When the peoples of Latin America began their struggle for independence they found their strongest inspiration in the North American Revolution; when the newly freed nations drew up their constitutions it was always with the Constitution of the United States before them as an example. The great Liberator himself had referred to the northern republic as "a singular model of political virtues and moral enlightenment unique in the history of mankind."

Within a period of less than a century that almost boundless admiration turned to resentment and bitter hate. This change in sentiment marks one of the unhappiest chapters in the history of the American hemisphere. It was no sudden about-face, but the gradual result of many years of increasing tension in inter-American relations. To most Latin Americans the whole unpleasant story is summarized in the words "Monroe Doctrine."

In the year 1823 the Holy Alliance, composed of Russia, Prussia, Austria, and France, was threatening to aid Spain regain her American colonies. They were anxious to "put an end to representative government," for the growth of this new idea endangered the security of their own absolutist regimes. Great Britain offered to support the United States in a strong stand against any such meddling in American affairs.

President Monroe sought the advice of Thomas Jefferson before reaching a decision, and the answer which Jefferson gave is almost as famous as the Doctrine itself. From his retreat at Monticello the former President referred to the question as the most momentous which had arisen since that of independence itself. "That made us a nation, this sets our compass and points the course which we are to steer through the ocean of time opening on us. And never could we embark on it under circumstances more auspicious. Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe; our second, never to suffer Eu-
rope to intermeddle in cis-Atlantic affairs. America, North and South, has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe, and peculiarly her own. She should therefore have a system of her own, separate and apart from that of Europe. While the last is laboring to become the domicile of despotism, our endeavor should surely be, to make our hemisphere that of freedom...

Jefferson went on to say that one nation most of all could disturb his country in this endeavor and that nation had offered to lend aid in its accomplishment. "With her [Great Britain] on our side," he wrote, "we need not fear the whole world."

President Monroe and Secretary of State John Quincy Adams concurred in this opinion, and the Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed on December 2, 1823. Reaction in Latin America was immediately favorable. Bolivar himself, still in the midst of his last campaign against the Spaniards, Santander in Colombia, Rivadavia in Argentina, Victoria in Mexico—leaders of the emancipation movement everywhere received Monroe's words with sincerest gratitude.

Yet they were all realists and knew that the puny spear of the President of the United States, unsupported by the might of the British fleet, would have meant absolutely nothing. Against the combined might of the Holy Alliance it would have been powerless. So while their thanks were given to Monroe, their strongest hopes were turned in the direction of Great Britain, who had already aided their struggle against Spain with both funds and men, and who now guaranteed their independence.

In 1826, when Bolivar called together his Congress of Panama, the first "Pan-American" meeting, he was at first loath to invite the United States. He was at this time hoping for a great confederation of Spanish American states, and believed that the inclusion of the northern republic would compromise his confederation from the viewpoint of England, which was its natural protector. Nevertheless, Bolivar was persuaded by revolutionary leaders of Mexico and Colombia to extend an invitation to the United States, and he did so most graciously.

The United States Congress was not strongly in favor of participating in this meeting, but finally sent delegates with the understanding that they should not approve any measure which would limit the freedom of each state to act according to its own interests.* This was an absolute negation of Bolivar's ideal of New World co-operation. The Monroe Doctrine, therefore, was to become purely an instrument of national policy; it was not to be, and was never intended to be, a charter for concerted hemispheric action.

At first the nations of Latin America were not at all disturbed by these implications. Bolivar's Congress of Panama, despite its grandiose start, was

* Neither of the two delegates arrived; one died en route, and the other had not yet left the United States when news was received that the congress had adjourned.
Ariel and Caliban

A fiasco. The nations which attended failed to do anything about the resolutions passed. British prestige was raised because British delegates were present while representatives from the United States were conspicuous by their absence, but by and large the whole thing was soon forgotten, or at least thrown into the background, in the fury of protracted anarchy and civil strife within the Spanish American nations themselves.

These nations not only praised the Monroe Doctrine excessively during the first half of the nineteenth century; they also gave it a one-sided interpretation which most suited their own national interests. Almost immediately after its proclamation Colombia and La Plata (Argentina) called upon the United States for protection. The Argentines sought protection against Brazil, and reasoned as follows: The Emperor of Brazil is a descendant of the Hapsburgs; the Hapsburgs are a European dynasty; therefore, the Brazilian threat to the Argentine is a European threat to the hemisphere. There were many other appeals made by Latin-American nations calling on the Monroe Doctrine, all of them turned down by the United States in these early years.

Yet during this period there was no real threat to the security of the hemisphere. The Monroe Doctrine perhaps exerted some small influence toward this end, but infinitely more important was the situation of Great Britain, the strongest maritime power of the nineteenth century. That nation had made commitments which demanded her greatest energy in Europe, India, Australia, Canada, Africa; in a word, all over the world. Since she could not extend herself farther and take over the control of vast Latin-American regions, she had decided to support the United States so that no other European power might obtain a foothold in the New World. It was this attitude on the part of Great Britain, rather than the Monroe Doctrine, which prevented the infringement of American sovereignties during the first half of the nineteenth century.

With the rapid growth of the United States and the continued success of British imperialism it soon became evident that no other nations could challenge the combined might of the two English-speaking nations. So long as Britain was the more powerful of the two the relations between her and her former colony were warm and friendly, but when it became evident that the United States itself was Britain’s greatest rival in the Western Hemisphere, this feeling cooled considerably, and toward the middle of the century relations reached a point of friction which almost led to war.

In the meantime, the nations of Latin America were seeing the structure of the hemispheric policy of the United States being built up by this country. The first action taken against a Latin-American power was in 1831 when, after a dispute over whale-fishing rights, Captain Silas Duncan took his United States warship Lexington into the port of Soledad on the Falkland Islands off the southern Argentine coast. Here his men landed,
destroyed the artillery, blew up the powder, and carried off the scalpskins and everything else they could lay hands on. The United States diplomatic representative in Buenos Aires had authorized this expedition and refused an apology after the depredation had been committed. Great Britain went even a step farther, and in 1833 occupied the Falkland Islands by force and, despite repeated Argentine protests, has not relinquished them to this day.

The American expedition had taken place while Rosas was in power and at a time when the American consulate in Buenos Aires was about the only place of refuge for those fleeing the wrath of the tyrant. Consequently, after those Argentine refugees had later taken over the government of their country on the defeat of Rosas, they did not look upon this intervention with any serious misgiving. Their hatred of the tyrant and gratitude for American protection blotted out all other considerations.

