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Research in Natural Resource Economics
- Survey
- Oil Market
- Gold Market
- Speculative Attacks
- Attacks on Price
Ceilings Supported by Bufferstock Sales
- Attacks on
Cumulative Catch Quotas in Fisheries
- Attacks on Common
Property Which Can be Privately Stored Once Extracted
- Attacks on
Unallocated "Stock Quotas" on Imported Durables
Research in Industrial Organization
- Horizontal Mergers
- Cartels
- Price Discrimination
Contributions to Other Fields
- Biology
- Law
- Political Science
Research in Natural Resource
Economics
A. Survey
"The Economics of Natural Resource Extraction: A
Primer for Development Economists," World Bank Research Observer,
February 1995.
B. Oil Market
"Exhaustible Resources and Industrial Structure: A
Nash-Cournot Approach to the World Oil Market," Journal of Political
Economy, October l976.
"Staving Off the Backstop: Dynamic Limit Pricing with a Kinked Demand
Curve," in R.W. Pindyck (ed.), Advances in the Economics of Energy
and Resources, JAI Press, Greenwich, Conn., l979.
Imperfect Competition in the International Energy Market: A
Computerized Nash-Cournot Model, D.C. Heath and Company, Lexington, Mass.,
l98l.
"Analytical Underpinnings of a Computerized World Oil Model," Operations
Research, Spring l982.
"The Length of Optimal Extraction Programs When Depletion Affects
Extraction Costs" (with T. Lewis and M. Eswaran), Journal of Economic
Theory, December l983.
"A Self-Enforcing Multilateral Agreement Among Oil-Importing
Countries," Contemporary Policy Issues, March l984.
"A Misguided Energy Program: Reshaping OECD's Oil-Sharing Plan"
(with R. Smith), New York Times, Sunday Forum, November 4, l984.
Supporting editorial appeared in New York Times, November l6, l984.
"Optimal Capacity Expansion by Foresighted Extractors and Producers"
(with S. Switzer), in Problèmes de Ressources Naturelles et Théorie
Économique edited by G. Gaudet and P. Lasserre, l986.
C. Gold Market
"Market Anticipation of Government Policies and the
Price of Gold" (with D. Henderson), Journal of Political Economy,
August l978 -- anthologized in Bhattacharya and Constanides' Classics in
Finance, l986.
"Ending the Hidden Subsidy to South Africa," Newsday,
July 10, 1987 (reprinted in the Ann Arbor News, August 5, 1987).
Testimony of March 23, 1988 before the House Foreign Affairs Committee
(Subcommittee on Africa) on the economic consequences of sales from official
gold stockpiles in Proposed Economic Sanctions Against South Africa,
Hearings and Markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1988 (GPO).
D. Speculative Attacks
During the mid-1970's Dale
Henderson and I discovered that speculative attacks (the
sudden, instantaneous accumulation of inventories by previously inactive
stockpilers) must occur in some circumstances in a competitive equilibrium
with rational agents. The first published analysis appeared in our gold paper
of 1978.
Our paper launched a huge literature on speculative attacks in the context
of financial markets (foreign exchange) with early contributions by Krugman, Flood, Garber, Obstfeld and others. For a recent of this
burgeoning literature (which consists of more than 170 articles as of
October, 1997), see "Perspectives on the Recent Currency Crisis
Literature" by Robert Flood and Nancy Marion.
My own work in this area (with various coauthors) explores the breadth of
contexts where attacks arise: ceilings on exhaustible resources like gold,
commodity agreements involving price bands, cumulative catch quotas in
fisheries, common property which can be privately stored, etc. The rest of
the attacks literature confines attention to the foreign exchange
market.
1. Attacks on Price Ceilings Supported by Bufferstock Sales
"Market Anticipation of Government Policies and the
Price of Gold" (with D. Henderson), Journal of Political Economy,
August l978 -- anthologized in Bhattacharya and Constanides' Classics in
Finance, l986.
"Recurrence of a Modified Random Walk and Its Application to an Economic
Model" (with R. Wenocur), SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics,
February l98l.
"The Vulnerability of Price Stabilization Programs to Speculative
Attack," Journal of Political Economy, February l983. Reprinted
in The Economics of Information, edited by David Levine and Steve
Lippman, 1995.
2. Attacks on Unallocated Cumulative Catch Quotas in Fisheries
"Private Storage of Common Property" (with G.
Gaudet and M. Moreaux), JEEM, 2002.
3. Attacks on Common Property Which can be Privately Stored Once
Extracted
"Private Storage of Common Property" (with G.
Gaudet and M. Moreaux), JEEM, 2002.
4. Attacks on Unallocated "Stock Quotas" on Imported
Durables
"The Effects of Periodic Quotas Limiting the Stock of Imported
Durables" (with G. Gaudet), JET, 2003
Research in Industrial
Organization
A. Horizontal Mergers
Since the first paper on "losses from mergers" (
coauthored with Switzer and Reynolds), a large micro literature has developed
on the subject with contributions by Davidson, Deneckere, Farrell, Froeb,
McAfee, Perry, Porter, Shapiro, Werden, Williams, and others.
