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STRADDLING THE POST-STRUCTURALIST ABYSS: BETWEEN TRANSCENDENCE AND IMMANENCE?

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Abstract Against a background of socio-economic change, planning practitioners are struggling to embrace the various processes of transformation of structures and practices in meaningful ways. Theorists, in turn, are struggling to come to terms with these practice transformations. Whilst many theorists would accept the need for dynamic, relational approaches there is strong debate about the meanings and implications of new theory. Tensions may arise from fundamental differences between transcendental and immanent frames: practice and theory seek immanence, yet are caught in remnants of transcendence. I explore the potential of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of ‘becoming’ as creative experimentation. I conclude that planning may involve a transcendental structure immanent in its practical local expressions; and that theorizing could benefit from ‘becoming-planning’.

Keywords becoming, Deleuze and Guattari, immanence, transcendence, transformation
Introduction

Place is always a site of negotiated meaning. As such, negotiation processes will often be conflictual (Hillier, 2002; McGuirk, 2004; Mouffe, 1999; Pløger, 2001, 2004). Faced with conflicting and seemingly incommensurable decisional imperatives, organizations are under constant pressure to adapt or transform creatively. The two questions which frame my article are:

• what are the key themes that recur in discussion on institutional transformation?
• how may these themes be theorized with relation to planning practice?

The themes I identify include first, the notion of immanence. As Amin (2004: 34) suggests, ‘if we are to see cities and regions as spatial formations, they must be summoned up as temporary placements of ever moving material and immanent geographies’. Second, I identify what Amin (2004) terms ‘a politics of connectivity’, which develops the current relational imagination to consider place as meaning ‘dwelling, affinity, immanence, relationality, multiplicity and performativity’ (Amin, 2004: 34; Thrift, 1999).

To date there have been few attempts to understand change/transformation on its own terms and to treat stability, organization or fixity as exceptional and temporary conditions. Such thinking proposes a theory of change which emphasizes movement and transformation, rather than theories of stability, permanence and order (Chia, 1999). Change, then, is not so much about patterns of ‘nodes’ or fixities (which are the outcomes of change), but about the temporal spaces between the emergences of such patterns.

Some 15 years ago, Bob Beauregard (1989) wrote that US planning practitioners found themselves astride an ‘ever-widening chasm’ between modernity and postmodernity. I argue in this article that Beauregard’s analogy remains pertinent, although the abyss is now perhaps a post-structuralist one, between transcendence and immanence as planners struggle with regulatory strategies seeking to tame processes of simultaneous fragmentation and coalescence. The result of such tensions between governability and ungovernability is what Deleuze and Guattari have termed a kind of ‘molecular soup’, where unexpected elements often come into play and things do not quite work out as intended.

This exploratory article, or ‘voyage in place’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987/1980) grows out of my feelings of unease over an apparent ‘lack of fit’ with developments in both planning theory and practice. I attempt to locate the causes of this unease by reference both to recent transformations in the English planning system and the tensions between local planning practice and central government rhetoric, and also to recent developments in planning theory and the tensions between, for example, theorizing based on Habermasian or Lacanian foundations and the work of authors such as
Patsy Healey which emphasizes a more fluid, dynamic and relational view of social action.

I argue that these tensions may be due to fundamental differences between transcendental and immanent frameworks of thought; that both practice and theory are seeking something immanent, but are bound up in the remnants of transcendence. As planning theorists and practitioners we seem to have had a pervasive commitment to an ontology of *being* which privileges end-states and outcomes, rather than an ontology of *becoming* which emphasizes movement, process and emergence (Chia, 1999).

I explore how such tensions may begin to be dissolved by referring to Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of ‘becoming’, in which ideas do not come to order from abstract and/or external notions, but develop as part of practical, creative experimentation played out within and between economic and socio-political institutions.

I conclude by suggesting that transcendence and immanence may enjoy a mutual collusion; that planning may involve a transcendental structure immanent in its practical local expressions; and that relevant theorizing could possibly benefit from exploring a notion of ‘becoming-planning’.

**The English planning system and theory in flux**

**The English planning system**

In brief, my understanding of the former English planning system is that it was characterized in particular by:

- highly centralized control – central government Planning Policy Guidance tended to be prescriptive;
- silo mentalities – many different central and local government departments engaged in ‘planning’-related work with little integration and entrenched bureaucratic and functional cultures;
- development of and reliance on indicators top-down, centrally driven and exogenous to local authorities.

All in all, this is what I would call a ‘transcendent’ system: where there is something ‘out there’ that is true and independent, which ‘goes beyond’ individual cases; a peculiar mysticism; the idea of the ‘good’ city, plan, process, etc. regulated by planning legislation as the practical manifestation of the transcendent.

From 2004, the system has changed dramatically. There is a requirement to:

- ‘front load’ community involvement: from identifying issues, to debating options and beyond. Community Strategies are supposed to
drive the new, more flexible, Local Development Frameworks (ODPM, 2004);

• the rhetoric is that of Empowered Participatory Governance (Fung and Wright, 2003)

which implicitly entails recognition of interrelating multiple horizontal and vertical networks, where emphasis is less on fixed structures than fluidity and change. In other words, the system is much more immanent than previously.

Planning theory

Recent developments in planning theory, especially in the work of Patsy Healey, Judith Innes and David Booher, and John Forester, emphasize a more dynamic and relational view of practice. At stake is a decidedly non-linear immanent notion of change, against a transcendent ideal type. I highlight a need for new planning theory which recognizes such tensions.

Patsy Healey’s (1999, 2004) work, in particular, articulates a ‘dynamic, relational view of social action’. Her institutionalist analyses of spatial planning in practice emphasize contexts of multiwebs of network complexity (forthcoming), fragmented and folded conceptions of space (2004) and the need for creativity in developing spatial strategies (2003a). She recognizes that ‘development’ is multiple, non-linear and continuously emergent. It follows ‘not one trajectory through a common time dimension, but occurs in multiple timescales, follows many, often conflicting, pathways, which may be “folded” and “circular” as well as linear’ (2004: 47).

Healey suggests that to adjust to complexity, there needs to develop a mode of governance which allows experimentation and which understands that experiments may fail as well as succeed (2003a, 2003b). She identifies a need to focus on the dynamics of arenas of interaction and to break out of ‘old ways of thinking’ (2003a) in ways which ‘have the flexibility both to adjust to new urban situations and to auto-transform in the face of new challenges’ (2003a: 5). Such thinking ‘demands a dynamic sensibility which recognises the complex interrelation between place qualities and multiple space-time relational dynamics rather than relapsing into a focus on traditional analyses of, e.g., territorially contained housing markets, labour markets and land use and transport interactions’ (forthcoming). Nevertheless, Healey recognizes that governance processes are sited in deeper cultural currents of framing issues which inhibit the emergence of government arenas which can “see, hear, feel and read” the place-relevant dimensions of relational complexity’ (forthcoming).