The second intervention of the United States began with the Texas-Mexican War, followed by the annexation of Texas and finally by the war with Mexico (1846-48). This conflict resulted in the loss to Mexico of the entire California territory, comprising the states of New Mexico, Arizona, California, and adjacent regions. Great Britain vigorously but ineffectually opposed both the annexation of Texas and of the California territory by the United States. She wanted no rival to break up her commercial supremacy in the southern regions.

Although the war with Mexico was the greatest outrage ever committed by the United States against a foreign power, it did not arouse widespread anxiety in Latin America. Only Mexico and the Caribbean area were noticeably affected. The countries farther to the south were too far removed from the scene of the conflict and were too engrossed in their own national struggles against tyranny to give much heed to this writing on the wall. Sarmiento and Mitre, both of whom later became presidents of Argentina, regarded the Mexican War as a mere boundary dispute without hemispheric significance. Sarmiento, who was in the United States while the fight was going on, expressed no preoccupation or concern over the fate of Mexico. Alberdi, who was writing his brilliant essays from exile in Chile, did not let the Mexican War in any way affect his praise and admiration for the United States. Neither did the distinguished Chilean writers, Lastarria and Bilbao, whose panegyrics of the northern republic continued unabated.

The Mexican War and the subsequent annexation to the United States of vast Mexican territories did prove that while Britain had guaranteed the inviolability of Latin-American states, she would not go to war against the United States to prevent that nation's encroachments. It further proved that the United States, rather than any European country, was from this point forward the real threat against the sovereignty of the southern countries. These things become clear when hindsight is applied to their inter-
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The Mexican War was followed by the struggle between the United States and Britain for control of Central America. The British had been established in Honduras as early as 1842. Up to the mid-century after independence they had done in this region pretty much as they liked. The Central American states were played off against each other, thus preventing any concerted action against British interests. The governments of these states sent several appeals to Washington, calling on the Monroe Doctrine for protection, but the United States was unwilling to take a stand until the discovery of gold in California (1849) forced the issue. It was not until then that Central America became very obviously the key to the Pacific.

At this point the American soldier of fortune, William Walker, burst into the picture. Walker held an M.D. degree from the University of Pennsylvania, but, tiring of medical practice, he abandoned his old life and migrated to California. From there he undertook a filibustering expedition to Mexico in 1853, and when that proved unsuccessful turned his attention to Nicaragua, where a civil war was raging between the "liberals" of the city of León and the "conservatives" of the city of Granada. The war was mainly over the issue as to which of the two cities should be the capital of Nicaragua. Walker and about fifty-five of his "colonists" landed on the Nicaraguan coast and offered their services to the liberals. These American soldiers of fortune grew in number until they reached several hundreds. The conservative party was defeated; a liberal was proclaimed president, and Walker was made commander in chief of the Nicaraguan army.

Things went well until the general began to interfere with the transit of Cornelius Vanderbilt's stagecoaches across the country. This line had been built up after the California gold rush of 1849 to meet the demand for a short cut to that state without the necessity of a long and hazardous trip overland. Vanderbilt's ships left New Orleans for a Nicaraguan port on the Gulf of Mexico, then a stage line picked up travelers and took them to Lake Nicaragua, a river boat carried them across this body of water, and another stage took them to the Pacific coast, where they re-embarked for San Francisco.

Walker and Vanderbilt quarreled over the taxes to be paid by this line, and the former tried to stop all passage across Nicaragua. Vanderbilt retaliated by financing Walker's enemies, and the upshot of the whole affair was the final defeat and capture of the filibuster, who was executed by his captors.

The government of the United States had blinked at Walker's piratical activities and had also coaxed on Cornelius Vanderbilt. Control of Central America was a necessary prerequisite to the development of the West, and
private individuals could help bring this control about without too directly involving the national government. If they fought among themselves on foreign soil, that was a matter of small moment. They were mere way-clearers for the later period of economic expansion.

At the same time as Walker and Vanderbilt were fighting it out in Nicaragua, back in the United States there arose a strong interest in building a canal across some part of Central America. Long before any definite plans had been made Great Britain and the United States had clashed over this issue. A treaty, made in 1850, placing the potential canal under joint control of the two nations proved unsatisfactory; feeling quickly rose to fever pitch, and by 1855 war seemed most likely. However, public opinion in England opposed any armed conflict; Disraeli spoke effectively against it, saying that his country would profit commercially by American control of that region, and finally the British Government gave way. It was perhaps this yielding more than anything else which prevented war and left the United States supreme in the hemisphere.

The annexation of Texas, the successful war against Mexico and expansion to the Pacific, the discovery of California gold at Sutter’s Mill, the exploits of Walker and Vanderbilt, and the final pre-eminence of the United States in Central America—all these things entered into the early imperialistic policy of the United States, creating the legend of adventure, romance, revolution, and wealth which the majority of the citizens of this country began to see in the “ungovernable revolution-ridden but picturesque states of the Caribbean where pickings were ripe for the taking.”

Only the outbreak of the American Civil War in 1861 prevented an extension of the imperialistic policy at this time. Latin Americans generally, however, did not feel the imminence of any such expansion, nor did their leaders indicate awareness of it. During the war and the period of reconstruction to follow, Mitre and then Sarmiento were presidents of Argentina (1862–74), Dom Pedro II ruled in Brazil, and Juárez came to the top in Mexico. All of these rulers were friendly to the United States, and three of them had been in this country, the last as a political refugee. While Latin-American patience had been sorely tried by the recent expansion of the northern republic, wholesale interventions had not yet taken place; the early friendship for this country was revived; and the hemisphere was again placed on a footing of good fellowship.

This rapprochement was strengthened by the French invasion of Mexico, under Napoleon III, and the establishment of the brief Mexican Empire of Maximilian. The invasion itself had taken place while the United States was engaged in fratricidal war and was powerless to act. The nations of Latin America, thus finding themselves suddenly without even the ghost of a Monroe Doctrine to protect them, felt the deepest anxiety and, after the Civil War, looked hopefully toward the United States for sup-
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port of Mexican sovereignty. These hopes were realized when President Lincoln dispatched a strong cable to the French Emperor.

