Information and Communications

The effective communication of information: (1) serves to initiate particular patterns of activity before, during, and after decision-making situations; (2) makes possible the circulation of orders and directives; (3) provides a vehicle for the exercise of influence--both informal (persuasion) and more formal influence (authority); and (4) supports the formal structure of control and authority within the organization. In addition to providing the matrix which links members of the organization in these various ways, the communication system serves as the instrument by which an organization is embedded in its broader environ-ment--the "outer world."

Communication Networks

Four conditions must be met in order to make a communication, or any portion of it, informative:

(1) The information being transmitted must have been previously unknown to the receiver. A communication is informative to the extent that the receiver learns something from it--an idea, concept, a point of view, or a relationship among these.

(2) The information must be acceptable to the receiver according to his or her own ideas, beliefs, needs, and attitudes. People are most likely to accept information which; (a) they are looking for, (b) they can see some possible use for in the immediate future, or (c) they fancy because of the physical or contextual conditions under which it occurs.

(3) The content of the communication must be clear. If the message, or any portion of it, seems ambiguous to the receiver, to that extent it will be either non-informative or misinformative.

(4) The message must be meaningful to the receiver. To be meaningful, the message content must be such that it can be readily assigned to any appropriate place in the receiver's knowledge of the subject and the relationship between ideas as the receiver sees them.

Often the communication network through which information is trans-mitted has an important bearing on its acceptance by individuals within an organization.

Organizational communications consist of a number of superimposed networks. Often these networks can be separated for empirical analysis. At times, however, sorting messages into different networks often lacks refinement because of the tendency for individuals to use rewarding channels again and again, even though such use goes beyond the intent for which a particular channel was established.

Primary attention has traditionally been given to organizational communications involved in the exercise of authority relations. Channels in this communication networks are defined in terms of the legitimacy that one individual or group has vis-a-vis others with respect to the issuance of directives, commands, and decisions. Such networks have directionality--orders usually flow vertically within an organization, from a relatively few individuals at the top to many in the lower echelons of the authority structure.

The information exchange network is sometimes thought of as an inversion of the authority communication flow. Messages in this network usually are concerned with internal operations and with the broader external environment and flow from the operational levels to the top of the organization. This network also can be used to supply information for operational decisions--to establish guidelines or parameters with which such decisions can be made.

The task-expertise network provides technical know-how regarding the performance of organizational activities. An important feature of this network is its fragmentation--relatively unrelated islands of expertise are created throughout an organization. Specialized jargon is used by occupational groups and professions in handling the tools and techniques of their trade. Such groups also provide norms concerning work standards and appropriate levels of performance.

When regularized channels fail to function adequately, new, highly specialized, informal lateral networks sometime develop. Unlike formal channels, the informal communication often is not directly subject to management control. Such networks frequently are the result of natural social groupings. These informal communication networks, sometimes called the "grapevine," can reinforce formal information flows or can work contrary to these channels.

Networks carrying messages about status may be less well defined. Such networks have many occasional and fleeting connections that cut across almost all other networks. Status often is attached to nodes within a network, as well as the network overall. Perceptions of one's own position within the status system also influences the extent to which certain communication channels are utilized.

When communication networks are highly differentiated, isolation may be very costly. Duplicate channels may have to be maintained for certain communication functions, and the content of messages may be lost due to high friction of transmission between channels. Such conditions frequently occur in public decision situations that require inputs from both the structure of government and the broader public. Interest groups may develop their own communication networks and gain access to the parallel networks of government at a variety of points. Informal points of contact may supersede formal channels, with the result that the more normative patterns of communications are circumvented or blurred. The demands of various interest groups may become distorted in transmittal through the group's communication channel and may be further distorted when transmitted from one system to another.

When communication networks are undifferentiated and overlap extensively, one set of messages may be submerged by another. Perhaps the most evident situation arises from an overlap of the networks of authority and friendship. In such cases, orders and commands may not carry sufficient force to be implemented effectively. By the same token, an undue overlap between the status and information-exchange networks may result in an information input receiving greater weight than it merits, simply because of the status enjoyed by the source.