The work of Judith Innes, especially that co-authored with David Booher, also recognizes that governance ‘is no longer only about government but now involves fluid action and power distributed widely in society’
The authors emphasize the importance of network power in collaborative planning practice (2002). Their writing reflects a view of complex adaptive systems (1999a) and the role of bricolage (1999b) in institutional change and theoretical development (Innes, 2004). Like Healey, they recognize that change will require creativity and that it ‘will be neither rapid nor easy’ (Innes and Booher, 2004: 14).

Similarly, John Forester’s detailed interviews with, profiles of and stories from planning practitioners throughout the 1990s (see Forester, 1999, for detailed references) have led him to conclusions about the interdependent nature of planning. He states that ‘interdependence is all about power, of course, all about relationships, and all about institutionalized interactions’ (Forester, 2004: 245).

This explains why, for me, the philosophy underpinning the British government’s (ODPM’s) new way of thinking and the above authors’ empirically-informed work appears not to mesh smoothly with the ideas of other academics and other theories. The ODPM in England, Healey, Innes and Booher and Forester, are thinking about immanence (uncertainty, fluidity, transformation) in a theoretical and practical world geared to transcendence.

I perceive there to be a gap for new heuristic tools for exploring transformation as the immanence of movement and change, and linking this with a reconfiguration of institutional fixity and the power of certain transcendent essences, or ‘eternal archetypes existing in disembodied form in some Platonic heaven’ (deLanda, n.d.: 1). Those ‘eternal archetypes’ are exemplified by notions of the ‘good city’, the ‘good environment’ and ‘good government’ which reflect a utopian idealism in planning practice present since its inception in the early 20th century (Healey, 2002). Such traditional concepts, as Healey (forthcoming) perceptively identifies, remain ‘locked into governance processes and embedded in governance cultures, without, in many instances, a legitimising intellectual discourse to support or refresh them.’

The lack of theoretically-based understanding of current practices leads to a weak intellectual basis for the development of new spatial strategies (Healey, 2002). Transcendent physicalist concepts of spatial order ‘fail to capture the dynamics and tensions of networks with very different driving forces and scalar relations’ (Healey, forthcoming). Furthermore, as Grosz (2001: 139) indicates, whilst utopias may be a virtual image of the future, they are fundamentally ‘that which has no future’ (emphasis in original). They are Lacanian imaginaries (see Gunder and Hillier, 2004) which create tension between fixities and fluidities and may serve to stifle any immanent potentialities.

If we are to enrich our theoretical understanding of the spatiality of places, I believe that there is a need for theoretical enquiry which includes not only relationality, multiplicity and fragmentation, but also performativity and immanence. Many of the philosophical underpinnings of recent
planning theories have been rooted in what are fundamentally transcendent notions (see McGowan, 2004). For example, Habermas and communicative rationality/consensus/reciprocity; Lacan and Žižek and desire, the impossible Real and l’objet petit a; Lefebvre and capitalism/second nature; Castoriadis and the imaginary institution of society (Dews, 2002; McGowan, 2004; Stavrakakis, 2002). I suggest that new theorizing could usefully mine the work of authors including Bergson, Deleuze, Foucault, Derrida, Kristeva, Serres, Rancière and Connolly. Such theorizing is post-structural, concerned with not allowing the definition or location of something (e.g. planning or politics) to be determined in advance. It is less about seeking some underlying structure but rather about searching for how and why transformation takes place.

Multidisciplinary theorizing

Several planning theorists have identified a need to look beyond planning for new inspiration (see, for instance, Forester, 2004). I draw attention to authors from a range of disciplines who, I believe, offer planning theorists considerable insight and stimulation.

In geography, the special issue of Geografiska Annaler B (Massey, 2004) offers a valuable signpost, while Nigel Thrift’s writings over the past eight years (1996 onwards) on ‘nonrepresentational theory’, or, perhaps more intuitively graspable for planners, his theory of practices, resonate strongly with spatial planning. Thrift’s practices are bound up with emotions, desires and imagination; of thinking as both doing and inhabiting as actors react to uncertainty in rational and irrational ways (2000). He is interested in ‘networks of associations between unlike actors which can exert power for change’ (2000: 234). Agency is vital, in all senses. From Thrift I take the conceptualization of planning as magic; a creative activity in which multiples of different elements and forces – physical, psychical and verbal – perform together. Places become a means of performing difference. The performative is ‘the gap, the rupture, the spacing that unfolds the next moment allowing change to happen’ (Dewsbury, 2000: 475).

Complexity science challenges the ‘static’ laws of equilibrium (or being) to propose an emphasis on dynamic transformations or becoming (Prigogine, 1980) in what is now termed ‘far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics’ (deLanda, 1999, 2002). Environments are seen as complex assemblages of a multiplicity of heterogeneous components, in which heterogeneity or difference plays a crucial productive role in the driving of fluxes. Open sets of possibilities are demonstrated when an assemblage meshes differences without concealing or eliminating them through homogenization. This is a trap into which traditional planning practice has tended to fall, focusing on reaching a ‘final’ stable state or outcome in what deLanda (2002) terms an ‘objective illusion’. Stable states are but temporary fixes in what should be regarded as non-linear systems in which other
alternatives/potentialities always exist, co-existing with that which happens to be actualized (deLanda, 2002).

Developing ideas of complexity further, in sociology, authors such as Bruno Latour, Michel Callon, John Law and John Urry think space relationally as the sum of relations, connections, embodiments and practices. Recent developments in actor-network theory have clarified the notion of network as ‘a labyrinth, a maze of unexpected associations between heterogeneous elements, each of which acts as a mediator’ (Latour, 2003: 36). Presence and absence (proximity and distance) are regarded not as bi-polar opposites (Callon and Law, 2004; Urry, 2004) and the traditional assumption of a spatial totality or shared context is problematized in favour of regarding spatial extent and position as permanent existential questions rather than as fixed coordinates (Callon and Law, 2004).

Bob Jessop’s (1997, 2001) neo-Gramscian strategic-relational approach combines elements of institutional and complexity theorizing to develop both the structural and strategic dimensions of a contextualized institutional analysis, rather than bracketing one dimension (as in structuration theory). A strategic-relational approach regards institutions as being inherently spatiotemporal and argues for the existence of specific ‘spatiotemporal fixes’ by which boundaries are established to secure the temporary and relative structural coherence of an institutional complex (Jessop, 2000).

