Portfolio Rebalancing in General Equilibrium*

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Abstract

This paper develops an overlapping generations model of optimal rebalancing where agents differ in age and risk tolerance. Equilibrium rebalancing is driven by a leverage effect that influences levered and unlevered agents in opposite directions, an aggregate risk tolerance effect that depends on the distribution of wealth, and an intertemporal hedging effect. After a negative macroeconomic shock, relatively risk tolerant investors sell risky assets while more risk averse investors buy them. Owing to interactions of leverage and changing wealth, however, all agents have higher exposure to aggregate risk after a negative macroeconomic shock and lower exposure after a positive shock.

Keywords: household finance, portfolio choice, heterogeneity in risk tolerance and age

JEL codes: E21, E44, G11

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1 Introduction

Understanding how different people trade in response to large market movements, or how they rebalance their portfolios, is central to finance and macroeconomics. Studying rebalancing in a meaningful way requires a model that incorporates investor heterogeneity because if all investors are identical then all will hold the same portfolio and there will be no trade. We study optimal rebalancing behavior with a simple general equilibrium overlapping generations model that features heterogeneity in both age and risk tolerance. The model is focused on asset allocation, with one risky asset in fixed supply and a risk-free asset in zero net supply. We find that both general equilibrium and lifecycle considerations have large effects on optimal rebalancing, and thus should be inherent parts of asset allocation models. Optimal rebalancing is fairly complex, with trading driven by leverage, aggregate risk tolerance, and intertemporal hedging effects.

Understanding the effects that drive optimal rebalancing behavior is particularly important for two reasons. First, as more empirical work is done on the rebalancing behavior of individuals it is important to have a benchmark for equilibrium behavior in an economy in which investors behave optimally. While our model is quite simple, it helps to provide such a benchmark. Second, to meet the needs of investors with different horizons and preferences, the mutual fund industry has created a number of products called “lifecycle” or “target-date” funds that are designed to serve as the whole portfolio for a large group of investors over their lifespan. To the extent that these funds follow simple linear rules of thumb for allocating assets across time their allocations will be both suboptimal and generally infeasible because simple rules ignore general equilibrium constraints. Our model helps to illustrate how “universal target-date” funds, which follow an optimal strategy over time and are feasible in general equilibrium, can be structured.

Empirical work on observed rebalancing is still relatively rare. Its primary finding is that most investors appear to display inertia in their asset allocation.\footnote{Calvet, Campbell and Sodini (2009) use four years of Swedish data to show that households only partially rebalance their portfolios, or they only partially reverse the passive changes in their asset allocations. Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008) find similar results using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics.} To motivate our analysis
along these lines, we plot nonparametric estimates of stock share as a function of age from the three most recent (publicly available) waves of the Survey of Consumer Finances. The left panel of Figure 1 depicts stock shares in the 2004 and 2007 waves, between which stock prices rose about 30 percent. The right panel covers 2007 and 2010, between which prices fell about 28 percent. Both plots also give the “passive” share implied by market returns and initial shares. Average rebalancing by age is therefore given by the difference between the passive curve and the actual curve for the second wave in each plot.

Figure 1: Rebalancing, SCF Data

(a) From 2004 to 2007

(b) From 2007 to 2010

Several interesting features are immediately apparent when looking at the plots. First, older investors have consistently higher stock shares in these data, which may be due to cohort effects such as those described in Malmendier and Nagel (2011). Second, there is substantial rebalancing in the data. While many individual investors may display inertia in their asset allocation, in aggregate investors do appear to react to market movements. Third, most age groups do not simply revert to their initial share. Rather, older investors, who on average hold more stock to begin with, buy more stock than required to return to their initial positions when the market rises. They also sell more stock than required to

\[ \text{The curves are estimated with simple nonparametric regressions using Epanechnikov kernels. The passive curves are plotted assuming the stock returns reported in the text and total average non-stock returns of 6\% between 2004 and 2007 and 4\% between 2007 and 2010. To be included in the sample each individual must report at least $10,000 of financial wealth and some positive stock holding. There are 1389, 1260, and 1313 observations in 2004, 2007 and 2010, respectively.} \]
return to their initial position when the market falls. Younger investors display the opposite pattern, selling more than required to return to their initial position when prices rise, and buying shares as markets fall. In other words, rather than the stock share by age function either reverting back to the initial share or shifting to the passive share, it appears to pivot in each wave. While our model will not capture every feature of these plots, it highlights the importance of the general equilibrium constraints that the plots suggest and it allows older investors to behave differently than younger investors, as they appear to do in the data.

Section 2 describes intuitively the three effects that drive our equilibrium outcomes: the leverage, aggregate risk tolerance and intertemporal hedging effects. It also discusses how our work relates to other research. In Section 3 we describe the overlapping generations model in detail. The model has a partially closed-form solution, which makes the intuition more transparent and substantially eases the solution of the model. Section 4 presents our quantitative solution of the model. Section 5 presents our conclusions.

2 Preview

Most of the earliest models of asset allocation in general equilibrium feature homogeneous agents, with the implication that agents will never trade or rebalance [e.g. Lucas (1978)]. We refer to such an implication as the buy and hold rule. Other models, when considered in partial equilibrium, imply that agents should always revert to their initial stock share [e.g. Merton (1971)]. We refer to this implication as the constant share rule. Optimal portfolio rebalancing deviates from these two very different rules for at least three reasons in our model and more generally. First, there is a leverage effect. Since the risk-free asset is in zero net supply in our model, there will always be some investors that hold a levered position in the risky asset. For those with a levered position, their passive risky asset share actually declines as the market rises, and vice versa. Levered investors need to buy when the market rises and sell when it falls in order to keep their risky-asset shares constant, which is the opposite of standard rebalancing advice. Second, there is an aggregate risk tolerance effect. As the wealth of different types of agents shifts, aggregate risk tolerance also shifts, which in
turn affects equilibrium prices and expected returns. Movements in aggregate risk tolerance induce people to trade in response to market movements in a way that does not maintain a constant share. In our specification, the aggregate risk tolerance effect is substantial. Third, there is an intertemporal hedging effect. Since future expected returns are time-varying, young agents have an incentive to hedge changes in their investment opportunities when they are middle aged. In principle, intertemporal hedging can have a significant effect on asset demand, but for reasons we will explain, in our specification it is quite difficult to generate enough mean reversion in asset returns to generate a substantial intertemporal hedging effect.

In Section 2.1, we give a numerical example to illustrate the leverage effect. In Section 2.2, we give the simple analytics of the aggregate risk tolerance effect. The intertemporal hedging effect is more complicated. We defer discussing it until Section 3 after we present the formal model. In Section 2.3 we discuss how our research relates to the research of others.

2.1 Leverage Effect

A simple example can help clarify the leverage effect. Suppose an investor wants to maintain a levered portfolio with a share of 200% in the risky asset. With a $100 stake to begin with, the investor borrows $100 to add to that stake and buys $200 worth of the risky asset. If the risky asset suddenly doubles in value, the investor then has $400 worth of the risky asset and an unchanged $100 of debt, for a net financial wealth of $300. The constant share rule generally has investors sell assets when their prices rise. After this increase in the price of the risky asset, however, the share of the investor’s net financial wealth in the risky asset is only $400/300 = 133\%$, since the investor’s net financial wealth has risen even more than the value of the risky asset. Therefore, if the goal is to maintain a 200% risky asset share, the investor needs to borrow more to buy additional shares. Hence, levered investors rebalance in a direction that is the opposite of unlevered investors. The general equilibrium constraint that each buyer must trade with a seller is partially met by having levered investors trade with unlevered investors.
2.2 Aggregate Risk Tolerance Effect

The aggregate risk tolerance effect is a consequence of general equilibrium adding up. It arises because the share of the risky asset held by an individual is a function of that individual’s risk tolerance relative to aggregate risk tolerance; and aggregate risk tolerance must move in general equilibrium when there are shocks that affect the distribution of wealth. We will now show that this feature of general equilibrium makes it impossible for all investors to maintain a constant portfolio share. Returns adjust to make people willing to adjust their portfolio shares in a way that allows the adding-up constraint to be satisfied.

To see this, consider the aggregation of an economy characterized by individuals who had portfolio shares determined as in Merton (1971). That is, an individual i’s share of investable wealth $W_i$ held in the risky asset would be

$$\theta_i \equiv \frac{PS_i}{W_i} = \frac{S}{\sigma} \tau_i,$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)

where $P$ is the price of the risky asset and $S_i$ is the amount of the risky asset. The only heterogeneity across individuals here comes from individual risk tolerance $\tau_i$ and the only heterogeneity over time comes from a time-varying expected Sharpe ratio $S$ or volatility $\sigma$.

Recall that the risk free asset is in zero net supply, so the total value of all investable wealth must equal the total value of the risky asset. Multiplying (1) through by each type’s wealth and aggregating across types yields

$$\sum_i \theta_i W_i = \sum_i PS_i = \left[ \sum_i W_i \tau_i \right] \frac{S}{\sigma} = W.$$ \hspace{1cm} (2)

Dividing equation (2) through by aggregate wealth and comparing the resulting expression to equation (1) allow us to derive an expression for the risky asset share that does not depend on the distribution of the asset’s return:

$$\theta_i = \tau_i \left[ \sum_i \frac{W_i \tau_i}{W} \right]^{-1} = \frac{\tau_i}{T}.$$ \hspace{1cm} (3)
where $T = \sum_i \frac{W_i \tau_i}{W}$ is aggregate risk tolerance.

