

Political Science 389.003: Campaigns and Elections

Fall 2007

Monday and Wednesday 11:30–1:00 (G115 AH)

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Office: 7735 Haven Hall (734/763-2220); email

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Office hours: Tue 2–4 or other times by appointment.

Course web page: <http://www.umich.edu/~wmebane/ps389.html>

- **districting in House elections**
 - **incumbent advantage and gerrymandering**
 - * **incumbent protection**
 - * **partisan districts**

- **districting in House elections**

- **Voting Rights Act**

- * **majority minority districts: changes over time**
 - * **contiguity and other aesthetics**
 - * **substantive representation and symbolic representation**
 - * **“bleaching” districts**

- **midterm elections and midterm loss**

- **midterm loss: president's party loses vote share at midterm**
- **midterm loss was a reliable pattern through most of the 20th century, except for 1998 and 2002**
- **it's back in 2006**
- **why did it happen, why did it go away, why is it back?**

- **midterm elections and midterm loss**

- **midterm loss: president's party loses vote share at midterm**
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- **why did it happen, why did it go away, why is it back?**

- **alternative possible theories**

- **surge and decline (false)**
- **economic performance voting (mostly false)**
- **“presidential penalty” (Erikson's term: mostly true)**


- **midterm loss: two reliable mechanisms seem to exist, one always, the other mostly**
 - **institutional balancing (based on institutional awareness and strategic voting)**
 - **ideological shifting**

- **models of institutional balancing**
- **a president and a legislature (treated as unicameral)**


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 - **Fiorina's model: voters choose the closest policy (sincere voting)**


voting model example




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


Fiorina model example (sincere voting)



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 - **four possible policies: $\theta_{DD}, \theta_{DR}, \theta_{RD}, \theta_{RR}$**
 - **Fiorina's model with strategic voting: voters choose the closest policy, taking into account how others will vote**

strategic voting model example



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- **a president and a legislature (treated as unicameral)**
 - **four possible policies:** θ_{DD} , θ_{DR} , θ_{RD} , θ_{RR}
 - **Fiorina's model with strategic voting:** voters choose the closest policy, taking into account how others will vote
 - **in (coalition-proof Nash) equilibrium, only one group of voters split their tickets**
 - **hence the observed split tickets all go only one way: they are either all DR or all RD, not some of each**

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
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
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- with cutpoint equilibria, ticket splits go only one way


Alesina-Rosenthal model: presidential year, uncertain




A-R model: pres. year with post-election policies




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
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
A-R model: pres. year, post-election policies



A-R model: midterm with Republican president




A-R model: midterm with Democratic president



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 - **Stimson's averaged opinion poll data going back to 1952**


Jim Stimson's Policy Mood, 1952-2004




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 - **NES data going back to 1976**

Median Absolute Difference, Self versus Winner's Party


(a) All Voters and Nonvoters




(b) Independent Independents




(c) Strong Democrats




(d) Democrats




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
(f) Independent Republicans



(g) Republicans




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


Median Signed Difference, Self versus Both Parties


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
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
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
(d) Democrats




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