A foundation in Gramsci enables examination of the state and governance as an institutional assemblage whose capacity to govern is realized hegemonically at multiple scales. Governance is regarded as a potential (or virtual) which can only be accomplished politically and contingently ‘through activating specific conjunctures of social, economic and political forces in a contingent articulation’ (McGuirk, 2004: 1022) of hegemonic projects to forge and maintain temporary fixes of unity of identity and interests.

I also refer to concepts drawn from the work of Pierre Bourdieu (1977, 2000) and from psychoanalysis (e.g. Lacan, 1971; Žižek, 1997, 2004) to help provide understanding of desires and behaviours, especially those taking place below the level of consciousness. Whilst my previous work has explored Lacanian psychoanalytical tools (Gunder and Hillier, 2004; Hillier, 2002, 2003; Hillier and Gunder, 2004), influenced by the work of Laclau and Mouffe (1985; Laclau, 1996; Mouffe, 1993, 1999). I now believe that what is required is reference to the spirit of psychoanalysis rather than to the transcendental letter.

My theory of planning will incorporate issues of fragmentation, multiplicity, rupture, agonism, fluidity, transformation, transgression and undecidability: both/and. However, it will not be a retreat into relativism or irrationality. I believe that no event is un-conditioned, but there is no transcendent conditioning origin.

As such, I am drawn to Foucault’s ideas of aleatoriness and of immanence (Foucault, 1972, 2004) and to Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas of
becoming or moving beyond. These notions allow unexpected elements to come into play and things not to quite work out as expected. They allow me to see planning and planners as experiments enmeshed in a series of modulating networked relationships in circumstances at the same time both rigid and flexible, where outcomes are volatile; where problems are not ‘solved’ once and for all but are rather constantly recast, reformulated in new perspectives.

Planning as an experimental form would be an interpretive framework which demands analysis of itself as a cultural product and a method for rendering the social. Plans would be ‘messy texts’ which are centrally interested in the creativity of social action through imagination, narrativity and performance (Marcus, 1994).

These are some of the multidisciplinary ‘building-blocks’ which are informing my thinking. The next step is to begin to construct a new way of looking at planning practice as immanent.

My new definition of strategic spatial planning practice would be something along the lines of:

• the investigation of ‘virtualities’ unseen in the present;
• the experimentation with what may yet happen;
• the temporary inquiry into what at a given time and place we might yet think or do.

Inspired by the geophilosophical work of Deleuze and Guattari, I regard planning as an exercise in ‘building new spaces for thought in the midst of things’ (Rajchman, 1998: 2).

**Deleuzoguattarian origami**

reality is ever changing and the challenge is how to live with that change.

(Williams, 2003: 5)

Why Deleuze and Guattari? Deleuzoguattarian philosophy is a spatial philosophy of the city and its modes of arranging or disposing persons and things (Rajchman, 1998). As such, ‘thinking takes place in the relationship of territory and the earth’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 85). Deleuze and Guattari promote experimentation; an experimentation which requires many and different, non-predetermined ways in which things can interconnect with no transcendent guiding principle (May, 2001; Rajchman, 2000). Deleuze, in particular, focuses on the potentialities of the multiplicity of forces which could be activated rather than on transcendent questions of the ‘good’ or on a (Lacanian-style) negativity of what is absent. Activity, movement and transformation are vital for Deleuze. Becoming is a
movement between things, disrupting current meanings, understandings and ways of being. Concepts are fluid, folding across and into each other (an analogy would be the manner of folding egg white into meringue), not always harmoniously, often in agonistic dissonance where differences come into contact with each other.

A Deleuzoguattarian framework may help us transform our traditionally rather static and transcendent ways of understanding place and planning. It offers a different understanding of space, spatialization and movement and the ways in which emergent properties and spatial orderings arise. It is increasingly influencing architectural thought and practice (such as Peter Eisenman’s Berlin Holocaust Memorial.) However, I am concerned less with strict application of Deleuzoguattarian concepts to planning than with raising some important questions to begin reconceptualization of planning theory; theory which is ‘open and connectible in all of its dimensions; it is detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant modification’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987/1980: 12). What matters for me are the creative possibilities produced by interconnection and folding.

Besides being inherently spatial (‘becomings belong to geography’, Deleuze and Parnet, 1987: 3) a Deleuzoguattarian frame is concerned with the processes through which existing forms of government (of self and others) are transformed. Patton (2000: 3) identifies a constant theme of Deleuze’s work as being the conditions under which new institutions take shape, in which Deleuze avoids the Freudian/Lacanian trap of privileging the psychical over the social, and the Habermasian trap of privileging the social over the psychical.

Deleuze and Guattari also offer us a new conception of the relations between theory and practice. This is a conception which understands such relationships ‘in a partial and fragmentary manner, not as determinate relationships between “theory” understood as a totality and “practice” understood as an equally unified process of the application or implementation of theory’ (Patton, 2000: 5), but as a ‘system of relays within . . . a multiplicity of parts that are both theoretical and practical’ (Foucault, 1977: 206). Deleuze and Guattari do not provide a cookbook of recipes (to maintain the earlier analogy). Their ‘system of relays’ is rather a rhizomic tangle of potential enquiries which offer varying lines of inspiration (Bonta and Protevi, 2004). It is up to us to identify, analyse and intervene in the mixture of forces at work in the complex spaces of our cities.

Chia (1999: 210) suggests that ‘what we experience as objective organizational reality is in fact aggregatively built up of interlocking acts of “arresting”, “locating”, “regularizing” and “stabilizing” arbitrary portions of an intrinsically fluxing and transforming “real” into a coherent, liveable social world’. Rather than a top-down hierarchical model of change, Chia follows Deleuze in presenting a rhizomic process ‘in which the precarious, tentative and heterogeneous network-strengthening features of actor-alliances are accentuated’ (Chia, 1999: 211) (actors including human and non-human). It
is the interactions and transformations of networks, meshes or gels (deLanda, 2002; Hillier, 2005; Sheller, 2004; Urry, 2004) which generate the temporarily stabilized aspects of reality which planners seek.

Three key principles dominate Deleuze and Guattari’s work:

- **movement** or change, immanence (‘reality is ever changing and the challenge is how to live with that change’, Williams, 2003: 5);
- **connection** (‘it is best for our actions to connect with all the things that have brought them about and that they can bring about’, Williams, 2003: 5); and
- the outside or **lack**, from which springs creative potential.

I outline these principles below, followed by brief explanations of Deleuzoguattarian notions of fixity, space and territorialization in order to inform development of new planning theory.

