Philosophy 361 Ethics Darwall Fall 1997 KANT II I. Kant argues for two fundamental claims. First, as we began to see last time, that moral imperatives are categorical imperatives, grounded in what he calls the Categorical Imperative (or CI). This argument, in Chapters I and II, takes place wholly within moral thought, beginning with premises Kant claims to be fundamental to the moral point of view. His second claim, is that any free rational agent is also committed to the CI by the logic of her deliberative thought. Kant advances this argument in Chapter III. We might think of the first argument as having a hypothetical conclusion: if anything is morally right or wrong, then it is by virtue of (moral) norms that bind all rational agents. The second argument aims to conclude the antecedent of conditional. Any rational agent is, indeed, bound by the CI. II We begin to get the flavor of Kant's view right at the beginning of Chapter 1: "It is impossible to conceive anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be taken as good without qualification, except a good will." (393) Some remarks: A. Note Kant's contrast between good will, which he also refers to as a good of character, and, respectively, talents, temperament, and gifts of fortune. On what grounds are these, and their value, distinguished? 1. The contrast seems to be between what the agent directly controls (his intention and effort to realize them) versus what is part of the choice context that confronts him. We are free to be good--not just what we do, but also, what principles we act on is up to us. 2. The distinction in value: A. The latter are not always good, and whether they are good depends on other things, importantly on whether they are accompanied by a good will. B. The value of the good will is not qualified by its relation to anything outside of it. Its value is independent of context and entirely unconditional. B. Is Kant right that the value of good will is unqualified? 1. Note that Kant is not saying that a good will always realizes good results, or even the results it intends. Rather, his claim is that the inherent value it has is not in any way compromised or qualified by these external factors. Thus (394): "Even if, by some special disfavour of destiny . . . this will is entirely lacking in power to carry out its intentions; if by its utmost effort it still accomplishes nothing, and only good will is left [n.b.] (not, admittedly, as a mere wish, but as the straining of every means so far as they are in our control); even then it would still shine like a jewel for its own sake as something which has its full value in itself. Its usefulness or fruitlessness can neither add to, nor subtract from, this value." 2. Consider what Kant says about happiness (the utilitarian candidate for the only intrinsic good): its value is qualified by context and external conditions. (393) C. Although we don't yet know what Kant means by a "good will", we can conclude that he means to refer to the preeminent value of the rational moral agent. Thus he identifies will with practical reason (412). And a central thesis of the Preface is that all moral laws apply, at their most fundamental level, to all rational agents. Good will essentially involves the character and activity of a rational moral agent. D. And, its value, which is the only unqualified value, is an inherently moral value. It is a value which can only be realized in moral agency itself. Thus Kant concludes: "A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes--because of its fitness for attaining some proposed end: it is good through its willing alone--that is, good in itself." (394) And because its goodness is entirely intrinsic, and unconditioned by context, it is good without qualification. III It follows from Kant's concept of will [(412): "Only a rational being has the power to act in accordance with his idea of laws--that is, in accordance with principles--and only so has he a will."], together with his conclusion that the value of the good will is realized through its willing alone, that good will involves acting on a particular principle or "maxim" [Kant's word for the agent's principle or reason for acting]. A moral agent of good will, Kant thinks, is committed to act only in ways that are consistent with, or required by, the moral law. Here we have Kant's famous doctrine that actions with genuine moral worth are done from the motive of duty. His idea is that an action cannot manifest the distinctive value of good will, the preeminent (unqualified) value of moral agency, unless the agent performs it out of the motive of duty--unless the agent does it because he thinks he morally should. IV N.B. Kant is not saying that an act is a duty, i.e., something the agent ought to do, and would be wrong not to do, only if it is performed out of the motive of duty. He can't possibly be saying that because there could be no distinction between acting in accordance with duty and acting from the motive of duty, unless it were possible for an action to be a duty, to be something one morally should do, without its being done from the motive of duty. One can do the right thing for the wrong reasons. Rather, the claim is that an action can be the right thing to have done without realizing the distinctive value of moral agency. That is because this distinctive value of the good will can only be realized by acting for certain reasons (on certain principles), specifically, only by doing what is right because it is right. V An easily accepted example of Kant's claim is the case of the grocer and the inexperienced customer. Assume it would be wrong to try to take advantage of inexperienced customers. Still, a shopkeeper may pursue the morally correct policy (charging all the same price) for various reasons. If he does so only out of self- interest, then his action will not have genuine moral worth, since it does not express good will. If, however, the shopkeeper pursues this policy because he thinks it morally correct to do so, then his action has moral worth. VI Now it might well seem that Kant's claim that the goodness of good moral character is intrinsic and unqualified does not entail that that only actions done from the motive of duty realize this distinctive, unqualified good. One might think, for example, that some other motive is unqualifiedly good--love, for example--and that action realizes this distinctive moral value, not when it is motivated by duty, but by love. We need to think through why Kant would reject any suggestion such as this. And to do this, we need to consider what he says (398) about the person who benefits others simply because she wants them to be happy. Here it is useful to compare what Kant says about morally worthy action expressing good will (which is unqualifiedly good) and being done from the motive of duty with Paul's encomium to love in his letter to the Corinthians. We shall discuss next time why Kant thinks that love cannot be the fundamental moral motive.