Sarah Moss


Department of Philosophy, University of Michigan
2215 Angell Hall, 435 South State Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1003


ssmoss@umich.edu

curriculum vitae



I am a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan. I work primarily in epistemology and philosophy of language. My research also addresses problems in formal semantics, philosophy of mind, and legal philosophy.

In Probabilistic Knowledge (OUP, 2018), I defend a probabilistic account of the contents of belief, assertion, and knowledge. I argue that partial beliefs, such as credences, can constitute knowledge in just the same way that full beliefs can. The central theses of the book have significant consequences for the philosophy of mind and language, as well as for social and political questions concerning racial profiling and legal standards of proof.


Selected publications

Pragmatic Encroachment and Legal Proof

forthcoming in Philosophical Issues vol. 31: Law and Epistemology

Global Constraints on Imprecise Credences: Solving Reflection Violations, Belief Inertia, and Other Puzzles

forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Knowledge and Legal Proof

forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Epistemology vol. 7. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021
Sanders Epistemology Prize, 2019

Full Belief and Loose Speech

Philosophical Review vol. 128, no. 3 (2019): 255-91
selected for the Philosopher's Annual, 2020

Probabilistic Knowledge

Sanders Book Prize, 2020
APA Book Prize Honorable Mention, 2019
Book symposium in Analysis vol. 80, no. 2 (2020): 316-70
Book symposium in Res Philosophica vol. 97, no. 1 (2020): 93-133
2-day masterclass on Probabilistic Knowledge, King's College London, March 2018
3-day symposium on Probabilistic Knowledge, University of Hamburg, August 2017

Reply to Edgington, Pavese, and Campbell-Moore and Konek

Analysis vol. 80, no. 2 (2020): 356-70

Reply to MacFarlane and Greco

Res Philosophica vol. 97, no. 1 (2020): 119-33

Moral Encroachment

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society vol. 118, no. 2 (2018): 177-205

Credal Dilemmas

Noûs vol. 49, no. 4 (2015): 665-83

On the Semantics and Pragmatics of Epistemic Vocabulary

Semantics and Pragmatics vol. 8, no. 5 (2015): 1-81

Time-Slice Epistemology and Action Under Indeterminacy

Oxford Studies in Epistemology, John Hawthorne and Tamar Szabó Gendler, eds. Oxford, 2015
Sanders Epistemology Prize Runner-up, 2013

Epistemology Formalized

Philosophical Review vol. 122, no. 1 (2013): 1-43
APA Article Prize Honorable Mention, 2014

Subjunctive Credences and Semantic Humility

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research vol. 87, no. 2 (2013): 251-78

Four-Dimensionalist Theories of Persistence

Australasian Journal of Philosophy vol. 90, no. 4 (2012): 671-86

On the Pragmatics of Counterfactuals

Noûs vol. 46, no. 3 (2012): 561-86
selected for the Philosopher's Annual, 2013

Updating as Communication

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research vol. 85, no. 2 (2012): 225-48
Rutgers Young Epistemologist Prize, 2011

Solving the Color Incompatibility Problem

Journal of Philosophical Logic vol. 41, no. 5 (2012): 841-51

The Role of Linguistics in the Philosophy of Language

Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Delia Fara and Gillian Russell, eds. Routledge, 2012

Scoring Rules and Epistemic Compromise

Mind vol. 120, no. 480 (2011): 1053-69


Teaching materials

Phil 384: Applied Epistemology

This course satisfies the Race and Ethnicity Requirement for University of Michigan undergraduates.

Phil 404: Introduction to Analytic Philosophy

Collected problem sets for Phil 404: Introduction to Analytic Philosophy

Phil 413: Formal Methods in Philosophy

Collected problem sets for Phil 413: Formal Methods in Philosophy

Phil 601: Probabilistic Knowledge

Collected problem sets for Phil 601: Probabilistic Knowledge

Phil 611: Conditionalization and Its Discontents

Collected problem sets for Phil 611: Conditionalization and Its Discontents