**Immanence**

From Bergson (1988) and Prigogine (1980), Deleuze and Guattari drew the idea of rhythms and difference-producing repetition. Something repeated can never be *exactly* identical to that which went before (the clock-time is different, the weather has varied slightly and so on). Repetition thus becomes open and ‘new senses of sense become possible built on the new frames of anticipation and forms of memory that can show up and be touched in and by events now’ (Thrift, 2004a: 188). I may walk along the same footpath as I have done regularly for several months, but each time see something ‘new’. New planning problems are never repeats of old ones. The seemingly familiar is yet surprising.

Time becomes other than a linear process. The past is yet to be determined as we overwrite or restructure the past. It is both/and. It is a virtuality of the present and future. We can readily see how institutional change incorporates ‘traces’ of its genealogical past, which both constrain and also create potential opportunities for the future. The future is never a linear trend-line extrapolated from the past. There is always something new and unexpected. Immanence ‘gives rise to the emergence of novel possibilities but [is] always necessarily circumscribed by its formative influences’ (Chia, 1999: 222). Change can take place by subtle variation, by agglomerative expansion, by opportunistic leap, by total upheaval, coup or revolution. It is multiple, unending and often unexpectedly other. ‘Every move . . . is an untimely moment redistributing what has gone before while opening up what may yet come’ (Dewsbury, 2000: 480). This is the Deleuzoguattarian concept of becoming.

Becoming as a noun implies the pathways along which an entity/concept may be transformed whilst retaining some resemblance to its former self.
Becoming invents new trajectories, new responses, unheard-of futures (Massumi, 1993). It is an escape from the old, with its constraints or lack, converting desire positively into opportunity. It is a dis-ordering or an interruption replaced with an unpredictable re-ordering. Deleuze and Guattari refuse to tie becoming to pre-formism of the expected (such as precisely following a plan) (Grosz, 1999). The most that can be done is to anticipate or map possible becomings. These anticipations could then be collaboratively discussed by all stakeholders and, if deemed undesirable, planned interventions could occur, noting, however, the inevitably uncertain outcomes of such interventions.

Becoming is linked rather to the unpredictable, indeterminate, never-accomplished actualization of virtualities. Futures are unforeseeable with the implication that we cannot completely know or plan who we are or what we may become. Future cities are:

those invented, imagined, ‘constructed’ relations or passageways between this unforeseen future and this indeterminate past in our being, through which we respond to the necessity, in what is happening to us, of some event – of some ‘actualization’ of some virtual future. (Rajchman, 1998: 109)

Planning’s role is to make the virtual intelligible.

Connectivity: and . . . and

The notion of multiplicity is important to Deleuzean thought. Entities (actors, places, things, i.e. actants) are comprised of influences which ‘fold together the culturally plural and geographically proximate and distant’ (Amin, 2004: 37). A laptop computer, for instance, is a box containing a multiplicity of parts, each with their own specific constituents, histories and networks. (For example, a single wire coated in plastic, comprises plasticizers, fillers, colour pigments, copper alloy wire, petroleum hydrocarbons, salt and so on which originate from around the world, sourced and assembled by workers, probably in the South, working and living in networks of their own.) Actors and places are all ‘sites of multiple geographies of affiliation, linkage and flow’ (Amin, 2004: 38). No wonder Deleuze said that he stammered ‘and, and, and’ (Deleuze and Parnet, 2002: 9) when contemplating multiplicity.

Planners, themselves actant multiplicities, are effectively concerned with the spatial implications of ways in which actors negotiate the everyday; the seemingly mundane, including, for example, on the surface, a multi-purpose trip of collecting and driving several children to school x, picking up milk and a newspaper, visiting the dentist, finding parking spaces, negotiating one-way systems, etc., and the underlying decisions of where to live (where is the boundary of the catchment area for school x, where is a good National Health Service dentist available, where are affordable properties with gardens, etc.)
or whether to walk, drive or take public transport and also the actor-networks involved (e.g. which produce the milk and newspaper and result in their being for sale in a certain shop in a certain location, which produce the synthetic crown and fixatives used by the dentist, etc., etc., etc.). As Thrift (1999: 38) comments, ‘the story is in what is linked, not what something is’.

For Deleuze multiplicities can be expressed in terms of the conjunction ‘and’. So, rather than viewing a place as ‘local centre a’, whatever a’s name may be; an ontology of ‘is’, a Deleuzean view would see the local centre as a multiplicity of physical spaces, of mobility networks and flows of communication, of cultural practices, of intersecting and overlapping communities; an ontology of juxtaposition, ‘and’. Spatial planning becomes a multiplicity of conjunctive syntheses: transport and housing and retail and offices and environment etc. Similarly, sustainability becomes environment and economy and society. Planning becomes the holistic, integrating activity which the ODPM (2004) envisages, evolving through a mechanism of conjunctive syntheses (Styhre, 2002). Such thinking entails regarding the local as not being pre-given, but rather as a field of agonistic relations; ‘thinking with AND, instead of thinking IS, instead of thinking for IS’ (Deleuze and Parnet, 1987: 57, emphases in original).

Space, then, can be regarded as a multiplicity which brings together characteristics of externality, simultaneity, contiguity or juxtaposition and qualitative and quantitative differentiations (Bergson, 1988; Grosz, 2001). Planning is the art (or science) of spatial manipulation. It is a mediator in the continuous process of space-becoming or spacing.

**Positive lack**

For me, one of the key aspects of Deleuzoguattarian theorizing is its positivity, especially in contrast to the negative emphasis of Lacan. All three authors theorize the abstract virtual or Real, although Deleuze and Guattari seek to affirm the constitutive outside, focusing on what possibilities lie in the gap; on what connections can be made. Deleuze and Guattari paint a positive or pragmatic rather than the negative picture of Lacanian lack.

‘There is no general prescription’ (Deleuze and Parnet, 2002: 144), however. The key is to be open to future potentialities. There will inevitably be agonistic tendencies as society is ever in transition and nothing is perfect. In particular, there will always be tensions between the state, with its requirement for self-preservation, and entities seeking to destabilize codings along new lines. The challenge is to reconcile ‘the integrity of the essence and the rivalry of claimants’ (Penner, 2003: 46).

**Spaces of flows**

Planners and geographers are now accustomed to the idea of a space of flows (Castells, 1996). For Deleuze and Guattari this is a space of lines
rather than of points. The aim is thus to follow and disentangle lines, which are themselves in constant flux, bifurcating and changing dimensions. The issue for planning becomes to conceive of and plan lines rather than a final point.