Storage of Communication--The Function of the Memory Bank

Information is not subject to the basic laws of conservation of matter and energy. Information can be both created and wiped out--although it can-not be created from nothing nor completely destroyed. Since information has physical reality, its storage--memory--is a physical process which can be represented in seven distinct stages:

(1) Incoming information is abstracted or coded into appropriate symbols;

(2) These symbols are stored by means of some appropriate recording device--distribution of written symbols on paper, activity patterns of cells in nerve tissues, or patterns of electric charges in electronic devices;

(3) Some of the information is dissociated from the rest;

(4) Some of the dissociated items, as well as the combination of items into larger assemblies, are recalled;

(5) Some of the recalled items may be recombined into new patterns that were not among the inputs into the system;

(6) Recombined items are further abstracted/coded, preserving their new pattern, but obliterating their combinatorial origins; and

(7) The new items are transmitted to storage or applied to achieve some desired action.

Only part of past experience is selected for storage. In human memory, a selection of what we would like to remember is combined with a selection of what our subconscious mind chooses to emphasize. Information and experience can be broken down into their component parts for storage, and then reassembled into new patterns quite different from the intake from the outside world. If improbable combinations and associations turn out to be highly relevant to a particular situation and lead to significant actions, they may be called strokes of genius, flashes of insight, or innovations. Putting information together and estimating that particular combinations are worth pursing is one of the fundamental activities of management, resulting in outputs which better meet the needs of the organization.

Memory serves a number of important functions in the processes of fiscal planning and management control. It is a major component in the screening and selection of inputs (the myriad of data that impinge on the processes) to intakes (information that is taken into the system). The selected information is transmitted to memory and stored for possible recall at later stages in the process. In defining a problem, selective recall serves to classify the general nature of the problem and to identify the constraints and boundary conditions of possible solutions. Combined information may be recalled from the system's memory bank, and further input is generated and stored for future recall.

Once a preliminary decision is reached as to the appropriate actions to be initiated, selective information combinations are recalled and applied to modify the decision in light of what is judged acceptable and feasible. In this process, a normative decision (what ought to be done) is measured against past experiences (drawn from memory) as to what might be the limited of appropriate action. This process of combining selected data and memories with the "right decision" to achieve an acceptable decision might be though of as a second screening process. The screen is continuously modified by the outputs of the system, i.e., by the results of decisions that are translated into action.

Expectations and Communication

Expectations play an important role in organizational communications. When messages are systematically sent and received, patterns of interaction develop among the communication nodes. Habitual usage of particular channels, over time, generate expectations which have the force of custom. Message often are carefully worded according to a certain set of expectations shared by the receivers. Any message which does not conform to such shared expectations is likely to be ignored or produce negative responses on the part of the receivers.

Communications are accompanied by the implicit expectation that, if the meaning is apprehended (and within the set of expectations of the receiver), responses will be forthcoming within a given range of possi-bilities. If an appropriate response is not produced, the communicator has three courses of action:

(1) To ignore (or fail to notice) the discrepancy between expectations and responses and proceed as if there were not discrepancy;

(2) To take note of the discrepancy and try again, perhaps by modifying the mode or content of the communication; or

(3) To take note of the discrepancy and revise his/her expectations to conform to the responses which have been observed.

As a rule, either (2) or (3), or a combination of these, is the usual outcome of such situations. These operations, in which the communicator modified his or her behavior (either "internally" or "externally") on the basis of observation, are examples of feedback in human action.

Expectations are built up, reinforced, or modified by the operation of feedback as a person experiences his or her external and internal environments. The interaction of expectations and the resulting feedback makes communications possible by acting as standards by which each participant can gauge the extent to which he or she understands the other and, in turn, is understood. Feedback permits self-correction or behavior adjustment in light of comparisons between responses and expectations. The relation-ship between the expectations of both the initiator and the respondents in a decision-making system are reciprocal or complementary. Interaction takes place within the framework of these complementary expectations and both influences and is influenced by them.

Selective Filtering: Omissions and Distortions

As information is transmitted within an organization, the omission of detail may provide one means of reducing communication overload. When such omissions are systematic with respect to certain categories of information, the process may be labeled selective filtering. In complex situations, such selective filtering often is crucial to effective communication.

