Cleavage Structure, Interest Groups, and Interest Intermediation

I. Background Summary on Socio-Economic Development, Cleavage-Structure, & Politics:

A. Basic Notion & Definition of Social Cleavage & Cleavage-Structure

B. Typologies of Social Cleavages:
   1. Ascriptive v. Functional Cleavages
   2. Religious, Ethnic/Linguistic, Class/Economic, Regional/Geographic

C. Characteristics of Social Cleavages & Cleavage-Structures Potentially Important to Key Elements of Democratic Performance
   1. Salience of the Divide (“latent” — “manifest”)
   2. Divisibility (“Bargainability” or “Compromisability”)
   3. Relative Power of the Groups Involved
   4. Fractionalization & Polarization (of Cleavage Structure)
   5. Cross-Cutting v. Reinforcing (Cleavage Structure)

D. Modernization & Democratic Perf; Key Hypotheses
   1. Modernization & Participation, Govt Stab, & Soc Order
      a. Education & the “Modern Person” Arg.
      b. Value-Harmonization Arg.
      c. Increasing Density of Interactions (Increasing Interdependence of Individuals in Society) Arg.
   2. Impact of Modernization Depends (is complicated)
      a. Ratio of Econ Dev’t to Social Mobilization Arg.
c. Pace of Development Arg.

E. Why do some democracies function well & others not? Answer in this material emphasizes nature & severity of underlying potential conflicts as expressed in social-structure & the way they are expressed. This omits other important parts of answer, some of which we will emphasize later. For now, note:

1. History: of oppression & repression & of homogeneity or heterogeneity
2. Institutional Structure: Checks & Balances, Regional Autonomy, Minority Representation in Parliament; Functional Representation of Minorities, Guaranteed Rights in Constitutions

F. Social-Cleavage Patterns & the Party System: basic notion that party system, i.e., number, sizes, & ideological positioning of parties, reflects somehow underlying social-structure. But relation moderated by:

1. Institutions operating b/w social structure & party system (most centrally, electoral institutions).
2. Party & other elite strategies, & history (loosely, inertia)

II. (GLM ch. 9) Lipset & Rokkan’s Diachronic Model of Cleavage-Struct Formation & Freezing

A. Two stages, Process of Nation-Building & Industrial Revolution, each bringing two fundamental conflicts, form underlying cleavage structure. The nature of their resolution forms the party system.

1. Nation Building I: Center v. Periphery
   a. Those seeking to standardize laws & consolidate power in
nation-state (center) against those striving to maintain local powers & privileges (periphery)

b. The struggle can end in:

(1) secession (Ireland from UK),
(2) absorption of periphery & its gradual fading as distinct (Bretton or Occitan in France),
(3) local autonomy (some Spanish & Italian regions),
(4) or retention of diffuse, persistent tension (e.g., Germany, except Bavaria which is more

(c) Only last two likely to result in this cleavage being reflected in party system

2. Nation-Building II: Church v. State

a. Conflict b/w (Catholic) Church’s claim of rights & privileges, esp. its supremacy in certain moral areas, vs. state consolidators; central issue often education

b. Resolution depends centrally on nation’s history & role in Protestant Ref. & later secularist movements:

(1) Where Protestant movements allied with state & won, party system does not usually reflect Church-State cleavage (e.g., UK, Scandinavia)
(2) Where Catholicism continued to dominate, Church-State cleavage tended to persist (e.g., Latin Europe)
(3) Where secularists most momentum (e.g., France), party system often evolved anti-clerical elements

3. Industrial Revolution I: Urban v. Rural

a. Conflict b/w traditionally dominant rural interests & new commercial & industrial classes

b. These have almost universally faded (basically because urban interests won), but...

(1) ...in some places agrarian parties emerged, & these often
persisted if leading strategists allowed party flexibility from its early aims & purposes, (e.g., Sweden, Finland)

(2) ...split has seen rebirth in reverse as urban decline began, (e.g., US, UK)

(3) ...some rebirth also in conflicts over agricultural protectionism (e.g., esp. Europe & Japan)

4. **Industrial Revolution II: Labor v. Employers**
   a. Increased concentration of production, & the accompanying increased organization of labor & employers as a group, led to almost-inherently-organized conflict
   b. Resolution occurred by two patterns:
      (1) Where workers rose & the bourgeoisie adopted an accommodative strategy, Socialist parties arose as the representatives of labor (e.g., UK, Sweden)
      (2) Where workers rose & the bourgeoisie adopted a stonewalling and/or repressive strategy, Communist parties arose as the representatives of labor (e.g., France, Italy, Germany, Spain)

B. **Argument:** The pattern of how these conflicts arose in each country & how they had been or were being resolved at time mass democracy arrived was frozen. I.e., cleavage structure is *frozen* in party system by mid-20th Century because:

1. **Underlying conflicts persist** & groups involved have developed collective identities
2. Major new political entities typically can arise only w/ large increases in suffrage & universal suffrage was mostly completed by then.
3. **Political rules made by** & so favor established parties
4. Established parties follow electoral strategies to isolate their supporters from outside appeals
C. Perceived increases in **electoral volatility** in 1970s led some to seek **explanations for unfreezing:**

