6.13 Logic And Paradoxes

Keywords: mathematical, paradox, negation, logic, proof, deontic, theorem, classical, necessarily, credal, logical, solution, realist, system, valid

Number of articles: 49
Weighted number of articles: 50.60148

A scatterplot showing the raw number of articles that are in the epistemology subtopic logic and paradoxes each year from 1945-2013. The average value is 0.72, and the median value is 0. It reaches a peak value of 4 in 1987, and has a minimum value of 0 in 1946.

Figure 6.57: Raw number of articles in topic 13, logic and paradoxes.

A scatterplot showing the weighted number of articles that are in the epistemology subtopic logic and paradoxes each year from 1945-2013. The average value is 0.74, and the median value is 0.5. It reaches a peak value of 2.86 in 1986, and has a minimum value of 0 in 1950.

Figure 6.58: Weighted number of articles in topic 13, logic and paradoxes.

A scatterplot showing the proportion of philosophy articles that are in the epistemology subtopic logic and paradoxes each year from 1945-2013. The average value is 0.2%, and the median value is 0.1%. It reaches a peak value of 0.8% in 1998, and has a minimum value of 0.0% in 1950.

Figure 6.59: Percentage of philosophy articles in topic 13, logic and paradoxes.

A scatterplot showing the percentage of epistemology articles that are in the epistemology subtopic logic and paradoxes each year from 1945-2013. The average value is 2.7%, and the median value is 1.9%. It reaches a peak value of 12.3% in 1955, and has a minimum value of 0.0% in 1950.

Figure 6.60: Percentage of epistemology articles in topic 13, logic and paradoxes.

Characteristic Articles

  1. Gabriel Uzquiano, 2004, “The Paradox of the Knower Without Epistemic Closure?,” Mind 113:95–107.
  2. Charles B. Cross, 2001, “The Paradox of the Knower Without Epistemic Closure,” Mind 110:319–33.
  3. Charles B. Cross, 2004, “More on the Paradox of the Knower Without Epistemic Closure,” Mind 113:109–14.
  4. Berit Brogaard and Joe Salerno, 2005, “Anti-Realism, Theism and the Conditional Fallacy,” Noûs 39:123–39.
  5. George Rea, 1987, “A Variation on Hollis’s Paradox,” Analysis 47:218–20.
  6. Martin Hollis, 1986, “More Paradoxical Epistemics,” Analysis 46:217–8.
  7. Daniel Bonevac, 1998, “Against Conditional Obligation,” Noûs 32:37–53.
  8. James E. Tomberlin, 1989, “Deontic Paradox and Conditional Obligation,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50:107–14.
  9. William H. Hanson, 1971, “Mechanism and Gödel’s Theorems,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 22:9–16.
  10. James E. Tomberlin, 1981, “Contrary-to-Duty Imperatives and Conditional Obligation,” Noûs 15:357–75.