From: Int. J. Middle East Stud. 31 (1999): 450-452.

MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, Freedom of Expression in Islam (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society. 1994). Pp. 349.

REVIEWED BY SHERMAN A. JACKSON. Department of Near Eastern Studies, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

The main objective of this book is to show that Islam promotes "the vindication of the truth and the protection of human dignity" by guaranteeing the right to freedom of expression. "Freedom of expression." however, encompasses a broad range of matters, from freedom to criticize the government (haqq al-mu’âradah) to freedom of religion and conscience (hurrîyah al-dînîyah). Similarly, these freedoms are not absolute but are tempered by both moral and legal constraints. The overall scheme of the book is thus to catalogue these rights alongside these constraints so that a realistic picture of the nature and scope of freedom of expression in Islam emerges.

The book is divided into four main parts. Part I, "Preliminary," lays out the overall scope of the work. Here, however, Kamali also discusses (briefly) the concepts of "rights," and "fundamental rights." Against the notion (put forth by Schacht, Gibb, and others) that Islam is essentially a system of duties, he argues that rights are equally central to Islam, and that this has only been obscured by the jurists' legalistic approach, which tended to look for and explicate duties rather than rights. This, however, should be taken to reflect a particular approach to rights rather than a denial of them. Of the many rights recognized by Islam, some are founded on clear injunctions and primary principles of the Qur’ân and Sunnah" (p.21). These Kamali identifies as "fundamentalist rights." some of which include the rights to life, property, privacy, movement, justice, personal dignity, and equality before the law.

Part 2, "Affirmative Evidence," goes on to catalogue the various rights and even duties to express oneself in Islam. These include commanding the good and forbidding evil (identified as hisbah); sincere advice (nasîhah); consultation (shûrâ); "personal reasoning" (jitihâd); freedom to criticize (hurrîyat al-mu’âradah); freedom to express an opinion (hurrîyat al-ra'y); freedom of association; and freedom of religion (al-hurrîyat al-dînîyah). All of these are supported by what Kamali presents as evidence from the Qur’ân and hadith, along with the views of various jurists. (Qur’ânic verses and hadith are given in Arabic script and translation throughout the book.)

Part 3, "Moral Restraints," discusses religious values and prohibitions that operate as limits on freedom of expression by discouraging its abuse or irresponsible use. These include prescriptions such as the ban on backbiting (ghîbah), defamation, derision, exposing the weaknesses of others, excessive questioning, capricious opinion (hawâ), "pernicious innovation" (bid’ah), biased criticism (baghy), and dissension (ikhtilâf). Under the heading "Special Subjects," theological issues such as the essence of God and free will and predestination are listed as topics that should be avoided because of their tendency to promote schism. Scriptural condemnations of "acrimonious contention" (mirâ), "disputation" (jadal), and "argumentation" (khusûmah) are also cited.

Part 4, "Legal Restraints," discusses limits on freedom of expression that are backed by prescribed (hadd) and discretionary (ta’zîr) punishments -- for example, slanderous accusation (qadhaf), attribution of disbelief to a Muslim (takfîr), sedition (fitnah), blasphemy (sabb Allâh wa sabb al-rasûl), heresy (zandaqah), and apostasy (riddah). The book ends with an appendix of five excurses, including discussions on haqq (rights), bid’ah, and the Salman Rushdie affair.

This book is a bold attempt to present its topic in terms that will appeal to a modern mindset. This, however, is the source of a number of weaknesses. The first, and perhaps most glaring, is the omission of a general discussion on the constraints on state power, such that one would gain a real sense of the extent to which freedom of expression is a viable right in Islam. It is, after all, one thing to have a right; it is quite another for the price of exercising it to be so high that one feels that one is better off forgoing it.

Second, it appears that a number of modern phrases are simply translated into Arabic (e.g., hurrîyat al-mu’âradah) and then arbitrarily rendered as technical terms, as if they represented long-standing Islamic institutions. Other modern concepts (e.g., freedom of association) are brought over in English, with no Arabic parallel. (One wonders, incidentally, whether a discussion of the madhhab might not have proved helpful here.) Similarly, the Islamic legal tradition is invoked to support the idea that the many freedoms Kamali cities have always been recognized in Islam. But the sources he relies on tend to detract from this claim. For example, none of the standard manuals of "madhhab-fiqh" (e.g., al-Hidâyah, MukhtasarKhalîl, al-Rawd al-murbi’, al-Muhadhdhab) or their commentaries are cited in the discussion. In fact, frequent resort is made to figures such as Ibn Hasm, Ibn Taymiyah, and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyah -- men who, though important in their own right, can hardly be said to represent tradition's dominant opinion. On other occasions, when even these scholars will not support the view he wants to present, Kamali resorts to his own or some other modern scholar's interpretation, or reinterpretation, of the Qur’ân and sunna. In most cases, the substance of these conclusions is convincing (especially Kamali's own views on apostasy, heresy, and blasphemy). But this vacillation, along with his choice of sources and jurists, raises questions about how much currency some of the views in this book could have enjoyed among the majority of Muslims over the centuries.

In many ways, this book is a handsome reflection of one of the major problems confronting modern Muslims -- namely, the crisis of authority, or the lack of viable and recognized mechanisms with which to validate their own views. Modern ijtihâd may be viable, but it is not fully recognized. Tradition may be recognized, but it does not always (certainly not easily) provide viable solutions. Modern writers are thus forced into a plainly ambivalent relationship with both tradition and ijtihâd. And their works often take on the dual appearance of being both primary and secondary sources. Readers will no doubt detect this characteristic in Kamali's work.

At the same time, there is a real sense in which the development of Islamic law has often amounted to a matter of time catching up with ideas: it is not always the source or the substance of an idea, but rather its sheer tenaciousness and its being discovered under the right circumstances, that validates it over time. Today's innovation, in other words, can become tomorrow's precedent. And it is here, perhaps. that the real importance of Kamali's work resides. For his "innovations" are always thoughtful and, more often than not, convincing. Many of his ideas will undoubtedly prove appealing to modern Muslims (and many non-Muslims). In the end, this may provide them with enough fortitude to stand the test of time. For this very possibility itself, Kamali deserves to be congratulated. Anyone interested in the subject would do well to consult this work. Indeed, its methodological shortcomings notwithstanding, Freedom of Expression in Islam will almost certainly inform all future discussion of its theme.