Severely Impaired Infants and Children

To Treat or Not?

Background: Baby Doe Regulations and Ethics Committees

- "Baby Doe" cases (see Munson, pp. 139-142) led to federal regulations recommending hospital ethics committees.
- Once rare, ethics committees now exist in most hospitals.
- Each develops its own rules for membership and procedure.
- Generally, an “optional-optional” model

When Is It Permissible to Withdraw Life-Sustaining Treatment?—A Continuum

See http://www-personal.umich.edu/~elias/Courses/Med/withdraw.htm

Two Key Questions

- What do we consider, rationally, the right thing to do?
- Who should decide?
  - Specifically, how much weight should be given to the views of parents?
  - Do they have a right of autonomy to act for their child?

Robertson and Engelhardt Clash on Key Issues

- Are defective infants full persons with right to life?
- Is it morally permissible (maybe even obligatory) to stop life-sustaining treatment for the sake of the child?
- Is it morally permissible to stop treatment for the sake of others: e.g., family?
- Is it morally permissible to stop treatment because costs are too great?

Robertson Responds to These Arguments for Non-Treatment

- Infants are not persons
- Non-treatment may be appropriate for the sake of the child to avoid a life worse than death
- Non-treatment may be appropriate for the sake of others (or costs)
“Infants Are Not Persons”
Robertson’s Response
- Infants must be considered persons.
  (Is Robertson’s argument completely nonconsequentialist, as one would expect?)
- Robertson opposes Tooley’s argument
  Below is Tooley’s argument:
  - To have a right to life one must have a desire to continue to exist
  - To have a desire to continue to exist, one must have the sense of self over time
  - Tooley: since early infants lack this, they are not persons with a right to life

Robertson: both rights oriented and consequentialist
- Rights (implied): “…based on the view that all living creatures are sacred, contain a spark of the divine…” (648-1)
- Consequentialist: Excluding some from care poses dangers of abuse
- Denying care has an effect on our whole view of what it is to be a child and affects other children (cf. genetic abortion)
- Implicitly: consider “symbolic significance”

“No Obligation to Treat When Infant’s Own Life Would Be Terrible”—Robertson’s Response
- Robertson: Even impaired life better than often portrayed
- Robertson: nearly impossible for someone else to judge that infant’s life not worth living
- What about grossly deformed, retarded, institutionalized child with incessant pain “where continued life is itself torture”? See Robertson’s response, p. 651-1

Larger Issue: Can We Judge that An Infant’s Life is Worse than Death?
- Robertson: “one who has never known normal capacities will judge differently
  Proxy judgment likely to invoke its own interests
- BUT: can we not judge that an infant is suffering?

“No Obligation to Treat When Burden On Others Is Too Great”–Robertson’s Response
- Families can be helped so that burden not overwhelming and even some benefit
  - “assistance MAY be available” (p. 652-1; my emphasis)
  - “the problem may not be insurmountable” (652-2)
- Health professionals’ problems are significant but comparatively minor
- Costs to society
  - Questions the cost-benefit calculations of others
  - Saving money doesn’t justify violating rights.

Engelhardt: Parents May Decide Not to Treat in Many Cases
- Children are not persons in full sense
- Non-treatment justified if either
  - Quality of life will be very poor
  - Costs (financial, psychological) great
- The decision is one for parents
  - Exception: children should be protected from parental decision not to treat if child can have good quality of life and not a severe burden (p. 656-1)
Costs Alone Can Justify Not Treating

- “Treatment that is very costly is not obligatory” (p. 655)
- “The argument should hold as well where the expected future life would surely be of normal quality, though its attainment would be extremely costly” (p. 656-1)

Symbolic or Expressive Significance

- “As long as parents do not unjustifiably neglect the humans in those roles so that the value and purpose of that role (that is, child) stands to be eroded (thus endangering other children), society need not intervene.
- “In short, parents may decide for or against the treatment of their severely deformed children.” (p. 656-1)

Engelhardt: May Even Be an Obligation Not to Treat

- In some cases continued existence is an injury for the child
- Legal idea developing of child suing for “wrongful life.”
- Is there a parallel ethical idea that we should accept?

Medical Ethics