This French intervention of Mexico was the only great breach of Latin-
American sovereignty since independence had been won; it lasted five years. Most American textbooks on the subject give the impression that the threat of the United States to enforce the Monroe Doctrine was the primary cause of the French withdrawal which left Maximilian to his fate. Mexican texts give the contrary impression—that the long-suffering Mexican army under the Indian Juárez was the principal factor in the defeat of the foreign Emperor. While both of these statements have a grain of truth in them—the second considerably more than the first—the pith of the matter was that Bismarck had already started a war in Europe and the French Emperor called back most of the troops he had sent to Mexico because he needed them at home. It was certainly no great victory for the Monroe Doctrine.

During the course of the nineteenth century the Latin-American attitude toward the Monroe Doctrine had changed considerably. Time after time the southern republics had called upon it for protection, always in vain. Time after time their national territories had been violated without any show of concern in the United States. Britain had taken the Falkland Islands from Argentina in 1833, and there was no suggestion of a protest from our country. In 1835 Britain had also occupied a portion of the coast of Honduras, and there was no protest. In 1838 France had bombarded Vera Cruz in the so-called Pastry War and the United States had said nothing about the Monroe Doctrine. France, Spain, Germany, and Great Britain had intervened in Haiti in the years 1869, 1871, 1872, and 1877 respectively, again without protests from the United States. Italy had threatened Colombia; France had used force against Santo Domingo, and several European nations had intervened in Central America without having the Monroe Doctrine brought to bear against them. One author refers to these interventions as “violations wholesale,” and points out ten major instances, and several more minor ones, when European force was applied to countries of this hemisphere without protest from the United States.¹⁰⁰

There were only three instances when the Doctrine was strongly in-
voked: during the French invasion of Mexico under Maximilian, during the British Venezuelan boundary dispute in 1895, and when there was a combined German-English-Italian threat to intervene in Venezuela in 1902. In the first instance Bismarck unwittingly helped to make the Doctrine effective; in the second, Great Britain found herself forced to back down because of the Boer question in South Africa, and in the third, President Theodore Roosevelt wielded his big stick over the head of the German Kaiser, sending him a cable stating that unless the Germans got out of Venezuela within twenty-four hours, Dewey’s fleet, which was already on
its way south, would blast them to pieces. Great Britain refused to back up Germany and the Kaiser had to withdraw. This was perhaps the only instance in which the Monroe Doctrine had really proved to be a positive protection to the hemisphere.

Nevertheless, the very existence of such a doctrine, whether invoked or not, served as a strong discouraging factor to imperialistic-minded European nations. On only a single occasion had a European power attempted to take over the government of a nation in this hemisphere. Most Latin Americans willingly admit this much. But they follow up this admission by adding that the Monroe Doctrine gave them the kind of protection that a cat gives to a mouse when other cats are in the neighborhood. Europe was being kept out of Latin America so that the United States might swallow up the southern territories at her leisure.

By the end of the century this began to be clearly evident. In 1895, when Richard Olney, then United States Secretary of State, invoked the Monroe Doctrine in the dispute between Britain and Venezuela over the boundary of British Guiana, he stated flatly that his country was "sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition." This statement became known as "Olney's fiat" and aroused considerable antipathy in the southern countries.

Only three years later the United States declared war against Spain because of the alleged blowing up of the battleship Maine in Havana Harbor, and thus began the unhappy period of "interventions wholesale" which caused a rupture between Latin America and the United States that has not entirely healed to this day.

Trouble had been brewing in Cuba for a long time; that island and a few smaller surrounding islands in the West Indies group were Spain's last colonial possessions in the American hemisphere. Her treatment of the Cubans was anything but enlightened. José Martí, the Cuban patriot and martyr, who lived for many years in New York City writing and working constantly to stir up enthusiasm for the Cuban cause, did much to fan the flames of hatred of the Spanish regime and to evoke sympathy for the island patriots. Theodore Roosevelt, with his invertebrate love of making a big splash regardless of the consequences, whooped up the war fever and personally trained his "Roughriders" to take part in the campaign. William Randolph Hearst went all out in drumming up support for the war against Spain. The citizens of the United States felt considerable sympathy for the Cuban people, but popular feeling alone would never have resulted in war had it not been goaded on by Hearst, Roosevelt, the sinking of the Maine, the speeches and writings of Martí, and by certain business interests. Senator Thurston of Nebraska, for example, spoke for these interests as follows: "War with Spain would increase the business and earnings of every American railroad, it would increase the output of every
Ariel and Caliban

American factory, it would stimulate every branch of industry and commerce."

All of these people except Martí, who had been killed in the meantime while trying to free his native land, were extremely well pleased when the Maine blew up at Havana and war was declared. However, as it was the first conflict in which the United States had engaged with a European power for nearly a hundred years, the inhabitants of the Atlantic seaboard lived from day to day expecting to see the Spanish fleet suddenly appear offshore with cannon blazing. No such incident ever occurred, and the United States Navy soon defeated the Spaniards.

General William Shafter, who commanded the American ground forces at Santiago, Cuba, did not have quite so easy a time of it. Shafter was a whale of a man who weighed close to three hundred pounds. No one doubted his courage but his obesity made his active campaigning difficult. The tropical heat almost prostrated him, and he spent hours daily lying half naked in a hammock "with one soldier massaging his balloonlike torso, while another swept cooling breezes over him with a palm-leaf fan." When it became necessary for the general to move about he had his men tear loose a huge door on which he ensconced his immense hulk and was thus carried over the rough terrain.

It was probably the worst managed war in the history of the United States. Medical supplies were at the bottom of incoming cargo, and a great portion of them never got ashore at all. Disease was rife in the American ranks; men were issued thick woolen uniforms for wear in the tropical heat, fed rations of half-rotten "embaled beef," and in the long run there were fourteen times as many deaths due to sickness as to actual combat. W. E. Woodward, in his *A New American History*, says that this foul beef aroused such howling criticism of the meat packers that it later led to government supervision of their industry.

Despite all this, the Americans were quickly victorious in both the West Indies and off the Philippine Islands. In this latter sector Admiral Dewey defeated the Spanish fleet with the loss of only a single man, who had died of heart failure due to the excitement. The entire war lasted less than four months and American dead did not total 6000.

Before and during the conflict opinion in Latin America had been divided as between those who were pro-Spanish and those who were pro-United States. But Spain's quick, disastrous, and inglorious defeat aroused a quiver of racial sympathy in her former colonies, and this was not long in being converted into the beginning of a very real fear of the great northern power. When it became clear that the United States had "liberated" Cuba and Puerto Rico merely to take them over herself, this fear became widespread and intense.

