P.F. Strawson, Reactive Attitudes, and Compatibilism
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Optimists and Pessimists

Optimists and pessimists:

Optimists: we don't know if determinism is true. But we know that our practices of praising and blaming people for their actions are justified. It must be that the two things don't conflict with each other. (the optimists are a kind of compatibilists)

Pessimists: our practices of praising and blaming are justified if we go beyond the facts that physicists have discovered and assume that determinism is false. (the pessimists are libertarians)

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Optimists’ story: practices of praise and blame are *causally effective*. 

Example: punishment. Deterrence and rehabilitation.

Praising and blaming a hurricane.

Pessimists’ reply: you only punish the guilty, and you have to be free to be guilty.

Optimists’ reply: we punish people who are not insane, who weren’t forced to do what they did, who weren’t ignorant or who were culpably ignorant . . . . That is the relevant sense of free.

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Types of Attitudes

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Examples: the attitude of the psychiatrist, the maker of political policy, the parent of small children.

Reactive attitudes: treating people as members of the moral community.

Examples: resenting it when someone deliberately hurts you (not just taking steps to prevent it in the future), feeling gratitude when someone intentionally helps you (not just thanking them so they help you again later), feeling morally indignant when on a wronged party’s behalf (even if neither the wronger nor the wronged will ever know of it).
Objective vs. reactive attitudes

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So we have another answer to the hurricane case: it would be perverse to "take it personally" when the hurricane hurts you.
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But was the libertarian right that this missing thing had anything to do with determinism?
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When Aren’t Reactive Attitudes Appropriate?

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Is it possible that all people should be treated as if they are insane?

Two reasons why not:

1. It’s impossible/impractical
2. Determinism in this case
“It’s impractical” is a pretty bad reply in itself. The skeptic about free will may well concede that her truths are difficult to live with—as some truths are . . . .
Impracticality

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... the real question ... is a question about what it would be rational to do if determinism were true, a question about the rational justification of ordinary inter-personal attitudes in general. To this I shall reply, first, that such a question could seem real only to one who had utterly failed to grasp the purport of the preceding answer, the fact of our natural human commitment to ordinary inter-personal attitudes. This commitment is part of the general framework of human life, not something that can come up for review as particular cases can come up for review within this general framework.
And I shall reply, second, that if we could imagine what we cannot have, viz., a choice in this matter, then we could choose rationally only in the light of an assessment of the gains and losses to human life, its enrichment or impoverishment; and the truth or falsity of a general thesis of determinism would not bear on the rationality of this choice.
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Compare other sorts of skepticism. (Strawson mentions skepticism about induction in the endnotes.)
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Let us see if Strawson gives us any tools to fix the problem . . . .
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Descriptive and Prescriptive Claims

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The is-ought gap.

Strawson uses the language of "theoretical" vs. "practical" claims.
Two interpretations of Strawson

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(Compare emotivism in metaethics.)
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These judgments are obviously not about the laws of physics determining or not determining something, but perhaps they are about determinism at the level of psychological laws. Strawson will have to offer some alternate interpretation.