Sarah Moss

UM Department of Philosophy
2215 Angell Hall, 435 South State Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1003


ssmoss@umich.edu

curriculum vitae



I am an Associate Professor in the philosophy department at the University of Michigan.

Before coming here, I was a math major at Harvard and a B.Phil. student at Oxford. I received my Ph.D. from MIT Linguistics and Philosophy in June 2009.



Probabilistic Knowledge

In Probabilistic Knowledge (OUP, April 2018), I defend a probabilistic account of the contents of belief, assertion, and knowledge. I argue that partial beliefs can constitute knowledge in just the same way that full beliefs can. The central theses of the book have significant consequences for many theories in the philosophy of mind and language, as well as for social and political questions concerning racial profiling and the nature of legal standards of proof.

Recent and upcoming discussions:

3-day symposium on Probabilistic Knowledge

University of Hamburg, August 2017

2-day masterclass on Probabilistic Knowledge

King's College London, March 2018

Author Meets Critics session on Probabilistic Knowledge

Central APA, February 2019

Author Meets Critics session on Probabilistic Knowledge

Pacific APA, April 2019

Selected papers

Full Belief and Loose Speech

Princeton Talks on Epistemology and Metaphysics Conference, April 2018
Washington University, April 2018
Oxford University, March 2018
NYU, October 2017
Philosophical Linguistics and Linguistical Philosophy, October 2017
Northwestern Epistemology Brownbag Series, May 2017

Global Constraints on Imprecise Credences

Paper in progress---comments welcome!

Moral Encroachment

Forthcoming in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society / Audio recording available on iTunes

Credal Dilemmas

Noûs vol. 49, no. 4 (2015): 665-83.

On the Semantics and Pragmatics of Epistemic Vocabulary

Semantics and Pragmatics vol. 8, no. 5 (2015): 1-81.

Time-Slice Epistemology and Action Under Indeterminacy

Oxford Studies in Epistemology, John Hawthorne and Tamar Szabó Gendler, eds. Oxford, 2015.

Epistemology Formalized

Philosophical Review vol. 122, no. 1 (2013): 1-43.

Subjunctive Credences and Semantic Humility

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research vol. 87, no. 2 (2013): 251-78.

Four-Dimensionalist Theories of Persistence

Australasian Journal of Philosophy vol. 90, no. 4 (2012): 671-86.

On the Pragmatics of Counterfactuals

Noûs vol. 46, no. 3 (2012): 561-86.

Updating as Communication

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research vol. 85, no. 2 (2012): 225-48.

Solving the Color Incompatibility Problem

Journal of Philosophical Logic vol. 41, no. 5 (2012): 841-51.

The Role of Linguistics in the Philosophy of Language

Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Delia Fara and Gillian Russell, eds. Routledge, 2012.

Scoring Rules and Epistemic Compromise

Mind vol. 120, no. 480 (2011): 1053-69.


Teaching materials

Phil 384: Applied Epistemology

Phil 404: Introduction to Analytic Philosophy

Collected problem sets for Phil 404: Introduction to Analytic Philosophy

Phil 413: Formal Methods in Philosophy

Collected problem sets for Phil 413: Formal Methods in Philosophy

Phil 601: Probabilistic Knowledge

Collected problem sets for Phil 601: Probabilistic Knowledge

Phil 611: Conditionalization and Its Discontents

Collected problem sets for Phil 611: Conditionalization and Its Discontents