Latin Americans were especially galled by the difference between the word and the deed of the northern republic. When war was declared on
Spain, in April 1898, the war resolution had included these words: "The United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island [Cuba] except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people."

Such was the word. The deed was quite different. United States military forces occupied Cuba and ran the government between 1898 and 1903, and, after their withdrawal in the latter year, there were three more armed interventions, the last ending in 1922. These three interventions, excluding the first which might be attributed to conditions following the war, resulted in the military occupation of Cuba by armed force of the United States for a period of about eight years. The Platt Amendment (1901) gave the United States complete control over the foreign policy of Cuba and also sanctioned her intervention at any time "to restore order." Cuba was forced to incorporate this amendment in her constitution, and it was not abrogated by the United States until 1934.

The epoch of large-scale capital investments in Latin America, which led to large-scale interventions, began after the Spanish-American War. The United States had by that time recovered sufficiently from the Civil War, and from the terrible reconstruction period which followed, to be on the alert for good investment opportunities wherever these might appear.

Between 1870 and 1900 more than ten million immigrants had entered the United States, and during the next twenty years more than twelve million others followed. Most of these immigrants were adults who had lived through their unproductive childhood years in Europe. Many thousands of them had received their education and training at European expense. They came to America in their prime and entered at once into the productive fabric of American life. The call of the West had left a vacuum on the Atlantic seaboard which had to be filled with imported workers, and these immigrants were brought in for that purpose. The population of the United States had increased from 38,500,000 in 1870 to 76,000,000 in 1900, then to more than 105,000,000 in 1920.

The epoch of westward expansion and the glittering frontier had been brought to a halt. Railways now spanned the continent and vast industries had sprung up. The earlier and cruder age of the Vanderbilts and the Goulds had given way to a more impersonal "age of dinosaurs," as James Truslow Adams calls it, in which immense industrial trusts practically took over the economic life of the nation. Andrew Carnegie, J. P. Morgan, and John D. Rockefeller built up their fortunes during this period. The main characteristic of this period was size itself—the immensity of the nation's industrial growth, productive power, organization, and wealth. A sort of impersonal economic law seemed to hold sway over all individual tastes and character. It bore the indelible stamp which marked the path of property everywhere. It cried out its goal of the almighty dollar, wealth for the
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During this age of the dinosaurs, or, "Empire Builders," the nation had become a great world power. The enterprises of these men had built up the West, had girded the continent with steel rails, had developed the great resources of a rapidly expanding economy. That economy might receive a slight setback when the most obvious of these opportunities had been taken advantage of, but it would not stop. It would simply look for other and more fertile fields for investment—fields where the return would continue to be fabulous. They found these fields in the undeveloped regions of Latin America.

Between 1900 and 1922 the national wealth of the United States jumped from approximately $88,000,000,000 to more than $320,000,000,000—an increase of 263 per cent. During the same period the population had risen from 76,000,000 to approximately 108,000,000, an increase of only 42 per cent. This meant that there was a tremendous increase in the standard of living inside the United States, and that the amount of fluid capital had increased so greatly that there was a surplus left over from home investment which was ready to be placed in foreign countries.

Other considerations, of course, entered into the picture. Certain essential raw products not obtainable within the continental United States, such as rubber, had to be procured elsewhere if the automobile industry was to be kept from stalling. Certain more or less luxury products, such as coffee, would be imported in tremendous volume in order to cater to the raised standard of living inside the United States. These were only incidental to the process of imperialistic expansion. The primary characteristic of that expansion was the investment of United States capital in foreign countries, especially the other American countries. We are not speaking now of trade but of the purchasing of titles to lands and mines, the construction and ownership of rail lines, factories, and refineries, the development under United States ownership of sugar plantations in Cuba, oil wells in Mexico and Venezuela, copper mines in Chile, and so on over the whole range of possible investment.

In the year 1900 total United States investments in Latin America were as follows: $50,000,000 in Cuba, $185,000,000 in Mexico, and only $55,000,000 in all the rest of Latin America. By 1911, year of the fall of Diaz, investments in Mexico alone had risen from $185,000,000 to more than one billion dollars. In that year a small moneyed group of American citizens actually owned more of Mexico’s productive industry than did the entire Mexican population. In the year 1911 United States investments in Mexico totaled $1,055,000,000, while Mexican capital investments came to only $793,000,000.

More or less the same thing happened in Cuba. United States investments there jumped from a paltry $50,000,000 in 1900 to nearly a billion
and a half by 1925. Again a small group of American investors actually controlled more Cuban industry than the entire population of that island. Total United States capital invested in Latin America increased from $290,000,000 in 1900 to approximately four billion dollars in 1924, according to figures of the United States Department of Commerce.

It was in order to protect these investments of a small minority that the government of the United States, utilizing the tax money from all of the people, intervened time after time in internal Latin-American affairs. Sometimes these interventions took place merely to preserve order so that property would not be destroyed and money lost. Sometimes they took the form of strong United States support of the man or party most favorable to North American interests.

Sometimes when Latin-American governments defaulted on repayment of loans made by private banks the United States Government occupied the country involved, took over the machinery of government, controlled both elections and customs in order to enforce the repayment of these loans.

With the prospect of the United States Navy and Marines to give them support in collecting, American banks sometimes pressed loans on Latin-American governments with every trick at their disposal. It has frequently been reported that Jorge Leguía, son of the dictator of Peru, was given more than $400,000 as his "take" for persuading his father's government to accept a big loan from a New York banking house.¹⁴ There were numerous other such incidents.

In many parts of Latin America economic penetration and political interference became inseparable. Together they added up to Yankee imperialism on a wide scale; and for millions of citizens of the southern countries the United States became known as the Colossus of the North, ready to impose its will by force whenever the occasion arose.

A brief summary of the most important of these armed interventions will give some idea of their scope. From 1899 to 1933 Nicaragua was virtually a protectorate of the United States, and for more than twenty years of that time the country was under military occupation. Aid was given to a rebellion in Panama and that province was "taken" from Colombia in 1903. The Dominican Republic was under absolute United States control between 1905 and 1924 and was occupied by Marines for ten years; Haiti was under military occupation from 1915 to 1934; between 1907 and 1925 there were six armed interventions in Honduras; Mexico was invaded several times between 1846 and 1916, including the bombardment and occupation of Vera Cruz in 1914, and the punitive expedition of more than 10,000 men sent into Mexico under General Pershing, who chased Pancho Villa for several months across that country while World War I was raging in Europe. Many other Latin-American nations were coerced by only slightly less violent means. The Mexican writer Luis Quintanilla in his
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Quintanilla in his

book, A Latin American Speaks, mentions a total of sixty United States interventions in fifty years.

