2.54 Causation

Category: Metaphysics

Keywords: causation, causes, causally, causal, causality, caused, cause, chain, effects, effect, smoking, fire, cancer, factor, occurred

Number of Articles: 385
Percentage of Total: 1.2%
Rank: 36th

Weighted Number of Articles: 392.6
Percentage of Total: 1.2%
Rank: 27th

Mean Publication Year: 1980.7
Weighted Mean Publication Year: 1979.2
Median Publication Year: 1985
Modal Publication Year: 1998

Topic with Most Overlap: Laws (0.045)
Topic this Overlaps Most With: Models (0.0607)
Topic with Least Overlap: Liberal Democracy (0.00022)
Topic this Overlaps Least With: Duties (0.00101)

Causation

Figure 2.125: Causation

Causation Articles in Each Journal

Figure 2.126: Causation Articles in Each Journal

Comments

For a topic that I thought was one of the central, even dominant, topics in twentieth century metaphysics, this ended up having a smaller presence in the data than I expected. It’s not tiny, either 36th or 27th depending on which measurement you use. But the graphs don’t jump up nearly as much as I expected.

Partially this is because it’s kind of hard to get the boundaries of discussions of causation right. Here are three things that different models struggled with.

  1. A lot of models wanted to separate out pre-Lewisian work on causation, often centered around Mackie, from Lewisian work. This model decided (correctly I think) that they belong together. (One model I was working with for a while made this distinction, then put Lewis’s original 1973 paper with the pre-Lewisian work.)
  2. The boundary between work on Causation, and work on Laws is pretty blurry. The boundary between work on Causation and work on Explanation might be even blurrier.
  3. A lot of recent work on causal models looks distinctive enough that it can get carved off, as it does here into a topic on Models.

This model is very confident that Lewis’s two Journal of Philosophy articles belong either in Causation or in Laws, but it’s not completely sold on them being causation articles.

Table 2.24: David Lewis (1973) “Causation” Journal of Philosophy 70:556-567.
Subject Probability
Causation 0.5751
Laws 0.1878
Propositions and Implications 0.1577
Sets and Grue 0.0411
Table 2.25: David Lewis (2000) “Causation As Influence” Journal of Philosophy 97:182-197.
Subject Probability
Causation 0.4061
Laws 0.2321
Ordinary Language 0.1954
Modality 0.0278
Abortion and Self-Defence 0.0208

And this isn’t a shortcoming of the models, I think. These topics really do blend together, and it’s hard to say where one starts and the other ends. One advantage of using a probabilistic model like this is that we can model blurred boundaries as intermediate probabilities, and still get a sense of the size of each topic without making arbitrary distinctions. The three problems above still remain, and you could put the boundary between Causation and Laws, Explanation and Models at very different places. But I think this is a decent picture of the size of discussions of Causation over time.

Note one other thing about this topic. There is an early Russell paper that is (just barely) in the topic.

Table 2.26: Bertrand Russell (1913) “On The Notion Of Cause” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 13:1-26.
Subject Probability
Causation 0.1369
Ordinary Language 0.1287
Laws 0.1226
Idealism 0.0846
Temporal Paradoxes 0.0613
Verification 0.0575
Time 0.0482
Definitions 0.0444
Chemistry 0.0353
Thermodynamics 0.0337
Methodology of Science 0.0328
Denoting 0.0281
Propositions and Implications 0.0261
Freedom and Free Will 0.0260
Psychology 0.0233

But it barely shows up in the graphs. This is such a common phenomenon; topics that are huge parts of late twentieth century philosophy are also the topic of early Russell papers. But the Russell papers made next to no impact in these journals at the time he wrote them.