Communication system become more effective when languages are employed which carry larger amounts of meaning with relatively fewer symbols. Organizations find such communication devices as occupational jargons, coding and classification systems, charts, diagrams, and other "visuals" helpful in increasing the efficiency of communications. The degree to which knowledge relevant to a given problem may be trans-mitted within an organization, however, depends on the extent to which details may be summarized and condensed in an efficient shared language. Very often, technical jargon loses its meaning as it is transmitted upward in the organization.

Selective filtering may lead to the deletion of important aspects of communications or the introduction of message distortions. It is often difficult to provide meaningful information about intangible and non-standard objects or concepts. Therefore, conscious efforts must be made to develop means by which less objective communication contents can be handled more effectively. As Cyert and March have observed:

Any decision-making system develops codes for communication about the environment. Such a code partitions all possible states of the world into a relatively small number of classes of states. . . . Thus, if a decision rule is designed to choose between two alterna-tives, the information code will tend to reduce all possible states of the world to two classes. [1]

Such rules for the codification of information inputs, however, frequently introduce additional distortions.

Systematic biasing of message content may not always be dysfunctional. In experimental situations, Allport and Postman found that transmitted messages ". . . tended to grow shorter, more concise, and more easily grasped and told," and that there was ". . . selective perceptions, retention, and reporting of a limited number of details from a larger context." [2] In other words, the messages often were sharpened.

Omissions and inaccuracies may increase the ambiguity of messages. However, since ambiguous messages are open to multiple interpretations, more agreeable meanings may be attached to them by the receivers. Thus, while ambiguity may result in slippage between he sender and receiver, such slippage may also promote consensus and agreement at least at one level of understanding. This consensus, in turn, may establish a working basis for further elaboration.

Designing a Information Management System

An information management system must be flexible and adaptive and must have the capacity to accommodate deficiencies as the system evolves. Procedures should be developed to detect these deficiencies and to make adjustments in the system so as to eliminate or reduce them. Managers, as well as information specialists and operations researchers, should participate in each phase of the design of an IMS.

Decision Classification

The design of an IMS should begin with an identification of the important types of strategic, managerial, and operational decisions required by the organization. Relationships among decisions should be defined and the flow of decisions should be determined. Such a decision-flow analysis often reveals that important decisions are being made by default. For example, past decisions often may still be binding on the operations of an organization even though they are no longer applicable to current problems and procedures. When asked: "Why do you follow these procedures," all-too-often the answer is: "Well, that's the way we have always done it."

An analysis of decision flows may also uncover situations in which interdependent decisions are being made independently. Frequently changes can be identified that should be made in the flow of decisions to correct information deficiencies which may involve (a) the responsibilities of management, (b) the organizational structure, or (c) measures of performance.

The next step in the design of an IMS involves an analysis of the information requirement of the major classes of decisions. Ackoff has suggested that organizational decisions can be grouped into three types: (1) decisions for which adequate models exist or can be developed and from which optimal solutions can be derived; (2) decisions for which models can be constructed but from which optimal solutions cannot be readily extracted; and (3) decisions for which adequate models cannot be constructed. [3]

In response to the first type of decisions, the model should have the capacity to identify the relevant information required for a solution to the problem. The decision process should be readily incorporated into the IMS (thereby converting it, at least partially, to a management control system). In the second case, while the model may specify what information is required, a further search process may be necessary, including the examination of alternative approaches, to fully explicate these information requirements.

Further research is required in the third situation to determine what information is relevant and how this information can be organized to address the decision situation. It may be possible through such research, to make more explicit the implicit models used by decision makers and in so doing, to treat such models as type-2 decision situations.

In each of these categories it is appropriate to provide feedback by comparing actual decision outcomes with those predicted by the models. It is important that the IMS have the capacity not only to answer the questions that might be addressed to it, but also to report any deviations from expectations (that is, actual decision outcomes that differ from those predicted). Each decision made, along with its predicted outcome, should become an input to a management control system. [4]

Problem Definition and Classification

As Rapoport has noted, the first step in solving a problem is to state it.

