Philosophy 361 Ethics Darwall Fall 1996 ARISTOTLE I I Both of the systematic ethical philosophers we have considered to this point, Mill and Kant, belong to the modern period. ["Modern philosophy" is usually marked as beginning with Rene Descartes, whose Meditations was published in 1641. Modern ethical philosophy begins with Montaigne and Hobbes (Leviathan,1651)] And Mill and Kant share certain common assumptions and approaches as moderns that are importantly lacking in the ethics of the ancient Greeks, including Aristotle. A. One notable feature of the modern period is the development of a certain conception of morality, a set of universal norms of conduct that: (a) regulate self-interest for mutual advantage (on the assumption that unregulated pursuit of self-interest would be mutually disadvantageous) (b) in a way that is expresses an impartial, equal regard for all persons. This "modern" conception of morality is a successor to the Judaeo- Christian notion of a divine law that binds all souls. B. Another is that the moderns accept the empirical methods of modern science (beginning with Bacon, Boyle, and Newton) and want to achieve an understanding of ethics that is consistent with the worldview of modern science. C. A third is the rise of the idea of the liberal democratic state, and the idea that the state must be justifiable to its citizens on equal terms without any premise that some lives are inherently better and more noble than others. II We may briefly consider Mill and Kant from this perspective. A. Mill is something of an exception to this because of his doctrine of quality, but generally the utilitarian tradition treats each person's preferences equally and does not take a view about which preferences are really worth satisfying and which are not. And morality, for the utilitarian, has the goal of promoting the greatest happiness of all, counting each person for one and no more than one. B. Kant's theory has something of the same "liberal" structure. All ends other than the distinctively moral end of rational nature itself are merely "nonmoral" and can generate no categorical imperatives. They are all ultimately reducible to the agent's own happiness. Morality, on the other hand, is constituted by an equal regard for all as rational autonomous agents, and this end, and this end only, is fully obligatory. II An important theme is that there are two different standpoints on our lives: (a) what is nonmorally valuable (for us) and (b) what we ought to do morally. III This modern "liberal" conception of morality has recently come under criticism: (a) Some argue that the liberal conception of morality is distortedly individualistic. Concern for a shared communal order, only comes in if individuals happen to care about it. Moreover, according to liberal theories, moral thinking proceeds from a perspective that transcends any actual community. To think morally is not to think as, say, a Catholic, a Frenchman, or even, as a human being--it is to think from a perspective of impartial equal regard for all persons (or all creatures who have a nonmoral good). But to think in this way, it is argued, is to be alienated from the connections and shared communal meanings that are necessary to realize what really matters in human life. It is to abstract ethical thought from its proper place, engaged within actual relationships and actual communities. (b) Others argue that the modern idea of morality focuses too much on acts (on the question, what is the right thing to do?) and not enough on character, feelings, and the emotions (c) And some argue that the very idea of morality is fatally flawed. They maintain that either Kant or the theological voluntarists are right about what kind of philosophical foundation morality would have to have to be vindicated, but deny that it can be given such a foundation. IV It is no coincidence that many who make these criticisms look to the ancient Greeks, and, especially, to Aristotle, for contemporary inspiration. A. Aristotle wrote under very different social and political conditions than characterized the early modern period. The Athenian city state was hardly at its peak during Aristotle's life (384 B.C.--322 B.C.), but it was still more a community of shared values. Writers in the early modern era had just come through a period in which many had fought and died for conflicting religious beliefs and where the problem was how to conceive of a moral order between persons who were deeply divided on these matters. Aristotle, on the other hand, writes as though a consensus on what matters in life is much likelier, at least among those he is willing to take seriously. B. The modern conception of morality plays no apparent role in Aristotle's thought. The word 'moral' certainly appears in our translation of Aristotle's text, but it simply carries the meaning of anything relating to character in the broadest sense. C. Aristotle's major question in the Nicomachean Ethics-- is what is the good, or the chief good? The modern distinction between moral and nonmoral good plays no role in his thought. He is simply concerned to discover the good. D. Finally, unlike at least Kant, Aristotle does not distinguish sharply between science and ethics. In trying to discover what is the good for human beings, he is not asking an ethical as distinct from a scientific question. According to Aristotle, we do not know the nature of a thing until we know its final cause, what end it tends to realize. Ethics seeks to discover the good or end of human beings, our final cause, what it is we are really aiming at or are for in life. This would not be a discovery of what we ought to be as opposed to what we are since, according to Aristotle, our end is implicit in what we are. In this we are like all natural creatures--to have an Aristotelian nature is to have an end or final cause. V Aristotle begins, then, with the question of what is the chief good for human beings. "If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this), and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for at that rate the process would be empty and vain), clearly this must be the good and the chief good." (1094a 17-20) How is he reasoning here? We can't simply conclude from the truism that all chains of desire must end somewhere or other that they must all end in the same place, that there must be one chief good. It is consistent with the premise that they all end, but in different places. Moreover, Aristotle himself must be willing to accept that if there is a single, chief good, that must be consistent with there being a number of things that are desired in themselves and for their own distinctive reasons. He announces a major difference with Plato, who held all good things were so by virtue of their relation to a single Form of the Good, that "of honour, wisdom, and pleasure, just in respect of their goodness, the accounts are distinct and diverse. The good, therefore, is not something common answering to one Idea." (1096b 24-26) Perhaps his thought is something like this. Even if there are several distinct final ends (ends desired and desirable for their own sakes), there must be some basis for deciding what to do when these conflict. If there is to be some basis for thought and action in the case of conflict, that must be in virtue of some overarching conception of a most final, or chief, good. "Will not the knowledge of it, then, have a great influence on life? Shall we not, like archers who have a mark to aim at, be more likely to hit upon what is right?" (1094a 21-24) VI Aristotle remarks that there is broad agreement that the chief good is eudaimonia, which Ross translates happiness, but is better understood as flourishing. And there is broad agreement that this consists in living and doing well, but beyond that there is not general agreement [Note, by the way, the methodological role that consensus itself plays in Aristotle's thought--he is always taking seriously what common opinion is trying to develop his own view dialectically within it.] A. Among the common views are that a flourishing life consists in pleasure, honor, and virtue. Aristotle will argue that the last is correct, and that properly appreciating that can explain what is superficially attractive about the other two views. Particularly interesting is his argument that when we want honor what we really want is to deserve honor. B. In addition to these dialectical arguments, Aristotle gives a general, positive argument for the claim that the good life is a virtuous life in Chapter 7. This is the famous "function argument" which we will discuss next time.