6.25 Preferences

Keywords: preferences, stable, preference, humean, money, prefer, option, opinions, independence, options, partition, causes, updating, small, utility

Number of articles: 21
Weighted number of articles: 21.01286

A scatterplot showing the raw number of articles that are in the epistemology subtopic preferences each year from 1945-2013. The average value is 0.31, and the median value is 0. It reaches a peak value of 4 in 1989, and has a minimum value of 0 in 1946.

Figure 6.105: Raw number of articles in topic 25, preferences.

A scatterplot showing the weighted number of articles that are in the epistemology subtopic preferences each year from 1945-2013. The average value is 0.31, and the median value is 0.06. It reaches a peak value of 3.05 in 1989, and has a minimum value of 0 in 1950.

Figure 6.106: Weighted number of articles in topic 25, preferences.

A scatterplot showing the proportion of philosophy articles that are in the epistemology subtopic preferences each year from 1945-2013. The average value is 0.1%, and the median value is 0.0%. It reaches a peak value of 0.8% in 1989, and has a minimum value of 0.0% in 1950.

Figure 6.107: Percentage of philosophy articles in topic 25, preferences.

A scatterplot showing the percentage of epistemology articles that are in the epistemology subtopic preferences each year from 1945-2013. The average value is 0.8%, and the median value is 0.2%. It reaches a peak value of 9.2% in 1989, and has a minimum value of 0.0% in 1950.

Figure 6.108: Percentage of epistemology articles in topic 25, preferences.

Characteristic Articles

  1. Clark Glymour and David Danks, 2007, “Reasons as Causes in Bayesian Epistemology,” Journal of Philosophy 104:464–74.
  2. Alex Byrne and Alan Hájek, 1997, “David Hume, David Lewis, and Decision Theory,” Mind 106:411–28.
  3. Isaac Levi, 2002, “Money Pumps and Diachronic Books,” Philosophy of Science 69:S235–S247.
  4. Steven P. Wall, 1996, “Public Justification and the Transparency Argument,” The Philosophical Quarterly 46:501–7.
  5. Erik Carlson, 2011, “The Small-Improvement Argument Rescued,” The Philosophical Quarterly 61:171–4.
  6. Johan E. Gustafsson and Nicolas Espinoza, 2010, “Conflicting Reasons in the Small-Improvement Argument,” The Philosophical Quarterly 60:754–63.
  7. Armin W. Schulz, 2008, “Structural Flaws: Massive Modularity and the Argument from Design,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59:733–43.
  8. Jordan Howard Sobel, 1989, “Partition-Theorems for Causal Decision Theories,” Philosophy of Science 56:70–93.
  9. Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz, 1989, “Stable and Retrievable Options,” Philosophy of Science 56:624–41.
  10. Franz Dietrich and Kai Spiekermann, 2013, “Independent Opinions? on the Causal Foundations of Belief Formation and Jury Theorems,” Mind 122:655–85.