Now suppose that there is a positive shock to the value of the risky asset $P$, but the expected return going forward remains unchanged. In the Merton world, the portfolio share as described in equation (1) remains unchanged. But note that the shock to $P$ will affect different investors differently. Those with high risk tolerance who held a disproportionate share of the risky asset prior to the shock earn a higher total return than those with low risk tolerance. Thus, after a positive shock, a higher fraction of all wealth will be held by those who have high risk tolerance and therefore have a high share of the risky asset in their portfolios. If each type continued to hold the same share in risky assets, the overall share of risky assets held would have to increase as a greater fraction of all wealth is held by those with a high risky asset share. But this is impossible, since (with the risky asset representing a share in all the capital income of the economy) the overall share of risky assets must be 1. Thus, the portfolio shares of each type cannot remain unchanged.

For portfolio shares to stay the same in market-clearing equilibrium, the aggregate risk tolerance $T$ would have to be constant. But aggregate risk tolerance cannot be constant. After a positive shock to $P$, the high risk tolerance investors who invest disproportionately in the risky asset will have an increased wealth weight, so aggregate risk tolerance increases. Our model, described in the next section, will make precise how the aggregate risk tolerance and individual portfolio shares move together consistently in general equilibrium.

This illustration of the failure of the constant portfolio share model of rebalancing does not assume time-variation in asset returns. It indicates instead that general equilibrium considerations stemming from a fixed asset supply will force the necessary time-variation in asset returns to counterbalance the effects of changes in aggregate risk tolerance on asset demand. From (3) or its counterpart in more complex models, one can predict that the change in aggregate risk tolerance will affect portfolio decisions going forward even without knowing what is happening to the asset return distribution.
2.3 Relation to the Literature

There is a great deal of research about asset allocation and portfolio choice in finance and economics. These topics have become particularly interesting recently as economists have begun to study household finance in detail following Campbell (2006). Three papers that discuss optimal trading behavior are Dumas (1989), Longstaff and Wang (2012) and Wang (1996). Dumas (1989) solves for the equilibrium wealth sharing rule in a dynamic equilibrium model with more and less risk tolerant investors. This paper nicely illustrates the importance of the distribution of wealth as a state variable. Longstaff and Wang (2012) discuss the leverage effect that we describe. Like our model, these papers find that more risk tolerant investors sell after negative market returns while less risk tolerant investors buy. All three of these papers feature continuous time models, in which prices evolve according to Brownian motion processes and agents trade every instant. As Longstaff and Wang (2012) explain, more risk tolerant investors trade in a dynamic way to create long positions in call options, while less risk tolerant investors create short call positions. As we discuss below, that paper’s main contribution is about the size of the credit market. Dumas (1989) shows that more risk tolerant investors would like to hold perpetual call options. Since investors are continuously hedging to create options positions, these models generally imply infinite trading volume. Our model differs from these by featuring lifecycle effects, discrete time and relatively large price movements, which will be more realistic for many investors. None of these models focuses on rebalancing behavior.

Relatively little of the research on portfolio choice, however, considers the general equilibrium constraints that we apply in our model. Three recent papers that feature general equilibrium are Cochrane, Longstaff and Santa-Clara (2008), Garleanu and Panageas (2008), and Chan and Kogan (2002). Cochrane, Longstaff and Santa-Clara (2008) has heterogeneous assets rather than heterogeneous agents so it is not about trade. Garleanu and Panageas (2008), like our paper, models investor heterogeneity in risk preference and age in an overlapping generations model. Chan and Kogan (2002) examines the aggregate risk tolerance effect in detail. All of these papers focus on the behavior of asset prices, showing that gen-
eral equilibrium can generate return predictability that is consistent with empirical evidence. None of these papers explores the implications of market returns for either trading or the portfolio choice of different types of individuals, which is the focus of our paper.

The focus of our paper is much closer to the focus of Campbell and Viceira (2002). They find an important intertemporal hedging component of portfolio choice. In our model the leverage effect and the time-varying aggregate risk tolerance effect are much more important. The intertemporal hedging effect in our model is intentionally weak because we do not build in features that might lead to hedging such as mean reversion in fundamentals or noise traders. We have experimented with several different sets of parameter values to see if we can make the intertemporal hedging effect larger in our context, but we have not been able to find a scenario in which it matters very much. Approaches such as Campbell and Viceira that use actual asset returns, which might reflect mispricing, have greater scope for finding intertemporal hedging.

There is a large and important literature about labor income risk and portfolio choice, including Bodie, Merton and Samuelson (1992), Jaganathan and Kocherlakota (1996), Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (2005), and Gomes and Michaelides (2005). In a recent paper that is related to our work, Heathcote, Krueger and Rios-Rull (2010) find that young people can benefit from severe recessions if old people are forced to sell assets to finance their consumption, causing market prices to fall more than wages. We purposely abstract from human capital considerations by assuming that agents only earn labor income before they have an opportunity to rebalance. Our aim is thus to focus on the general equilibrium effects while suppressing the important, but complex effects of human capital.

The leverage effect that we find is of course related to the effect discussed by Black (1976). Geanakoplos (2010) has recently developed a model emphasizing how shocks to valuation shift aggregate risk tolerance. Risk tolerant investors, who take highly levered risky positions, may go bankrupt after bad shocks, thereby decreasing aggregate risk tolerance and further depressing prices. This analysis hence features both the leverage and aggregate risk tolerance effects. The details of his model are quite different from ours. Moreover, the focus of his
analysis is defaults, which will not occur in our setting. Nevertheless, both his model and our model feature time varying aggregate risk tolerance driven by changes in the distribution of wealth.

As mentioned in the introduction, Calvet, Campbell and Sodini (2009) and Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008) examine portfolio rebalancing with administrative holdings data and survey data, respectively. Both papers find that people do not completely rebalance—that investors do not completely reverse the passive changes in their asset allocations. This finding is consistent with optimal rebalancing according to our model. Moreover, the leverage effect implies that investors with high initial shares will change their allocations in the opposite direction from that predicted by full rebalancing—or in other words that risk tolerant investors will chase returns. In fact, regressions in the online appendix of Calvet, Campbell and Sodini (2009) indicate that the coefficients on passive changes in allocation are increasing in initial stock share. This is exactly what we would expect to find.3

When academic researchers think about asset allocation, they generally include all risky assets (including all types of corporate bonds) in their definition of the risky mutual fund that all investors should hold. In our model, regardless of how one might divide assets into safe or risky categories, we define the “risky asset” or the “tree” to be the set of all assets in positive net supply and we define the risk-free asset to be in zero net supply. The levered position in trees in our model encompasses both stock holdings and the risky part of the corporate bonds.

By contrast, when practitioners think about portfolio choice they generally treat stocks, bonds, and cash-like securities as separate asset categories in their allocation and rebalancing recommendations, as Canner, Mankiw and Weil (1997) point out. To understand the size of the leverage effect, it is important to remember that stock is a levered investment in underlying assets. Thus, for example, if the corporate sector is financed 60% by stock and 40% by debt, an investor with more than 60% in stock is actually levered relative to the

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3 Since Calvet, Campbell and Sodini (2009) have detailed data on investors’ actual holdings and returns, some portion of the returns their investors experience are idiosyncratic. This rationalizes the fact that the coefficients in the online appendix of Calvet Campbell and Sodini (2009) increase in initial share but they do not become positive for investors with high initial shares.
economy as a whole. If some corporate debt can be considered essentially risk-free then it should be possible to express such an investor’s position as a portfolio of a levered position in the underlying assets of the economy and some borrowing at the risk-free rate. The leverage effect will be important for all investors that hold a levered position in the underlying assets of the economy—which is everyone who has an above-average degree of leverage (though typically not everyone who has an above-median degree of leverage).

3 Model

We include in the model only the complications necessary to meaningfully study rebalancing. The economy has an infinite horizon and overlapping generations. There are two types of agents with different degrees of risk tolerance. The level of risk tolerance is randomly assigned at the beginning of the agent’s life and remains unchanged throughout life. Each agent lives for three equal periods: young (Y), middle-aged (M) and old (O). Agents work in a representative firm and receive labor income when they are young, and live off their savings when they are middle-aged and old. All agents start their life with zero wealth, and do not leave assets to future generations; that is, they have no bequest motive. There is no population growth, so there is always an equal mass across the three cohorts. In this section, we provide the details of how we model and specify the technology, the asset markets, and the agents’ preferences and their resulting decision problems.

3.1 Technology and Production

Our setup has a character very similar to that of an endowment economy. There is a fixed supply of productive assets or “trees.” Hence, we have a Lucas (1978) endowment economy, though unlike Lucas, we will have trade because not all agents are identical, and the endowment includes labor as well as “trees.” The young supply labor inelastically. Trees, combined with labor, produce output that is divided into labor income and dividend income. The labor income stream serves to provide resources to each generation. The dividend income
provides a return to risky saving. This setup allows us to provide resources to each generation without inheritance. As noted above, by providing labor income only at the start of the life, we intentionally abstract from the interaction of human capital with the demand for risky assets.

