Sarah Moss

UM Department of Philosophy
2215 Angell Hall, 435 South State Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1003


ssmoss@umich.edu

curriculum vitae



I am an Associate Professor in the philosophy department at the University of Michigan.

Before coming here, I was a math major at Harvard and a B.Phil. student at Oxford. I received my Ph.D. from the Linguistics and Philosophy department at MIT in June 2009.

In my forthcoming book, Probabilistic Knowledge, I defend a unified probabilistic account of the contents of belief, assertion, and knowledge. I argue that partial beliefs can be knowledge in just the same way as full beliefs can. The theory of probabilistic knowledge that I defend has significant consequences for many prominent theories of assertion and knowledge, as well as for how we think about racial profiling, gendered speech, and legal standards of proof. Here is an abstract for the book: Probabilistic Knowledge. The published book should be available by January 2018.


Upcoming talks

Probabilistic Knowledge and Transformative Experience

Themes in Transformative Experience Conference, April 2017

Probabilistic Knowledge and Legal Proof

Analytic Legal Philosophy Conference, April 2017

Book symposium on Probabilistic Knowledge

Universität Hamburg, August 2017

Author Meets Critics session on Probabilistic Knowledge

Central APA, February 2018

Additional talks to be determined

NYU Philosophy Department colloquium, Fall 2017
Aristotelian Society, March 2018


Selected publications

Probabilistic Knowledge

forthcoming with Oxford University Press

Credal Dilemmas

Noûs vol. 49, no. 4 (2015): 665-83.

On the Semantics and Pragmatics of Epistemic Vocabulary

Semantics and Pragmatics vol. 8, no. 5 (2015): 1-81.

Time-Slice Epistemology and Action Under Indeterminacy

Oxford Studies in Epistemology, John Hawthorne and Tamar Szabó Gendler, eds. Oxford, 2015.

Epistemology Formalized

Philosophical Review vol. 122, no. 1 (2013): 1-43.

Subjunctive Credences and Semantic Humility

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research vol. 87, no. 2 (2013): 251-78.

Four-Dimensionalist Theories of Persistence

Australasian Journal of Philosophy vol. 90, no. 4 (2012): 671-86.

On the Pragmatics of Counterfactuals

Noûs vol. 46, no. 3 (2012): 561-86.

Updating as Communication

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research vol. 85, no. 2 (2012): 225-48.

Solving the Color Incompatibility Problem

Journal of Philosophical Logic vol. 41, no. 5 (2012): 841-51.

The Role of Linguistics in the Philosophy of Language

Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Delia Fara and Gillian Russell, eds. Routledge, 2012.

Scoring Rules and Epistemic Compromise

Mind vol. 120, no. 480 (2011): 1053-69.


Teaching materials

Phil 297: Honors Introduction to Philosophy

Phil 383: Knowledge and Reality

Phil 404: Introduction to Analytic Philosophy

Collected problem sets for Phil 404: Introduction to Analytic Philosophy

Phil 413: Formal Methods in Philosophy

Collected problem sets for Phil 413: Formal Methods in Philosophy

Phil 601: Probabilistic Knowledge

Collected problem sets for Phil 601: Probabilistic Knowledge

Phil 611: Conditionalization and Its Discontents

Collected problem sets for Phil 611: Conditionalization and Its Discontents

Phil 611: Semantics Beyond Truth Conditions

Phil 615: Contemporary Research in Metaphysics and Philosophy of Language