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h = 0 h = .20 h = .325 h = .487 h = .68 h = 1
g = -.08 tex2html_wrap_inline2042 tex2html_wrap_inline2042 .9, .23 tex2html_wrap_inline2048 tex2html_wrap_inline2048 tex2html_wrap_inline2048
g = -.025 tex2html_wrap_inline2042 2.0, .22 .94, .23 tex2html_wrap_inline2048 tex2html_wrap_inline2048 tex2html_wrap_inline2048
g = -.015 tex2html_wrap_inline2042 1.7, .23 .92, .235 .41 , .38 .24 , .471 .06 , .69
g = 0 tex2html_wrap_inline2084 1.5, .228 .91, .24 .42, .37 .29, .466 .17, .63
g = .0425 tex2html_wrap_inline2048 1.3, .30 .6, .29 .53, .35 tex2html_wrap_inline2106 tex2html_wrap_inline2106
g = .10 tex2html_wrap_inline2048 .95, .26 .74, .31 .52, .36 tex2html_wrap_inline2106 tex2html_wrap_inline2106
g = .24 .89, .43 .67, .35 .58, .33 .48, .36 .43, .42 tex2html_wrap_inline2106
Table 1: First-stage Game, Based on the Candidates' Payoffs in the Second-stage Subgames

Legend: g, service concentration; h, challenger quality.

Candidates' payoffs: tex2html_wrap_inline2142 ; tex2html_wrap_inline2144 .

 

 
strategy probability
g = -.025 tex2html_wrap_inline2148
g = .0425 tex2html_wrap_inline2152
h = 0 tex2html_wrap_inline2156
h = .487 tex2html_wrap_inline2160
Table 2: Mixed Strategy Equilibrium Probabilities in the First-stage Game

Legend: g, service concentration; h, challenger quality.

Candidates' payoffs: tex2html_wrap_inline2166 ; tex2html_wrap_inline2168 .

 

   
type of type of .3in Distance Test Divergence Test
post-election spending PACs .3in tex2html_wrap_inline1960 tex2html_wrap_inline2172 tex2html_wrap_inline2022 tex2html_wrap_inline2172
education corporate .3in 4.65 .00 13.87 .00
highways corporate .3in 2.50 .01 5.67 .00
social welfare corporate .3in 3.47 .00 11.07 .00
other corporate .3in 3.11 .01 12.08 .00
education labor .3in 1.10 .41 4.23 .00
highways labor .3in 1.06 .46 1.71 .04
social welfare labor .3in .66 .82 2.84 .00
other labor .3in .44 .96 1.51 .06
education non-connected .3in 7.45 .00 13.66 .00
highways non-connected .3in 4.33 .02 6.81 .00
social welfare non-connected .3in 2.34 .01 9.42 .00
other non-connected .3in 12.32 .00 14.73 .00
Table 3: Tests of Hypothesized Changes in Stability

Notes: Probabilities show the upper-tail cumulative distribution function value. For tex2html_wrap_inline1960 the distribution is tex2html_wrap_inline1976 . For tex2html_wrap_inline2022 the distribution is tex2html_wrap_inline2184 .

   figure1037
Figure 1: Campaign Dynamics Partial Bifurcation Set

   figure1046
Figure 2: A Flow Near a Closed Orbit at the Most Likely tex2html_wrap_inline1214 Campaign

   figure1056
Figure 3: Partial Bifurcation Set Near the Most Likely tex2html_wrap_inline1214 Type and Quality Values

   figure1069
Figure 4: Vector Field for Highway Transfers, Corporate PAC Contributions and Votes, 1984

   figure1079
Figure 5: Vector Field for Highway Transfers, Corporate PAC Contributions and Votes, 1986


next up previous
Next: About this document Up: Appendix Previous: Derivation of the Tests

Walter Mebane
Fri Oct 23 17:45:50 EDT 1998