CRITICAL READING ASSIGNMENT FOR 9/19
J. S. Mill, Utiliarianism, Ch. II,
paragraph. 20
"The same considerations dispose of another reproach against the
doctrine
of utility, founded on a still grosser misconception of the purpose of
a
standard of morality, and of the very meaning of the words right and
wrong.
It is often affirmed that utilitarianism renders men cold and
unsympathising;
that it chills their moral feelings towards individuals; that it makes
them
regard only the dry and hard consideration of the consequences of
actions,
not taking into their moral estimate the qualities from which those
actions
emanate. If the assertion means that they do not allow their judgment
respecting
the rightness or wrongness of an action to be influenced by their
opinion
of the qualities of the person who does it, this is a complaint not
against
utilitarianism, but against having any standard of morality at all; for
certainly
no known ethical standard decides an action to be good or bad because
it
is done by a good or a bad man, still less because done by an amiable,
a
brave, or a benevolent man, or the contrary. These considerations are
relevant,
not to the estimation of actions, but of persons; and there is nothing
in
the utilitarian theory inconsistent with the fact that there are other
things
which interest us in persons besides the rightness and wrongness of
their
actions. The Stoics, indeed, with the paradoxical misuse of language
which
was part of their system, and by which they strove to raise themselves
above
all concern about anything but virtue, were fond of saying that he who
has
that has everything; that he, and only he, is rich, is beautiful, is a
king.
But no claim of this description is made for the virtuous man by the
utilitarian
doctrine. Utilitarians are quite aware that there are other desirable
possessions
and qualities besides virtue, and are perfectly willing to allow to all
of
them their full worth. They are also aware that a right action does not
necessarily
indicate a virtuous character, and that actions which are blamable,
often
proceed from qualities entitled to praise. When this is apparent in any
particular
case, it modifies their estimation, not certainly of the act, but of
the
agent. I grant that they are, notwithstanding, of opinion, that in the
long
run the best proof of a good character is good actions; and resolutely
refuse
to consider any mental disposition as good, of which the predominant
tendency
is to produce bad conduct. This makes them unpopular with many people;
but
it is an unpopularity which they must share with every one who regards
the
distinction between right and wrong in a serious light; and the
reproach
is not one which a conscientious utilitarian need be anxious to repel."