Sarah Moss

UM Department of Philosophy
2215 Angell Hall, 435 South State Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1003

curriculum vitae

I am an Associate Professor in the philosophy department at the University of Michigan.

Before coming here, I was a math major at Harvard and a B.Phil. student at Oxford. I received my Ph.D. from MIT Linguistics and Philosophy in June 2009.

In my forthcoming book, Probabilistic Knowledge, I defend a unified probabilistic account of the contents of belief, assertion, and knowledge. I argue that partial beliefs can constitute knowledge in just the same way as full beliefs can. The theory of probabilistic knowledge that I defend has significant consequences for many prominent theories of assertion and knowledge, as well as for how we think about racial profiling and legal standards of proof.

2017-18 talks

3-day book symposium on Probabilistic Knowledge

University of Hamburg, August 2017

Author Meets Critics session on Probabilistic Knowledge

Central APA, February 2018

2-day masterclass on Probabilistic Knowledge

King's College London, March 2018

Probabilistic Knowledge and Legal Proof

New York University, October 2017
Rutgers Value Theory Workshop, October 2017

Full Belief and Loose Speech

Philosophical Linguistics and Linguistical Philosophy Conference, October 2017
University of Cambridge, March 2018

Moral Encroachment

Simon Fraser University, January 2018
University of British Columbia, January 2018
Aristotelian Society, March 2018
Pacific APA, March 2018

Solving the Problem of Evil

Oxford University, March 2018
Washington University, April 2018

Global Constraints on Imprecise Credences

Princeton Conference, April 2018

Selected publications

Probabilistic Knowledge

forthcoming with Oxford University Press

Credal Dilemmas

Noûs vol. 49, no. 4 (2015): 665-83.

On the Semantics and Pragmatics of Epistemic Vocabulary

Semantics and Pragmatics vol. 8, no. 5 (2015): 1-81.

Time-Slice Epistemology and Action Under Indeterminacy

Oxford Studies in Epistemology, John Hawthorne and Tamar Szabó Gendler, eds. Oxford, 2015.

Epistemology Formalized

Philosophical Review vol. 122, no. 1 (2013): 1-43.

Subjunctive Credences and Semantic Humility

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research vol. 87, no. 2 (2013): 251-78.

Four-Dimensionalist Theories of Persistence

Australasian Journal of Philosophy vol. 90, no. 4 (2012): 671-86.

On the Pragmatics of Counterfactuals

Noûs vol. 46, no. 3 (2012): 561-86.

Updating as Communication

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research vol. 85, no. 2 (2012): 225-48.

Solving the Color Incompatibility Problem

Journal of Philosophical Logic vol. 41, no. 5 (2012): 841-51.

The Role of Linguistics in the Philosophy of Language

Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Delia Fara and Gillian Russell, eds. Routledge, 2012.

Scoring Rules and Epistemic Compromise

Mind vol. 120, no. 480 (2011): 1053-69.

Teaching materials

Phil 384: Applied Epistemology

Phil 404: Introduction to Analytic Philosophy

Collected problem sets for Phil 404: Introduction to Analytic Philosophy

Phil 413: Formal Methods in Philosophy

Collected problem sets for Phil 413: Formal Methods in Philosophy

Phil 601: Probabilistic Knowledge

Collected problem sets for Phil 601: Probabilistic Knowledge

Phil 611: Conditionalization and Its Discontents

Collected problem sets for Phil 611: Conditionalization and Its Discontents