Philosophy 361 Darwall Ethics Fall 1997 NIETZSCHE I I Both of the systematic ethical philosophers we have considered to this point, Mill and Kant, belong to the modern period. ["Modern philosophy" is usually marked as beginning with Rene Descartes, whose Meditations was published in 1641. Modern ethical philosophy begins with Montaigne and Hobbes (Leviathan,1651)] And Mill and Kant share certain common assumptions as moderns: A. Each the modern conception of morality: a set of universal norms of conduct that: (a) regulate self-interest for mutual advantage (on the assumption that unregulated self-interest would be mutually disadvantageous) (b) in a way that is expresses an impartial, equal regard for all persons. This "modern" conception of morality is a successor to the monotheistic religious (i.e., Judaeo-Muslim-Christian) notion of a divine law that binds all souls. B. The moderns also broadly accept the empirical methods of modern science (beginning with Bacon, Boyle, and Newton) and want to achieve an understanding of ethics that is consistent with the worldview of modern science. C. The rise of the liberal democratic state brings the idea that the state must be justifiable to its citizens on equal terms without any premise that some lives are inherently better and more noble than others. II. Consider Mill and Kant from this perspective. A. Mill is something of an exception to C because of his doctrine of quality, but generally the utilitarian tradition treats each person's preferences equally and does not take a view about which preferences are really worth satisfying and which are not. And morality, for the utilitarian, has the goal of promoting the greatest happiness of all, counting each person for one and no more than one. B. Kant's theory has something of the same "liberal" structure. All ends other than the distinctively moral end of rational nature itself are merely "nonmoral" and can generate no categorical imperatives. All are ultimately reducible to the agent's own happiness. Morality, on the other hand, is constituted by an equal regard for all as rational autonomous. III. Nietzsche submits this idea of morality to radical critique. He believes both that the idea is philosophically insupportable and that when we understand its genealogy, we will see that what actually explains our having it are profoundly negative aspects of human life. Morality is an ideology. We can believe it only if we ignore why we do. IV. Central to Nietzsche’s thought is a fundamental distinction between the ideas of good and bad, on the one hand, and those of (moral) good and evil, on the other. (Notice the title of Essay I.) The natural form ethical evaluation first takes, he believes is that of excellence or merit. People who excel, who have merits we admire and esteem, thereby have a kind of natural nobility. A. These are “rank-ordering, rank-defining value judgments.” (I.2) We naturally look up to, we respect and esteem, those with merit. He calls them “knightly aristocratic values” (See I.4,5,7, B. The “primary” half of the pair is good. Bad is what is not-good. What is not worthy of esteem and respect. C. The “good” features are naturally “positive”: they affirm and sustain life, vigor, strength, etc., e.g. openness, cheerfulness, creativity, physical strength, agility, grace, beauty, vigor, health, wit, intelligence, charm, and friendliness. V. On the other hand, the “primary” half of the good/evil pair is evil. The idea of evil is reactive. It comes from the negation of good. Indeed, Nietzsche believes that it derives from negating good (natural merit). And the idea of moral good is simply the negation of that negation. It is what is not evil. The original negation is due to ressentiment—a psychological process through which the naturally weak suppress their anger at being slighted by the strong who consider them of little merit. Unable to express their anger honestly, they suppress it to an unconscious level, in the “dark workshop” of the human psyche. It then comes to be expressed not as personal anger, but in an alienated, impersonal form, namely, as moral indignation and resentment. The strong who disrespect the weak are seen, by virtue of their disrespect, as deserving moral disapproval—as being evil. VI. We can see how this process is supposed to work in Nietzsche’s parable of the lambs and the birds of prey (I.13). The birds see the lambs as their natural inferiors, as meat. The lambs are angered by this, but can’t do anything about it directly by expressing personal anger. So they express their anger in an impersonal way. They reproach the birds; they hold them morally responsible for what they lambs see as their evil conduct. They project the ideology of morality, which is just the impersonal expression of their personal anger and hatred. Nietzsche is saying that morality is born in denial. VII. The problem from Nietzsche’s perspective is that, unlike the birds of prey, the naturally strong have been taken in by this ideology. Through Judaeo- Christian religion, a “priestly caste” has taken over culture to such a degree that the ideology of morality is now the dominant view. But in addition to being born in hatred and denial, Nietzsche believes both that the idea of morality is philosophically insupportable (for example, in its assumption of free will) as well as one that has terrible consequences for human culture— it is an ethic of weakness and illness that chokes off genuine human achievement. VIII. An example for next time: punishment and the idea of guilt. IX. Nietzsche’s positive view: perfectionism.