The statement usually involves a description of an existing state and desirable state of affairs where the factors involved in the discrepancy are explicitly pointed out. The success with which any problem is solved depends to a great extent on the clarity with which it is stated. In fact, the solution of the problem is, in a sense, a clarification (or concretization) of the objectives. [5]

Vague problem statements lead to vague methods, where success is erratic and questionable. The more a given problem can be extended through the examination of timely information about the situation, the greater the promise of a successful solution.

A distinction should be made among four different types of problem sets. Most problems that confront complex organizations represent generic events, of which the specific occurrence is only a symptom. As a general rule, such generic situations require adaptive decisions, that is, decisions which may require considerable reconstruction of programmed details before they are applicable to a given problem situation. Adaptive decisions alleviate built-up pressures by removing the more immediate sources of demand or by providing satisfactory alternative solutions to that which is sought. Until the generic problem is identified, however, significant amounts of time and energy may be spent in the piecemeal application of adaptive decisions to the symptoms without ever gaining control of the generic situation.

The second type of occurrence is one that, although unique in a given organization, is actually a generic event. For example, a company's decision on the location of new processing plant may be a unique situation as far as the present company officials are concerned. It is, however, a generic situation that has confronted many other companies in the past. Some general rules exist for deciding on the best location for such facilities, and the decision makers can turn to the experience of others for these guidelines.

The third possible problem classification is the truly unique situation. Here, the event itself may be unique or the circumstances in which the event has occurred may be unique. The huge power failure of November, 1965, for example, which plunged northeastern North America into darkness, was a truly exceptional or unique event, at least according to first explanations. On the other hand, the collision of two airplanes miles from any air terminal is a unique situation, not because airplanes do not run the risk of collision, but because of the unique circumstances under which the event occurred.

The fourth type of event confronting the decision process is the early manifestation of a new generic problem. Both the power failure and the collision of two airplanes, for example, turned out to be only the first occurrence of what are likely to become fairly frequent events unless generic solutions are found to certain problems of modern technology.

As illustrated in Exhibit 1, the relationship among these four categories can be described in terms of (1) the availability of rules and principles (information) for dealing with such problems and (2) the frequency of encounter of these situation. General principles, rules, or procedures usually can be developed or adapted to deal with generic situations. Once an appropriation problem classification has been found, all manifestations of the same generic situation can be handled fairly pragmatically by adapting the rules or principles to the concrete circumstances of the problem situation. In short, such problems can be handled through adaptive decision making. The unique problem and the first manifestation of a generic problem, however, often require greater innovation in the search for successful solutions.

Exhibit 1. Problem Definition and Classification

By far the most common mistake in decision making is to treat a generic problem as if it were a series of unique events. Treating a unique event as if it were just another example of the same old problem to which the same old rules can be applied can have equally negative repercussions. The role of the experienced manager is to avoid incomplete solutions to problems that are only partially understood. The technical expertise of those individuals closest to the situation should be used to classify the problem. Settling on a plausible albeit incomplete definition of the problem is also a danger. A well-developed management information system can provide safeguards against an incomplete definition by providing mechanisms to reject such definitions if an when they fail to encompass the observed facts regarding the problem.

The outcome of this analysis should be a clear definition of the problem. If the problem cannot be stated specifically--preferable in one interrogative sentence, including one or more objectives--the analysis has been inadequate or of insufficient depth. Emotional bias, habitual or traditional behavior, and the human tendency to seek the path of least resistance may contribute to a superficial analysis, followed by a statement of the apparent rather than the real problem. An excellent solution to an apparent problem will not work in practice, because it is the solution to a problem that does not exist in fact. Short-circuiting this phase in the process may actually result in more time spent later to get at the real problem when it becomes painfully evident that further analysis is required.

Endnotes

[1] Richard M. Cyert and James G. March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 124-125.

[2] Gordon W. Allport and L. Postman, "The Basic Psychology of Rumor," in The Process and Effects of Mass Communication, edited by W. Schramm (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1954), pp. 146-148.

[3] Russell L. Ackoff, "Management Misinformation Systems," Management Science (Application Series) 14 (December 1967), reprinted in Donald H. Sanders and Stanley J. Birkin, Computers and Management in a Changing Society (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980), p. 44.

[4] Ibid., p. 45.

[5] Anatol Rapoport, "What Is Information?" ETC: A Review of General Semantics, Vol. 10 (Summer, 1953), p. 252.

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