Some of these armed interventions read like the farfetched melodramas

of cheap adventure fiction, but there was nothing fictional in the impres-
sion which they made on the Latin-American mind. Take, for example,
the case of Panama.

For some years the United States had been interested in building a canal

across Central America. The French had started the construction of one

across Panama in 1884, but after five years the construction company

charged with the job had crashed, and work was called off. The chief

engineer of the French company, Bunau-Varilla, acquired the rights and

equipment of the bankrupt organization, hired a well-known New York

attorney named Nelson Cromwell to help him, and tried to sell out to the

government of the United States for a big price. He asked more than

$100,000,000, and the congressional committee investigating the matter esti-

mated the company's assets as being worth approximately $40,000,000.

Consequently they advised that the canal be dug across Nicaragua instead

of across Panama. Bunau-Varilla, fearful of losing everything, sent Nicha-

guan stamps bearing pictures of erupting volcanoes to every member of

the Senate in an effort to defeat the new bill. Fortunately for the French-

man, one of these volcanoes broke loose just before a decision was reached

in the Senate, and the Nicaraguan project was defeated.

Colombia and the United States then became engaged in treaty discus-
sions about a canal across Panama, which was then a part of Colombian

territory. The Colombian Congress was unwilling to accept the sum which

the United States had offered ($10,000,000 cash and a yearly rental fee of

$250,000) and adjourned without having approved the treaty.

Bunau-Varilla, his attorney Cromwell, and one of their Panamanian

friends, Manuel Amador, physician of the Panama Railway Company,

then plotted a revolution for the independence of Panama. There had

already been flurries of separatism in Panama, and the potential sum of

$10,000,000 which might be snatched from under the very nose of Colombi-

n made prospects look brighter for the "patriots." Panama was promised

immediate recognition by the United States if a revolution did occur, not

by the government of the United States, but by Cromwell, Bunau-Varilla,

and Amador. However, to help matters along, a United States warship,

the Nashville, was sent to the scene with instructions to prevent an armed

conflict. Soldiers from the Nashville, following these instructions, refused

to permit a body of Colombian troops which had been sent to quell the

revolution to cross the isthmus. The revolution thus came off; the news

was wired to Washington; the new government was recognized promptly,

and negotiations were entered into with the independent state of Panama.

Construction on the canal was soon under way.

Several years later, in 1911, Theodore Roosevelt, while speaking at the
state university in Berkeley, California, used these words: “I took the Canal Zone and let the Congress debate, and while the debate goes on, the Canal does also.”

Colombia did not let these words pass unnoticed, but renewed her efforts to obtain some compensation for the loss of Panama. Finally, in 1921, she was given $25,000,000, but this payment did not in any degree allay her bitterness toward the Colossus of the North.

Bunau-Varilla served as the first Panamanian minister to the United States; the New York attorney Cromwell received a check for $800,000 for his part in the affair, and Amador, the railroad physician, became the first president of Panama.\(^{131}\)

The Panama Revolution took place in 1903, and the few friends the United States had left in Latin America after the occupation of Cuba were now convinced of the Yankee menace. There was a great wave of protest from all quarters. Elihu Root, Secretary of State under Theodore Roosevelt, made an eloquent attempt to still these Latin-American fears at the third Pan-American Congress held at Rio in 1906: “We wish for no victories but those of peace; for no territory except our own; for no sovereignty except the sovereignty over ourselves. We deem the independence and equal rights of the smallest and weakest member of the family of nations entitled to as much respect as those of greatest empire, and we deem the observance of that respect the chief guaranty of the weak against the strong. We neither claim nor desire any rights, or privileges, or powers that we do not freely concede to every American Republic.”

All Latin America applauded these words, but again the deed and the statement differed. Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Cuba, Honduras, and Mexico all soon felt the sharp claw of Yankee imperialism upon their backs. For many years the first four of these countries were under United States military dictatorship, with their customs and finances under the complete control of banking houses of this country, which thus assured themselves of profits through force. Their interest in placing such loans under armed protection is readily understandable, for the sums involved were often fifteen to twenty millions in a single instance. The interest on $20,000,000 for one year at 6 per cent amounts to $1,200,000—no mean profit even for a New York banking firm.

The story of Mexico was somewhat different; it revolved around the development of Mexican oil, an issue still alive in Pan-American relations. In 1900 Edward L. Doheny and other American oilmen purchased 280,000 acres of Mexican land for the sum of $325,000, or about $1.15 an acre. President Díaz had encouraged the investment of American capital in Mexico, and Doheny simply took a wildcatter's chance and struck it rich. Fabulous oil wells were found on his Mexican lands. A good well in California brings in 600 barrels a day; a single Mexican well produced 70,000
barrels a day at the beginning, and, under forcibly reduced flow, continued to produce 25,000 barrels a day for many years. Another well, the famous Blue Hill, or Cerro Azul, the largest oil well in the world, produced between 45,000 and 50,000 barrels a day, also for several years.\textsuperscript{122}

Toward the end of the Diaz regime things began to look a little less favorable for the American oil interests. The Mexican dictator wanted to open the doors to British investments in the same field on terms which made them serious competitors. Before things had reached an impasse Diaz was ousted by Madero, who had many friends in the United States. Madero lasted less than two years and was followed by Victoriano Huerta, who took over the government by force. Huerta had the ideallistic but incompetent Madero executed and then threw his body into the street in an effort to make it appear that his death had been an accident. Immediately on assuming power Huerta made it plain that he favored British financial interests, especially British investments in oil, and Great Britain recognized him at once, making him a large loan.

