Sarah Moss

Department of Philosophy
2215 Angell Hall, 435 South State Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1003


ssmoss@umich.edu

curriculum vitae



I am an Assistant Professor in the philosophy department at the University of Michigan.

Before coming here, I was a math major at Harvard and a BPhil student at Oxford. I received my Ph.D. from the Linguistics and Philosophy department at MIT in June 2009.


Research interests

Recently my work has focused on questions connecting philosophy of language and formal epistemology: what semantic theories accommodate intuitive norms governing credences in counterfactuals, how updating de se credences resembles communicating de se beliefs, and how we can know non-propositional contents of assertion.

I am also currently working on the stage theory of persistence, the pragmatics of counterfactuals, and formal models for compromise between agents with different credence distributions.


Recent papers and presentations

Diachronic Decision Theories

Midwest Epistemology Conference, October 2010

Problems for Theories of Persistence

Carolina Metaphysics Workshop, June 2010
Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference, April 2010
CMM Graduate Conference, September 2008

Updating as Communication

University of Toronto, October 2009
Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference, August 2009
Formal Epistemology Workshop, June 2009
APA Pacific Division Meeting, April 2009

Scoring Rules and Epistemic Compromise

Second Formal Epistemology Festival, May 2009
Formal Epistemology Workshop, May 2008
MITing of the Minds Philosophy Conference, January 2008

Structural Equations and Counterfactuals: Comments on Katrin Schulz

Rutgers Semantics Workshop, April 2009

Solving the Color Incompatibility Problem

Constraining Credences in Counterfactuals

MIT Philosophy Retreat, September 2008

On the Pragmatics of Counterfactuals

Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference, August 2008
First Formal Epistemology Festival: Conditionals and Ranking Functions, July 2008
University of California, Berkeley, May 2008
University of Michigan, April 2008
NYU Philosophy Department Colloquium, October 2007
Massachusetts Bay Philosophy Alliance, October 2007

Desire Cancellation as Presupposition Failure: Comments on "Desires" by Ben Bradley and Kris McDaniel

Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference, August 2007