**Introduction:**

**Course Description:**

This course introduces the comparative political science of developed democracies. It aims to elucidate some of the systematic relationships that may exist between certain social, political, and economic variables in such countries, and not to detail the political history of developed democracies, much less of any subset thereof. For example, we study whether and why different electoral systems produce different party systems, not whether Labour won the last British election, or by how much. The Labour victory is an example of a datum which, combined with (preferably lots of) other data, may help us evaluate the empirical validity of some of these theories about the relationships between variables.

We define our universe of cases, developed democracies, as those countries in which relatively liberal democracy and relatively free-market capitalism no longer engender serious debate but rather serve as the systemic bounds within which politics occur. Empirically, that corresponds least ambiguously to the countries of North America, Western Europe, Japan, and Australasia, since World War II in most cases, so these country-times serve as our empirical referent. This time period in these 24± countries are our cases; i.e., each country-time exemplifies a political system with certain features operating in a certain context. Comparing across as many of these country-times as possible, we hope to develop an understanding of the systematic relationships among society, economy, and polity in developed democracies.

**Example:**

To help clarify the aims of our study, consider a simple example of a hypothesized relationship between variables and of how political scientists might use the history of these 24± countries as comparative empirical referents to evaluate the hypothesis. **Theoretical Hypothesis:** fewer parties tend to gain legislative representation in plurality/majority (P/M) electoral-systems than do so in proportional-representation (PR) electoral-systems. **Conceptual Variables:** electoral system, number of parties in the legislature. **Empirical Data:** in 24 capitalist democracies, code the electoral system as either P/M or PR (PR defined as cases where the number of legislative seats per district exceeds one, P/M by cases where the numbers of seats per district equals one); code the number of parties as 4 or fewer or 5 or more (counting only parties that win seats in the lower, more powerful house of the legislature). The data below refer to the last election before 1990. **Comparative Evidence:** 4 of 6 countries with P/M electoral systems elected four or fewer parties to the legislature in the last election prior to 1990 whereas 15 of 18 countries with PR systems elected five or more parties. The comparative-historical record does seem to offer our conjecture some support. These are the sorts of questions we will ask; the next question, of course, is “So what?” I.e., after this question, we naturally wish to ask whether legislatures with many parties exhibit systematic differences in the sorts of legislation they produce from legislatures with fewer parties. Do many-party legislatures act slower than two-party legislatures, perhaps? Are the latter prone to more extreme policies? etc.

### An Example Table of Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries with Plurality / Majority Electoral Systems</th>
<th>Countries with Four or Fewer Parties in Legislature</th>
<th>Countries with Five or More Parties in Legislature</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Countries with Plurality / Majority Electoral Systems</strong></td>
<td>US, Canada, N.Z., Australia</td>
<td>France, U.K.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Course Requirements and Grading:

The required texts provide our core readings, and the bookstores have ordered them. They are also on reserve at the UGL, as are the reserve texts. Required selections from these reserve texts and all required or further readings not in the required texts are on electronic reserve.

Texts:

**Required:**

- **Franzese:** Franzese, Robert J., Jr., Macroeconomic Policies of Developed Democracies (Cambridge UP: 2002).
- **Laver & Shepsle:** Laver, Michael, Kenneth Shepsle, Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies (Cambridge UP: 1996).
- **Lijphart:** Lijphart, Arend, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in 36 Countries (Yale UP: 1999).

**Reserve:**

- **Lane & Ersson:** Lane, Jan-Erik, Svante O. Ersson, Politics and Society in Western Europe, 3rd ed. (Sage: 1994).
- **LNN I:** Leduc, Lawrence, Richard G. Niemi, Pippa Norris, Comparing Democracies: Elections and Voting in Global Perspective (Sage: 1996).
- **Powell II:** Powell, G. Bingham, Jr., Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence (Harvard UP 1982).

Reading and Class Participation:

Everyone is responsible for being prepared to discuss all of each week’s readings when you come to class. I will endeavor to make this learning experience as interactive as course size permits. Your cooperation in that endeavor by participating in discussion, providing comments and criticism when asked, and asking questions as you have them is crucial (and is a noticeable part of your grade). If class size prohibits free discussion, I will direct it: expect to be called.

**Resident Experts and Short Papers:**

Early in the semester, I will divide the class into 3 groups. Throughout the rest of the course, one group will serve as our resident experts on each week’s materials. We rotate through the groups twice. This is NOT a “group assignment”. Each resident expert acts on her/his own for all aspects of the assignment, and we will grade you each individually.

