

Tilman Börgers
Curriculum Vitae
May 10, 2012

Work address:

University of Michigan
Department of Economics
611 Tappan Street
337 Lorch Hall
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1220

Telephone: +-1-734-764 8022

E-mail: tborgers@umich.edu

Web:

<http://www-personal.umich.edu/~tborgers/>

Citizenship: German, US permanent
resident

Education

Habilitation, Universität Basel, 1993.

PhD in Economics, London School of Economics, 1987.

Diplom Volkswirt, Universität Köln, 1983.

Employment

Samuel Zell Professor of the Economics of Risk, University of Michigan (since 2005).

Professor of Economics, University College London, 1996 - 2005.

Reader in Economics, University College London, 1993 - 1996.

Lecturer in Economics, University College London, 1991 - 1993.

Assistent, Universität Basel, 1987 - 1991.

Editorial Service

Review of Economic Design (associate editor since 2012), *The B.E. Journals in Theoretical Economics* (editorial board member: 2004-2011), *Games and Economic Behavior* (editorial board member: 2004-2011), *Mathematical Social Sciences* (editorial board member: 1998 - 2003), *Ricerche Economiche* (editorial board member: 1996-2001) *Review of Economic Studies* (assistant editor: 1992-1994, managing editor: 1994-1995, editorial board member: 1995-2001).

Honors

Economic Theory Fellow, 2011.

Michigan Economics Society's Outstanding Professor, Fall 2010

Prize for the best paper in the *Economic* in 2005 (for: "Strange Bids: Bidding Behaviour in the United Kingdom's Third Generation Spectrum Auction", joint with Christian Dustmann).

Publications

Books:

1. *An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design*, in preparation (contracted with Oxford University Press).

Journal Articles:

1. Robustly Ranking Mechanisms (with Doug Smith), *American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings)* (2012), forthcoming.
2. Efficient Compromising (with Peter Postl), *Journal of Economic Theory* 144 (2009), 2057-2076.
3. A Note on Budget Balance under Interim Participation Constraints: The Case of Independent Types (with Peter Norman), *Economic Theory* 39 (2009), 477-489.
4. Information Invariant Equilibria of Extensive Games (with Timothy McQuade), *The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Contributions)*, Vol. 7 (2007), Article 42.
5. Strange Bids: Bidding Behaviour in the United Kingdom's Third Generation Spectrum Auction, *Economic Journal*, 115 (2005), 551-578 (with Christian Dustmann).
6. Costly Voting, *American Economic Review* 94 (2004), 57 - 66.
7. Expedient and Monotone Learning Rules, *Econometrica* 72 (2004), 383 – 405 (with Antonio Morales and Rajiv Sarin).
8. Awarding Telecom Licenses: The Recent European Experience, *Economic Policy* 36 (2003), 216-268 (with Christian Dustmann).
9. Rationalizing the UMTS Spectrum Bids: The Case of the UK Auction, *Ifo Studien* 48 (2002), 77 - 109 (with Christian Dustmann). [Reprinted in: Gerhard Illing and Ulrich Klüh (editors), *Spectrum Auctions and Competition in Telecommunications*, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003, 119 - 157.]
10. The British UMTS Auction: A Response to Klemperer and Schmidt, *Ifo Studien* 48 (2002), 121 - 122 (with Christian Dustmann). [Reprinted in: Gerhard Illing and Ulrich Klüh (editors), *Spectrum Auctions and Competition in Telecommunications*, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003, 171 - 172.]
11. Naïve Reinforcement Learning With Endogenous Aspirations, *International Economic Review* 41 (2000), 921 - 950 (with Rajiv Sarin).
12. Is Internet Voting a Good Thing?, *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics* 156 (2000), 531-547.
13. Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics, *Journal of Economic Theory* 77 (1997), 1-14 (with Rajiv Sarin).
14. On the Relevance of Evolution and Learning to Economic Theory, *Economic Journal* 106 (1996), 1274 – 1385.
15. On the Dominance Solvability of Large Cournot Games, *Games and Economic Behavior* 8 (1995), 297 – 321 (with Maarten Janssen).
16. Weak Dominance and Approximate Common Knowledge, *Journal of Economic Theory* 64 (1994), 265 – 276.
17. Pure Strategy Dominance, *Econometrica* 61 (1993), 423 – 430.
18. 'Cautious' Utility Maximization and Iterated Weak Dominance, *International Journal of Game Theory* 21 (1992), 13 – 25 (with Larry Samuelson).
19. Iterated Elimination of Dominated Strategies in a Bertrand-Edgeworth Model, *Review of Economic Studies* 59 (1992), 163 – 176.
20. Undominated Strategies and Coordination in Normalform Games, *Social Choice and Welfare* 8 (1991), 65 – 78.
21. Upper Hemicontinuity of the Correspondence of Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium Outcomes, *Journal of Mathematical Economics* 20 (1991), 89–106.
22. Perfect Equilibrium Histories of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games, *Journal of Economic Theory* 47 (1989), 218–227.

Contributions to Books:

1. Complexity Constraints and Adaptive Learning: An Example, in: S. Huck (editor), *Advances in Understanding Strategic Behaviour: Game Theory, Experiments, and Bounded Rationality: Essays in Honour of Werner Güth*, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004 (with Antonio Morales).
2. Auction Theory for Auction Design, in: M. Janssen (editor), *Auctioning Public Assets*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 19-63 (with Eric van Damme).
3. The Design of Treasury Bond Auctions: Some Case Studies, in: M. Janssen (editor), *Auctioning Public Assets*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 230-256 (with Joe Swierzbinski).
4. When Does Learning Lead to Nash Equilibrium?, in K. Inderfurth et al. (editors), *Operations Research Proceedings 1999*, Berlin etc.: Springer Verlag, 2000, 176-202.
5. Comments on Economics and Language, in: A. Rubinstein, *Economics and Language*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, 108 - 113.
6. Game Theory (Economic Applications), in: A. Kuper and J. Kuper (editors), *The Social Science Encyclopedia* (2nd edition), London: Routledge, 1996, p. 325. Revision forthcoming in the 3rd edition.
7. A Note on Implementation and Strong Dominance, in: W. Barnett, H. Moulin, M. Salles and N. Schofield (editors), *Social Choice, Welfare and Ethics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, 277 - 287.