It was at about this time that Woodrow Wilson was inaugurated as President of the United States. President Taft, who was just going out of office, had taken no action at all in regard to Mexico, regarding the Huerta issue as too hot to handle in the last days of his administration. American financial interests were asking for intervention, or at least for a strong stand against Huerta. President Wilson made the latter course the settled policy of his government. He not only refused to recognize Mexico but gave as his reasons that Huerta had attained power by unconstitutional and violent means, had disbanded his Congress and imprisoned the Mexican deputies, had assassinated his predecessor, and was unable to restore order in Mexico. No mention was made of the fact that he was anti-United States in his economic leanings, a fact which had at least as much weight as any of the rest. The wife of our chargé d'affaires in Mexico City, Edith O'Shaughnessy, made the following ironic comment: "Our government gave warning that it would not consider concessions granted during the Huerta regime as binding on the Mexicans. It makes one rub one's eyes."\textsuperscript{123}

This was the beginning of a new epoch in the relations between the United States and Latin America. First of all, the "moral" principle had been invoked; second, recognition was being withheld from a de facto Latin-American government as a measure of coercion against that government. President Wilson later clarified the issue when he stated in conversation that it was his intention "to teach these Latin-American republics to elect good men."

The general consensus of opinion at the time seemed to be that Huerta was not a "good man." Most of his own countrymen now admit that he was an inveterate drunkard, a murderer, a ruthless tyrant who had no respect for constitutional law, an upholder of the feudal policy of the Diaz
regime. No sooner had he attained power than he filled the jails with political prisoners, having dozens of them shot. He surrounded the halls of Congress, declared that body dissolved, and imprisoned one hundred and ten Mexican deputies. Revolution broke out against Huerta almost immediately under Carranza, Obregón, Calles, Villa, and other leaders. Carranza was declared "commander of the constitutionalist forces," and Huerta proved unable to "pacify" the country, which was the principal purpose for which he had forced himself into power.

In spite of all these things, when President Wilson stated that revolution and assassination must come to an end in Latin America, and that he was going to teach those nations to elect good men, he overlooked the fact that no Mexican government had ever come to power since the days of independence except through violent or fraudulent means. He also neglected to apply his "moral" principle to Peru, very quickly recognized by this country, although its government under Benavides was fairly steeped in blood. Latin Americans very naturally questioned the validity of President Wilson's sense of objective morality.

The attitude of Great Britain throughout this episode, and the attitude of all the Mexicans who supported Huerta, was that if the United States had recognized the Huerta regime the revolutions could have been suppressed. Non-recognition lent powerful support to Huerta's enemies, encouraging them to open rebellion.

Up to this point, however, feeling in Latin America, and even in many parts of Mexico itself, was not strongly anti-United States, because, despite the apparent justice of recognizing whatever government is in power, it was widely agreed that Huerta would have been but another edition of the bloody and incorrigible Díaz.

President Wilson did not stop with non-recognition. Prodded on by American oil interests, he lifted the embargo which this country had placed on arms crossing the Texas-Mexican border, and thus enabled the revolutionists who controlled that area to obtain weapons and munitions. It was later brought out in a congressional investigation in Washington that Mr. Doheny had, through his representative, Felicitas Villareal, helped along the "constitutionalist" cause of Carranza with $200,000 in cash. Furthermore, the oil companies refused to pay taxes to Huerta, and furnished oil to the value of $685,000 to the revolutionary forces.182

President Wilson in the meantime referred to his policy as "watchful waiting," and made the following comment: "Little by little Huerta has been carefully isolated. By a little every day his power and prestige are crumbling, and the collapse is not far away. We shall not, I believe, be obliged to alter our policy of watchful waiting."

He was mistaken, for that policy was soon to be altered most violently. The fuse was lighted by the so-called "Tampico flag incident." A group of American soldiers had landed in a forbidden area in Tampico, were ar-
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Ariel

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rested by the Mexican authorities, held for half an hour, and then released. A formal apology was given to the American commander; the Mexican official who had ordered the arrest was punished, and a salute was ordered given the American flag. The American admiral demanded that the salute consist of twenty-one guns. The Mexicans balked at making such a tremendous concession, for a twenty-one-gun salute is given only after the gravest outrages, and Huerta, who had already tendered his personal apologies, along with those of the commandant, attempted to excuse his gov-

ernment from the indignity. The Americans were adamant. For further argument ten warships were promptly dispatched to Tampico with a regiment of Marines. Huerta now offered to place the matter before the Hague tribunal. When this offer brought a negative response he agreed to have the twenty-one-gun salute fired, provided the Americans fired their twenty-one-gun return volley at the same time. Otherwise, he said, he was afraid that the salute might not be returned at all and his government would thus be humiliated.

The argument was still going on when it was learned in Washington that a German vessel, the *Ypiranga*, was nearing Vera Cruz with a load of munitions for the Huerta government. The government of the United States, now determined to bring about the fall of Huerta, decided to block the arrival of this aid, and President Wilson wired the American forces to take Vera Cruz at once. Despite strong Mexican opposition, a landing was made, and after considerable fighting the city was captured. Seventeen American soldiers were killed; about two hundred Mexicans, among them several women and children, lost their lives in the storming of Vera Cruz. Even the rebellious constitutionalists under Carranza, obviously aided by the incident, strongly protested against this violation of Mexico’s sovereignty.

The capture of Mexico’s main port cut off a fourth of that country’s im-

ports and made the survival of the Huerta regime impossible. Mexico City was taken by the revolutionists; Carranza became president. He was promptly assassinated, and the revolution continued. By this time the United States had become involved in World War I, and Mexico became a secondary issue. Naturally feeling in that country continued to be bitterly anti-American; it was rumored that the place was infested with German spies, and many journalists even suggested that Germany had been invited to use Mexico as a base from which to invade the United States.

The effect of this outrage against Mexico was to make a great part of Spanish America suspicious of the United States throughout the period of World War I when co-operation was so badly needed. Brazil, which con-

sidered herself as standing apart from the bloc of Spanish-speaking na-

tions of the south, was the only large Latin-American power to declare war on the side of the allies. There was considerable pro-allied feeling in many quarters, but the Vera Cruz incident stood out like a sore thumb, prevent-
ing the mobilization of anything approaching the spirit of continental solidarity.

After the war there were further interventions and the military occupation of several Caribbean regions continued. Nicaragua was the last of these storm centers. In 1928, at the peak of North American occupation, there was a total of 5,821 officers and men in that country. One hundred and thirty-five of them lost their lives while serving there, and the occupation cost the taxpayers of the United States $5,517,832, as testified by Major General B. H. Fuller before the House Appropriations Committee, February 9, 1931.

It has often been said that investment follows the flag, but in the case of United States imperialism in Latin America the process was generally reversed. Investments were first made and then the flag was sent to protect them for the small moneyed group in whose interest they were held. The American people at large neither profited from these investments nor had any interest in backing them up with the lives of their loved ones or with millions of their taxpayers' dollars. Nevertheless, in those days this was our national policy and it aroused widespread ill will in Latin America.