Each resident expert must write a short paper theoretically reviewing and extending or empirically considering some part of that (those) week(s)’s material. A theoretical review & extension does not merely summarize the readings; rather, it selects one argument (or a few related arguments), summarizes it or them, and, most importantly, extends it (them) theoretically: offering intelligent argumentation as to why that (those) argument(s) may not be quite right, or further reasons that the argument(s) may hold, suggestions as to what follows logically instead or also, and/or some other further implications the author has not considered. That is, you must make your own positive (not normative) argument, extending in some way (one or a few related) argument(s) from the relevant readings. You must also provide some discussion of what kind of evidence would weigh for or against your own argument. You need not actually provide evidence (although if you can, great), but you must describe what kind of evidence would be relevant and how it would array if your argument is correct and if it is incorrect. An empirical consideration, similarly, does not merely summarize the readings; it attempts to apply some argument(s) from the text(s) empirically to some new case(s). That is, you sketch how the author(s)’s argument might work in some country-time(s) beyond the original sample or otherwise go beyond the original empirical application. Do not simply replicate the authors’ empirics. Again, you must describe how the way events unfolded supports the author(s)’s explanation and what would have occurred differently if the author(s)’s explanation were lacking or how the evidence fails to support the author(s)’s arguments and how that evidence would have looked had it followed the author(s)’s argument. These papers are to be medium length (shoot for 7 double-spaced, 12-point-font, 1”-margins pages), so you need to develop your theory or empirical evaluation to some intermediate depth.

I will hold resident experts especially responsible for rescuing class discussion if it stagnates (or fails to start). Recall that I will grade such participation for everyone; it is doubly important—it literally counts twice—for resident experts.

As noted, we will rotate through the groups so that each student is a resident expert twice. Try to write at least one paper of each type for your own edification, although we will grant exceptions if you come to us before-hand with a compelling interest in pursuing the same type of analysis in your second resident-expert round as in your first.

**Final Exam:** Our final (cumulative) exam is on Thursday, December 16, 4:00 - 6:00.

**Grading:** General Readiness & Participation: 15%; Resident-Expert Duties & Papers: 50% ± (25% each); Final: 35%.

**Due Dates:**

- **Readings:** Please complete all readings for each week before that week’s Tuesday session.
- **Short Papers:** Deliver your first-draft papers to the GSI in the manner determined by Friday 12pm (noon) of the last week of each of your resident-expert group’s weeks. He will return them to you the following Tuesday, and your revisions are due that Friday.
- **Final Exam:** Friday, December 16, 10:30 - 12:30.
Syllabus and Class Schedule:

The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Fall Term 2005 Calendar

Registration (for students not pre-registered) .......................... Sep 2, Fri
Labor Day (Holiday) ....................................................... Sep 5, Mon
Classes begin .................................................................... Sep 6, Tue
Fall Study Break ............................................................. Oct 17-18, Mon-Tue
Thanksgiving recess 5:00 p.m. .......................................... Nov 23, Wed
Classes resume 8:00 a.m. ................................................... Nov 28, Mon
Classes end ....................................................................... Dec 13, Tue
Study Days ........................................................................ Dec 14, 17-18 Wed, Sat-Sun
Examinations ..................................................................... Dec 15-16, 19-22 Thu-Fri, Mon-Thu
Commencement ............................................................... Dec 18, Sun

PS341 Weekly Schedule:

Week 1: Logistics, Administrative Details; Introduction
  Tuesday (9/6): Introduction to Comparative Developed-Democratic Politics
  Thursday (9/8): CLASS CANCELLED

Week 2: Socio-Economic Structure (SES), Part I: SES & Politics (Resident Expert: 1a, SES)
  Tuesday (9/13): The Politics and Policymaking Cycle in Developed Democracies/Intellectual History of Comparative Politics
  Thursday (9/15): Socio-Economic Structure & Politics
  Required: Lane & Ersson, ch. 2., pp. 52-101; Powell II, ch. 3, pp. 30-53.