Deleuze and Guattari distinguish between two different forms of line. First there are broad molar lines of rigid sedimentarity. Molar lines tend to map the official organization of institutions and lives (e.g. life-stages: school, job, retirement). The second lines are molecular lines of supple segmentivity which ‘trace out little modifications, . . . they sketch out rises and falls’ (Deleuze and Parnet, 2002: 124) along which occur processes of desire, affective attachments and all kinds of becomings. The two forms of line are closely entangled, as Deleuze and Guattari (1987/1980: 260) describe: ‘every society, but also every individual, is, therefore, composed of both segmentarities at once: the one molar, the other molecular’.

Deleuze and Guattari also identify a third kind of line; the line of flight. It is a crack or rupture of the other lines and a flight from what has been and what is towards a destination which is unknown. It marks a threshold of lowered resistance to something (‘you can no longer stand what you put up with before’, Deleuze and Parnet, 2002: 126), a change in desire or the intensity of desire, a new anxiety and so on. Often political, lines of flight may be born out of resistance, but they can be positively creative. ‘It’s along this line of flight that things come to pass, becomings evolve, revolutions take shape’ (Deleuze, 1995: 45). Deleuze and Guattari are far more interested in the middle of lines as transformation starts in the middle, in between, in the margins. Transformation occurs through cracking, rupturing, and more importantly, through folding.

Folding brings new connections as once-distant entities are now juxtaposed. It generates new energies as folds are never pre-formed or given. They have no transcendent rules or final solutions. Folds literally complicate. They express a multiplicity.

Space is a verb; to take place. It is a process of action or happening. Space-time is pliant. As Grosz (2001: 117–18) suggests:

this kind of space can no longer be considered static, infinitely extended, . . . regular, amenable to gridding, to co-ordinates, to geometric division . . . . It is not an existing, God-given space, the Cartesian space of numerical division, but an unfolding space, defined, as time is, by the arc of movement and thus a space open to becoming, by which I mean becoming other than itself, other than what it has been.

Think, for example, of sand on a beach, flowing into drifts and dunes. Let us then regard space not as a container or passive receptacle, but as change, a moment of immanent becoming. Bulldozing sand dunes to give sea views for prime residential development will be ephemeral as sand will blow across the flattened surface creating new entities of drifts and mounds.
Planning attempts to perform a kind of controlled folding. However, plans rarely eventualize exactly as anticipated because space is a virtuality, in continuous transformation, which makes the constellation of what are apparently stable forces slide. Spaces may resist intended folding whilst unanticipated folding occurs elsewhere.

Perhaps planning should become a practice of finding and encountering rather than of regulating and judging (Deleuze and Parnet, 2002)? Regulating and judging demand conformity to invented rules, to a transcendence of ‘correct’ ideas which effectively prevent people from thinking. As Deleuze and Parnet (2002: 13) suggest regulation invents an absolute state which operates in the mind, ‘hence the importance of notions such as universality, method, question and answer, judgment, or recognition, of just correct’, to which I add notions of ‘the best’ and ‘the optimal’ from rational comprehensive thinking. Regulation too often means that answers must go through preformed questions worked out on the basis of the ‘solutions’ required. Such overly stringent regulation impedes creativity. It ‘effectively trains thought to operate according to the norms of an established order or power, and moreover, it installs in it an apparatus of power, sets it up as an apparatus of power itself’. Regulation as power-full control means that one must ‘have correct ideas’ (both quotations, Deleuze and Parnet, 2002: 23).

To shake off such a model, planning could perhaps become open to encounters with the outside, to openly experiment, to relax its demands for hierarchical structures of control (Deleuzoguattarian arborescent structures) and free up the potential for creative, nonconformist ways of thinking and working, proceeding by intersections, crossings of lines, encounters. ‘No correct ideas, just ideas’ (‘pas d’idées justes, juste des idées’) (Deleuze and Parnet, 2002: 9).

Temporary fixities

In order for planners to represent an entity in a plan or to act purposefully they need more than ‘just ideas’, however. They require some point of stability. This is the heart of planning. Moreover, such ‘stability’ is inevitably ephemeral. It can only be temporary. Think of a flower, whose existence is really only a temporary phase in a continuous transformation between seed and dust (Chia, 1999).

Planning practice, therefore, while theoretically concerned with change, is actually change-resisting because it requires representation to stabilize elements sufficiently to be able to act purposefully. Planning’s attempts to abstract patterns and coherences out of fragmented nets and gels serve to arrest, stabilize and simplify what would be otherwise irreducibly complex and dynamic. Planning practice is, then, an inherently simplifying mechanism. It generates a “counterfeit” version of real dynamic complexity rendered static by applying the pre-cast symbols of representation’ (Chia, 1999: 224) in order to make its task of control/regulation possible. In this
way, planning practice could be said to work *against* the forces of change rather than with them.

There is a desire, however, for some ‘virtually stable turbulence within the flow’ (Serres, 1982: 83). Whilst planning regulation is concerned with reducing contingency, its purpose is also to emphasize the contingencies of the world, and the many possibilities that are open at any point (Thrift, 1999). The challenge for practitioners is to be phronetically aware and to use regulation sensitively.

**Smooth and striated space**

Planning, for its very existence, needs to create a ‘structured counter-space’ (Stanley, 1996) or Deleuzean striated space; a space which tends to be oversimplified, overcoded and which reflects the dominance of certain actors, certain discourses and certain materialities.4

Smooth and striated spaces can be physical (as in cities), or mental (psychological). Smooth space is seemingly undifferentiated space (e.g. felt cloth), in contrast to striated space (woven cloth) which is regular, ordered and closed. Smooth space may be regarded as composed chaos; a ‘complex web of divisions, bifurcations, knots and confluences’ (Serres, 2000: 51). In striated space, relationships are linear cause and effect and the observer has a god’s-eye view, able to see the order of things by deterministic laws. Smooth space consists of points as relays between lines; striated space consists of lines between points (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987/1980). Table 1 summarizes the various qualities of smooth and striated space.

Striated space is fixed. It ‘bounds, structures, frames and locates action; and practices of discipline, regulation, subjection take place inside these spaces’ (Osborne and Rose, 2004: 218). Moreover, time is detached from space. Yet, as Osborne and Rose indicate, striated space always fails – it is lacking. There is a constitutive outside or lack: people rebel, plans go awry, things change.

Striated space tends to be associated with the state: ‘one of the fundamental tasks of the state is to striate the space’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987/1980: 479) (e.g. in the UK, through the ODPM or the Home Office), whilst smooth space is created by war machines along lines of flight (e.g. anti-wind farm lobbies, civil liberties organizations). Both spaces, nevertheless, cannot be completely actualized. The lack remains, opening up opportunities for the counter form of space.

