(Notetaker’s note: I am sure I cannot do justice to Prof. Scarcia’s presentation; I did my best to write everything down, but I’m not, unfortunately, a stenographer. Where I know there are lapses, I put in ellipses. To indicate questions I have with my own notes, I put in question marks or similar commentary. I have elected to use the third person, to maintain this as reportage.)

The lecture is based on documentary sources and impressions during her last trips; she has been going regularly since 1994 (and before).

Both before and after the Revolution, Prof. Scarcia was impressed by the increased production of books and letters. Giving Ministry of Culture statistics, she asserts that newspapers being published with permission before 1979 were 2, and now there’s 67, with 40 new ones appearing between May ’97 and March ’99.

They are making books and papers available to a larger audience. Prof. Scarcia compared post-Revolutionary Iran to post-Fascist Italy: the periods were linked to revolutions in politics in both. She sees trends regarding generations, separating those who experienced the periods themselves and those who followed and know the preceding era only based on its myths.

There was feedback in the Arabic-speaking world after the Revolution. The Vilayat-e Faqih created a response. In Egypt in 1979, and in Beirut and Cairo, all in Arabic, there was a discussion. The book industry in Lebanon was/is in the hands of Shi’ites. There was an apparent aim at intellectuals, who seemed disappointed in the Revolutionary government’s socialist reforms. Her research covered 1979-91, and she was looking at book production. She found books on fiqh of both 18^th century writers and modern ones.

The Iranian leadership during the war with Iraq produced books with a psychological bent, focusing on dreams and hopes being true. However, this is over a relatively short period of time; it doesn’t help to look at the outlines. … During this period there was significant demographic change, as a large percentage of the population is under the age of 25 and 3 million students are in universities.

Under Khomeini, the influence on book production is rather strange, since book production numbers can be compared to art production, etc, and all have suffered under the regime’s censorship, although nonetheless it is of high quality. Books were used as ideological excursus.

There was also an impact that new medias and technologies had on the government and communication in general. Earlier, the telegraph and audio cassettes had revolutionized the distribution of information. Now computer technology is changing information distribution again. Among many of the initiatives is the 5^th National Islamic Technology Conference (name?), originally founded in 1996, with increasing participation each year. There many editions of manuscripts and new books are presented and distributed to whoever wants them. There has also been gathering from libraries outside of Iran to present manuscripts and critical editions. Throughout there has been a heavy emphasis on books.

After Khatemi’s election, a minister (didn’t get name) visited Italy and spoke there about how everyone must look at the Revolution on its own footing in order to see it clearly, and that everyone need not think alike about it. He (the minister) said that the publication of books is important as a part of a free society, and that the press and the development of an information industry become evidence of the society’s freedom. Iran doesn’t fear the press’s expansion, and doesn’t want to put thoughts into a clandestine place.

The (Culture?) ministry provides the following data for the period after the election of Khatemi. 9000 titles were published with more than 50,000 copies each. In 1998, 4800 books were published with more than 70,000 copies. In July 1998, commenting on the book fair’s success, Prof. Scarcia said that about 1200 people participated, which was a 38% increase. There were 4200 books for children, and women were there as entrepreneurs. Publishers were, however, complaining that they didn’t have a good distribution system, and that they had difficulties getting a license for books. Within the last two years, in some cases permission to publish has been issued without there being all the "necessary" information in order to help more liberal information sources to get back out after being closed down. Two weeks ago (although Prof. Scarcia said she hadn’t been able to verify it; this would be about the end of January 2000) clerics were protesting this in Qum.

Consequences

Does interest retrieve tradition crushed by modernization? Does it represent nationalism or Islamic ideas? Does it support historical research? Seek consensus or create ideas?

Khomeini’s propaganda (this was Prof. Scarcia’s word) focussed on moral standards. The structures of society were looked at from the position of moral constraints. One was to return to the forefather’s customs (like the veil) while leaving aside real problems, like minorities claiming political visibility.

Western analysis has been misleading. It’s usually very polarized, for or against, and thus does not confront the social structures. One might say that there is change in different criteria than expected by the West. Prof. Scarcia’s aim has been to trace the ideological mechanisms. When Khomeini came to power, he was trying to get the means to make structural changes. There was a focus on spiritual change as a founding feature, ethics over politics, in order to "remoralize" the country. Islamic economics was not unknown to the Iranian clerics. There was Bakrassad (spelling?) d. 1980; two of his texts were well known but not cited by name. He was seen as a third way, neither capitalist nor socialist. His books were first published in Persian in 1971, 1978, and an English translation was done in Tehran between 1982 and 1984.

The founding structure of economics was not in words but in facts. They needed to make up for social injustice by making communal ownership. Such measures were ideologically successful in that they overrode Pahlavi ideas. Banisadr’s ideas were published in a clandestine way in Paris in 1979, but when he wanted to implement them, it didn’t work.

