Philosophy 361 Ethics Darwall Fall 1996 KANT IV TEXT ANALYSIS PROJECT FOR 11/6: Groundwork, pp. 114-6. ****************************************************************** ****** I Last time we saw how Kant argued (at 400-402) from premises about the good will and the moral worth of actions to a formulation of the Categorical Imperative: "I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law." In this lecture we will focus on this principle II To begin, we need to understand Kant's general distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives. By an 'imperative', Kant means a proposition about what a person ought to do. "All imperatives are expressed by an 'ought'. By this they mark the relation of an objective law of reason to a will that is not necessarily determined by this law in virtue of its subjective constitution." (413) Some 'ought' claims are hypothetical in the following sense: they indicate an action as the best (or the only) means to an end the agenthas. Thus: "if you want the shortest route to Flint, you ought to take U.S. 23." A hypothetical imperative is not simply a conditional 'ought' . The following is a categorical:. "If you have promised to go, you ought to go." Hypothetical imperatives merely indicate an action is (most) consistent with a given end. Genuinely willing (as opposed to idly wishing) an end is being prepared to take some means to achieve it. If the only means to achieve A is B, then consistency requires that if one wills A one should will B. But, unlike a categorical imperative, a hypothetical imperative carries absolutely no implication that one ought to do B, even if, oddly enough, one wants to do A. What it says is that you cannot (consistently) both will A and not will B. But, of course, one can satisfy that demand by simply renouncing A as end. You could decide not to go to Flint. Categorical imperatives, on the other hand, say what, under certain circumstances, one ought to do. Thus, unlike a merely hypothetical imperative, one can conclude from them that, if the circumstances obtain, one really ought so to act. Part of what Kant means in the Preface by the 'absolute necessity' he says is an essential component of our ordinary idea of moral duty or obligation, is that, as we ordinarily think of them, moral 'ought''s are categorical imperatives. III But what are our moral duties? What laws bind all rational moral agents? That is what the little argument that we looked at last time was supposed to answer. The moral law is that which the good will is guided by. Since the good will can be guided by no end external to action which it can only bring about as result or consequence; and since practical reason does not provide us direct insight into our duties (recall the passage from 402 we looked at last time: "without having as its base any law prescribing particular actions"--i.e. practical reason does not directly tell us: don't lie, cheat, steal, etc."); the good will can only be guided by the very idea of universal law. And this requires commitmet to the following principle: "I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law." (402) So, the moral law, i.e. the law to which all rational moral agents are subject as such, must be this principle. Kant calls it the Categorical Imperative (henceforth CI). Any specific duties we have, then, must derive from it. IV Actually, Kant believes that the CI can be formulated in several different ways, at least four, as Paton counts them [Kant apparently counts three, see below]: a. The Formula of Universal Law (and Law of Nature) (420,421) b. The Formula of the End in Itself (429) c. The Formula of Autonomy (431) d. The Formula of the Kingdom of Ends (433) We will be concentrating on three of these: a,b, and d. In interpreting each, we should note that Kant thinks of them all as different formulations of the same underlying idea: "The aforesaid three ways of representing the principle of morality are at bottom merely so many formulations of precisely the same law . . . ." (436) V The universal law formulation. "Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." (421) "Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature." (421) A. N.B. Kant does not say: do something only if you would be willing for everyone to do that specific action. Rather he says, act only on a maxim if you could will that everyone act on that maxim. Recall that by maxim Kant means a principle that includes the agent's motive or reason for acting. Whenever a person acts intentionally, she does so because of various features of the situation that constitute her reason for acting. These can be expressed in a principle of the form: if A, B, C, etc., then I will do X; where A, B, C, etc. are whatever circumstances her intention to do X is conditional on. B. We are then to ask ourselves whether we can (in some appropriate sense yet to be determined) will that the world be such that everyone is motivated in precisely this same way in precisely the same situations. Thus, there are two steps. First, we consider what we are proposing to do and for what reasons (i.e., on which maxim). Second, we consider whether we can will that everyone act on that maxim. If we cannot do so, we ought not to act on it ourselves. We must find some other maxim, one that passes the test. C. Kant thinks there are two kinds of case where one could not will that everyone act on one's maxim. i. Cases in which there simply could not be a world in which everyone acts on the maxim because everyone's trying would be destructive of everyone's continuing ability to do so: "Some actions are so constituted that their maxim cannot even be conceived as a universal law of nature without contradiction." (424) ii. Cases where one can conceive of a world in which everyone acts on the maxim, but where one cannot consistently or rationally will such a world. In either kind of case, the maxim will fail the CI test. According to Kant, it would be wrong to act on a maxim of either kind. VI Kant gives examples of both kinds: i. His second example: a person proposes to make a promise he doesn't intend to keep to pay back money in order to meet a need of his own. He must consider whether he could will a world in which everyone is motivated in precisely the same way. Kant claims that he cannot since it is only possible for people to promise in the first place if there is sufficient trust for others to believe that the person promising intends to keep his promise. But a world (otherwise like our own) in which everyone acted on this maxim would be a world in which such trust will not exist. Therefore it is impossible even to conceive of a world in which everyone acts on this maxim as though by a law of nature; therefore it is wrong to act on this maxim oneself. a. How far can this argument be taken? Would no maxim licensing a false promise, in circumstances of extreme need, say, be such that it could be willed to be a universal law? b. How much of this example depends on the special "institutional" or "practice" features of promising. What if there were an evil practice that would similarly be destroyed by intentional departures from it? Would Kant's theory enjoin against that? c. What if someone were convinced that promising was, in fact, an evil institution? Should Kant's argument have weight against him? ii. Kant's fourth example: a person proposes not to come to the aid of others because it is not in his own interest to do so. He then asks whether he could will a world in which everyone is similarly motivated. Clearly he can coherently conceive of such a world, so this kind of case is different from the first. But can he rationally will that everyone act on this maxim as though by a law of nature? It seems he cannot, because in willing that he act on the maxim, he is willing that his own interest be promoted, but in willing that everyone act on the maxim, he is willing that his own interest not be promoted ["since many a situation might arise in which the man needed love and sympathy from others, and in which, by such a law of nature sprung from his own will, he would rob himself of all hope of the help he wants for himself." (423)] Thus his will is in conflict with itself. Query: must we assume here that his interests are likelier to be promoted in a world in which people are motivated to help others in distress than in a world where they are not? Will this always be true? What if, given knowledge of his own relatively secure position, a person could rationally will the latter rather than the former world, but if he were ignorant of his privileged position would rationally prefer the former to the latter? What should we say then? Note that Kant's example 2 also illustrates the idea of a contradiction in will. The person (in the example) who makes a lying promise uses the trust of others and the practice of promising for his own ends. But would these ends by promoted or harmed by everyone's making such promises? If the latter, then he cannot rationally will that world and also will that his own ends be promoted by his making the lying promise. Therefore, it is wrong for him to make a lying promise to advantage himself.