April 2018), I defend a probabilistic
account of the contents of belief, assertion, and knowledge. I
argue that partial beliefs, such as credences, can constitute knowledge in
just the same way
that full beliefs can. The central theses of the book have significant consequences for
the philosophy of mind and language, as well as for social and political questions concerning racial
profiling and legal standards of proof.
Book symposia in Analysis and Res Philosophica, coming soon.
Symposium session on Probabilistic Knowledge, Pacific APA, April 2019
Author Meets Critics session on Probabilistic Knowledge, Central APA, February 2019
2-day masterclass on Probabilistic Knowledge, King's College London, March 2018
3-day symposium on
Probabilistic Knowledge, University of Hamburg, August 2017
Philosophical Review vol. 128, no. 3 (2019): 255-91
Forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society vol. 118, no. 2 (2018):
Noûs vol. 49, no. 4 (2015): 665-83
Semantics and Pragmatics vol. 8, no. 5 (2015): 1-81
Oxford Studies in Epistemology, John Hawthorne and Tamar
Szabó Gendler, eds. Oxford, 2015
Philosophical Review vol. 122, no. 1 (2013): 1-43
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research vol. 87, no. 2 (2013): 251-78
Australasian Journal of Philosophy vol. 90, no. 4 (2012): 671-86
Noûs vol. 46, no. 3 (2012): 561-86
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research vol. 85, no. 2 (2012): 225-48
Journal of Philosophical Logic vol. 41, no. 5 (2012): 841-51
Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Delia Fara and Gillian Russell, eds. Routledge, 2012
Mind vol. 120, no. 480 (2011): 1053-69
This course satisfies the Race and Ethnicity Requirement for University of Michigan undergraduates.
Collected problem sets for Phil 404: Introduction to Analytic Philosophy
for Phil 413: Formal Methods in Philosophy
Collected problem sets for Phil 601: Probabilistic Knowledge
Collected problem sets for Phil 611: Conditionalization and Its Discontents