The production function is Cobb-Douglas $Y_t = \frac{1}{\alpha} D_t K_t^\alpha L_t^{1-\alpha}$, where $K_t$ is the fixed quantity of trees, $L_t$ is labor, $\alpha$ is capital’s share in production, and $D_t$ is the stochastic shock to technology. We normalize the quantity of trees $K_t$ to be one. The quantity of labor is also normalized to be one. Therefore, total output is $Y_t = \frac{D_t}{\alpha}$, total labor income is $\frac{(1-\alpha)D_t}{\alpha}$, and total dividend income is $D_t$. Given our normalizations, technology levels will equal stochastic dividends. All labor income goes to the young, since they are the only ones supplying labor. Dividend income will be distributed to the middle-aged and old agents depending on their holdings of the risky tree.

In order not to build in mean reversion mechanically, in our benchmark case we assume the growth rate $d_{t+1} = D_{t+1}/D_t$ is serially uncorrelated. In our calculations, we parameterize the dividend growth as having finite support $\{G_n\}_{n=1}^N$, where $G_n$ occurs with probability $\pi_n$ each period. The dividend growth shocks are realized at the beginning of each period before any decisions are made.

### 3.2 Assets

Before turning to agents’ decision problems, it is helpful to define assets and returns. In our economy, there are two assets available to agents: one risk-free discount bond and one risky tree security. The risk-free bond is in zero net supply, and the risky tree has a fixed supply of one. In our benchmark case, we parameterize the dividend growth process to have two states. In this benchmark case, these two assets provide a complete market.

One unit of a bond purchased at period $t$ pays 1 unit of consumption in period $t+1$ regardless of the state of the economy then. A bond purchased at time $t$ has a price of $1/R_t$, where $R_t$ is the gross risk-free interest rate. One unit of the tree has a price $P_t$ in period $t$ and pays $D_{t+1} + P_{t+1}$ if sold in period $t+1$. Thus, the gross tree return $R_t^{\text{Tree}}$ is $\frac{P_{t+1} + D_{t+1}}{P_t}$,
and the excess tree return is \( Z_{t+1} = \frac{P_{t+1} + D_{t+1}}{P_t R_t} \).

### 3.3 Agents’ Decision Problems

Since this paper focuses on asset allocation, we specify preferences so that there is meaningful heterogeneity in risk tolerance, but the consumption-saving tradeoff is simple. We use the Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences with a unit elasticity of intertemporal substitution (Epstein and Zin 1989, Weil 1990). The utility of agents born in date \( t \) with risk tolerance \( \tau_j = \frac{1}{\gamma_j} \) is given by

\[
\rho_Y \ln(C^j_{Yt}) + \frac{1 - \rho_Y}{1 - \gamma_j} \ln E_t \exp \left( (1 - \gamma_j) \rho_M \ln(C^j_{Mt+1}) + (1 - \rho_M) \ln \left( E_{t+1}(C^j_{Ot+2})^{1-\gamma_j} \right) \right),
\]

where \( C^j_{Yt}, C^j_{Mt+1} \) and \( C^j_{Ot+2} \) denote consumption at young, middle and old ages, and \( \rho_Y \) and \( \rho_M \) govern time preference when young and when middle-aged. These parameters \( \rho_Y \) and \( \rho_M \) will turn out to be the average propensities to consume. With an underlying discount factor equal to \( \delta \), we have \( \rho_Y = \frac{1}{1+\delta+\delta^2} \) and \( \rho_M = \frac{1}{1+\delta} \). The degree of risk tolerance can be either high \((j = H)\) or low \((j = L)\). Because this utility has a recursive form, we work backwards.

**Old Agents**

The problem for old agents at date \( t \) is trivial. They simply consume all of their wealth, so total consumption of the old \( C^j_{Ot} \) equals the total wealth of the old \( W^j_{Ot} \).

**Middle-aged Agents**

A middle-aged agent at date \( t \) chooses consumption when middle-aged, and chooses a probability distribution of consumption when old through choosing bond holding \( B_{Mt} \) and tree holding \( S_{Mt} \) to maximize intertemporal utility

\[
\rho_M \ln(C^j_{Mt}) + (1 - \rho_M) \ln \left( E_t(C^j_{Ot+1})^{1-\gamma_j} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma_j}},
\]

(5)
subject to the budget constraints

$$C^j_{Mt} + B^j_{Mt}/R_t + P_tS^j_{Mt} = W^j_{Mt},$$  \hspace{1cm} (6)$$

$$C^j_{Ot+1} = W^j_{Ot+1} = B^j_{Mt} + S^j_{Mt}(P_{t+1} + D_{t+1}).$$  \hspace{1cm} (7)$$

Recall that the middle-aged agents have no labor income, so they must live off of their wealth $W^j_{Mt}$.

Consider the portfolio allocation of this middle-aged agent. It is convenient to define the certainty equivalent total return

$$\phi^j_{Mt} = \max_{\theta \in \Theta} \left\{ E_t \left\{ (1 - \theta)R_t + \theta R_t Z_{t+1} \right\}^{1-\gamma_j} \right\}^{1/(1-\gamma_j)},$$  \hspace{1cm} (8)$$

where $\theta$ is the share of savings (invested wealth) in the risky asset. Given the homotheticity of preferences and the absence of labor income when youth is past, the optimal portfolio share $\theta^j_{Mt}$ that yields $\phi^j_{Mt}$ also maximizes expected utility from consumption when old.

Thus, the middle-aged agent’s problem is equivalent to solving the following decision problem:

$$\max_{C^j_{Mt}, \theta \in \Theta} \rho_M \ln(C^j_{Mt}) + (1 - \rho_M) \ln(W^j_{Mt} - C^j_{Mt})$$

$$+ (1 - \rho_M) \ln \left\{ E_t \left\{ (1 - \theta)R_t + \theta R_t Z_{t+1} \right\}^{1-\gamma_j} \right\}^{1/(1-\gamma_j)}.$$

Since only the first two terms depend on $C^j_{Mt}$, the first order condition for $C^j_{Mt}$ is

$$\frac{\rho_M}{C^j_{Mt}} = \frac{1 - \rho_M}{W^j_{Mt} - C^j_{Mt}},$$

which has the solution

$$C^j_{Mt} = \rho M W^j_{Mt}.$$

The simple consumption function follows from log utility in the intertemporal dimension,
which makes the saving and portfolio choices independent. Thus, the maximized utility of
the middle aged is given by

\[ V_{Mt}^{j}(W_{Mt}^{j}) = \rho M \ln(\rho M W_{Mt}^{j}) + (1 - \rho M) \ln \left( (1 - \rho M)W_{Mt}^{j} \phi_{Mt}^{j} \right). \]  

(9)

Bond holdings \( B_{Mt}^{j} \) are given by \( (1 - \theta_{Mt}^{j})(1 - \rho M)W_{Mt}^{j}R_{t} \) and tree holdings \( S_{Mt}^{j} \) are given
by \( \theta_{Mt}^{j}(1 - \rho M)W_{Mt}^{j}/P_{t} \).

**Young Agents**

With no initial wealth, the young have only their labor income for consumption and saving. Labor income of a young agent in period \( t \) is \( W_{Yt} = (1 - \alpha)D_{t}/\alpha \). A young agent of
type \( j \) decides on consumption, bond and tree holdings \( (B_{Yt}^{j}, S_{Yt}^{j}) \) (that together determine
middle-aged wealth \( W_{Mt+1}^{j} \)) to maximize the utility

\[ \rho Y \ln(C_{Yt}^{j}) + \frac{1 - \rho Y}{1 - \gamma_{j}} \ln \left( E_t \exp((1 - \gamma_{j})V_{Mt+1}^{j}(W_{Mt+1}^{j})) \right) \]  

(10)

subject to the budget constraints

\[ C_{Yt}^{j} + B_{Yt}^{j}/R_{t} + P_{t}S_{Yt}^{j} = W_{Yt}^{j} \]  

(11)

and

\[ W_{Mt+1}^{j} = B_{Yt}^{j} + S_{Yt}^{j}(P_{t+1} + D_{t+1}). \]  

(12)

Substituting the maximized middle-aged utility given by equation (9) into (10) yields the
following decision problem for a young agent:

\[
\max_{C_{Yt}^{j}, \theta \in \Theta} \quad \rho Y \ln(C_{Yt}^{j}) + (1 - \rho Y) \ln(W_{Yt}^{j} - C_{Yt}^{j}) \\
+ (1 - \rho Y) \ln \left\{ E_t \left[ ((1 - \theta)R_{t} + \theta R_{t}Z_{t+1})(\phi_{Mt+1}^{j})^{1-\rho M} \right]^{1-\gamma_{j}} \right\} \\
+ (1 - \rho Y) \left[ \rho M \ln(\rho M) + (1 - \rho M) \ln(1 - \rho M) \right].
\]
Only the first two terms depend on \( C_{Yt}^j \). Again because of log utility, optimal consumption is given by

\[ C_{Yt}^j = \rho_Y W_{Yt}^j. \]

Since only the third term of equation (4) depends on \( \theta \), the optimal tree portfolio share \( \theta_{Yt}^j \) for the young maximizes the certainty equivalent, time-aggregated total return function for the young \( \phi_{Yt}^j \):

\[
\phi_{Yt}^j = \max_{\theta \in \Theta} \left\{ \mathbb{E}_t \left\{ \left[ (1 - \theta) R_t + \theta R_t Z_{t+1} \right] (\phi_{Mt+1}^j)^{1-\rho_M} \right\}^{1-\gamma} \right\}^{1-\gamma_j}. \tag{14}
\]

Comparing the middle-aged portfolio problem in (8) with the young portfolio problem in (14), we find that the young solve a more complicated problem given their longer life span. Middle-aged agents with only one more period of life simply maximize the certainty equivalent return of their portfolio investment next period, as in equation (8). Young agents with two more periods to live need to pay attention to the covariance between portfolio returns from youth to middle-age and the certainty equivalent of the returns going forward beyond middle age.