1. **Social-Structural Changes in Developed Democracies**
   a. **Sectoral-Structure:** industrial decline, massive agricultural decline, massive service-sector rise
   b. **Erosion of Class Boundaries**
      (1) general education & more wide-spread higher edu
      (2) changing work modes: relative 9 manual labor
      (3) increasingly widespread affluence (though relative disparities may have widened too)

2. **Changes in Patterns of Individual Voting Behavior:**
   Decline of **Structural Voting**
   a. Decline of class voting & of religious voting but still recognizably different.
   b. **Arguments:** suggested reasons for former listed above, to which add:
      (1) secularization & decreasing coherence of views among religious & secular alike
      (2) increased individuality & political sophistication

3. **Changes in the Issues about which those Individuals:**
   **Dealignment v. Realignment**
   a. **Realignment:** new parties & changing support among existing parties
      (1) Some see a “New Politics” movement
         (a) new, highly educated, young middle class
         (b) distinctive new values & issues: environment, feminism, etc.
         (c) new-left parties: greens, new communists; new-right: anti-government, xenophobic, protest
      (2) GLM suggest this may be exaggerated
(a) these new parties are still marginal electorally
(b) parliamentary and/or electoral necessity implies increasing association of the “new” lefts & rights with “old” ones
(3) Conclusion: “Realignment” is very limited, some new dimensions in a still-recognizable left-right divide. Great electoral stability remains across left-right blocks; instability is within blocks.

b. **Dealignment**: non-partisan allegiances & no allegiances. Supposed evidence: (a) declining party identification, (b) rise of new parties & party-system fractionalization, & (c) increased electoral volatility. All of which are questionable.


A. Broad Theme:

1. Two prominent changes in link from socioeconomic structure to voting behavior
   a. Traditional cleavages (esp. class & religion) transformed & weakened as predictors of individuals’ electoral choices
   b. Changing bases of ideological conflict: the rise of “post-materialism”

2. These producing general rise in “issue-based” voting
   a. Less based on socially pre-determined & structured competition
   b. A new calculus of electoral decisions
      (1) Individualistic
      (2) Varying issue positions & weights thereupon

B. The post-war era through late 60s to 70s
1. Party competition & voting patterns structured around social divisions within a polity
   a. Review Lipset & Rokkan’s “Diachronic” Model & the Social-Cleavage/Party-System “Freezing” Hypothesis
   b. Expected to persist because...
      (1) Such cleavage structures long-lasting: underlying conflicts persist & grps developed collective ID
      (2) Universal suffrage largely completed: new parties tend to form (only) when new grps enter electorate
      (3) Political rules made by & so favor estab’d parties
      (4) Established party strategies: often try to isolate their supporters from outside appeals
      (5) Alignment with underlying social-structural groups advantageous to parties & voters [How? See below.]
   c. Why were these divisions so potent?
      (1) Represented & (re-)produced deep ideological divisions
         (a) Class: conflict over nature of politics & economics, over very organization of society
         (b) Religion: basic value-systems (right & wrong) in conflict
      (2) Social groups enabled parties to institutionalize a basis for support
         (a) Labor unions & firms provided organizational & people support
         (b) Ditto for churches

2. What does(reputation for) alignment of parties with social-structural groups do for voters & parties?
   a. The groups so divided provided a social & political reference & source of info for their members (voters)
   b. They provide organizational structure, people, & political ally for parties
C. General decline in sociologically determined vote [n.b., see fig. pp. 172, 183-4, usually said post-1968 or so, but seems pretty much uniform since the war to me]

1. Simple Class-Voting Decline
   a. **Define class voting:**
   b. Blue/White collar divide appears to be decreasingly relevant as a predictor of party vote
   c. **Explanations for specifically this cleavage decline:**
      (1) Class division better defined by degree of job autonomy & authority
      (2) Rise of the middle class “salariat” & affluent blue-collar worker
      (3) Educational divide: skilled v. unskilled labor, human-capital rich v. poor
      (4) Broad sectoral: public v. private; traded v. non; service v. industry v. agriculture
      (5) Life-style differences: industrial v. yuppie
   d. Even so, general decline in ability of such socio-economic status indicators to predict vote choices

2. Religious Voting “Decline”
   a. **Define religious voting, two types:**
      (1) Denominational voting
      (2) Religious v. secular
   b. **Explanations for specifically this cleavage decline:**
      (1) Secularization
         (a) Decreasing church memberships & attendance
         (b) Ethical individuality–e.g. US Catholic Church
      (2) Church/state, secular/relig conflict largely resolved
   c. N.b,
(1) other structural voting, esp. religious/secular, seems to have persisted to much greater degree than has class voting

(2) Dalton’s broader claim of falling structural voting rests more solidly therefore on fact that divisions of relevance to declining proportion of population

