Sarah Moss

Department of Philosophy
2215 Angell Hall, 435 South State Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1003

curriculum vitae

I am an Associate Professor in the philosophy department at the University of Michigan.

Before coming here, I was a math major at Harvard and a B.Phil. student at Oxford. I received my Ph.D. from the Linguistics and Philosophy department at MIT in June 2009.

I have recently finished a book manuscript that defends a unified probabilistic account of the contents of belief, assertion, and knowledge. I argue that partial beliefs can be knowledge in just the same way as full beliefs can. The theory of probabilistic knowledge that I defend has significant consequences for many prominent theories of assertion and knowledge, as well as for how we think about racial profiling, gendered speech, and legal standards of proof. Here is an abstract for the book: Probabilistic Knowledge. Please email me for a copy of the manuscript.

Selected papers

Credal Dilemmas

Noûs vol. 49, no. 4 (2015): 665-83.

On the Semantics and Pragmatics of Epistemic Vocabulary

Semantics and Pragmatics vol. 8, no. 5 (2015): 1-81.

Time-Slice Epistemology and Action Under Indeterminacy

Oxford Studies in Epistemology, John Hawthorne and Tamar Szabó Gendler, eds. Oxford, 2015.

Epistemology Formalized

Philosophical Review vol. 122, no. 1 (2013): 1-43.

Subjunctive Credences and Semantic Humility

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research vol. 87, no. 2 (2013): 251-78.

Four-Dimensionalist Theories of Persistence

Australasian Journal of Philosophy vol. 90, no. 4 (2012): 671-86.

On the Pragmatics of Counterfactuals

Noûs vol. 46, no. 3 (2012): 561-86.

Updating as Communication

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research vol. 85, no. 2 (2012): 225-48.

Solving the Color Incompatibility Problem

Journal of Philosophical Logic vol. 41, no. 5 (2012): 841-51.

The Role of Linguistics in the Philosophy of Language

Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Delia Fara and Gillian Russell, eds. Routledge, 2012.

Scoring Rules and Epistemic Compromise

Mind vol. 120, no. 480 (2011): 1053-69.

Recent and upcoming presentations

To be determined

Ranch Metaphysics and Epistemology Workshop, January 2017
MIT conference in honor of Robert Stalnaker, April 2016

Probabilistic Knowledge

Brown University, March 2016
Purdue University, February 2016
MITing of the Minds, January 2016
University of Southern California, October 2015
Unviersity of Wisconsin, Madison, September 2015
Cornell Workshop on Bayesian Theories of Perception and Epistemology, July 2015
Harvard University, March 2015
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, March 2015

On the Semantics of Epistemic Vocabulary

Rutgers Semantics Workshop, October 2014
University of California, Berkeley, October 2014
Philosophical Linguistics and Linguistical Philosophy Conference, September 2014
Semantics and Linguistic Theory (SALT) 24, May 2014
University of Chicago Linguistics and Philosophy Workshop, May 2014
Ohio State University, March 2014

Teaching materials

Phil 297: Honors Introduction to Philosophy

Phil 383: Knowledge and Reality

Phil 404: Introduction to Analytic Philosophy

Collected problem sets for Phil 404: Introduction to Analytic Philosophy

Phil 413: Formal Methods in Philosophy

Collected problem sets for Phil 413: Formal Methods in Philosophy

Phil 601: Probabilistic Knowledge

Collected problem sets for Phil 601: Probabilistic Knowledge

Phil 611: Conditionalization and Its Discontents

Collected problem sets for Phil 611: Conditionalization and Its Discontents

Phil 611: Semantics Beyond Truth Conditions

Phil 615: Contemporary Research in Metaphysics and Philosophy of Language