Philosophy 152 Philosophy of Human Nature Darwall Fall 1996 HUME II I Hume's naturalistic theory of ethical judgment A. Involves natural psychological mechanisms i. association of ideas ii. sympathy B. These combine to generate judgments of vice and virtue i. When we contemplate a character trait or motive, we naturally think of the usual consequences of this trait or motive. ii. When these consequences involve people feeling some way or other (pleasure or pain) we will find ourselves thinking of these. iii. Through sympathy or what Hume calls "humanity," those ideas will give rise to comparable feelings in us. iv. This will then be approbation or disapprobation for the trait. We will thus, through our sentiment, judge the trait to be a vice or a virtue. II Notice an analogy between ethical judgment and color judgment (an analogy Hume elsewhere draws). Just as having a certain color is being such as to look that color to normal observers in good conditions, so being a virtue or vice is being such as to cause approbation in normal human "observers" in appropriate circumstances. What about this analogy? III A problem, how to regularize to "appropriate circumstances." A. The "general point of view" B. Sympathy and the formation of a social standard IV So why should we be virtuous according to this picture? A. Hume faces this question on p. 215: what is the "interested obligation" to virtue? B. His response? i. p. 216: "But what philosophical truths can be more advantageous . . . " What is he appealing to here? What are the "charms" of virtue? What about the "companionable" virtues? ii. p. 217, the problem of the "sensible knave"