A few quotations from outstanding leaders and writers of Latin America during the past century will show more clearly than any further generalized comment the slow growth of this ill will toward the United States.

In 1819 Simón Bolívar expressed his opinion of the United States in these words: "Who can resist the love which so intelligent a government inspires... Who can resist the sway of that inspired nation which, with a skillful, active, and powerful hand, directs all of its energies always and everywhere toward social perfection, which is the true goal of human institutions?"

In 1824 Santander, the national hero of Colombia, said: "The action of President Monroe in making that proclamation is eminently just. It is an act worthy of the classic land of American liberty."

In 1852 Alberdi, whose writings formed the basis of the Argentine constitution, wrote: "The type who best represents the greatness of the United States is no military Napoleon; it is Washington, and Washington does not stand for military triumphs but for prosperity, growth, organization, peace. He is the hero of order within liberty par excellence." Alberdi then says that the English language is the language of liberty, industry, and order, and he calls upon his compatriots to "follow the example of the civilization of the Anglo-Saxon race."

In 1873 Juan Montalvo of Ecuador, after viewing our Civil War, commented as follows: "A nation so extravagant and fantastic as the United States of America, where the customs run contrary to the laws... where democracy reigns in institutions and aristocracy in the form of pride and scorn excludes from the common society those whose color is not light
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enough . . . this nation, I say, in the midst of its liberty, its liberalism, its progress, must inspire terror in the breast of South Americans."

In 1891 José Martí, the apostle of Cuban independence, who lived in New York for many years and probably came to know the United States better than any other outstanding Latin American writer, made this statement in an article appearing in a Mexican newspaper: "The scorn of our formidable neighbor, who does not know us, is the greatest danger of our America. The day of our meeting is near, and it is urgent that this neighbor come to understand us well so that she will not continue to feel scorn for us. Through ignorance and greed, perhaps, she might be brought to lay hands upon us."

José Enrique Rodó, of Uruguay, whose essay Ariel became a sort of Bible for Latin-American youth for more than a generation, wrote in that famous little book in 1900: "The mighty nation of the north is now carrying out a sort of moral conquest over us. Admiration for its greatness and its power is a feeling that is growing rapidly among our ruling classes, and perhaps even more among the multitude which is so easily impressed with success or victory . . . . Today the people of that nation aspire to the leadership of the world's civilization and look upon themselves as the precursors and originators of the culture of the future. The well-known phrase 'America can beat the world,' ironically quoted by Laboulaye, is the deep conviction of almost any virile westerner. . . . There is no point in trying to convince these people that the torch lighted on the shores of the Mediterranean more than three thousand years ago, which soared to glory in the culture of Athens, a work and tradition of which we Latin Americans form a part, adds up to a sum which cannot be equaled by any equation of Washington plus Edison. North Americans would almost be willing to rewrite the Book of Genesis in order to put themselves on the front page."

Rubén Darío, born in tiny Nicaragua, but Spanish America's greatest and most cosmopolitan poet, wrote this final paragraph in the introduction to his finest book, Songs of Life and Hope, which came out in 1905: "If in these verses there is a political feeling, it is because that feeling appears universally. And if you find lines to a certain well-known president, it is because they express the protest of an entire continent. Tomorrow we may all become Yankee Americans (indeed, that is our most likely destiny). At any rate, my own protest remains written on the wings of the immaculate swans, as illustrious as Jupiter."

In 1911 García Calderón, one of Peru's best-known writers, wrote at the beginning of a chapter entitled "The North American Peril" these stinging words: "To save themselves from Yankee imperialism the Latin-American democracies would almost accept a German alliance, or the aid of Japanese arms. Everywhere the Americans of the North are feared. In the Antilles and in Central America hostility against the Anglo-Saxon invaders assumes the character of a Latin crusade."
In 1917, when the United States asked for hemispheric solidarity in the face of the German menace during World War I, Iñigo Enrique Artigas of Colombia wrote: "Our pro-Ally sentiments are so well known that it might be believed that the attitude of this journal would be definitely in favor of the United States in its contention with Germany. But—higher than these opinions—first in our minds is love of our country. And that love will never allow us to forget the offenses which the Anglo-Saxon republic has committed against us. When that nation invokes the principles of international law to induce us to join her protest against Germany, she is engaged in a mockery. . . . With what authority, after events like those of November 3, 1903 [Artigas refers to Panama], can a nation speak in the name of international law?"

From the end of World War I up to the year 1933 Latin-American antipathy toward the United States was deep, bitter, and almost omnipresent. Blanco Fombona of Venezuela blasted away at the hated northern colossus and its people of the Caribbean countries, summarizing hemispheric relations as a "duel between two races"; Vasconcelos of Mexico called Elihu Root's slave Pan-Americanism "more dangerous than the cannon of the old English pirates," and in his History of Mexico reiterated a dozen times that all Mexican governments between 1913 and 1930 had been mere bookkeepers of the Embassy of the United States; Manuel Ugarte of Argentina made himself famous with an attack on Yankee imperialism which became the classic analysis.

In between these spurts of bitterness were sandwiched a few words of admiration for the material progress of the United States, and of respect for the achievement of individual liberty within that nation. Fear was often mingled with envy in these Latin-American attacks, and the envy always shone through.

Bad as the history of American imperialism is, the other side of the picture certainly does not deserve to escape the criticism which it justly merits. The North American viewpoint is presented cogently in Duncan Aikman's The All-American Front. "The highlight in the Latin-American reaction was not that they protested against the stronger neighbor's conduct and suspected his intentions. The key to the Latin mental process is that the spokesmen for the indignant republics recognized no imperfections or provocations in the conduct of their own governments, that they dramatized themselves as the victims of a wholesale outrage before the outrage itself had developed beyond a local basis, and shrieked against the imperialism of the 'New Rome' without making the slightest effort to arouse, or co-operate with, the vast, latent forces in the northern republic which were opposed to imperialism." 138

As an example of his argument Aikman points to the case of Panama, which brought forth prolonged and unanimous howls of "wolf" from the nations of Latin America, every one of which regarded Colombia "simply
Ariel and Caliban

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as the victim of her idealistic patriotism." There was no slight suggestion that Colombia "might have been obstructing an international enterprise of vast economic benefit to all the twenty republics.

