Philosophy 361 Ethics Darwall Fall 1997 GILLIGAN II I At the end of last time, we asked where Utilitarianism would fit in Gilligan’s categories. It may seem inappropriate to locate it in the ethics of rights, since rights are fundamental for the utilitarian. Moreover, one plausible way of thinking of utilitarianism is as arising out of a kind of equal caring for the fate of all sentient beings. To see that this may not be right, consider her analysis of Amy and Jake's responses to Heinz's dilemma. Jake gives something like a utilitarian, or more generally, consequentialist, analysis of the problem. Amy, however, refuses to analyze the problem as having fixed parameters set by the situation as Heinz finds it; she sees it as nested in a complex of relationships, all of which are continuously negotiated and renegotiated. Consider how Gilligan describes their differences on p. 31. This seems to amount to the difference between seeing the issue as (1) (a) fixed by the general features of the situation to which a more or less determinate answer should exist, where (b) the problem can, in principle, be thought about, and perhaps solved, impersonally as a problem of impartial judgment, versus (2) (a) a problem that arises within a network of particular relationships to particular people, and (b) which can be thought about, and solved, only by working within those relationships themselves, and not by impersonal, disengaged thought. II This, then, is the deepest challenge posed by Gilligan's work. On both modern traditions we have examined, Kant and Mill, ethical thought aims to be impersonal, or, at any rate, impartial. The moral point of view is disengaged from any particular relationships to particular others, whether to family, friends, or any particular community. With Aristotle, things are less clear. In any case, the challenge of the "different voice" to modern orthodoxy in moral philosophy, at least, is that by making impartiality fundamental, it disengages ethical thought from any location situated within relationships to particular others, and thus alienates the moral self from particular others. Morality, then, becomes an obstacle to genuine relationship, rather than an expression of human relationship. III We must be careful to understand the precise nature of this challenge. A. First, as we have seen, if the challenge is that the more orthodox voice assumes a conception of the moral person as distinct from others, and seeks solely to protect individuals from each other, say, by a system of rights, then its target seems pretty restricted. Most obviously, utilitarianism, and arguably, even Kantianism, would not be its primary concern. Consider Kant on treating others as ends in themselves. B. Still, while Kantianism urges that respect for others requires positive efforts to aid, and not just forbearance of harm, it might nonetheless be argued that there is an important distinction between respect, on the one hand, and concern or care, on the other. For one thing, to care about another person it must matters to you what happens to him/her, even independently of what you do. Not so with respect; it shows itself in conduct. You can respect persons in your conduct, treat them never simply as means, even if you care not a whit for what happens to them through natural causes. C. But Utilitarianism itself seems to be challenged. Granted, it can be based on care and concern, but by extending it to every creature who can have a welfare, it seems to have no place, at least at a fundamental level, for the particular carings or concerns that constitute the specific relationships we have to particular others. In the context of these relationships, we care about the particular other, about, say, Madge. And we care about her not because she is a person, sentient being, or human being-- we care about her because she is Madge. This is the kind of concern the ethic of care seems to voice, not simply an impartial equal regard for the interests of all. D. Here again we need to be careful. The point cannot be that utilitarianism, or even Kantianism, has no place for this sort of particularistic concern. 1. First, both a utilitarian and a Kantian can well argue that, given human nature, it is a good thing that people give weight to the interests of those with whom they share ties of friendship and family that they do not give to the interests of stranger. For various reasons, a practice rule, permitting, or even requiring, this may maximize utility, or be the object of rational choice from an original position. 2. Indeed, we can even imagine it to be the case that someone like Mill might argue that the happiness of human beings partly consists in flourishing human relations. Still, on these traditional views, the justification for giving expression to concerns for particular others--to a concern for Madge--will be derivative from an impartial principle. To this the partisan of particularistic concern may object: particularistic concern is itself fundamental to ethics, not derivative. IV But is it clear that there is a conflict between the ethics of care and ethics of rights? Or, is it possible that these are complimentary views? Is there, for example, a clear conflict between Jake and Amy? Or are there approaches reconcilable? Note that Jake focuses on an answer or solution to the problem, while Amy focuses on process. Do we know, for example, that Amy would disagree with Jake’s analysis that life matters more than property if she were convinced that everything possible had been done to