UM Department of Philosophy
In my book, Probabilistic Knowledge, I defend a unified probabilistic account of the contents of belief, assertion, and knowledge. I argue that partial beliefs can constitute knowledge in just the same way that full beliefs can. The theory of probabilistic knowledge that I defend has significant consequences for many theories of assertion and knowledge, as well as for how we think about racial profiling and legal standards of proof.
University of Hamburg, August 2017
King's College London, March 2018
Author Meets Critics session on Probabilistic Knowledge
Central APA, February 2019
Full Belief and Loose Speech
Princeton Talks on Epistemology and Metaphysics Conference, April 2018
Paper in progress---comments welcome!
Forthcoming in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society / Audio recording available on iTunes
Noûs vol. 49, no. 4 (2015): 665-83.
Semantics and Pragmatics vol. 8, no. 5 (2015): 1-81.
Oxford Studies in Epistemology, John Hawthorne and Tamar
Szabó Gendler, eds. Oxford, 2015.
Philosophical Review vol. 122, no. 1 (2013): 1-43.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research vol. 87, no. 2 (2013): 251-78.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy vol. 90, no. 4 (2012): 671-86.
Noûs vol. 46, no. 3 (2012): 561-86.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research vol. 85, no. 2 (2012): 225-48.
Journal of Philosophical Logic vol. 41, no. 5 (2012): 841-51.
Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Delia Fara and Gillian Russell, eds. Routledge, 2012.
Mind vol. 120, no. 480 (2011): 1053-69.
Collected problem sets for Phil 404: Introduction to Analytic Philosophy
for Phil 413: Formal Methods in Philosophy
Collected problem sets for Phil 601: Probabilistic Knowledge
Collected problem sets for Phil 611: Conditionalization and Its Discontents