Accepted for presentatin at ISA: International Studies Conference
    New Orleans, LA, February 17-20, 2010

Paper Title:
"The political economy of OPEC as non-cartel and of its two factions: Explaining 
differences in relations with the U.S.-OECD states and in development trajectories"

Participants
O'Donnell, Thomas (Author)
Affiliatio: New School, NYC & CENDES-Universidad Cental de Venezuela, Caracas

Panel:    "The Politics of Supply in Global Energy Markets"
Time:      Friday, February 19, 2010 8:30 AM  
Location:  Marlborough A  

ABSTRACT:

Longstanding research makes clear OPEC does not play a true "cartel" role. Data and 
historical evidence show it does play a lesser economic-control function within the 
market-based, one global barrel system. Sometimes able to adjust prices, it dampens 
market volatility, including via the collusive north-south International Energy 
Forum, and aids supply security. Aside from quotas, OPEC has enforced price-band 
agreements with the U.S. and IEA-OECD, and provides access to Saudi surplus during 
crises. However, not all OPEC states have similar interests or abilities to 
cooperate with consuming states. Export revenues per capita show OPEC divided, 
especially during low prices, into two: low absorbers (Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Qatar) 
with longterm businesslike planning abilities, and high absorbers (Iran, Iraq, 
Nigeria, Venezuela, Libya) without. These economic differences largely explain 
different relations with U.S. and OECD states: high absorbers in conflict or axis of 
evil, the others U.S. protectorates/allies, and with different development 
trajectories that undermine sweeping rentier and resourse-curse theories. Data show 
production increasingly concentrated in OPEC and Persian Gulf, with U.S. policy 
continually driving high-absorber states to low-absorber politics, esp. Iraq, Iran, 
Libya and Venezuela.