This is the strongest argument that can be adduced in favor of intervention; the reader must decide whether it is strong enough. Aikman does emphasize one point which Latin Americans have often overlooked; that there has existed at all times in the United States a powerful popular feeling against economic imperialism anywhere, that the masses of the citizens of the United States "look with acute disapproval on the idea of subjugating independent republics for the benefit of powerful oil, mining, power, and banking interests."

Latin-American writers and speakers, particularly those who visited the United States personally and then took a belligerent anti-North American stand (Marti, Ugarte, Vasconcelos, et al.), did not weaken their enemies but only alienated their friends within this country by the manner in which they expressed themselves. Too frequently they demanded respect for the sovereign integrity of governments which had neither a real sovereignty nor a real integrity. They minimized or failed to point out that in case after case the Latin-American governments involved were utterly irresponsible, that they defaulted their obligations with a recklessness which was inexcusable, that frequently within the countries violated there were strong native elements which favored intervention, that some governments called for such intervention without duress, that many Latin Americans were not (and are not) above requesting help from the United States, provided it favors their side. Aikman indirectly suggests that to point out this distortion of the perspective might be like "accusing a lady of losing her critical integrity while being ravished," and thus almost nullifies his entire argument.

Far more significant than the opinions of Aikman and of any other writer defending the United States point of view were those expressed by the Uruguayan Rodó, in the year 1900. Rodó’s little book Ariel transcends the ordinary bounds of an essay on a foreign country. He expressed the sentiments of a whole people in making that famous comparison between materialistic "Caliban," the United States, and the far finer embodiment of all cultural values, or "Ariel," which the nations of Latin America were made to represent.

Rodó characterized the United States as a nation practically without a culture. He even referred to our educational system as a vast leveling process which lost in profundity what it gained in extension. North Americans acquired but did not create works of art; they had never felt the "divine frenzy of poem or picture." Their civilization, despite its material progress, suggested a vast emptiness. They formed an uncouth nation whose God was utilitarianism.
Rodó admired the spirit of liberty which reigned in the United States, and praised the North American's robust efficiency, inventiveness, his powerful desire for betterment, and his ennoblement of useful labor. He praised but minimized the redemption of human lives through a higher standard of living, and suggested, following Emerson, that a nation should be judged by its superior minority rather than by its masses.

Rodó's conclusion was that the hemisphere might best fulfill its destiny by combining the North American's liberty and material progress with the Latin American's hallowed cultural tradition and respect for genius. He admitted great admiration among many Latin Americans for the democratic civilization of the north, and warned against its encroachment on the higher cultural values so long exalted in the south. Only through fusion of the two could there be attained a real fulfillment.

Rodó made at least one fundamental error in his essay, which was to deny the existence of a powerful and creative culture in the United States. Unfortunately this error was magnified by many of Rodó's less well-informed readers, and it became the fashion in Latin America to remember only the writer's premise: Ariel and Caliban. This was the starting point, not the end of Rodó's own thinking.

Latin Americans exalted their culture to the skies and felt in this way a kind of superiority over the average citizen of the United States. Culture became a sort of "untouchable" value which lifted many a high-soaring spirit above such materialistic considerations as decent government, material progress, education for the masses, and so forth. There is no doubt that this attitude, not begun but canalized by Rodó, has done great damage to the Latin-American way of life. Strangest of all is the almost incredible fact that long after Latin Americans generally had passed beyond the Rodó stage of thinking, in the years following World War I, people in the United States began to pick up the already fallen torch of the Uruguayan essayist and to hoist it on high, shouting to the heavens the superiority of the Latin culture as compared with that of their own nation!

During the past fifty years Latin America has been brought into intimate contact with the culture of the United States. World War I shut off France as a place to which her students, thinkers, and artists might journey as they had for so many years previously. The only country that remained open to them was the United States. Our universities, libraries, and other cultural institutions began for the first time to attract large numbers of citizens from the southern countries. The movement was greatly intensified by the flowering of American literature, drama, and art during the past half-century. The best plays in New York were immediately translated into Spanish and put on in Latin America. Eugene O'Neill, Ernest Hemingway, John Steinbeck, John Dos Passos, William Faulkner, Tennessee Williams, Henry Miller, Edward Albee, Arthur Miller became as widely known in Latin America as any of the native authors.
The motion picture and radio broadcasting became further mouthpieces for the great northern culture, and covered the continent all the way from the Rio Grande down to Tierra del Fuego. By the time World War II began, Latin Americans had completely reversed their estimate of the cultural life of the United States. The Department of State and the Co-ordinator of Inter-American Affairs helped the process along by bringing distinguished Latin Americans to this country and by sending distinguished North Americans south. They also established centers for the teaching of English in nearly all of the leading southern cities, assembled and dispatched libraries for these centers, gave funds for educational projects of many kinds, and kept men of high intellectual standing in Latin America as cultural attachés. The zeal to learn English and the enthusiasm for the culture of the United States became omnipresent.

This feeling reached such a peak that the national librarian of Columbia, one of the most outstanding intellectuals of his country, made a special plea for a "defense against the wave of foreign culture which is flowing in upon us." His words were directed to a special congressional committee, and among the thoughts expressed were the following: "It is necessary for us to realize that times oblige us to think about defending our own culture and our racial tradition. Let us welcome the wave of foreign culture which is moving toward us, forcing itself upon us, but unless we devise practical means to defend our own native and traditional culture, it will disappear under the avalanche of abroad. If things continue in the present vein, the coming generation will cease to believe in any other culture than that which expresses itself in English; the children who are now growing up will think that nothing of value exists, that no book is worth reading unless it is written in English. Our defense must consist not in closing our doors to this wave from abroad, but in intensifying our own Colombian, Spanish, Latin culture in the minds of the generation now maturing."160

Ariel and Caliban had at last met face to face, and the difference was not so great as had at first been assumed. Two ways of life exist side by side, and the stronger, better organized, more systematized of the two is asserting its dominance. The fine techniques of the north are overrunning the hesitant folk expression of the south. In this transition state Latin America feels momentarily weak and unsure of herself, and this coincides with the moment of greatest United States cultural strength.

In the mind of the south the danger of absorption, or obliteration, has begun to seem very real. The only possible answer is cross-fertilization, which must become a common responsibility.

Latin America's deepest pride is that she has something of great value to offer. She longs for a reciprocal process. The grave danger to the hemisphere is that this small voice may be crying in the wilderness.