Book Reviews:

1. Review of Ken Binmore, "Rational Decisions," *Journal of Economic Literature* 48 (2010), 153-156.
2. Review of Michael Chwe, "Rational Ritual - Culture, Coordination and Common Knowledge", *Economica* 71 (2004), 689 - 691.
3. Recent Books on Evolutionary Game Theory, *Journal of Economic Surveys* 15 (2001), 237 - 250.
4. Review of Bacharach et. al. (editors), "Epistemic Logic and The Theory of Games and Decisions", *Journal of Economic Literature* 37 (1999), 669 – 671.
5. Recent Textbooks on Game Theory, *Journal of Economic Surveys* 8 (1994), 83 – 98.

Working Papers:

1. Equilibrium Bids in Sponsored Search Auctions: Theory and Evidence (with Ingemar Cox, Martin Pesendorfer and Vaclav Petricek), resubmitted, *American Economic Journal: Microeconomics*.
2. When Are Signals Complements or Substitutes? (with Angel Hernando-Veciana and Daniel Krähmer), resubmitted *Journal of Economic Theory*.
3. Optimal Voting Rules When Voting is Costly (with Katalin Bognar and Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn), resubmitted, *Games and Economic Behavior*.
4. Access to Health Care as a Congestion Game (with Yung-wen Liu).
5. Robust Mechanism Design and Dominant Strategy Voting Rules (with Doug Smith), revision invited *Theoretical Economics*.

PhD Students

Doug Smith, *Robust Mechanism Design*, 2011, now at the Federal Trade Commission.

Katalin Bognar, *Essays on Costly Voting*, 2008, now part-time teaching at UCLA.

Martin Bøg, *Endogenous Social Interactions*, 2006, now at Erasmus University Rotterdam.

Pedro Rey, *Psychology, Economics and Incentives*, 2005, now at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (joint supervision with Steffen Huck).

Peter Postl, *Mechanism Design for Information Acquisition*, 2004, now at the University of Birmingham.

Angel Hernando, *Essays on Auction Theory*, 2000, now at the University of Carlos III, Madrid.

Antonio Morales, *Learning, Imitation, and Economic Rationality*, 1999, now at the University of Malaga.

Nir Vulkan, *Uncertainty, Information Acquisition, and Economic Equilibria*, 1996, now at the Saïd Business School (Oxford), (joint supervision with Ken Binmore).

Antonella Ianni, *Interaction Patterns, Learning Processes, and Equilibria in Population Games*, 1996, now at the Universities of Southampton.

Teaching

Undergraduate course in Intermediate Microeconomic Theory, Economics of Information, Game Theory.

Graduate courses in Game Theory, Mechanism Design.

Research Grants

1. National Science Foundation grant for the “Socio-Technical Infrastructure for Electronic Transactions” program at the University of Michigan (joint with six other principal investigators), 2007-2012, \$3,000,000.
2. Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), research grant RES-000-23-0201 for research on “Quantitative Methods for Behavioural Mechanism Design”, 2003 – 2006, approximately £150,000 (jointly held with Steffen Huck and Hide Ichimura).
3. ESRC conference grant RES-451-26-0010 for conferences on “Game Theory and Applications”, 2003-2005, approximately £15,000 (jointly held with Bhaskar Dutta and V. Bhaskar).
4. ESRC center grant for the *Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution* at University College London, 1995 - 2005, approximately £450,000 per year (this grant was jointly held with colleagues at University College London; I was director of the center 2001 - 2005).
5. ESRC conference grants R45126448496 and R45126477098 for conferences on “Game Theory”, 1997 – 2000, approximately £26,000 (joint with Murali Agastya and Martin Cripps).
6. ESRC research grant R000235526 for research on “Learning Processes in Game Theory”, 1994 – 1996, approximately £40,000.
7. Schweizerischer Nationalfonds, 1990 – 1991, grant for a one year visit to the economics department of the “University of California at San Diego” approximately £25,000.

Administration

Director, Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution, 2002-2005.

Acting Director, Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution, 2001-2002.

Private Consulting

Advice to Frontier Economics on a spectrum auction in Singapore, 2007.

Advice to the British Horseracing Board, 2004.

Advice regarding the Nuon/Reliant merger (with NERA), 2003/2004.

Advice to ISO New England, The New York ISO and PJM Interconnection on capacity markets (with NERA), 2003.

Advice to a private client on competition policy issues, 2003.

Advice to the Office for Gas and Electricity Markets (UK) on auctions for long-term entry capacity to the gas transmission system, 2002.

Advice on secondary trading of radio spectrum for the Radiocommunications Agency (UK) (with NERA), 2002.

Advice on the design of a UMTS auction to the government of Latvia (with NERA), 2002.

Advisor to the Dutch government regarding allocation mechanisms (with a team of academics at the University of Rotterdam), 2001.

Foreign expert for the Dutch parliament's review of the Dutch UMTS auction, 2001.

Advice to the Radiocommunications Agency (UK) on the design of a UMTS spectrum auction, 1997-2000.

Advice to the government of Peru about the sale of telecommunications licenses, Lima, Peru, 1996.

Evaluation of the research programme on "Economic Beliefs and Behaviour" for the Economic and Social Research Council, 1999.