Interestingly, a macro literature on "losses from policy
coordination" developed independently beginning with a contribution by
Rogoff in 1985. For a nice expository survey of this literature, see chapter
3 of Monetary Policy in Interdependent Economies (MIT Press) by
Canzoneri and Henderson.
The idea for my first paper (co-authored with Switzer and Reynolds) came
from running the simulation model of the world oil market and then observing
that if Mexico
joined OPEC the combined discounted profits would decline because of the
non-OPEC expansion. Here are my four contributions to this area:
"Losses from Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry
Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium" (with R. Reynolds and S.
Switzer), Quarterly Journal of Economics, May l983--reprinted in Cournot
Oligopoly: Characterization and Applications, edited by Andrew Daughety,
Cambridge University Press, 1988.
"Increasing the Profits of a Subset of Firms in Oligopoly Models with
Strategic Substitutes" (with G. Gaudet), American Economic Review,
June 1991.
"Towards a Theory of Horizontal Mergers" (with G. Gaudet)
chapter 7 in The New Industrial Economics edited by G. Norman and M.
La Manna (Edward Elgar
Publishers), 1992.
"Mergers of Producers of Perfect Complements Competing in Price"
(with G. Gaudet) Economic Letters, vol. 39, 1992.
B. Cartels
"Exhaustible Resources and Industrial Structure: A
Nash-Cournot Approach to the World Oil Market," Journal of Political
Economy, October l976.
"Staving Off the Backstop: Dynamic Limit Pricing with a Kinked Demand
Curve," in R.W. Pindyck (ed.), Advances in the Economics of Energy
and Resources, JAI Press, Greenwich, Conn., l979.
Imperfect Competition in the International Energy Market: A
Computerized Nash-Cournot Model, D.C. Heath and Company, Lexington, Mass.,
l98l.
"Analytical Underpinnings of a Computerized World Oil Model," Operations
Research, Spring l982.
"Cartels that Vote: Agricultural Marketing Boards and Induced Voting
Behavior" (with J. Cave), Public Regulation: New Perspectives on
Institutions and Policies, edited by Elizabeth Bailey, and published by
MIT Press, l987.
"The Positive and Normative Consequences of Treble Damage Awards in
Private Lawsuits for Price Fixing," Journal of Political Economy,
December 1987.
"Predicting Committee Behavior in Majority-Rule Experiments"
(with E. Goodstein), Rand Journal,
Summer 1990.
"Increasing the Profits of a Subset of Firms in Oligopoly Models with
Strategic Substitutes" (with G. Gaudet), American Economic Review,
June 1991.
"Cartel Quotas under Majority Rule" (with J. Cave), American
Economic Review, March 1995. Reprinted in Agricultural Markets:
Mechanisms, Failures and Regulations edited by David Martimort, North Holland (July, 1996).
"Optimal Asymmetric Strategies
in Research Joint Ventures" (with G. Shaffer), International Journal
of Industrial Organization, (March,1998).
Cartels, a two-volume collection co-edited with Margaret
Levenstein, 2007 Edward Elgar
C. Price Discrimination
"Cartels that Vote: Agricultural Marketing Boards and
Induced Voting Behavior" (with J. Cave), Public Regulation: New
Perspectives on Institutions and Policies, edited by Elizabeth Bailey,
and published by MIT Press, l987.
"When is Inducing Self-Selection Suboptimal for a Monopolist?" Quarterly
Journal of Economics, May 1989.
"Durable-Goods Monopoly with Discrete Demand" (with M. Bagnoli
and J. Swierzbinski), Journal of Political Economy, December 1989.
"Intertemporal Self-Selection with Multiple Buyers under Complete
Information" (with M. Bagnoli and J. Swierzbinski), Economic Theory,
vol 5, 1995.
Contributions to Other
Fields
A. Biology
"Deducing Implications of Fitness Maximization When a
Tradeoff Exists Among Alternative Currencies" (with K. Kalat and A.
Wheatcroft), Behavioral Ecology, vol. 6, no. 4, winter 1995.
"The Economics of Mutualisms: Optimal Utilization of Mycorrhizal
Mutualistic Partners by Plants" (with Miroslav Kummel), Ecology,
(Vol. 87, 4), April 2006 DOWNLOAD PDF
"Book Review of Creating Incentives for Pharmaceutical Research on
Neglected Diseases by Michael Kremer and Rachel Glennerster, Economic
Development and Cultural Change (forthcoming, 2007)" DOWNLOAD PDF
B. Law
"Game Theory and the Law: Is Game Theory Ready for
Prime Time?" (coauthored with T. Sims), Michigan Law Review, May,
1996.
C. Political Science
"Cartels that Vote: Agricultural Marketing Boards and
Induced Voting Behavior" (with J. Cave), Public Regulation: New
Perspectives on Institutions and Policies, edited by Elizabeth Bailey,
and published by MIT Press, l987.
"Predicting Committee Behavior in Majority-Rule Experiments"
(with E. Goodstein), Rand Journal,
Summer 1990.
"Cartel Quotas under Majority Rule" (with J. Cave), American
Economic Review, March 1995. Reprinted in Agricultural Markets:
Mechanisms, Failures and Regulations edited by David Martimort, North Holland (July, 1996).
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