Smooth and striated space should not be regarded as mutually exclusive, but rather ‘intermixtures which constantly make use of elements of each other’ (Osborne and Rose, 2004: 211). Forces at work within space are constantly attempting to striate it whilst in the course of striation other forces are smoothing. The two presuppose each other in an agonistic relation. As Bogard (2000: 290–1) writes, ‘smooth(ing) society has rough spots . . . [R]oughness is just part of smoothing, both its condition and its effect’.
Territorialization describes ‘the creation of meaning in social space through the forging of coded connections and distinctions’ (Brown and Lunt, 2002: 17) into some form of uniformity or consistency, such as laws, symbols, slogans or concepts (such as performance measures). For instance, local authority planning departments are territorialized by the English ODPM so that the desires and behaviours of local planners align with those of central government. Whilst all humans and institutions territorialize, it is a principal function of the state (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987/1980). The act of governance requires the stabilization and fixing of certain forms of social interaction in order to maintain ‘social harmony’. Similar to the Foucauldian concept of governmentality, Deleuze and Guattari describe state territorialization as a form of action, or capture, on individual or social forces which seeks to limit or constrain their possibilities for action (Patton, 2000) (e.g. anti-social behaviour legislation).

As stated above, however, individuals and groups may decide to leave a territorial assemblage following physical or psychological lines of flight, shedding the system by which they had been previously controlled. Deleuze and Guattari (1987/1980) term this as deterritorialization: the destabilization and ultimate removal of codings that confer fixed meaning. Absolute deterritorialization would resemble an anarchic revolution. However, as Deleuze and Guattari (1994) indicate, deterritorialization does not take

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Smooth space</th>
<th>Striated space</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>nomadic space of movement</td>
<td>sedentary space</td>
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<tr>
<td>space of war machine</td>
<td>space instituted by state apparatus</td>
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<tr>
<td>constantly transversed into striated space</td>
<td>constantly reversed into smooth space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>felt: entanglement</td>
<td>woven space: warp and woof</td>
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<tr>
<td>infinite, open and unlimited</td>
<td>fixed, limited</td>
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<td>continuous variation</td>
<td>back and forth</td>
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<tr>
<td>‘barbarian’</td>
<td>imperial</td>
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<td>close-range/micro-vision</td>
<td>long-distance/macro-vision</td>
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<tr>
<td>multiple perspective</td>
<td>central perspective</td>
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<tr>
<td>points of reference immanent</td>
<td>points of reference transcendent</td>
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<tr>
<td>abstract line: wandering, irregular</td>
<td>concrete line: bounded, constant, regular</td>
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<tr>
<td>line without beginning or end</td>
<td>line of fixed orientation</td>
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<td>matter variable</td>
<td>matter gridded and organized</td>
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<tr>
<td>smooth space of Go</td>
<td>striated space of Chess</td>
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<td>thought space</td>
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Adapted from Bonta (1999).

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Adapted from Bonta (1999).
place without some form of reterritorialization; the establishment of new rules and ideologies.

**Becoming-planning?**

I have attempted to demonstrate that the world is in a constant state of flux. Gels, some more viscous than others, flow at varying speeds, connecting a whole range of human and non-human entities, which themselves are dynamic multiplicities.

We can never accurately predict movements/transformations or their multiplier effects, even though such movements may be tightly ‘planned’ or regulated. For example, the ODPM is attempting to orchestrate a top-down transformation of the English planning system so that it becomes a more locally-driven, flexible ‘monster’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994), but it has not reckoned with the psychology of individuals and groups or the power of transcendent notions of the spirit, purpose and processes of planning practice.

Theorists, such as Patsy Healey, are developing relational institutional theory, based on what they perceive as taking place in the practice worlds around them. However, such theories jar with both the deep-rooted ideas of rational comprehensivism and the more recently accepted ‘communicative turn’ in planning based on concepts of communicative rationality drawn from Habermas. These latter theories are essentially transcendent theories, compared to the struggles of Healey to express immanence.

I consider that both practitioners and theorists are caught straddling the abyss between transcendence and immanence. Many can see that the metaphorical ocean around them is uncertain, indeterminate and immanent, yet they cannot shake off the powerful, deep-rooted comfort of transcendence as an anchor in the constantly shifting currents.

I believe that there needs to be a theory of planning which provides a robust philosophical foundation for the work of authors such as Healey, and which can give support to practitioners daunted by complexity and the manifold contrarities and multiplicity of undecidabilities with which they struggle on a daily basis. A becoming of planning practice should thus be effected through a becoming of planning theory. To this end, I have referred to Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of becoming, in which ideas do not come to order from abstract and/or external notions, but develop as part of practical, creative experimentation played out within and between economic and socio-political institutions.

Planning theory and practice need to become in Deleuzean terms, in multiple and constant processes of transformation, opening up potentialities for connections and integrations. Planning practice, in particular, should be recognized as being experimental (Dewsbury, 2000; Hinchliffe, 2001). It is bricolage (Innes and Booher, 1999b). It is practical wisdom/phronesis:
about ‘knowing how to go on’ (Dewsbury, 2000: 493); ‘knowing how to negotiate our way through a world that is not fixed and pre-given but that is continually shaped by the types of actions in which we engage’ (Rosch et al., 1991: 144).

So, what would Deleuzean planning do? It would look at the intersecting practices of materialities and imaginations, identifying the key practices which constitute particular performances and recognizing the social, economic and political structures underlying such practices as appropriate. Planning would map the networks or meshworks between elements of the hybrid collectives of being and becoming. It would name the neglected and violated entities, actors/actants and spatialities and outreach to their unfamiliar cartographies and networks. By unpacking the relations between entities, their withs and withouts and their power plays, planners might identify and anticipate the typically overlooked aspects or insurgencies which might arise out of the intersections between them.

As Cloke (2004) suggests, planning is a ‘crashing together of a myriad daily practices and performances.’ In order to make sense of this cacophony, there is a need for some temporary fixity and stabilization of meanings, but this should not be the disembodied tokenism of oversimplification, a power-full representation to create ‘certainty’ for god-like professional planning practitioners, but rather a condition of potentiality (the Deleuzean virtual) for new knowledge and creativity. It is a moment of risk-taking, of not being in total control (Hinchliffe, 2001), of transcending the technicalities of planning practice to create an ‘open reading frame for the emergence of unprecedented events’ (Rheinberger, 1997: 31); the very antithesis of what planning (as embodied in the British Royal Town Planning Institute) currently represents.5

What are the potentialities/virtualities for planning to be folded otherwise? Deleuzean notions of immanence/becoming and multiplicity/imply a world of continuous variation, becoming and chance rather than one of constancy, being and predictability (Doel, 1996). Immanence, however, does not mean completely random, haphazard change and experienced practitioners, sensitive to situations and aware of potentialities, may anticipate the locations and directions of transformative lines of Deleuzean flight. Phronetic practical wisdom is important (Hillier, 2002).

