Philosophy 152 Philosophy of Human Nature Darwall Fall 1996 Plato V I How does Plato's argument that justice is intrinsically good respond to Glaucon's challenge? II What about the following objection: Yes, of course, it is good in itself to be guided by reason, but why suppose that reason directs us to do things that we usually consider just, e.g., keep promises, respect other people's rights, and so on? Couldn't reason direct us to pursue our own enlightened, long-term interest? III How might Plato respond to this objection? What about the following response? You say that reason directs us to pursue our own enlightened, long-term interest. But the rational judgment that there is reason to do A is not the same thing as the judgment that doing A is in my long-term interest. This is shown by the fact that I can know that doing A is in my interest but still ask (or even doubt) that I should do A. So it is not enough to know that something is good for me to know that reason directs it. I must know that what is good for me is good absolutely. Now, it may of course be true that what is good for me is good absolutely. But is that any likelier to be true thatn that what is good for you or for anyone is? It is hard to see how it can be. So if what is good for me is good, then what is good for others is likewise good. One way of putting Glaucon's challenge is that everyone thinks that only their own good matters for what they should do. This response to the challenge is that their own good matters (is good) only if the good of others is likewise good. So the good of others is no less intrinsically good than one's own good. What do you think of this response to the objection?