Philosophy 152 Philosophy of Human Nature Darwall Fall 1996 HUME III (For next time: read Loptson's chapter on Marx, pp. 120-136) I Why should we be virtuous according to Hume's picture? A. Hume faces this question on p. 215: what is the "interested obligation" to virtue? B. His response? i. p. 216: "But what philosophical truths can be more advantageous . . . " What is he appealing to here? What are the "charms" of virtue? What about the "companionable" virtues? ii. p. 217, the problem of the "sensible knave" II Fully to understand the knave's challenge, we must grasp Hume's views about justice. A. Justice, unlike benevolence, is not a natural, but an "artificial" virtue. i. There have to be certain natural conditions for justice, or a conception of justice even to arise. a. Not too much bounty or too much benevolence b. Not too much scarcity or too much ill-will ii. And even when those conditions arise, the virtue of justice depends on the existence of certain conventions. For example, there is no "natural" property. Respect for property presupposes the mutual acceptance of certain rules that establish ownership. Hume believes that under usual human conditions, people can recognize it to be in their mutual interest to establish and follow these rules. They communicate to each other the intention to follow these rules, conditional on others following them also. And this creates the virtue of justice: the disposition to follow these rules so long as others do also (note the difference between this and the disposition to follow these rules so that others will do so also). III Now reconsider the problem of the sensible knave.