**A Variable Annuity as Numeraire**

Since future expected returns are time-varying, the multi-period decision problem of the young creates an opportunity for intertemporal hedging (Merton 1973). To sharpen the interpretation of intertemporal hedging, define

\[
Q_{Mt+1}^j = \frac{1}{\phi_{Mt+1}^j} \left( \frac{\rho_M}{1-\rho_M} \left( 1 - \phi_{Mt+1}^j \right)^{1-\rho_M} \right), \tag{15}
\]

which prices the variable annuity that yields—at lowest cost—a lifetime utility equal to the lifetime utility from one unit of consumption at period \( t + 1 \) and one unit of consumption at period \( t + 2 \). That is, the agent will be indifferent between being limited to consuming one unit of consumption at both middle and old age and having wealth of \( Q_{Mt+1}^j \) to deploy optimally. To see this, note that by (5), consumption of one at both middle and old age yields a lifetime utility of zero for the middle-aged agent. Middle-aged wealth of \( Q_{Mt+1}^j \) must
therefore make the middle-aged lifetime utility given by (9) equal to zero once the optimal consumption and portfolio share are substituted in, so

\[ \rho_M \ln(\rho_M Q_{Mt+1}^j) + (1 - \rho_M) \ln((1 - \rho_M)Q_{Mt+1}^j) + (1 - \rho_M) \ln(\phi_{Mt+1}^j) = 0. \]  (16)

The value of \( Q_{Mt+1}^j \) given in (15) is the solution to (16). The variable annuity itself implicitly replicates the optimal portfolio strategy for the agent. Given this definition of the variable annuity price, equation (14) can be rewritten as follows:

\[ \phi_{Yt}^j = \rho_M^{-\rho_M}(1 - \rho_M)^{\rho_M - 1} \max_{\theta \in \Theta} \left\{ E_t \left\{ \left( 1 - \theta \right) R_t + \theta R_{Zt+1} Q_{Mt+1}^j \right\} ^{1 - \gamma_j} \right\} ^{1 - \gamma_j}. \]  (17)

Thus, a young agent maximizes the simple certainty equivalent of his or her portfolio’s return relative to the return on the variable annuity. In other words, this variable annuity serves as a numeraire for returns. The value of the variable annuity can be thought of as the price of a share of a universal target-date fund, a fund that is optimal over an agent’s lifespan and feasible in general equilibrium.

Note that, because of its definition as the amount of wealth yielding lifetime utility equal to the lifetime utility from consumption constant at one, equation (9) can be rewritten

\[ V_{Mt}^j(W_{Mt}^j) = \ln(W_{Mt}^j) - \ln(Q_{Mt}^j). \]  (18)

Defining the corresponding price of the variable annuity in youth that can give lifetime utility equivalent to the lifetime utility of one unit of consumption in each of the three periods of life, \([Q_{Yt}^j]^{-1} = \rho_Y^{-\rho_Y}(1 - \rho_Y)^{1 - \rho_Y}[\rho_M^{-\rho_M}(1 - \rho_M)^{1 - \rho_M}]^{1 - \rho_Y}(\phi_{Yt}^j)^{1 - \rho_Y}\), the maximized utility for a young agent that results from substituting in the optimal decisions can be similarly written as

\[ V_{Yt}^j(W_{Yt}^j) = \ln(W_{Yt}^j) - \ln(Q_{Yt}^j). \]

Thus, the price of the variable annuity fully captures the dependence of the value function.
on the investment opportunity set. Note that, unless $\gamma = 1$, wealth and $Q$ are no longer additively separable after the application of the appropriate curvature for risk preferences.

### 3.4 Market Clearing

In our economy, the safe discount bonds are in zero net supply, and the risky tree has an inelastic supply normalized to one. We now substitute the asset demands we derived in the previous subsection into the asset market clearing conditions. Recall that the asset demands of the young are given by $S_{Yt}^j = (1 - \rho_Y)W_{Yt}^j\theta_{Yt}^j/P_t$ and $B_{Yt}^j = (1 - \rho_Y)W_{Yt}^jR_t\psi_{Yt}^j (1 - \theta_{Yt}^j)$. The asset demands of the middle-aged are given by $S_{Mt}^j = (1 - \rho_M)W_{Mt}^j\psi_{Mt}^j/P_t$ and $B_{Mt}^j = (1 - \rho_M)W_{Mt}^j(1 - \theta_{Mt}^j)R_t$. The old have no asset demand. Summing over the type $j$ and the generations, the asset market clearing conditions can be written as

$$1 = \frac{1}{P_t} \sum_{j=H,L} \psi_j [(1 - \rho_M)W_{Mt}^j\theta_{Mt}^j + (1 - \rho_Y)W_{Yt}^j\theta_{Yt}^j]$$

(19)

and

$$0 = R_t \sum_{j=H,L} \psi_j [(1 - \rho_M)W_{Mt}^j(1 - \theta_{Mt}^j) + (1 - \rho_Y)W_{Yt}^j(1 - \theta_{Yt}^j)],$$

(20)

where $\psi_j$ is the constant fraction of labor income going to young agents of type $j$.

In addition to the asset market clearing conditions, the goods market clearing condition is also instructive. It is

$$\frac{D_t}{\alpha} = \frac{\rho_Y(1 - \alpha)D_t}{\alpha} + \rho_M(\psi_HW_{Mt}^H + \psi LW_{Mt}^L) + W_{Ot},$$

(21)

where the wealth level of the old $W_{Ot}$ is given by the sum across the two types. Note that the propensity to consume out of wealth is 1 for the old, so there is no parameter multiplying $W_{Ot}$. Since the asset demands for old agents are equal to zero regardless of the level of risk aversion, we do not need to keep track separately of the wealth of each old group.

The total financial wealth of the economy is the sum of the value of the trees $P_t$ and the dividend $D_t$, since the risk-free asset is in net zero supply. At the beginning of the period
all financial wealth is held by the middle-aged and the old. Hence, the total wealth of the
old is $W_{Ot} = P_t + D_t - \psi_H W^H_{Mt} - \psi_L W^L_{Mt}$. Substituting this expression into equation (21)
and solving for $P_t$ gives rise to an equation for $P_t$ based only on contemporaneous variables:

$$P_t = (1 - \rho_Y) \frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} D_t + (1 - \rho_M)(\psi_H W^H_{Mt} + \psi_L W^L_{Mt}).$$  \hspace{1cm} (22)

The right-hand side of (22) can be interpreted simply as the sum of savings supplies—and therefore total asset demands—of the young and middle aged, determined by their propensities to save and initial levels of wealth.

Normalizing all the variables in the above equation by dividend $D_t$ gives the expression
for the price-dividend ratio $p_t$:

$$p_t = (1 - \rho_Y) \frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} + (1 - \rho_M)(\psi_H w^H_{Mt} + \psi_L w^L_{Mt}),$$  \hspace{1cm} (23)

where lower case letters denote the corresponding variables divided by the dividend $D_t$.
Thus, the price-dividend ratio $p_t$ is linear in the total (per-dividend) middle-aged wealth
$\psi_H W^H_{Mt} + \psi_L W^L_{Mt}$. The first term on the right-hand side of (23) corresponds to the demand
for saving of the young, which is a constant share of dividends and is therefore a constant
in the per-dividend expression.

Having an analytic expression for the price-dividend ratio both adds transparency to our
analysis and simplifies the solution of the model. Analytic expressions for portfolio shares
and expected returns for the risky and risk-free assets are not available. In the next section,
we will turn to numerical solutions of the model. Unlike the price-dividend ratio, which
only depends on total middle-aged wealth, portfolio shares and expected returns will depend
on the distribution of wealth among the middle-aged agents. This distribution depends
on the history of shocks. For example, as we will discuss explicitly in the next section, a
good dividend growth shock raises the share of wealth held by the middle-aged risk-tolerant
agents who invested heavily in the risky asset when young. This increased wealth share of
the risk-tolerant agents in turn affects asset demands and expected returns.
3.5 Aggregate Risk Tolerance Revisited

Recall that in Merton’s partial equilibrium environment an individual’s portfolio share depends analytically on the ratio of individual to aggregate risk tolerance as in equation (3). In terms of our model, aggregate risk tolerance is

\[ T_t = \frac{W_H Y_t \tau_H + W_H M_t \tau_H + W_L Y_t \tau_L + W_L M_t \tau_L}{W_t}, \]  

(24)

where the savings or invested wealth of each type \( j = \{H, L\} \) and \( a = \{Y, M\} \) is \( W_{at}^j = (1 - \rho_a) \psi_j w_{at}^j D_t \) and the total invested wealth across all types is \( W_t = W_H Y_t + W_H M_t + W_L Y_t + W_L M_t \).\(^4\)

There is no analytic expression for portfolio shares corresponding to equation (3) in our model. Nonetheless, changes in aggregate risk tolerance have similar effects on portfolio shares. For example, when aggregate risk tolerance is high, there is a tendency for all agents to reduce their share of the risky asset. Aggregate risk tolerance remains a useful construct for understanding the demand for the risky asset and for the determination of expected returns in our model.

