Philosophy 152 Philosophy of Human Nature Darwall 1996 DE BEAUVOIR IV New paper deadline? For next time: read, from The Second Sex, pp. 20-37. I Questions about the Loptson chapter? II Last time we were exploring the nature of gender. Unlike sex, gender is not a biological concept, it is rather a social or normative concept. A society has a notion of gender when the standards and norms accepted in it differentiate on the basis of sex. For example, if its standards of vice and virtue hold that a certain trait would be a virtue in a man, but not in a woman, or vice versa. A person who accepts such standards will have various standards for herself as a woman or as a man. If we consider these standards as an observer, from the outside, we will be considering gender as a social concept. If, however, we accept (or reject) such standards, then we will be considering gender as a normative concept. III So we considered whether there might be traits that actually are "gender virtues." The suggestion was made that there might be if evolution selected for different traits in males and females, say, for greater aggressiveness in males. Suppose this evolutionary hypothesis is true, what would follow from it? IV We also wondered, but did not pursue whether the very idea of gender implies domination. Or whether the idea of gender would have arisen in human history but for the subordination of women. Let's come at this from a different angle today, however, to transit to De Beauvoir's ideas about gender. Consider the phenomenon of eating disorders to which adolescents and young women seem especially prone in our society. Suppose we asked what explains why this phenomenon is so much likelier to occur with females than with males. Would this help us understand the notion of gender? V There is a natural connection here to the conception of gender that De Beauvoir suggests in The Second Sex.