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Sarah Moss
Department of Philosophy ssmoss@umich.edu curriculum vitae |
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Research interests
Recently my work has focused on questions connecting philosophy of
language and formal
epistemology: what semantic theories accommodate intuitive norms governing
credences in counterfactuals, how updating de se credences
resembles communicating de
se beliefs, and how we can know non-propositional contents of
assertion.
Diachronic Decision Theories
Midwest Epistemology Conference, October 2010 Problems for Theories of Persistence
Carolina Metaphysics Workshop, June 2010
University of Toronto, October 2009 Scoring Rules and Epistemic Compromise
Second Formal Epistemology Festival, May 2009 Structural Equations and Counterfactuals: Comments on Katrin Schulz Rutgers Semantics Workshop, April 2009 Solving the Color Incompatibility Problem Constraining Credences in Counterfactuals MIT Philosophy Retreat, September 2008 On the Pragmatics of Counterfactuals
Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference, August 2008 Desire Cancellation as Presupposition Failure: Comments on "Desires" by Ben Bradley and Kris McDaniel Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference, August 2007 |
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