In fact, the combination of the price-dividend ratio and aggregate risk tolerance is sufficient to fully characterize the state of the model economy at any point in time. Both the price dividend ratio and aggregate risk tolerance are simple functions of \( (w_{Mt}^H, w_{Mt}^L) \): recall (23) and rewrite (24) as

\[ T_t = \frac{(1 - \rho_Y)(1 - \alpha) \psi_H w_{Mt}^H \tau_H + \psi_L w_{Mt}^L \tau_L + (1 - \rho_M) \psi_H w_{Mt}^H \tau_H + \psi_L w_{Mt}^L \tau_L}{(1 - \rho_Y)(1 - \alpha) \psi_H w_{Mt}^H \tau_H + \psi_L w_{Mt}^L \tau_L}. \]  

(25)

These two equations are easily invertible (indeed, given \( p_t \) and \( T_t \) they translate into a pair of linear equations in \( w_{Mt}^H \) and \( w_{Mt}^L \)). Thus, there is a one-to-one mapping between \( (w_{Mt}^H, w_{Mt}^L) \) and the vector \( (p_t, T_t) \). One could in fact view \( (p_t, T_t) \) as the state vector for the economy as an alternative to the equivalent description of the state by \( (w_{Mt}^H, w_{Mt}^L) \).

\(^4\)Note that the relevant wealth for this aggregation in our model is saving or invested wealth, i.e., wealth after consumption. In the continuous-time Merton model, there is no consumption during the investment period, so the distinction between before- and after-consumption wealth is absent.
4 Quantitative Results

In this section, we examine numerical solutions of a particular parameterization of our model focusing on the optimal portfolio allocations and rebalancing behavior of households in general equilibrium. Portfolios vary across agents with different levels of risk tolerance. In particular, the optimal portfolio share is larger than the market portfolio share (100%) for the high-risk-tolerance agents and lower than the market portfolio share for the low-risk-tolerance agents. The portfolio tree shares of all types comove in response to the dividend growth rate shock: declining after a good shock and rising after a bad shock. The underlying wealth dynamics ensure that such comovements in the portfolio shares are consistent with general equilibrium.

4.1 Parameterization and Solution

Table 1 summarizes the parameter values used in the quantitative analysis. A model period corresponds to 20 years in the data. The 20-year discount rate of 0.67 corresponds to an annual discount rate of 0.98. Consequently, $\rho_M$ is 0.75 and $\rho_Y$ is 0.69. Capital’s share is 0.33. The cross-sectional heterogeneity in risk tolerance is set to match the findings in Kimball, Sahm and Shapiro (2008). They estimate the mean risk tolerance to be 0.21 and the standard deviation to be 0.17. The distribution they estimate has skewness of 1.84. We match these three moments by giving 92% of agents a low risk tolerance $\tau_L$ of 0.156 and 8% of agents a high risk tolerance $\tau_H$ of 0.797. We refer to the low-risk-tolerance agents as cautious agents and the high-risk-tolerance agents as daring agents.

The dividend growth shock process is assumed to be i.i.d with two states of equal probability. In the bad state, the detrended gross growth rate is $G_1 = 0.67 \approx (1.005^{1/1.025})^{20}$ and in the good state, it is $G_2 = 1.5 \approx (1.045^{1/1.025})^{20}$. With our 20-year time horizon, these parameters imply that the dividend growth rate is 2.5% per year in expected terms, 0.5% per year in the bad state and 4.5% per year in the good state. The dividend growth rate shocks capture generational risk. The mean scenario mimics the experience of the United States, the good scenario mimics that of South Korea, and the bad scenario mimics that of the Japan in the
last two decades. Since all key variables below are expressed on a per-dividend basis and the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution is equal to 1, the trend growth rate of 2.5% per year
does not affect any of our analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Benchmark Parameter Values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital’s Share</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discount Factor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-aged Average Propensity to Consume</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young Average Propensity to Consume</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Risk Tolerance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Risk Tolerance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraction of Low Risk Tolerance Agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraction of High Risk Tolerance Agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i.i.d. Dividend Growth Shock Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detrended Growth Rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As noted above, our model does not have an analytical solution, so we solve the model numerically. To make the model stationary, we detrend relevant variables with same-dated dividends. Given six types of agents and two types of assets in our model, it might seem that the dimension of the state space would be large. As shown in section 3.4, however, we are able to reduce the state space to two endogenous variables: the wealth levels of the middle-aged cautious and middle-aged daring agents ($w^{H}_{Mt}, w^{L}_{Mt}$). We are able to omit states governing the dividend growth rate from the state space due to the i.i.d. assumption. We discretize the state space in our numerical solution, but we allow the decision variables to be continuous. We use the recursive dynamic technique to solve the model. For the detailed computational algorithm see Appendix I.

We now present the quantitative behavior of our model economy, focusing particularly on asset holdings. Our findings on price and return dynamics are not the main contribution of this paper, so we discuss them in Appendix II.
4.2 The Dynamics of Risk Tolerance

Understanding the endogenous wealth dynamics across agents is central to understanding the dynamics of asset holdings. The history of shocks matters because it affects the distribution of wealth and therefore aggregate risk tolerance. We display impulse response functions, starting from the average steady state and then show the average response of the economy after a good or bad shock in period 1. Figure 2 shows how aggregate risk tolerance responds to both positive and negative shocks. The plot is symmetric because it gives deviations from the mean and good shocks and bad shocks are equally likely.

Figure 2: Aggregate Risk Tolerance

![Figure 2: Aggregate Risk Tolerance](image)

The impulse response shown in Figure 2 shows aggregate risk tolerance rises as a result of a good shock and falls as a result of a bad shock. While the long-run average aggregate risk tolerance is about 0.227, it falls to 0.202 after a bad shock and rises to 0.25 after a good shock. This is because a good shock corresponds to a positive return and an increase in the wealth of daring agents. The shock in period 1 matters less for risk tolerance in period 2 because one of the affected cohorts dies, and another affected cohort reaches the simplicity of old age. Yet on average the period 1 movement in risk tolerance rebounds so that it is more than reversed in period 2.

What explains the dependence of aggregate risk tolerance in period 2 on the shock in
period 1? A good shock at time 1 puts a large share of invested wealth in the hands of daring middle-aged agents, who then hold a large fraction of all available shares of the risky asset, leaving less for their more cautious peers and for the young cohort as a whole. Thus, the overall holdings of the young cohort are less aggressive when they enter economic life on the heels of a good dividend-growth-rate shock than when they enter economic life on the heels of a bad dividend-growth-rate shock. This is particularly relevant for daring young agents, as it means that the fraction of all invested wealth in middle age that they hold is less than it would otherwise be. Thus, after a good shock in period 1 the wealth of daring middle aged agents in period 2 is unusually low, and therefore the aggregate risk tolerance in that state of the world is also unusually low. This explanation is symmetric, so that after a bad shock in period 1 risk tolerance is unusually high in period 2. Similar reasoning can explain how shocks affect risk tolerance in later periods. In principle each shock affects all future values of aggregate risk tolerance, but in practice the effect of any shock tends to average out after 3 periods.

Figures 3 plots the impulse responses for wealth shares after bad and good shocks and Figure 4 shows how the aggregate wealth shares of different types of agents sum to one. Consistent with the rest of our results, the wealth share of the middle aged daring goes down after a bad shock and up after a good shock. The wealth share of the middle aged cautious shows the opposite pattern, and the wealth share of the young does not vary much with shocks.

4.3 Portfolio Choice and Rebalancing

Most modern discussions of asset pricing in general equilibrium focus on the properties of asset prices and returns. Asset holdings are left implicit. Since we are particularly concerned with implications for individual asset demands, we look directly at portfolio choice and rebalancing in response to shocks in this subsection. Figure 5 plots the impulse response of the equilibrium tree holdings of different types of agents to both bad and good shocks. Figure 6 plots the same thing in a cumulative fashion to show explicitly that the holdings
Figure 3: Wealth Shares by Type

Figure 4: Aggregating Wealth Shares by Type
always sum to one.

Figure 5: Equilibrium Tree Holdings

Like the impulse response plot of aggregate risk tolerance in Figure 2, the period 0 value in these plots is the long-run mean tree holding for each group. Also like Figure 2, these figures are symmetric in the shock, in that the impulse response for positive shocks is the opposite relative to that mean of the impulse response for the negative shocks. Both figures show that tree holdings respond substantially to good and bad shocks. After a bad shock, the tree holdings of the young agents of both types increase. The holdings of daring middle-aged investors fall substantially while those of cautious middle-aged investors rise. After a good shock the holdings of daring middle-aged investors rise substantially and those of the other types fall. By period 2 these effects are largely reversed.

The effects in Figures 5 and 6 are driven by the same type of logic used to explain aggregate risk tolerance above. After a bad shock the wealth of middle-aged daring investors has declined substantially and they hold less of the risky asset. Because the risky asset is relatively cheap, other investor types (young daring, young cautious, middle-aged cautious) are happy to hold more. The middle-aged cautious investors are rebalancing in the direction (but not the exact extent) a constant share rule would imply. The logic after a good shock
is the reverse.

The findings of these figures are developed further in Table 2. The first three columns of Table 2 report the portfolio share of each type of agent. The statistics in the table help us to isolate three important effects: leverage, aggregate risk tolerance and intertemporal hedging.