If there is no single modernity, rather a network, gel or mesh of negotiated multiple modernities,6 and if planning decision-making and implementational power is rooted, in part, in the micropolitics of localities, then the autonomy of planning is inevitably contingent and constrained in important ways. We should not forget that planning is a performative practice situated in dynamic contexts operating at both macro- and micro-scales – the Deleuzean molar and molecular respectively (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983/1972, 1987/1980).7 Theoretical approaches which emphasize the relational (of multiplicities; flux; incompleteness; undecidability; nets, meshes, gels or goos; becoming and so on) should not omit consideration of
contextual structures through which practices, relations, disconnections and trajectories are influenced.

As such, there is a need to go beyond, not only a unifying ‘is’, but also beyond the juxtaposition of elements (the Deleuzean ‘and’), and beyond syntheses, to question what are the relationships between the elements: a ‘with’ perhaps? Juxtaposition and syntheses are not enough. ‘And . . . and . . . and’ still leaves a gap in the moment of encounter. As theorists and practitioners we need to bridge these moments of chasm. We need to unpack the complex interrelatedness of elements which constitute a multiplicity and the terms of construction of those relations.

Whereas concentration on structures gives an overly-bounded, too-rigid frame, purely relational approaches cannot identify what determines or shapes the opportunities of actors. Thrift (2004b) accuses theorists of ‘star-mapping’ but of ‘not joining the dots’. He omits, however, the important context of the agent doing the joining. In viewing the night sky, we cannot see three-dimensional space or time with the naked eye and so may misrecognize the elements and join together the unrelated. So, whose interpretation counts and why? Perhaps, rather than simply joining the dots to create a hegemonically predetermined representation, we should be investigating potentialities hidden in the interstices.

Can immanence be affirmed over transcendence? There is a need to distinguish between the immanent and the transcendent within the this-worldliness of society. Analysis of Deleuzoguattarian smooth and striated space may be of assistance in this regard. Striations are elements of transcendence which structure the social field channelling the creative flows of immanence. Striations include laws, regulations, guidelines and also measures of govern mentality, subjection and subjectification. They are molar constructs, anchored by Lacanian master signifiers, such as ‘sustainability’. Striations can be transformed, however, to different effect than regulation as control and repression, through the smooth space of immanence if the creative forces of immanence and lines of flight are permitted opportunity.

Planning is a virtual practice. Rajchman (1998: 117) regards the virtual city as the city that holds together the most, and most complicated, ‘different possible worlds’. A virtual city, like a virtual plan, is agonistic; it allows insurgencies and encounters. Virtual planning is not concerned with setting out all possibilities in advance. As Gibson (1996: 13) suggests, it ‘must turn away from laws and regulations to exchanges and interferences, connections and disconnections between spaces . . . it must concentrate on perturbations and turbulences, multiple forms, uneven structures and fluctuating organizations’. A plan should always be incomplete so as to be able to respond to the ‘unforeseen moments in what happens in us and to us that open up onto new histories, new paths in the “complication” of our ways of being’ (Rajchman, 2000: 61). A virtual plan constitutes a space whose rules can themselves be altered through what happens in it. For me, the role of a plan
is not to predict but to ‘remain attentive to the unknown knocking at the door’ (Deleuze, 1995). A plan is about connections: ‘and’ or ‘with’.

‘To make connections one needs not knowledge or certainty, but rather a trust that something may come out, though one is not yet completely sure what’ (Rajchman, 2000: 7). A ‘belief of the future, in the future’ (Deleuze, 1995: 6). However, this is not to suggest abdicating responsibility for trying to prepare for a ‘better’ future than the present, even if transcendent notions of ‘the good’ are destabilized and dissolved. Deleuze and Guattari (1987/1980: 483) write of an ‘an exact yet rigorous’ practice which is ‘open and connectable in all of its dimensions’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987/1980: 12); a continuous exchange of striated and smooth space, of deterritorialization and reterritorialization.

Deleuzoguattarian planning practice could perform a space in which representations are unsettled and destabilized. To date, there have been few empirical examples of such ‘fluid’ planning. An exception is the redevelopment of Melbourne Docklands in Australia (Dovey, 2005). In Melbourne, the Committee for Melbourne’s (1990) discussion paper on the future of Melbourne Docklands embodied immanence. It sketched a ‘very glossy future vision for the Docklands, but there was no planning or urban design framework. A few indicative maps contained stylish scribbles indicating possible functional zones’ (Dovey, 2005: 132). This document was followed by the Docklands Authority’s 1993 Docklands Plan, which consciously omitted proposals for infrastructure in what it called its ‘Proactive Context Map: Not a Master Plan’. Words such as ‘plan’ and ‘planning’ were replaced with ‘development’ and ‘coordination’ (Dovey, 2005: 135) as market forces were expected to fill the blanks on the Not-Master-Plan. Too much fluidity and uncertainty created a vacuum, however, both for development investment and the public imagination. Developers regarded investment as too risky without knowing whether adjacent developments would complement or detract value from their own. While the high levels of flexibility gave developers an opportunity to think creatively, and planning law was negotiated as individual development processes unfolded, that same flexibility on neighbouring lots rendered creativity extremely risky. Similarly, it appeared difficult to generate public enthusiasm for a predominantly blank document. Accordingly, in 1996 the Docklands Authority commissioned an urban design vision (ARM, 1996) to stimulate discussion. In this elaborate computer graphic vision the buildings and infrastructure plan were entirely fictional. Ironically, this ‘vision’ of pure imagination, which would never be realized, received almost universal support from the media and public. As Dovey (2005: 198) comments, ‘the hype exceeded the hope’. By 2000 it had become clear that the situation was untenable and the Docklands Authority finally embarked on a ‘genuine public plan for the area’ (Dovey, 2005: 153).

Melbourne Docklands give us an example of deterritorialization; an unsettling of stabilized understandings (of process, of identity) in favour
of the smooth spaces of capital. Yet, ungrounded planning processes in this instance did not lead to immanent engagement with creative development. It seems that although identities and spaces are fluid, they nevertheless require partial fixing in some manner if differential subject positions and social relations are to exist. Such partial fixing takes place round nodal or passage points in the form of temporary, hegemonic relations (e.g. the outcome of public consultation, the adoption of a local plan, a development assessment decision). There was a need for some kind of transcendent ground or fixity to manage the resulting uncertainties in Melbourne.

