6.40 Accuracy

Keywords: inaccuracy, utility, expected, credence, credences, global, measure, functions, function, agent, conditionalization, tree, reflection, constraints, agents

Number of articles: 32
Weighted number of articles: 34.37435

A scatterplot showing the raw number of articles that are in the epistemology subtopic accuracy each year from 1945-2013. The average value is 0.47, and the median value is 0. It reaches a peak value of 9 in 2012, and has a minimum value of 0 in 1946.

Figure 6.165: Raw number of articles in topic 40, accuracy.

A scatterplot showing the weighted number of articles that are in the epistemology subtopic accuracy each year from 1945-2013. The average value is 0.5, and the median value is 0.06. It reaches a peak value of 8.67 in 2012, and has a minimum value of 0 in 1948.

Figure 6.166: Weighted number of articles in topic 40, accuracy.

A scatterplot showing the proportion of philosophy articles that are in the epistemology subtopic accuracy each year from 1945-2013. The average value is 0.1%, and the median value is 0.0%. It reaches a peak value of 2.1% in 2012, and has a minimum value of 0.0% in 1948.

Figure 6.167: Percentage of philosophy articles in topic 40, accuracy.

A scatterplot showing the percentage of epistemology articles that are in the epistemology subtopic accuracy each year from 1945-2013. The average value is 1.1%, and the median value is 0.3%. It reaches a peak value of 11.3% in 2012, and has a minimum value of 0.0% in 1960.

Figure 6.168: Percentage of epistemology articles in topic 40, accuracy.

Characteristic Articles

  1. Patrick Maher, 2002, “Joyce’s Argument for Probabilism,” Philosophy of Science 69:73–81.
  2. Anna Mahtani, 2012, “Diachronic Dutch Book Arguments,” Philosophical Review 121:443–50.
  3. Benjamin Anders Levinstein, 2012, “Leitgeb and Pettigrew on Accuracy and Updating,” Philosophy of Science 79:413–24.
  4. Branden Fitelson, 2012, “Accuracy, Language Dependence, and Joyce’s Argument for Probabilism,” Philosophy of Science 79:167–74.
  5. Sarah Moss, 2011, “Scoring Rules and Epistemic Compromise,” Mind 120:1053–69.
  6. Hannes Leitgeb and Richard Pettigrew, 2010, “An Objective Justification of Bayesianism Ii: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy,” Philosophy of Science 77:236–72.
  7. Kenny Easwaran, 2013, “Expected Accuracy Supports Conditionalization—And Conglomerability and Reflection,” Philosophy of Science 80:119–42.
  8. Hilary Greaves and David Wallace, 2006, “Justifying Conditionalization: Conditionalization Maximizes Expected Epistemic Utility,” Mind 115:607–32.
  9. Hannes Leitgeb and Richard Pettigrew, 2010, “An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring Inaccuracy,” Philosophy of Science 77:201–35.
  10. Richard Pettigrew, 2012, “Accuracy, Chance, and the Principal Principle,” Philosophical Review 121:241–75.

Highly Cited Articles

  1. James M. Joyce, 1998, “A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism,” Philosophy of Science 65:575–603. (0.4809241)