Philosophy 361 Ethics Darwall Fall 1996 KANT V I Suppose someone were to argue concerning the fourth example (423) of the Universal Law Formulation CI that he is prepared to will that all act on the maxim of helping others only when it is in their own interest. He might be sufficiently securely set up that it would pay him on balance for all to act on this maxim since he would forego having to help others and would almost always be able to get whatever help he needed by paying for it (of course, there may well be kinds of help he might need that cannot be bought). It would seem, then, that, while it might be wrong for some people to refuse to render aid to others unless it was in their interest (because they could not rationally will that all act on the maxim), it might not be wrong for a person such as we have just considered. This seems a troubling result. Ultimately, we will be able to see that the CI may not entail it. A first step is to consider the End-In-Itself Formulation, bearing in mind that Kant thinks all the different formulations are equivalent. II "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end." (429) What does this mean? (a) First, Paton points out we would probably do better to substitute "rational nature" for "humanity." The context suggests that it is by virtue of being rational beings (i.e. by having a will--"a power of determining oneself to action in accordance with the idea of certain laws, i.e., a capacity to act on reasons or principles) that human beings are entitled to be treated always as ends and never as means only. (b) Second, Kant says not that it is wrong to treat others as means, but that it is wrong to treat them simply as means, or as means only. But what does this involve? III The intuitive idea is one that has been incorporated in moral common sense: persons are not mere things or instruments; they have a dignity (434f) that is worthy of respect.. They cannot, therefore, be treated as objects to manipulate or use for one's own ends; they must always be treated with respect for their nature as rational and moral agents. It is wrong simply to use people; rather one must respect their dignity as persons. But this is still pretty metaphorical, we need a clearer interpretation. IV Before we proceed, however, we might consider how Kant proposes to ground the CI's second formulation. Where does this idea fit into Kant's moral philosophy? Is it an independent premise? Or is it based on other ideas we have already encountered? The root idea, again, is that the same features that make human beings subject to the moral law (their having a will or capacity to act for reasons) at the same time entitle them to respect as beings with their own wills and own reasons for acting. Put another way, the capacity for autonomous self-directed living makes one subject to the moral law but it is also true that the moral law itself requires a respect for that very capacity--we must respect it in ourselves and in others. A. Now one way that Kant seems to argue at 427f is somewhat as follows: 1. Moral imperatives are categorical imperatives. 2. Any imperative that is conditional on some end "that a rational being adopts arbitrarily" is merely hypothetical. 3. The possibility of a categorical imperative depends on there being some end which is essential to practical reason. 4. The only possible such end is rational nature itself. Rational nature would have to be an end in itself in that it would have to be its own end. "Suppose, however, there were something whose existence has in itself has an absolute value, something which as an end in itself could be a ground of determinate laws; then in it, and in it alone, would there be the ground of a possible categorical imperative." "Now I say that man, and in general every rational being, exists as an end in himself" (428) "Rational nature exists as an end in itself. This is the way in which a man necessarily conceives his own existence: it is therefore so far a subjective principle of human actions. But it is also the way in which every other rational being conceives his existence on the same rational ground which is valid also for me; hence it is at the same time an objective principle; hence it is at the same time an objective principle" (429) 5. There can be categorical imperatives only if rational nature is an end in itself. 6. There can be moral imperatives only if rational nature is an end in itself. Therefore, there is a moral law only if it has as part of its content that persons be required to respect rational nature as such. B. There is another route to the same conclusion that proceeds through the Universal Law Formulation: 1. Each rational agent necessarily regards his own rational nature as an end in itself. [To see the force of this, ask yourself if you can contemplate living, but not as a rational agent, without the capacity to direct your life by values and reasons that make sense to you.] 2. But a person's capacity for rational agency is vulnerable to whether others treat it with respect. [To see the force of this, recall what it is like when you go home to your parent's house and they treat you as though were not "your own person" but still subject to their direction. The point is that it may be difficult to retain a lively conception of your own personhood if it is systematically denied by others, just as it is difficult to maintain the view of oneself as, say, not fat, if everyone tells you you are.] 3. Therefore we cannot rationally will that others contemn or slight our rational personhood. 4. But we can rightly act only on maxims on which we can will all to act. [universal law formulation] 5. Therefore we must respect the rational personhood of ourselves and others. V But again, what does this involve? What is it to respect the rational nature of persons? Well, it involves respecting the capacity of all persons to act on their own principles or reasons. That, after all, is what Kant takes practical reason to be. We get some help from Kant's examples. It is wrong to make a lying promise to another to induce a benefit from him (second example), because this treats his will as a mere instrument. "For the man whom I seek to use for my own purposes by such a promise cannot possibly agree with my way of behaving to him, and so cannot himself share the end of the action." But does this mean that we cannot ever rightly act towards other people in ways that do not advance their ends also? In what sense must others be able to share our ends? Suppose a person is convicted of a crime and the judge proceeds to sentence her. Is it necessary that the judge be advancing the prisoner's ends in sentencing. Suppose she protests: but I don't want to be sentenced, and if you sentence me you will simply be using me for your (and society's) ends. One possible way of intepreting Kant here would be to say that it is necessary that the principle on which the judge acts in sentencing be one that it would be reasonable for the prisoner to accept as well. That is, even though the prisoner does not want herself to be sentenced, she may not be opposed to there being laws, indeed she may well prefer this to anarchy-- criminals are only rarely anarchists. So she would will the principle, even if she is not very happy about its application in this case. So one way of interpreting Kant would be to say that we treat others with respect for their rational nature, their capacity to act on principles, when the maxims or principles on which we act, are ones which they would rationally will to be universal law. VI This interpretation faces a number of problems. A. First, is there any reason to think that there are principles on which it would be rational for all persons to will all persons to act? If not, we may face the problem that there are insoluble moral dilemmas-- since the agent is also a person whose rational nature he must himself respect, if there are conflicts between what he and an affected other would rationally will as universal principles, then he may act wrongly whatever principle he acts on. B. Second, Kant is often interpreted as saying here that persons can never be used as mere means, whatever the circumstances. So, for example, it would be wrong to treat someone as merely an unwitting instrument (say to lie to him) for an end, however good. But is it clear that it could be irrational for anyone to will that everyone act on a maxim licensing such treatment? Could it really be irrational, say, for a person to prefer the destruction of one person, even himself, say, if it was necessary to save the world