Conclusions

The project of transformation in planning to me is a matter of learning what planning theory and practice are capable of becoming. Theorists and practitioners need to think in radically different ways about what we and they are if new potentialities are to be creatively generated. Planning performs in the space between the past and the future. Planning is a human accomplishment and one which most of us would agree is necessary. I argue for a transformation in practice (and theory) which reflects reality as ‘always a unique and never-to-be-repeated coalescence of a multiplicity of potentialities’ (Chia, 1999: 226).

There appears to be a demand amongst planning practitioners, land investors/developers and the public, for some sort of fixity, stability or purpose which does not appear satisfiable by laissez-faire, ‘seat-of-the-pants’ or ‘plan-as-you-go’ approaches. Do planners, in fact, have a moral responsibility to provide such stability? Do planners perhaps personify that imaginary desire for simplicity, order and stasis which seems inherent within humans (Watson, 1999)? If post-structuralist interpretations of the world as unpredictable, uncontrollable and unregulatable are not to end up in Nietzschean nihilism, is there a need for planning to have a vision towards which it attempts to steer local environments?

With one metaphorical foot planted in the transcendence of the ‘good city’ and the ‘optimal environment’ and the other practising inhabiting the interstices from where new lines of flight might arise, planning theorists and practitioners straddle the post-structuralist abyss. The name of the game is not to rediscover the transcendent universal but to find the conditions under which something new or immanent may be created (Rajchman, 1998).

As such, I would hope that planning practice might become:8 a kind of ‘magic’ (Thrift, 2000) ‘spatial investigation’9 proceeding by experiment and induction, which allows disparate points of view to coexist; which has a concern for indeterminate essences rather than contoured, ordered ones; for dynamic or emergent properties rather than fixed ones; and for allowing
intuition and uncertainty, multiplicity and complexity rather than systematic certainties.

I believe that planning does and should have principles. These would be synthetic and contingent principles of encounter and connection. The principle of reason would be that of contingent reason, working on a plane of composition (the plan) that is not abstractly preconceived but constructed collaboratively, ‘opening, mixing, dismantling, and reassembling increasingly unlimited compounds’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 188). Planning practice would provide ‘just a little order to protect us from chaos’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 201): a shadow of the future.

I am interested in exploring the concept of what Cloke (2004) names as ‘hybrid’ theory which embraces Deleuzean ‘minor’ theory of molecular entities and lines, whilst not losing sight of structuring molar, social, cultural and economic contexts. Planning should be an exercise in building new spaces for thought in the midst of things (Rajchman, 1998). But it needs to recognize what those ‘things’ are, and the power-laden relationalities between them.

Perhaps planning theorists need to contemplate both transcendence and immanence, both structures and relationalities, both molar and molecular and how they themselves might coexist and interrelate. As Deleuze and Guattari (1987/1980: 271, cited in Mengue, 2003: 64) write, ‘politics and its decisions are always molar, but it is the molecular, with its local interpretations, which shapes them’ (my translation).

In what Mengue (2003) theorizes as ‘the double face of the social’ of molar/molecular distinction, coexistence and complementarity, there is scope for contextual structures and broad institutional (utopic) molar visions of the future (Deleuzean striations) within which micro-scale molecular differences, fluidities and becomings of multiplicities interconnect. Mengue (2003) returns to Arendt’s (1958) concept of pluralities and the notion of both ‘levels’ being deliberatively decided (as in Habermas, 1996). See also Nancy Fraser (Fraser, 1992; Fraser and Honneth, 2003) and Bruno Latour’s (2004) two houses of the collective. Latour’s (2004: 235) concluding comments on political ecology can apply equally to planning. ‘The state of [planning] remains to be invented, since it is no longer based on any transcendence but on the quality of follow-up in the collective experimentation.’

Transcendence and immanence may thus actually enjoy a mutual collusion in planning practice. Transcendental structures of ‘rules’ and visions, regarded as a codifying reaction to emergence that folds back on becoming (e.g. use classes, ODPM guidelines, collective visions of the future) are immanent in their practical local expressions. The rules thus become an integral part of practice without ceasing to be a transcendent intervention. Transcendence as such becomes immanent. Rules are a transcendental nexus that constrain with a light touch to encourage local experimental variation and the expression of creativity. Planning practice may thus perform the repeated recapture of transcendence and immanence.

Planning as experiment is the condition of possibility for new knowledge and research. ‘But it is in concrete social fields, at specific moments that the

The question ‘what next’ resists closure. I do not venture to propose what ‘must be’ or ‘should be’ done as this would be to fall into an abyss of my own making. What comes next, for me, like Doel (2004) will be a contingent encounter; a complex going-beyond which is relational and ambivalent rather than absolute (Castree and MacMillan, 2004). I consider that to think becoming will be an important project for the future, for planning theorists and practitioners. It will be a project ‘for those who want to do something with respect to new uncommon forces, which we don’t quite yet grasp, who have a certain taste for the unknown’ (Rajchman, 2000: 6). For myself, it is, as Guattari (2000/1989: 40) wrote, ‘Work in Progress’.

Acknowledgements

I am particularly grateful to Nigel Thrift, Ash Amin and Stuart Elden for stimulating my thinking on the issues in this article and to Patsy Healey and Louis Albrechts for comments on an earlier version.

Notes

1. In Lacanian terms, actualization of virtualities would be attempts to realize the Real.

2. Deleuze and Guattari use the term ‘virtual’ to indicate potentiality. Potentiality is more indefinite than possibility. Potentialities cannot be fully realized or ‘actualized’. They thus demonstrate similarities to the Lacanian concept of the Real.

3. The French noun for fold ‘le pli’ has a philosophical lineage in a family of words such as complication, implication, multiplication, replication, suggesting that multiples are folded in complex ways rather than simply added on. Similarly, to explicate is to unfold or explain, while something pliant is foldable.

4. We can chart at least four different theorizations of the planning imaginary in its efforts to assert some sort of order:
   - Lacan – desire fixed through the symbolic and the master/university discourses;
   - Foucault – governmentality and normalization;
Lefebvre – three spatial representations, especially representations of space, conceived and imaginary spaces;
Deleuze – striated space and (re)territorialization.

5. ‘Planning should be the antithesis of the law of unintended results’ (MacDonald and Serafian, 2004: 25).
6. If, indeed, we have ever been ‘modern’ at all (Latour, 1993).
7. Molar social entities include social classes, gender and ethnic categorizations. At molecular scales, a range of different and fluid social affinities, sexual preferences and ethnic belongings may be recognized.
8. I thank Nigel Thrift for planting the rhizome of a gardening analogy here, which I am currently growing.
9. I use the term ‘investigation’ in the transactional sense that regards knowledge as vicarious experience created in interaction among ‘investigator’ and respondents or community.
10. See Gunder and Hillier (2005).

References


Fraser, N. and Honneth, A. (2003) *Redistribution or Recognition? A


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