First, leverage arises endogenously, with the daring agents being highly levered and with the cautious agents holding a risky, but unlevered portfolio. As shown in the first column of Table 2, the cautious agents hold only about 48% of their savings (invested wealth) in the risky asset and the rest in the risk-free bonds. By contrast, the daring agents invest on average 568% of their invested wealth in the risky asset by selling the risk-free bonds to the cautious agents. This difference in portfolio shares across types enables shocks to change the distribution of wealth across types.

Second, as the second and third columns of Table 2 show, one of the most striking implications of the model is that all types have a higher mean portfolio tree share after a bad shock than after a good shock due to the aggregate risk tolerance effect. A bad shock pushes down aggregate risk tolerance and raises the expected excess return. As a
Table 2: Portfolio Choice, Savings Weight and Asset Demand by Type (Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$G_t$</th>
<th>Portfolio Share $\theta$</th>
<th>Savings Weight W_i</th>
<th>Tree Amount W_j</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Bad</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cautious</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daring</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The portfolio share is the ratio of risky assets and savings of each type, the savings weight is the fraction of each type's savings in total savings, and the tree amount is the amount of tree held by each type. In particular, the tree amount equals the savings weight times the portfolio share for each type. Both the tree amount and the savings weight should sum up to 100 percent across types. Savings is after-consumption wealth. $G_t$ denotes the dividend growth rate shock in period $t$.

result, all types of agents choose a larger portfolio share. After a good shock, aggregate risk tolerance rises, the expected excess return declines, and all agents decrease their portfolio shares. It may seem surprising that all agents are able to move their portfolio shares in the same direction in general equilibrium. Section 4.5 below shows that changes in the wealth distribution combined with the effects of leverage—in particular, changes in the share of all invested wealth in the hands of middle-aged daring agents—allow all portfolio shares to move in the same direction.

Third, Table 2 indicates that for each level of risk tolerance the portfolio share of the young is similar to that of the middle-aged. Recall that we abstract from the dynamic interaction between human capital and portfolio choice by having labor income only at the beginning of the life. The comparison between young and middle-aged portfolios for a given level of risk tolerance thus isolates the pure intertemporal hedging effect. Table 2 indicates that the intertemporal hedging effect is small quantitatively. Qualitatively, the cautious young have a lower portfolio share than the cautious middle-aged, while the daring young have a higher portfolio share than the daring middle-aged. Section 4.7 discusses these implications in detail.
The average young portfolio share has important implications for the dynamics of the total middle-aged wealth and aggregate risk tolerance next period. Recall that the cautious agents account for 92% of the population and the daring agents account for the other 8%. The average young portfolio share is 105% (= 0.92 × 53 + 0.08 × 704) after a bad shock and 74% (= 0.92 × 43 + 0.08 × 433) after a good shock. Thus, the young hold a slightly more daring portfolio (105%) than the market portfolio (100%) after a good shock, but a much more conservative portfolio (74%) after a bad shock. These patterns for the portfolio share of the young contribute to the history dependence of aggregate risk tolerance that we discussed in the previous subsection.

4.4 Bonds

To further illustrate how shocks affect the equilibrium of our economy, we plot impulse response functions for bond shares by investor types. The bond share plots appear in Figures 7 and 8. In these two figures the daring investors always have negative bond holdings, implying borrowing to hold levered positions in the risky asset, while the cautious investors always have positive bond holdings. After a bad shock the middle-aged daring investors, whose wealth has declined substantially, borrow less. The young daring investors borrow more because the risky asset is relatively cheap and their initial wealth relative to aggregate output is not affected by the bad shock. Figure 8 shows that the size of the bond market also varies with shocks. After a bad shock the bond market is relatively small, while after a good shock it is larger than the long-run average. This result is very similar to the main finding of Longstaff and Wang (2012), who emphasize the effect of shocks on the size of the bond market. Our results shed light on the composition of borrowing and lending. For example, when aggregate borrowing contracts after a bad shock, the drop in lending mainly comes from the behavior of the young cautious agents. On the borrowing side, the young daring actually increase borrowing after a bad shock but the decline in middle-aged borrowing is sufficient to make aggregate borrowing decline.
Figure 7: Bond Holdings by Type

Figure 8: Aggregate Bond Holdings
4.5 Correlated Movements in Portfolio Shares

It may seem surprising that all types of agents move their portfolios in the same direction in a general equilibrium. The key forces behind this finding are the changes in the total wealth and therefore in the invested wealth levels of the middle-aged agents that generate changes in the tree holdings $\tfrac{\dot{W}_t}{W_t}$ of each type to satisfy the adding-up constraint

$$1 = \frac{W_{Yt}^L}{W_t} \theta_{Yt}^L + \frac{W_{Yt}^H}{W_t} \theta_{Yt}^H + \frac{W_{Mt}^L}{W_t} \theta_{Mt}^L + \frac{W_{Mt}^H}{W_t} \theta_{Mt}^H. \quad (26)$$

To understand the implications of this constraint, look first at the “savings weights”—that is the weights for invested wealth or after-consumption wealth $\tfrac{W_t}{W}$—reported in the middle columns of Table 2. The cautious agents have a larger savings weight than the daring because the cautious have a larger mass. The savings weight of the cautious is, however, lower after a good shock (85%) than after a bad shock (92.8%), so the aggregate risk tolerance increases after a good shock. Both the daring and cautious young agents have a slightly larger savings weight after a good shock than after a bad shock. The cautious middle-aged have a much smaller savings weight after a good shock (23.3%) than after a bad shock (32.7%). In contrast, the daring middle-aged have a much larger savings weight after a good shock (9.6%) than after a bad shock (2%).

Now, examine the quantity of trees held by each type of agents in the last two columns of Table 2. The quantity of trees held by each type equals that type’s portfolio share multiplied by the savings weight of each type. Even though the economy has relatively fewer daring agents, the tree holdings of the daring agents are comparable in total size to those of the cautious agents due to their heavily levered position. After a good shock, the young agents have slightly higher savings weights but much lower portfolio shares, leading to much lower total tree holdings. After a good shock, the middle-aged cautious agents have a much lower savings weight and thus an even lower quantity of tree holdings given their decreased portfolio share. On the other hand, the middle-aged daring agents have a much higher savings weight after a good shock, almost four times higher. The increase in their savings weight dominates
the decline in their portfolio share, implying a larger total quantity of tree holdings by the middle-aged daring agents.

This effect can be illustrated with the impulse response plot in Figure 9. This figure plots the reaction of each investor type to bad and good shocks by comparing their portfolio shares to their long-run mean portfolio shares. The shares of the young daring and middle-aged daring are so similar that the lines are very difficult to distinguish in the plot. The figure clearly shows that after a good shock, all portfolio shares drop. After a bad shock they rise.

![Figure 9: Portfolio Shares relative to Mean](image)

All types of agents in the economy adjust their portfolio shares in the same direction in response to the dividend growth shocks. In particular, all increase their portfolio shares after a bad shock and decrease them after a good shock. Even though all agents move their portfolio shares in the same direction, some must sell while others buy in order to attain their new positions. The changes in the underlying wealth distribution make such portfolio behavior consistent with general equilibrium.
4.6 Rebalancing by Cohort

So far we have been focusing on the portfolio dynamics of each type of agent at a point in time. Now we track the portfolio rebalancing of each cohort over time. When young, the agents choose an optimal portfolio share after the dividend shock. At the beginning of middle age, before any rebalancing, the value of their tree holdings as a share of their middle-aged wealth changes passively in response to the realized dividend shock and the realized tree return. We refer to this portfolio share as the realized portfolio share. The agents then choose the optimal portfolio share for their middle age (governing wealth accumulation between then and old age). We present the sequence of the three portfolio shares in Table 3. Because we are tracking cohorts (or individuals), we group equilibrium observations by the history of shocks rather than reporting an impulse response as we have done previously. \(G_Y\) and \(G_M\) denote the shocks that the agents experience when young and when middle-aged, respectively.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(G_Y, G_M)</th>
<th>Cautious Agents</th>
<th>Daring Agents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Young</td>
<td>Realized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad, Bad</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>52.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good, Bad</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>39.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad, Good</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>71.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good, Good</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>59.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: \(G_Y\) and \(G_M\) denote the shocks that agents experience when young and when middle-aged, respectively.

Let’s first examine the passive movements of the portfolio share of each cohort. Since the cautious young agents are not levered, the realized middle-age portfolio share rises substantially after a good shock at their middle age, and declines slightly after a bad shock. By contrast, since the daring young agents are highly levered, their realized middle-age portfolio share rises after a bad shock, but declines after a good shock. In addition, the magnitude of the changes in their portfolio share is quite large. For instance, the realized portfolio share rises from 706% to 988% after a history of two bad shocks, and declines from 706% to 166%.

\(^5\)This realized portfolio share implicitly assumes that consumption is financed by asset sales in proportion to asset shares, including proportionate paying off of debt for agents who have negative bond holdings.
after a bad shock when young followed by a good shock at middle age.

If the constant share rule were more or less correct, the agents would undo the movements in the realized middle-aged portfolio shares and return to the portfolio share when young. In terms of the direction of the adjustment at middle age, the constant share rule is consistent with the behavior of the cautious agents. The cautious agents do not, however, return to the same portfolio share when young. In fact, the new optimal level is typically quite different from the optimal share when young. The difference in the optimal shares between the two periods is particularly large when the shock they experience when young is different from the shock at middle age.

