Philosophy 361 Ethics Darwall Fall 1996 ARISTOTLE V I Last time we were left with the question what determines the mean, and hence, the state of character that is virtuous. This question is more of a metaethical question than one of normative ethics. And it conceals two different questions, one epistemological and the other metaphysical. The epistemological question is: how do we tell or know whether a character trait is the mean or virtuous one? The metaphysical question would be: what makes it the case that a state of character is a mean or virtuous one? Aristotle says, first, that this state is "determined by a rational principle." We might be able to see our way clear to what he could plausibly mean if we recall if I take it that something is a reason for me to do something, then I must think that it would, similarly, create a reason for any person relevantly like me. Similarly, if something has an ethical property--then that must be by reason of what other properties it has. And anything else which had just those same properties by reason of which it has the ethical property would likewise have the ethical property as well. By saying that the mean is determined by a rational principle, Aristotle implies that the "X,Y,Z" properties by reason of which a given state is a virtue cannot simply be "is a mean state between two extremes," since there is the further question--what determines the mean?--and Aristotle says that that is determined by a rational principle. So what the mean state is will itself depend on its other properties, on its instantiating a general truth of the form: any trait with properties X,Y,Z will be a virtue. III Moreover, Aristotle goes on to say that which state is the mean is determined "by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it." There are two important points here, at least. A. First, it is not enough that certain properties simply be true of the trait, by reason of which it is a mean; it is necessary that these properties be apprehensible by a person of practical wisdom. She has got to be able to recognize the properties and instances of them, and to think, on the strength of a trait's having them, that it is the appropriate mean between opposing extreme vices. It is sufficient, here, that there be a principle implicit or inherent in her judgment of where the mean is. B. The second point, is that we obviously need to figure out what Aristotle means by a person of practical wisdom to see exactly what his proposal about the determination of the mean comes to. To this project we now turn. IV It is in Book VI that Aristotle discusses practical wisdom. He begins by noting that according to his definition of the mean it is determined by the "rational principle" or "right rule" that the person of practical wisdom would use. But he admits that "such a statement though true, is by no means clear," and therefore, "it should be determined what is the right rule and what is the standard that fixes it." And so he launches into a discussion of practical wisdom. Aristotle classes practical wisdom as an "intellectual" as opposed to a "moral virtue" (the moral virtues are what the theory of the mean applies to). So already we have what may seem a puzzle: what determines moral virtue is the principle that would be used by a person with intellectual virtue, with practical wisdom. But what is this intellectual virtue? What is practical wisdom? First, Aristotle distinguishes between two kinds of intellectual activity, only one of which involves practical wisdom. There are "two parts [of the soul] which grasp a rational principle." (1139a 6) One is a purely theoretical contemplation that can be utterly unconnected to action; practical wisdom, however, is about "variable things"; it is about what is to be done. It is, therefore, a certain kind of excellence at deliberation. V What Aristotle goes on to say about this deliberative excellence is complex and complicated, and we can only focus on some of the high points. A. First, deliberation involves a kind of reasoning that is directed at some end. We try to work out the best way of attaining our ends. And the person with practical wisdom must be good at this. But this is only a necessary condition. "There is a faculty which is called cleverness; and this is such as to be able to do the things that tend towards the mark we have set before ourselves, and to hit it. Now if the mark be noble, the cleverness is laudable, but if the mark be bad, the cleverness is mere smartness; hence we call even men of practical wisdom clever or smart. Practical wisdom is not the faculty, but it does not exist without this faculty." (1144a 23) B. Also, Aristotle distinguishes between "making" and "acting". Making is what characterizes the arts or any skill at producing a product or achieving some end beyond an action. A making is purely instrumental. Genuine action, however, praxis, is chosen as an end in itself. Only human beings are capable of praxis, of choosing to do an action simply because it is an action of a certain kind which the agent conceives it to be inherent valuable (noble) to do. Practical wisdom concerns not just excellence at the intellectual activity involved in making, i.e., purely instrumental or strategic thinking, but rather the intellectual excellence involved in praxis, i.e., genuine action. VI But still, what does this involve? If practical wisdom is not mere cleverness, if it requires having the right ends to aim at, and if it involves, especially, having the appropriate distinctively human ends, i.e. those actions we aim at as ends themselves (praxis), then it would seem that the practically wise person must already be virtuous. She must already have the moral virtues (i.e., those relating to character and action) in order to be practically wise. And this is effectively what we find Aristotle saying: "Again, the work of man is achieved only in accordance with practical wisdom as well as with moral virtue; for virtue makes us aim at the right mark, and practical wisdom makes us take the right means." (1144a 5) Practical wisdom can't merely be what enables us to take the right means to any end--that is mere cleverness. It is what enables us to deliberate well with respect to the right ends; but it is moral virtue which gives us those. So practical wisdom would seem to presuppose moral virtue. Moreover, Aristotle says that practical wisdom is a kind of insight or perception. The practically wise person is able to see what is the appropriate degree of passion and the appropriate action in response to it. This suggests that the principle by which the practically wise determine the mean is not a formulation that could be applied by someone who lacked the virtue--it is a kind of sense of what to do. VII But now, this is apt to seem very puzzling indeed. Moral virtue is determined by the mean. The mean is determined by the principle that would be used by a person of practical wisdom. A person of practical wisdom is someone who deliberates well from ends that he has as morally virtuous. This seems a very tight circle indeed. VIII It may help to loosen the circle up a bit to recall that Aristotle also says that "it is thought to be a mark of a man of practical wisdom to be able to deliberate well about what is good and expedient for himself, not in some particular respect . . . but about what sorts of thing conduce to the good life in general." (1140a 25) This gives us the following picture. The practically wise person does not simply deliberate well relative to those ends she has as morally virtuous (e.g. to be brave, just, temperate, and so on), and which she has acquired through upbringing. She pursues these ends for their own sake, and chooses acts of these kinds for their own sake, and chooses for its own sake to be the kind of person who cares doing these kinds of things for their own sake, and so on. But, intrinsically desirable as these specific virtuous actions are, they are not the most final end; that, after all, is the chief good--eudaimonia or a good life. Eudaimonia is not, however, distinct from these excellent, distinctively human activities. Taken together, in some harmonious way, they make up a eudaimon life. (Recall Mill on happiness having "parts" or "ingredients.") But there is still the question of how they are to be fit together to make up such a life. We can take what Aristotle says at 1140a 25 as suggesting that the practically wise person is the person who is able to think well about this very question. He is able to think well about how the different moral virtues fit into a good life on the whole. So, one way of thinking about Aristotle's picture is this. Upbringing by practically wise, virtuous people gives a maturing young adult, say, the right ends to be aiming at, the ends that specify the different moral virtues--courage, temperance, etc. Having these is a prerequisite for acquiring practical wisdom itself. And we acquire practical wisdom by doing something like what Aristotle himself does in his Ethics, and what his students do in listening to him. Not just anyone is in a position to engage in ethical thinking of the sort Aristotle undertakes in the ethics ("Hence a young man is not a proper hearer of [Aristotle's] lectures." (1095a 1) They do not yet have the "starting points" for ethical thought and discussion, which they can have only if they already have the right habits and have internalized the moral virtues. But once an adult has these, she can then reflect on the place of the various virtues in the good life. This will presumably be a matter of mutual adjustment--e.g. what we judge courageous depends on what goods we think are worth withstanding danger for, and this will not be independent of the other virtues (e.g. what justice is and when it is worth withstanding what dangers for, etc.) The practically wise person, then, would be a person who develops a conception of the good life within which the distinctively human excellences are harmoniously fit.