consult with all parties and that, nonetheless, the situation remained without a solution to which all parties could agree? Likewise, do we know whether, if his attention were drawn to the issue of process, Jake would not have agreed with Amy's remarks about that? One possibility is that there are just different issues here. Notice that were Heinz, his wife, and the druggist to consult together, they would still face the problem of what should be done. Mutual consultation may be necessary to solve their problem, but it isn’t sufficient. Another way of suggesting the complementarity of the ethics of care and of rights is to notice that it might be argued that neither universal principles nor the kind of empathetic and sympathetic insight afforded through particularistic care can be dispensed with. In a slogan, principles without insight born of empathy/sympathy are empty, and empathy/sympathy without universal principles is blind. Principles are of no help by themselves, since we have to understand the nature of the situation we are confronting and frequently it requires empathy/sympathy even to “get” what is at issue, what the situation is like for the persons facing it, what feelings are involved, etc. And vice versa. V Finally, note that it is possible to think of both utilitarianism and Kantianism as deriving from the sorts of particularistic emotions and concern that characterizes the ethics of care. A. We have all had the experience of responding with sympathy to another person. This is a response to the specific person. It is not as if we must first see the person as an instance of a more general kind--creature who is capable of feeling pleasure or pain--and then respond to the person under that category. We respond directly to the person. And in doing so we come into some kind of relationship to that person. Still, even if this is a response to a particular person, it is an instance of a kind of response that we can have to creatures more generally. Roughly: our capacity to come into this sort of relationship to a particular person is an instance of general capacity that can be engaged with, in principle, any particular person. Moreover, because we can see ourselves in this way as well, we can come to see all humans, say, as having a commonality, as all potential fellows, as fellow human beings. We might see all sentient beings as fellows. We might then feel an equal concern for all (as fellows). Voila! Utilitarianism. If we arrive at utilitarianism through the second line of thought, we do so in a way that derives (impartial) concern for all from the sort of concern that is voiced by the ethic of care. And the impartial concern that is derived is not that of an impartial judge, but that of an impartial member. We begin with the ethic of care and then extend it to get utilitarianism. B. Similarly, we might think of Kantianism as an extension to any person of the sort of respect that one can feel for a particular person. As an illustration, consider what it is like to have a vivid experience of someone as a person whose dignity demands respect. Suppose you are a parent who, complacent in your authority, have become overbearing and self-righteous with your emerging adolescent. For a while, your child has just been taking it, but this time you’ve gone too far, and your child upbraids you, saying something like. “You treat me as if I were an irresponsible boob. But the fact is that I’m just like you, and you don’t like it. I’m just as responsible as you are, and you’re a hypocrite to pretend otherwise. You wouldn’t stand for me to treat you the way you treat me. And you have no right to do so.” You might be brought up short by such a remonstrance. Indeed, the blood might rush to your face as you recognized the justice of your child’s charge. In feeling shame, you also feel respect for your child. Your shame consists in recognizing yourself through the eyes of your child. And to do that you have to acknowledge the authority of your child’s view. You have to see him as having the standing to evaluate you, as someone whose view of you is to be taken seriously. Moreover, in recognizing the justice of his charge, you must also be seeing your child as having the standing to lodge the claim he makes against you. In seeing him as having the standing to make the claim to respectful treatment, you see him as someone who can demand respect. As with sympathy, your attitude is directed at an individual person, your child. It is him, in particular, whom you are experiencing as having a dignity deserving respect. And if you are moved by what he says to reflect on and change your conduct towards him, your changed conduct will express respect for him individually. At the same time, however, what it is in or about him that warrants your respect is nothing unique to him in particular, but something he shares with any rational agent. So although respect is individual-regarding, it is also implicitly general or universal. When you reflect on your respect for your child, you must admit that is based on nothing that distinguishes him, in particular. Respect involves recognizing an individual’s dignity or value in himself, but it is grounded in features a person shares with any other moral agent. So just as utilitarianism can be seen as extending to all sentient beings (as equally warranted) a sympathetic concern that is directed at particular individuals, so likewise can Kant’s ethics be viewed as extending to all persons a kind of respect that is directed at particular individuals also.