In addition to the quantitative differences, there are two types of qualitative differences between the optimal rebalancing shown in Table 3 and the constant share rule. First, even returning to the same tree share requires opposite adjustments for people who seek to be more levered than the economy as a whole as compared to agents who seek to be less levered than the economy as a whole. Second, for the daring agents, the direction of their adjustments at middle age is sometimes opposite to the direction that would restore their tree share to what they had earlier. In particular, after a bad shock when young followed by a good shock at middle age, the daring middle-aged agents further increase their portfolio share above the realized portfolio share.

4.7 Intertemporal Hedging

Intertemporal hedging in our model arises when the portfolio shares shift consistently by age to take into account any predictability in returns. Referring back to Table 2, there is little difference in the portfolio choice between the young and the middle-aged. Given that our generational model produces only limited predictability in returns, it is not surprising that we see little intertemporal hedging. On the other hand, the qualitative implications of intertemporal hedging are still interesting and deserve some discussion.

To understand these patterns of intertemporal hedging, recall the portfolio choice problem of the young in equation (14) and of the middle-aged in equation (8). Unlike the middle-aged,
who care about simple real returns, the young care about returns relative to the returns of the variable annuity, as indicated by (17). Table 4 presents the annuity price conditional the current and the past shock.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4: Period-t Variable Annuity Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( G_t )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( G_{t-1} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the cautious agents, the variable annuity price is higher after a bad shock than after a good shock. The combination of a low risk-free rate and lower expected tree returns late in life after a bad shock makes it harder to finance a comfortable retirement (see Table 3). This unfavorable movement in the variable annuity price after a bad shock increases the effective risk of holding tree shares when young. By contrast, this variable annuity price is irrelevant for the middle-aged cautious agents; they care only about one-period returns. Thus, the young cautious agents invest less in the tree than the middle-aged cautious agents. The annuity price variation in period \( t \) is larger when the dividend shock is good in period \( t - 1 \). Thus, this finding is reinforced when the cautious agents experienced a good shock when young.

For the daring agents, however, the variable annuity price is lower after a bad shock than after a good shock, since they tend to be so highly levered that the increase in the equity premium after a bad shock makes it easier for them to finance a comfortable retirement. This variable annuity price pattern helps the daring agents smooth consumption at their middle age, and thus the young daring agents invest more in the risky asset than the middle-aged daring agents. The variation in the period-\( t \) annuity price is larger when the dividend shock is bad (which yields a greater covariance of the equity premium with the later shock) than when the dividend growth shock is good. Thus, quantitatively, the young daring agents invest more in risky assets than the middle-aged daring agents especially when they experience a bad shock in their youth.
5 Conclusion

We develop a model to illustrate how optimizing agents rebalance in equilibrium. The dynamics of portfolios differ starkly from benchmark models where agents either hold constant portfolio shares or buy and hold the market portfolio. The model includes agents with different risk tolerance, so there is meaningful trade, and three periods of life, so there is meaningful rebalancing over time. The model has a partial analytic solution. In particular, the state of the economy can be summarized by the distribution of wealth of middle-aged investors. This analytic solution both helps make the findings of the paper transparent and simplifies the solution of the full dynamic equilibrium model.

There are several effects that are key to understanding rebalancing in equilibrium. First, there is a leverage effect. In the model, leverage arises endogenously because of the heterogeneity in risk preferences. Shocks to the valuation of risky assets cause levered agents to rebalance in the opposite direction from unlevered agents. Second, there is an aggregate risk tolerance effect. Shocks to the valuation of risky assets affect agents’ wealth differently depending on their initial position in the risky asset. Such shifts in the distribution of wealth change aggregate risk tolerance and therefore the demand for assets going forward. Note that the leverage and aggregate risk tolerance effects are connected because leverage magnifies how valuation shocks change the distribution of wealth. For example, after a bad shock leverage increases. The levered agents sell to reduce their leverage and the unlevered agents buy. But the increase in leverage is so great that even after rebalancing levered agents have higher exposure to risky assets. Therefore, all agents become more exposed to risk after a bad shock, and the opposite is true after a good shock.

Third, there is an intertemporal hedging effect whereby equilibrium time variation in expected returns affects the portfolio choices of young investors as they exploit mean reversion in asset returns. This intertemporal hedging effect arising from mean reversion is what is often highlighted in analyses emphasizing time- or age-variation in portfolio shares. While it is present in our model, it is quantitatively weak by design. The model is solved under a specification with i.i.d. growth rates, so mean reversion in returns is not built into the
specification. Other analyses of intertemporal hedging in the literature are based on empirical properties of actual returns, which might include mean reversion arising from mispricing. Our model has all agents frictionlessly optimizing, hence many sources of mean reversion that may be present in the data are intentionally not present in the model in order to highlight the implications of equilibrium for rebalancing.

Some key implications of the model are broadly consistent with recent rebalancing experience by age in data from the Survey of Consumer Finances. Determining the implications of our model for standard rebalancing data requires some thought. Our model features the underlying fundamentals — one risky asset and risk-free borrowing and lending. Data from markets feature stocks, bonds and other types of risky assets. Of course, these financial assets are claims on the fundamentals that also depend on the corporate capital structure. In particular, leverage in the corporate sector has important implications for the risk exposure of stockholders. For example, consider an investor with 100 percent stocks when the capital structure in the economy is half equity and half debt. In terms of our model, that investor will have a risky asset share of two. Because of the leverage effect described in the model, as stock prices rise a 100 percent stock investor will have a lower risky tree share before rebalancing because her wealth grows faster than the value of her equity. What is going on is that when the value of all capital in the economy increases, stocks become less levered relative to the economy as a whole. Thus, to maintain the same leverage relative to the economy as a whole, an investor who began with 100 percent in stocks would need to buy more stocks after this market uptick. However, a finding of the paper is that this because of general equilibrium forces, an investor will not rebalance to the same tree share as before the market uptick, but to a somewhat lower tree share, tempering somewhat the need to buy more stock. This example highlights how intuition about portfolios in terms of stocks must be interpreted with caution because of the underlying leverage of the corporate sector.

Looking back at the implied rebalancing from Survey of Consumer Finances data reported in Figure 1, several features of the recent history are consistent with the model but inconsistent with both the constant share and buy and hold rules. In the SCF data some
of the older investors behave like the daring agents in the model, perhaps because of cohort effects. In Panel A, which reflects recent positive returns, older investors are actively buying to increase their stock share above the passive implied level for 2007. The reason they need to buy is that, because they are levered, when there is a good shock their exposure to risk decreases as wealth increases more than the value of their equity holdings. Younger investors are either actively selling or simply not buying as much. Younger investors act like the cautious agents in our model, avoiding large risky asset holdings after a positive shock. In Panel B, which reflects recent negative returns, the patterns are reversed. Older investors sell more than the passive implied quantity of assets, and younger investors buy more than what would leave them at their passive level. These patterns are broadly consistent with the model, but inconsistent with a constant share or buy and hold rule.

Our framework is useful for understanding how portfolios would respond to a stock market crash in an economy where all investors were behaving optimally. Contrary to both the constant share and buy and hold rules, after a market crash our investors increase their share in risky assets relative to the pre-crash levels—though by different amounts depending on their risk tolerance.

Finally, our analysis points to a principle that must hold much more generally than the particular model we study here: *mutual funds that serve a nontrivial fraction of investors will have to take into account general equilibrium constraints to be feasible and optimal.* In particular, many existing target-date funds, which follow simple linear allocation rules regardless of economic conditions, will not be optimal for most people. Moreover, as target-date funds become ubiquitous, they will become infeasible since they will not find counterparties to trade with as they rebalance. Our particular model points to how “universal target-date funds”—funds that are optimal for all investors given risk tolerance and age—should adjust their target asset allocation in response to economic shocks.
References


Appendix I: Solution Technique

Let’s consider discrete grid points for the state variable. However, we allow the choice variables to be continuous. We assume that the world ends at the end of period $T$, and solve the model backward from the last period. Behavior at time $T$ is very simple: all remaining agents consume their wealth and the price-dividend ratio is zero. Thus, we can derive the value functions $v_{YT}^j(w^H_{MT}, w^L_{MT})$ and $v_{MT}^j(w^H_{MT}, w^L_{MT})$.

Consider now time $T - 1$ for a state $(w^H_{MT-1}, w^L_{MT-1})$. The price-dividend ratio is given by equation (22).

The optimal consumption allocation can be easily derived. To solve for the portfolio allocation, we need to know $R_{T-1}^j(w^H_{MT-1}, w^L_{MT-1})$. For any guess of $R_{T-1}^j$, the optimal portfolio share $\theta_{MT-1}^j$ can be computed as follows:

$$\theta_{MT-1}^j(w^H_{MT-1}, w^L_{MT-1}) = \arg \max_{\theta} \sum_{n'=1}^N \pi_{w'} \left[ (1 - \theta)R_{T-1} + \frac{G_{n'}}{p_{T-1}} \right]^{1-\gamma_j}.$$

We check the bond market clearing condition and update $R_{T-1}$ until the market clears. Given the optimal portfolio shares, we compute the certainty equivalent total return functions for the young $\phi_{YT-1}^j(w^H_{MT-1}, w^L_{MT-1})$ and for the middle-aged $\phi_{MT-1}^j(w^H_{MT-1}, w^L_{MT-1})$. Thus, we can derive the value function of the young and the middle-aged.

