Philosophy 361 Ethics Darwall Fall 1996 MILL IV I We turn to Mill's theory of the right--to his view about what makes an action right or wrong. Note first that this is a moral question in a way that the issue of what is intrinsically good is not. Only the conduct of a moral agent can be right or wrong. II Utilitarianism holds that the question of whether an act is right or not must be settled, ultimately, by reference to the promotion of happiness and unhappiness--the only intrinsically good ends. But, as we shall see, there is room for a number of different versions of this general view. Indeed, Mill himself says things that suggest two different possibilities. [We won't examine the second until next time.] Recall the "greatest happiness principle" II.par2: "actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness." This looks like act utilitarianism, or AU for short. Act utilitarianism (AU): An act is right if, of those acts available in the circumstances, it would produce the greatest total net good (happiness). Note a number of things about this view: A. First, Mill holds that both quantity and quality make distinct, independent contributions to the intrinsic value of pleasure or happiness. So we can't suppose that, for Mill, AU is to be understood as depending on a crude measure of quantity of pleasure or happiness. Still, if we are going to compare amounts of good in some homogenous way, even if good is complex, we will need some measure. The utilitarian seems committed to the proposition that this can be done. IT IS IMPORTANT TO KEEP THIS ASSUMPTION IN MIND, ESPECIALLY SINCE MILL MAY SEEM TO BE CLOSE TO DENYING IT IN HIS THESIS THAT SOME INTRINSIC GOODS ARE HIGHER THAN OTHERS. IS THIS ASSUMPTION METAETHICAL? We shall have to set this problem to one side. B. Note the following features of AU. Whether an act is right depends on 1. whatever effects the act would actually have. a. on whomever it would affect (with each person's (creature's) happiness being taken account of), b. no matter how remote, in space or time. 2. considered on balance (for example, counting happiness as positive good, and unhappiness as bad (negative good), we sum up total net happiness). [N.B.: an act might cause unhappiness, but net happiness, and vice versa.] 3. in relation to whatever other acts one could perform in those very same circumstances. C. An outrageously simple example: Suppose you can only do A or B. Suppose that x, y, z would be benefited or harmed to the following degrees from each act. x y z A 5 -2 2 B 2 2 2 III There are some very attractive things about AU. The underlying intuitive idea is that, from the moral point of view, each person should count the same, and, therefore, each person's good should count the same. The moral point of view is an impartial perspective. According to AU, in any circumstance, what it would be right for a person to do, depends simply on which act would be best from this point of view--which act would maximizing total net happiness (or, as we might also say, utility). Despite this intuitive appeal, utilitarianism has been perenially subject to objections of various sorts. Mill considers several of these in II.par 11-25. I will here mention two. A. One objection to AU is this: "there is not time, previous to action, for calculating and weighing the effects of any line of conduct on the general happiness." Indeed, one might even complain that AU makes it impossible ever to know what is right or wrong, since to know that we would have to know which act, of all that were available in the circumstances, would have the greatest total net happiness, taking account of all effects of all possible effects from the point of action to the end of time. Neither objection provesthat AU is false. They only prove, if true, that if AU is true, moral knowledge is very difficult, maybe impossible, and almost certainly not possible before the point of action. But even so the utilitarian could still hold that he is saying what the criterion or standard of rightness itself is, not that this is what individuals should always be looking to in making decisions about what to do. Mill notes that societies have been reflecting on the consequences of different kinds of actions since time immemorial, and that they have formulated various secondary principles (II.par24) as rough guides or rules of thumb [this is an example of what Rawls will call a summary rule in "Two Concepts of Rules" (assigned for next time)] The act utilitarian can then hold the following: AU determines what makes an act right or wrong. But it wouldn't necessarily maximize utility for us simply to act with AU in mind (for the reasons the objector presses), so we ought to use secondary principles as guides, although, if their verdict ever conflicts with AU, it is still AU which determines what is right. B. "As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator." (II.par18) Likewise: it requires that we give no greater weight to the welfare of those who are dearest to us, loved ones, family, and so on. Mill replies by distinguishing between a rule of action and a motive. AU purports to be the former; it does not say that one should always care equally about all. FOR NEXT TIME: HARMAN ARGUES THAT UTILITARIANISM CLASHES IN A VARIETY OF WAYS WITH COMMON SENSE MORALITY. READ CH. 3 AND, ESPECIALLY, CH. 5 OF UTILITARIANISM AND CONSIDER THE TWO FOLLOWING QUESTIONS: (A) IS THIS AN ARGUMENT AGAINST UTILITARIANISM, AND IF SO HOW WEIGHTY? (B) DOES MILL'S CH. 5 SUGGEST A DIFFERENT UTILITARIAN POSITION THAT DOESN'T CONFLICT WITH COMMON SENSE AS MUCH? ********************************************************* *************** Text Analysis Project Assignment for 9/25: Harman, The Nature of Morality, Ch. 2, section 4, "The Open Question Argument, pp. 17- 20. ********************************************************* ***************