3. Other Key Social Divisions

a. Region
   (1) Occasional, dramatic flare-ups
   (2) Still, some general fall in region’s predictive power

b. Urban/Rural & Center/Periphery
   (1) Differences diminishing due to transport & communications revolutions
   (2) But still-present agricultural-industry-service divide

c. Race/Ethnicity
   (1) Prominent exception to general declining relevance of socioeconomic structure to one’s vote-choice
   (2) Many societies are still homogeneous or nearly so, less relevant there obviously

D. General explanations (hypotheses) for decline of socioeconomic structure as predictor of vote choice

1. Underlying conflicts have increasingly been resolved
   a. Nieuwbeerta (1995) finds that strength of class voting declines in the size of the welfare state
   b. [Note: this would also explain persistence of race-ethnicity & relative decline of other cleavages]
   c. Dalton dismisses this, though, noting:
      (1) Periodic recessions bring economic issues back to front [doesn’t this weaken his other claims?]
      (2) Persisting poverty, homelessness [yes, but do these segments
of the population vote? It varies.]

(3) Crime [not exactly clear to me how this fits with any of the above cleavages *per se*]

(4) Large differences remain on abortion, homosexual rights, & other “moral issues” [yes, but it’s exactly in this that religious/secular divide persists]

d. [As is clear from my comments here, I think the case for “relative resolution of underlying conflicts” argument could be made more strongly. **Notice that deg. to which underlying conflicts “resolved” might explain relative decline of some types of struct voting & relative persistence or rise of others**]

2. Parties have broadened or have sought to broaden their appeals across cleavage lines

a. Some evidence of platform convergence on broad socio-economic issues [e.g., industrial nationalization], but recently evidence indicates a reversal of that trend: increasingly polarized politics. Perhaps, the polarization is diminishing again? (Pragmatic left winning in US, UK, France, Germany?) Remains to be seen.

b. Dalton notes that voters, party leaders, & “political experts” still perceive large and/or clear partisan differences which would imply...

(1) ...that it’s not that voters don’t perceive or are unclear about partisan differences, nor that parties no longer express such differences, but rather...

(2) ...that the socio-economic status of the voter serves less as a determinant of how the voter will interpret & react to the different signals sent by parties & received by voters.

3. **Dalton’s preferred explanation** emphasizes structural & institutional changes that have produced a declining relevance of relatively fixed social characteristics for
contemporary electoral politics

a. These social cleavages still very relevant to those deeply enmeshed in them, but that’s fewer & fewer.

b. Increasing proportion of population characterized by:
   (1) “Fragmentation of life spaces” [Huh? Define]
   (2) Less participation, membership, or involvement in “stable & bounded social structures” [?]
   (3) Lifestyles becoming increasingly individualized & diverse [?]

c. [How about social fluidity & individual mobility across structured divides? Notice how this explains relative decline of class & less decline in religion & no decline in race/ethnicity.]

d. Dalton acknowledges that parties have contributed to & reinforced all this:
   (1) By seeking to accommodate these changes in structure & institutions within the existing party structure they have eroded their core, established images/reputations
   (2) But they do not wish to commit yet to any strong stand on the new issues.

E. New Bases of Political Cleavages, i.e. Post-Materialism

1. Define/Examples of “Post-Materialism”:
2. How did/do they arise?
   a. The rise of new issues benefitted from the decline of old ones: the “open space” argument
   b. Vice versa, the new issues cut across old divides, weakening their ability to divide: the “emergence of cross-cutting issues” argument
   c. Meanwhile, citizens everywhere have increasingly demanded more opportunities to participate more actively in policy-making: the general “further democratization of society &
politics” argument
d. Finally, notice that the new issues appeal exactly to those groups increasingly outside of traditional structured & institutionalized cleavages: young, new middle class, educated, non-religious, [others?]
e. [Other hypoths? esp. regarding environmentalism, are non-material problems increasing? affluence? education? cross-derivatives, i.e. implications of Maslow’s hierarchy?]
f. Before we proclaim “all new” divides, new cleavage patterns, though, we need to keep in mind:
   (1) Not all of these issues are so terribly new, even if perhaps there current prominence might be unprecedented.
   (2) Compared to the structured ideologies underlying class & religious cleavages, materialist vs. post-materialist framework (still) diffuse & imprecise: what beside their novelty links these concerns?

F. So what is the impact of all this change?

1. Decline in long-term partisan predispositions =>
   a. Rise short-term factors like issues & image?
   b. Rise performance-based voting, like econ voting?
   d. Rise in “issue-voting”?

2. Issue-voting:
   a. Define Issue-Voting:
   b. Harder to study systematically because:
      (1) Issues vary across elections & across individuals
      (2) Multiplicity of issues at all times
   c. Issues underlying old cleavages still around; new issues are
added thereto

3. Takes some time for, & its an uncertain process by which a new basis, for partisan competition can arise.
   a. Grps must org to represent & mobilize interested.
   b. Parties must establish positions, reputations, & images on those interests (in uncertain environ).

4. New Politics is orthogonal to old politics divides: Left v. Right, Religious v. Secular (or Cath. v. Prot. etc.)
   a. The new divide is, maybe, sustainable society & libertarian values v. conservative social values & structured life choices.
   b. [Is this another dimension? or more like new manifestation or replacement of relig v. secular?]