Philosophy 361 Darwall Ethics Fall 1997 SUMMING UP I Recall the distinction between metaethics and normative ethics. Normative ethics deals with substantial ethical issues, such as, What is intrinsically good? What are our moral obligations? Metaethics deals with philosophical issues about ethics: What is value or moral obligation? Are there ethical facts? What sort of objectivity is possible in ethics? How can we have ethical knowledge? Recall, also, the fundamental dilemma of metaethics. Either there are ethical facts or there aren’t. If they are, what sort of facts are they? In what do they consist? If there are not, why do we think, talk, and feel as though there are? II Philosophical ethics is the integration of metaethics and normative ethics—the attempt to come to an integrated understanding of both. Given our current perspective, how can we view the philosophical ethics of Mill, Kant, Aristotle, Nietzsche, and the ethics of care? III For Mill, the question is what is the relation between his (metaethical) empirical naturalism and his (normative) qualitatively hedonist value theory and his utilitarian moral theory? One place we can see Mill’s empiricism is his treatment, in Chapter III, of the question of why the principle of utility is “binding”, how it can generate a moral obligation. Compare Mill’s treatment of this question with Kant’s treatment of the question of why the CI is binding in Chapter III of the Groundwork. IV What is Kant’s metaethics? Since he holds that morality is both necessary and a priori, Kant must be some kind of rationalist. But, unlike Plato, he is not the kind of rationalist who holds that there are metaphysically independent ethics facts that reason grasps through a kind of perception or rational ethical insight. For Kant, morality is a construction of practical reason. But that doesn’t make it arbitrary, since Kant argues that its construction (“legislation”) is essential to the practical reasoning of any free rational agent. Mill’s value theory is a version of the ideal judgment theory. So is Kant’s, but note the differences. Mill’s theory is empiricist, Kant’s rationalist. Kant grounds morality in structures that, he argues, are necessary to free, rational practical judgment. But how do Kant’s metaethics relate to his normative ethics. Pursuing the comparison with Mill, how is Kant’s anti-consequentialist (deontological) claim that it is wrong to treat persons in certain ways even if that maximizes happiness grounded in his metaethics, in particular, in his metaphysics of ethics? V With Nietzsche, we get a critique of any theory of morality, Millian or Kantian, on broadly empiricist and naturalist grounds. As against Kant, Nietzsche argues both that there is no free will of the kind Kant says we must presuppose, and that what underlies the Categorical Imperative is no construction of free practical reason, but ressentiment and cruelty. And against, Mill’s claims that morality has an adequate empirical basis in natural conscience (the salience of the “moral point of view”), sympathy, and the desire to be in unity with others, Nietzsche argues that its genesis depends on particular historical circumstances and continued ignorance of its real causes. But while Nietzsche is a “moral nihilist”, he is not an “ethical nihilist.” And while he doesn’t confront metaethical issues in a systematic way, it seems clear enough that he thinks that however the metaphysics of ethics are to be understood, they had better be compatible with a general naturalist orientation. What, then, are the possibilities available to him? Noncognitivism? Relativism? Some version of ethical naturalism? An ideal judge theory? Note, again, that the relevant theory will be one of ethical judgments and beliefs that are nonmoral. Nietzsche evidently believes that all moral beliefs are false. VI Like Nietzsche, Aristotle offers us a philosophical ethics that is not a philosophical account of morality, at least, not in the same sense that Kant and Mill are trying to vindicate. What is Aristotle's metaethics? Aristotle distinguishes his approach from Plato’s, which he thinks mistakenly treats ethics as a transcendent phenomenon. Rather, ethics is concerned with something immanent, with what is good for human beings. Here Aristotle’s ethics fit with his general teleological metaphysics. Every natural species has a good or telos essential to its nature. Homo sapiens are no different from any other. But how are Aristotle’s normative ethical views supported by his metaphysics? Here we need to understand his views about the distinctive character of human rationality, the role of ideals of the noble and base, the role of emotion and a kind of “sense” or judgment that can arise only through experience, maturation, and upbringing. One question that is particularly salient is what modern life would be like were we to live with Aristotle’s conception of ethics in place of the idea of morality that Mill and Kant are trying to defend. VII What is most distinctive about the ethics of care is the idea of responsibilities to particular individuals. According to Kant and Mill, moral obligations are not fundamentally particularistic in this way, they are rooted in universal moral principles. What philosophical conception might underlie the ethics of care? Think about how we experience our relationships to others. Don’t we experience particular others as making claims on us? Personal relationships are probably the best examples, but aren't relationships with strangers quite similar. Think, for example, of fundamental forms of human exchange like gift-giving, promise, and contract. Indeed, the original root meaning of ‘obligation’ refers to bond created between individuals by such exchanges. As in, “much obliged.” VIII Of course, in this course we have only been able to pursue some of the many different ways in which philosophers have tried to think through the ethical and philosophical questions about value and obligation that any thoughtful human being faces. In the end, it is up to each of us to decide what answers to these questions we find most convincing.