Suggestions:*

Alesina & Roubini with Cohen, Ch. 9, “Political Parties, Institutions, and Budget Deficits,” pp. 227-52.


All Cites in Alesina & Perotti “The Political Economy of Budget Deficits.”

Blanchard, Olivier, Stanley Fischer, Lectures in Macroeconomics MIT, 1989, ch. 11.
Frieden, Jeffrey, Debt, Development, and Democracy, Princeton UP, pp. 15-41.
Johnson, Chalmers, MITI and the Japanese Miracle (Stanford UP 1982).
Mark Hallerberg’s & Jurgen Von Hagen’s work on bdgt inst’s & debts/deficits.

Central Bank Independence & Monetary Credibility:

BACKGROUND/REVIEW:


Franzese & Hays, Basic Econ Lecture Notes, pp. 17-35: [http://www.umich.edu/~franzese/PS651_FranzeseHays_Basic EconNotes.pdf](http://www.umich.edu/~franzese/PS651_FranzeseHays_Basic EconNotes.pdf)


ADDITIONAL MATERIALS:


Wage/Price-Bargaining Institutions and Corporatism:

BACKGROUND/REVIEW:


ADDITIONAL MATERIALS:


Emerging Syntheses:

ADDITIONAL MATERIALS:

Franzese's Lecture Notes: [http://www-personal.umich.edu/~franzese/ps651_FranzeseLectureNotes.pdf](http://www-personal.umich.edu/~franzese/ps651_FranzeseLectureNotes.pdf)


Comparative & International Monetary Political Economy:


SEE ALSO BY BERNHARD & LEBLANG (and, do your own search, by Bernhard or Leblang):


“Parliamentary politics & foreign exchange markets: the world according to GARCH,” International Studies Quarterly 2006

“Pols and pounds: Public opinion and exchange rate behavior in Britain,” Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2006


Further Suggestions:

verdier2003drc,

@article{leblang2006iea,
title={{Institutions, Expectations, and Currency Crises}},
author={Leblang, D. and Satyanath, S.},
journal={International Organization},
volume={60},
umber={01},
year={2006},
publisher={Cambridge Univ Press}
}

@article{mukherjee2008mip,
title={{Monetary Institutions, Partisanship, and Inflation Targeting}},
author={Mukherjee, B. and Singer, D.A.},
journal={International Organization},
volume={62},
umber={02},
year={2008},
publisher={Cambridge Univ Press}
}


More on Monetary Policy and Central Bank Independence:


Other Approaches to Inflation:

Lindberg, Leon and Charles Maier, eds., The Politics of Inflation and Economic Stagnation, esp. chs. 5, 9 by Crouch and Cameron (pp. 224-279).
Goldthorpe, John and Fred Hirsch, eds., The Political Economy of Inflation.

More Politics of Monetary Policy and Central Banking:


Hall, Peter, ed., The Political Power of Economic Ideas.


Lohmann on Federalism and CBI.

Bernhard, William, Banking on Reform.

Woolley, John, Monetary Politics. (Cambridge UP. 1983).

More on Corporatism and Coordinated Wage-/Price-Bargaining:

Berger, Suzanne, ed., Organizing Interests in Western Europe.

Bruno, Michael and Jeffrey Sachs, Economics of Worldwide Stagflation.


Carlin, Wendy and David Soskice, Macroeconomics and the wage Bargain 1990.

Collier, Ruth Berenice and David, "Inducements versus Constraints: Disaggregating Corporatism," APSR 73, 1979: 967-86


Goldthorpe, John, ed., Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism, rest.


Katzenstein, P. Small States in World Markets and Corporatism and Change and Between Power and Plenty.


Schmitter, Philippe and Gerhard Lehmbruch, eds., Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation.


Szwarc, Adam, and Michael Wallerstein, Paper Stones.

Crouch and Pizzorno, eds., The Resurgence of Class Conflict in Western Europe Since 1968.


Steinmo, Sven, Taxation and Democracy Yale UP 1993.

More on Labor Markets and Unemployment:


More Syntheses:

[Cites from Franzese review pieces.]


Lange and Garrett, “The Politics of Growth: Strategic Interaction and Economic Performance, 1974-1980,” JoP 47, 1985: 792-802. (There are a number of co-authored pieces by these two on this topic. Any early one plus the APSR article in the required list should do.)


More on International Monetary Political Economy:

IO 56(4) Special Issue on Political Economy of Monetary Institutions.


Work of Bernhard & Leibtag.

Freeman, Hays, Hx work.

TOPIC: Electoral & Partisan Cycles

Electoral Cycles:

(1) Adaptive Explanations & Keynesian:


Tufte, entire, 154pp. [Franzese’s Lecture Notes: http://www-personal.umich.edu/~franzese/ps489_Tufte.pdf]


(2) Rational Expectations & Neoclassical:


Alesina & Roubini with Cohen. Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy, Ch. 2, pp. 15-44.
Economic Effects on Elections and Voting:

Further Considerations:
Drazen, Ch. 7, “Elections and Changes of Policymakers,” pp. 219-308.
Franzese, ch. 5: 256-78. [Franzese’s Lecture Notes: http://www-personal.umich.edu/~franzese/p489.Franzese.pdf]


Further Suggestions:
Persson, Torsten, Guido Tabellini, Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility, and Politics, Harwood, 1990, esp. ch. 5.
Alt, James and Alex Chrylstal, Political Economies, ch. 5, pp. 103-25.
Alt, James, “World Demand...” APSR.
Clark, William Roberts, Capitalism not Globalism.
Lane, Jan-Erik and Svante Ersson, Comparative Political Economy, Chs. 6 (pp. 144-76).

Economic Effects on Elections and Voting:
Alt, James and Alex Chrylstal, Political Economies, ch. 7.
[Inglehart, Ronald. Any or All of the Culture Shift offerings.]
Kitschelt, Herbert, The Transformation of Swedish Social Democracy.
Lane, Jan-Erik and Svante Ersson, Comparative Political Economy, Chs. 6 (pp. 144-76).
[Lev-Witchel, Michael, et al., Any or All of econ-&-elects, comparative offerings]
Payne, James, “Inflation, Unemployment, and Left-Wing Political Parties, APSR 73, 1979, 185-90 and Hibbs’ reply.
Przeworski, Adam and John Sprague, Paper Stones, chs. 1-3.
TOPIC: Trade Policy

BACKGROUND/REVIEW:
Franzese & Hays, Basic Econ Lecture Notes, pp. 17-35:


Further Suggestions:


Pincus, Jonathan, “Pressure Groups and the Pattern ofTariffs,” JPE 1975, 757-78.


[As a general rule, if it’s by Krueger and it sounds possibly useful for your work: read it.]


Pincus, Jonathan, Politics, Pressures, and the Antebellum Tariff (Columbia UP 1982).


**TOPIC:** Transition & Reform

*Drazen,* Ch. 10, “Inaction, Delay, and Crisis,” pp. 403-454.

*Drazen,* Ch. 13, “Reform and Transition” pp. 615-674.


**International Regimes, International Cooperation, and International Security**


**Further Suggestions:**