Week 3: SES, Part II: SES & Political Behavior (Resident Expert: 1a, SES)
  Tuesday (9/20): Socio-Economic Structure & Politics
  Required: GLM, ch. 9, pp. 263-306.
  Thursday (9/22): Socio-Economic Structure & Politics

Week 4: Comparative Governmental Systems (CGS), Part I: Description (Resident Expert: 2a, CGS)
  Tuesday (9/27): Executives, Parliaments, Constitutions & Judiciary
  Required: GLM, chs. 2-4, pp. 24-114.
  Thursday (9/29): Levels of Government, Constitutional Origins
  Required: GLM, ch. 6 154-186; Powell II, ch. 4, pp. 54-73.

Week 5: CGS, Part II: Alternative Visions of Democracy (Resident Expert: 2a, CGS)
  Tuesday (10/4): Majoritarian vs. Consensus Democracy
  Required: Lijphart, chs. 1-3, pp. 1-47.
  Thursday (10/6): Majoritarian vs. Proportional Visions of Electoral Democracy
  Required: Powell, chs. 1-2, pp. 3-43.

Week 6: Electoral Systems (Resident Expert: 3a, Electoral Systems)
  Tuesday (10/11):
  Thursday (10/13):
  Required: Lijphart, ch. 8, pp. 143-170.
  Further Reading: Lijphart II, entire; Lane & Ersson, pp. 181-182, 226-40; A. Blais & L. Massicotte, “Electoral Systems” in LNN, ch. 2, pp. 49-82; Powell II, ch. 4, pp. 54-73.
Week 7: Parties & Party Systems (P&PS), Part I: Description (Resident Expert: 1b, P&PS)
  Tuesday (10/18): FALL (STUDY) BREAK; NO CLASS MEETING!
  Thursday (10/20): Patterns of Party Politics & Party Families
  Required: GLM, chs. 7-8, pp. 187-262.

Week 8: P&PS, Part II: Analysis of Parties and Party Systems (Resident Expert: 1b, P&PS)
  Tuesday (10/25): Parties’ Internal Structures & Procedures
  Further Reading: LANE & ERSSSON, chs. 3-5, pp. 102-192.
  Thursday (10/27): Party Systems

Week 9: Voting, Participation, & Representation (VP&R), Part I: Voting (Resident Expert: 2b, VP&R)
  Tuesday (11/1): Partisanship and Partisan Representation
  Required: DALTON, chs. 7-11, pp. 127-242 (ch. 8, pp. 165-95, is review).

Week 10: VP&R, Part II: Extra-electoral Participation & Interest Groups (Resident Expert: 2b, VP&R)
  Tuesday (11/8): Interest Groups & Social Movements
  Thursday (11/10): Extra-electoral Participation & Extra-parliamentary Politics
  Required: LIJPHART, ch. 9, pp. 171-84; GLM ch. 14, pp. 441-465.

Week 11: CGS, Part III: The Distribution of & Citizen Influence on Governmental Authority (Resident Expert: 3a)
  Tuesday (11/15): The Allocation of Governmental Authority
  Thursday (11/17): Accountability, Mandates, & Representation in Governance
  Required: POWELL, chs. 3-5, pp. 47-121.

Week 12: Parliamentary Government Formation & Dissolution (PGF&D), Part I: Unidimensional Models (R.E.: 3b)
  Tuesday (11/22): Unidimensional Models of Coalition Government Formation
  Required: LIJPHART, ch. 6, pp. 90-115; GLM, ch. 12, pp. 381-421.
  Further Reading: POWELL II, ch. 7, 133-53; LANE & ERSSSON, pp. 240-246.
  Thursday (11/24): Happy Thanksgiving

Week 13: PGF&D, Part II: A Multidimensional Model (Resident Expert: 3c, CGS or PGF&D)
  Tuesday (11/29): L&S, chs. 1-4, pp. 3-89.
  Thursday (12/1): L&S, chs. 5-9, pp. 90-192.

Week 14: Outcomes, Part I: Does the Variety of Democracy Matter?
  Tuesday (12/6): Does the Variety of Democratic Systems Matter for Policies?
  Required: GLM, ch. 13, pp. 422-40; LIJPHART, chs. 15-17, pp. 258-309.
  Further Reading: LANE & ERSSSON, chs. 9-10, pp. 294-349; POWELL II, chs. 9-10, pp. 175-228.
  Thursday (12/8): Does the Variety of Democratic Systems Matter for the Quality of Democracy?
  Required: Powell, chs. 6-10, pp. 122-254.

Week 15: Outcomes, Part II: Current Research on How the Variety of Democracy Matters
  Further Reading: FRANZSEZ, Macroeconomic Policies of Developed Democracies, ch. 4-5, pp. 196-278.