With the war with Iraq, there were tensions within the leadership. The government needed to get money for weapons, and this overrode ideals. The outcome doesn’t justify the bloodshed in the country, and could still lead to opposition.

Books

Books are related to the logic of power. According to the Revolutionary ideals, the West’s cultural crisis is due to a loss of ethical values. Good books strengthen new ideas, help recover a pre-Islamic past, so the government was interested in getting books and getting them read. Reading also implies time for thought, spending time off combating other "fun" things. There is no need to stress the classic ideas of Islamic book culture, as there is a correlation between religion, ethics and culture. The technology, while still closely held, is very popular. Religious publishing has expanded. In 1994, information technology procedures were spread, even by groups that were not popular with the regime, because the regime needed the technology so badly. It could also help strengthen Islamic policy, since by circulating books, one spreads ideas, but the traditional models are not top-down approaches. As being culturally aware becomes a status symbol and a bar against the West, some religious organizations claim autonomy to get a wider appeal. They point out the autonomy of the authors’ thought even when it’s not necessarily true. Even things published in Beirut are not necessarily independent; the government pushes Iranian ideas through Beiruti Shi’ites to make it look more independent, putting down Sunnis. At the same time, there is a historiography on the Ahl al-bait that can be used to criticize the vilayat-e faqih, using a pretense of theoretical precedents from the past. Others would say that the Vilayat-e Faqih is just a monarchical system, although they are now in jail.

Mass production claims on the revolutionary process continue. For women’s issues, this means taking to the streets. Censorship and the veil have not pushed them into the home; they often go for Khatemi. They claim access to the theological and ideological choices. What has not been looked at is how books about women’s issues are presented in the press.

Prof. Scarcia has looked at "non-scientific" works. For ideology, one must look at the two extremes: within the academe and as taught to people.

The cultural production as a part of Shi’ism is not necessarily Iranian. The common ground of learned men is the backbone; instead of just including ‘alims, however, the production of thought and the constancy of production have also included "heretical" ideas. Iran here comes to have an important role. Some ideas about religion are presented for the population while apparently representing the regime; there are lots of other ideas, however. In 1998-99, an institute created in 1994 sent a number of foreign scholars a journal and asked for information and comments. It said that about 60 ancient texts had been published.

Popular histories in Iran

The starting point for these is Shi’ism, with the oppressed, the victims. This is re-iterated because it turns within the regime. Messianism is brought into a utopian dimension. It was used before to oppose the Shah, as well as being used to interpret the war, changing the meaning of the Islamic Revolution to acquire a nationalism meaning. It creates unpredictable repercussions when foreign Iranians use it to understand the Revolution without liking the national state. It is used as a way to feed history.

Do we face an attempt to elaborate a systematic project? Westernization is opposed, but the West is no longer demonized. There is a certain realism in the government. One cannot escape the ideas of the West, for the price is too high, since one would need to reject widespread bases of development, which the regime still promises. Within the country, one sees social and economic revolution (revision?) in how long political corruption can be contained.

The moral aspirations are reflected in the country. Sociology has become the most fashionable approach. Popular books, like Mache gune ma kodim (spelling very approximate!) are released in print runs of 20,000. The role of periodicals seems to be to focus on topics. The press has focused on the presidential elections with a methodological approach. They wanted to prove the press’ freedom, so therefore one could see this as important. There is an appeal to a modern and/or western message. Theology is, however, restricted -- one does not find it in the press.

Prof. Scarcia did a bibliographic review on articles concerning books which are usually presented ordered by the book’s subject. The religious books were only rarely listed separately, with Islamic and non-Islamic religious books mixed together, ancient and modern texts also mixed. When materials were catalogued by geographical region, Iran was separated, and the classification was less subjective. More of the (history?) books were on the last imperial dynasties, especially on the Qajars. Texts on local history, both old and new, came in last. The minorities are not happy about this, since their histories are often included in this category. Fractures are often along classical Islamic lines.

Looking at the Qajars, was a book sponsored by the Foundation of Islamic Iran (name?), which wants to protect and disseminate learning. After 1991, it also served as a publishing house, and by 1996, most of its books were about the Qajars. Prof. Scarcia looked for opinions, and found that the Pahlavis have to be placed apart, and the local history must be looked at like the Qajars are. Iran in this case serves as a locus for Shi’ite religious thinking, taking over for Iraq as an inspired home. The histories use structural understandings of Iran in Qajar times to foster a political and structural legitimacy. The ulama were opposed to the shahs in the mid 19^th century, so this is used to draw out ways to create change.

Within this, in order to reconstruct history, one has to find mistakes, like the wrong role of clerics. This has occurred to such an extent that most representative texts look at the Revolution with sociology as a branch of history. For example, Ali Zakuli (spelling?) in a book dedicated to Amir Kabir and others, discusses oppositions found in battling corruption in the 1830’s. The thesis: destiny, since if they were in the spotlight today, it would still be the same.

--Vika Gardner, 22 February 2000