Philosophy 361 Ethics Darwall Fall 1996 KANT VI TEXT ANALYSIS ASSIGNMENT: Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. I, Ch. 7, from bottom, p. 12, "Presumably, however, . . . " to top p. 14, "Let this serve . . ." *********************************************************** ************* I Kant's End in Itself Formulation enjoins us always to treat rational nature, whether in our own person, or in that of others, always as an end and never simply as a means. Since will is distinctive of practically rational beings, we may take this to enjoin always respecting the will of others, in some sense. I stress 'in some sense', because Kant plainly can't be asking that we never act contrary to someone's will. For one thing, this could not be obeyed in a situation where wills conflict. I suggested that it might be closer to Kant's idea (whether it is, I leave you to judge) if we interpret him as requiring persons always to respect others as capable of acting for principles, and hence, to be prepared to constrain our actions towards others if they (or we) could not will our maxim to be universal law. II That this may be on the right track is suggested by what Kant calls The Formula of Autonomy. Recall that in his argument in Chapter One that a person of good will would be guided by the CI (400-402), Kant rejected the idea that the moral law has a metaphysical reality that is independent of practical reason, which reason enables a rational person to detect or discover. Practical reason is not like good eyesight which can detect things (say, variously shaped objects) which exist independently of it. In this way, Kant's view of reason is profoundly different from Plato's. The moral law is not something with independent metaphysical existence which reason directly intuits. That he must be rejecting this Platonic picture is evident in his formula of autonomy. There Kant says, "the will is therefore not merely subject to the law, but is so subject that it must be considered as also making the law for itself and precisely on this account as first of all subject to the law (of which it can regard itself as the author)." (431) The moral law does not simply bind rational persons from outside their will, as it were (in the way, say, a social more or legal statute may exist independently of the will of the person to whom it applies). Rather, a rational person is subject to the moral law because, in some way, it is a law of her own making. And, to extend the point, she will be morally bound to act in accord with a given social more or legal statute only if her doing so is required by a law that can arise from her own will. III The first formulation requires that we act only on maxims that we could ourselves will to be universal law. We might then think of the second formulation as adding that we must act in ways that are consistent with the idea that others are also rational persons. We rightly acknowledge this by constraining our action toward them to maxims which they could will as universal law. So Kant writes: "From this there now follows our third practical principle for the will--as the supreme condition of the will's conformity with universal practical reason-- namely, the Idea of the will of every rational being as a will which makes universal law." (431) IV A fairly substantial problem now arises. It would seem that it had better be the case that, in the relevant sense, all rational persons would will the same universal laws. If this is not the case, then how can any particular person simultaneously respect his own rational will and that of another when they would will different universal laws? Suppose, for example, that two different individuals, one needy, the other wealthy, would will different universal laws governing the giving of aid to those in need. Suppose the needy person would will that those who are in a position to help others who are in need do so until, and unless, doing so would put them into a position of greater need themselves. Suppose that the wealthy person would will that those who are in a position to help others who are in need do so until, and unless, doing so would require the sacrifice of something that they care about more than trivially (say, a sacrifice comparable to that of a nice meal out for one of us). What, then, would Kant's theory require? V One possible solution to this problem is to interpret Kant's idea of a "kingdom of ends" in the way John Rawls does in his Theory of Justice. Kant writes: "The concept of every rational being as one who must regard himself as making universal law by all the maxims of his will, and must seek to judge himself and his actions from this point of view, leads to a closely connected and very fruitful concept--namely, that of a kingdom of ends. "I understand by a 'kingdom' a systematic union of different rational beings under common laws. Now since laws determine ends as regards their universal validity, we shall be able--if we abstract from the personal differences between rational beings, and also from all the content of their private ends--to conceive a whole of all ends in systematic conjunction . . . that is, we shall be able to conceive a kingdom of ends which is possible in accordance with the above principles." (433) Rawls suggests we understand Kant as asking, not what principles we would will to be universal law from our own individual situations-- mindful of our social status, natural endowments, race, sex, and what we individually value. Rather, we should ask what principles it would be rational for a person (me or anyone else) to will that all be governed by were we to make that choice from a position of ignorance about our own individual situations. Behind a veil of ignorance, all persons have the same interests as rational persons--the freedom to pursue their ends, a social framework that affirms their status as rational persons, etc. On this "Rawlsian" interpretation, what Kant's CI is really asking is that we act only on maxims that would not conflict with principles that it would be rational to choose as universal law from behind a veil of ignorance. This provides a unified interpretation of the CI. VI This concludes the "moral line of argument" for the CI. But if we don't assume that morality is binding on any rational person, what can show that it is? At this point in the Groundwork Kant does not believe he has any argument that morality is anything other than "a chimerical idea" or a "mere phantom of the brain" (445) "We have merely shown by developing the concept of morality generally in vogue that autonomy of the will is unavoidably bound up with it or rather is its very basis." (445) So in Chapter III, he turns to "a critique of this power of reason itself" which is necessary to show how both morality and freedom are possible. Kant's major argument is pretty compact--it is mainly given on 446-448, although he provides important elaboration throughout the rest of the chapter. He begins by distinguishing between a "negative" and a "positive" definition of freedom. The former is simply the idea that in conceiving of our actions as free we must suppose that the will is "able to work independently of alien causes." (446) He doesn't say a whole lot about why the negative definition is inadequate as it stands, but his idea seems to be something like this: the mere idea that the will is independent of alien causes does not yet give us an adequate notion of rational self-determination. For the will could be utterly random, and be independent of alien causes, and not involve rational self-determination. The latter includes the idea of an agent acting for reasons. But this, Kant has already argued at 412, involves the agent willing in accordance with a conception of law. Here, of course, the kind of law cannot be a law of natural causes and effects. Rather, the idea seems to be that I cannot think that an action of mine make sense, is sensible, reasonable, or supported by reasons, unless I think that it would be sensible or reasonable for a person in a situation just like mine. But this is a universal law which I take to apply to all rational persons. Thus, I can conceive of my will as rationally self-determined only if I take it to be governed by universal principles by which any person should be governed. But what are such principles? Well, now we are back in the same region of argument that we were when we discussed Kant's reasoning at 400-402 for the CI from the idea of a person who is guided by respect for the (moral) law. Since there is no law, independent of the will of a rational person, to which he is simply subject, the only possible law he could be subject to is just to act only on maxims which he could make or will to be universal law, i.e., the CI. VII This gives us that freedom of the will consists in the capacity of rational agents to act on the CI--and we succeed in rationally determining our own wills when we are guided by the CI. Well, assume that this is what freedom is. Why should we suppose that we are free in this sense? Here Kant makes a bold claim: "Now I assert that every being who cannot act except under the Idea of freedom is by this alone--from a practical point of view--really free." (448) A presupposition of this claim is that we (rational agents) cannot, in fact, act except under this idea. Is this true? It might be. Ask yourself: can you act without believing that you have some reason for doing so?