We now study period $T - 2$ for any state $(w^H_{MT-2}, w^L_{MT-2})$, which has the same fundamental structure as a generic period. The price-dividend ratio is a function of the sum of the state variables, and the optimal consumption allocation can be easily derived using the first-order conditions. To solve for the model, we need to know the risk-free rate and the portfolio choice of the young. Given any guess of $(R_{T-2}, \theta_{YT-2}^H, \theta_{YT-2}^L)$, the portfolio choice of the young implies the next-period state variable $(w_{MT-1}^{H'n'}, w_{MT-1}^{L'n'})$ and the price-dividend ratio $p_{T-1}^{n'}$, for any dividend growth realization $G_{n'}$. Thus, we can compute the middle-aged optimal portfolio and certainty equivalent total return $\hat{\phi}_{MT-1}^j(w_{MT-1}^{H'n'}, w_{MT-1}^{L'n'})$. We then can compute the optimal portfolio choice of the young $\theta_{YT-2}^j$, which is used to update our initial guess. We also update the interest rate using the bond market clearing condition. We repeat the above procedures until our guesses converge. We then compute the certainty equivalent total return function and the value functions of the middle-aged $v_{MT-2}^j(w^H_{MT-2}, w^L_{MT-2})$ and the young $v_{YT-2}^j(w^H_{MT-2}, w^L_{MT-2})$.

We repeat the above procedure for period $T - 3$, $T - 4$, etc, until the value functions of the young and the middle-aged across the two periods converge.

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6The asset-market and goods-market equilibrium conditions are modified: the marginal propensity to consume and the optimal risky asset share for the young become the same as for the middle aged.
Appendix II: Price and Return Dynamics

In this appendix we describe the price and return dynamics implied by the model in order to make the intuition behind our rebalancing results clear. Table 5 presents the summary statistics based on a model simulation of 10,000 periods, which is a sufficiently long sample to eliminate the simulation uncertainty. Returns are expressed as annual rates. The log risk free rate has a mean of 1.92% and a standard deviation of 0.97%. The log realized tree return is on average 3.62% with a standard deviation of 8.95%. Thus, the model economy generates a 1.70% risk premium with a standard deviation of 8.94%. Although our model is not specifically designed to deliver a large risk premium, it goes a substantial fraction of the way toward explaining the historical premium and its volatility.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Correlation with G</th>
<th>Auto Correlation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>log(Risk Free Rate)</td>
<td>1.92%</td>
<td>0.97%</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log(Realized Tree Return)</td>
<td>3.62%</td>
<td>8.95%</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log(Realized Excess Return)</td>
<td>1.70%</td>
<td>8.94%</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log(Expected Tree Return)</td>
<td>3.99%</td>
<td>0.15%</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log(Expected Excess Return)</td>
<td>2.07%</td>
<td>0.48%</td>
<td>-0.87</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tree Price-Dividend Ratio</td>
<td>18.94</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>-0.47</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The model’s expected returns and price-dividend ratio, on the other hand, are much less volatile than in historical data. For instance, the price-dividend ratio is on average 19, with a standard deviation of 0.54. Because shocks to the fundamentals are i.i.d. in the growth rate, movements in the realized return on the risky asset move essentially one-for-one with the dividend shock. Moreover, the i.i.d. growth shock means that any forecastability of returns comes from general equilibrium effects, not from the fundamentals per se. It turns out that these general equilibrium effects have a contribution to returns that is relatively small compared to sheer good and bad luck, so there is relatively little serial correlation in the realized risky return and the risk-free rate.

The expected excess return is critical for portfolio choice. It is strongly negatively correlated with the dividend growth rate shock and is somewhat mean reverting. Mechanically, these results are coming from movements in the risk-free rate, which is highly correlated with the shock to the dividend growth rate. Intuitively, the risk-free rate is moving because the shock to dividends changes the wealth of daring agents and therefore shifts the aggregate risk tolerance.

The dependence of the risky asset share of the young cohort as a whole on the shock right before they begin investing makes it possible to explain the behavior of the price-dividend ratio. Recall that the price-dividend ratio is determined exactly by the total middle-aged wealth in each period. See equation 23. Because of the Cobb-Douglas production function and the constant average propensity to consume, the invested wealth of the young cohort is a fixed fraction of output, or equivalently, in a fixed ratio to the dividend. Their later wealth
in middle age in comparison with the dividend at that time depends on their overall portfolio return compared to the growth rate of the dividend. Let us explain the general level of the price-dividend ratio after each of the four possible histories of the last two shocks.

A good shock leading into the youth of the current middle-aged cohort depressed their risky asset share when young, and they were significantly underlevered relative to the economy as a whole. Then a second good shock will actually cause the growth rate of their wealth to fall behind the growth rate of the dividend (which equals the growth rate of economic production as a whole). Middle-aged wealth that is smaller relative to the expanded size of the economy will then lead to a low price-dividend ratio (in part because dividends are large). In contrast, a bad shock as they go into middle age causes the economy to grow more slowly than their relatively safer portfolio, leading to a high middle-aged wealth to dividend ratio, which in turn implies a high price-dividend ratio.

The bad shock leading into the youth of the current middle-aged cohort led that cohort to have slightly elevated risky asset holdings and thus to be slightly overlevered relative to the economy as a whole. A good shock at middle age then leads them to have a high level of wealth relative to the economy as a whole, leading in turn to a high price-dividend ratio. In contrast, a bad shock at middle age causes them to have a low level of wealth relative to the economy as a whole, leading in turn to a low price-dividend ratio.

Note that the last shock makes a bigger difference for the price-dividend ratio between the (Good, Good) and (Good, Bad) histories than it does between the (Bad, Good) and (Bad, Bad) histories. The reason is that the daring middle-aged agents in the previous period pulled more dramatically ahead of the economy after a good shock leading into their middle age than they fell behind the economy after a bad shock leading into their middle age. This led the current middle-aged cohort to have a significantly underlevered portfolio after a good shock leading into their youth, but only slightly overlevered portfolio after a bad shock leading into their youth.

To summarize the history dependence of prices, we present the key price statistics conditional on the current shock, the past shock, and the two past shocks in Table 6. The kind of reasoning above can be extended to interpret the consequences of a longer history of shocks, but the most recent shocks have the most powerful effect on the model economy. One reason we include the effects of a three-shock history is the identity relating the realized tree return to the history of the price-dividend ratio:

\[ R_t^{\text{Tree}} = \frac{P_t + D_t}{P_{t-1}} = \frac{D_t}{D_{t-1}} \left( \frac{1 + (P_t/D_t)}{P_{t-1}/D_{t-1}} \right) = G_t \left( \frac{1 + p_t}{p_{t-1}} \right). \]

Thus, the realized tree return depends on the values of the price-dividend ratio in two different periods. Among three-shock histories, the realized tree return is highest after (Good, Good, Good) since the two good shocks at \( t-2 \) and \( t-1 \) depress \( p_{t-1} \), while the good shock at \( t \) gives a high \( G_t \). The realized tree return is lowest after the three-shock history (Bad, Bad, Good) not only because two bad shocks at \( t-2 \) and \( t-1 \) depress \( p_{t-1} \) somewhat, but also because the tail end of a bad shock at \( t-1 \) followed by a good shock at \( t \) puts \( p_t \) at a reasonably high level as well as giving a high \( G_t \).
history (Good, Bad, Bad) because the combination of a good shock at $t - 2$ followed by a bad shock at $t - 1$ elevates $p_{t-1}$, while the bad shock at $t$ gives a low $G_t$.

Table 6: History Dependence of Key Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$G_t$</th>
<th>$P_t/D_t$</th>
<th>log $R_{Tree}^t$</th>
<th>log $R_t$</th>
<th>$E(\log R_{Tree}^t)$</th>
<th>$E(\log Z_t)$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Bad 19.20</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>3.91</td>
<td>2.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Good 18.69</td>
<td>5.60</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>4.08</td>
<td>1.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$G_{t-1}$</td>
<td>Bad 18.99</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>3.96</td>
<td>2.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Good 19.41</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>3.86</td>
<td>2.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$G_{t-2}, G_{t-1}$</td>
<td>Bad, Bad 19.07</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>3.94</td>
<td>2.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Good, Bad 18.90</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>3.98</td>
<td>2.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bad, Good 19.21</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>3.91</td>
<td>2.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Good, Good 19.59</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>3.81</td>
<td>2.19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: $P_t/D_t$ denotes the price-dividend ratio, log $R_t$ denotes the log risk free interest rate, log $R_{Tree}^t$ denotes the log realized tree return, given by $\log(\delta_t + P_t) - \log P_{t-1}$, $E(\log R_{Tree}^t)$ denotes the expected log tree return, and $E(\log Z_t)$ denotes the expected log excess return. All prices are annualized. All prices are in percentage, except the price-dividend ratio. $G_t$, $G_{t-1}$ and $G_{t-2}$ denote the dividend growth rate shock in period $t$, $t-1$ and $t-2$, respectively.

Table 6 also shows that the risk free rate is higher after a good shock than after a bad shock in period $t$. This pattern becomes particularly pronounced after a good shock in period $t - 1$. The expected tree return is higher after a good shock in period $t$. However, the pattern does not hold when we consider a two-period history of shocks. After a good shock in period $t - 1$, the expected tree return is higher after a good shock. In contrast, after a bad shock in period $t - 1$, the expected tree return is higher after a bad shock. The expected excess return is lower after a good shock in period $t$, given the high aggregate risk tolerance after a good shock in period $t$. The expected excess return is especially low after a history of the bad and good shocks.