The Fourth Meeting of the Permanent Monitoring Panel on Terrorism (PMPT) took place in Erice on 18-22 May 2005, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Ahmad Kamal.

The list of participants is attached at Annex A.

The Panel received messages of support containing substantive suggestions for its work from H.R.H Prince Hassan bin Talal of Jordan, and from H.E. Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, former Secretary General of the United Nations, both of whom were unable to attend its session due to prior commitments. The full text of these two messages is attached as Annex B and C.

The participants recalled and reiterated their continuing conviction that the objective of these PMPT meetings was to respond to the planetary emergency of terrorism and to mitigate its dangers through an approach which was scientific, comprehensive, complementary, and interdisciplinary, by availing themselves of the intellectual resources of the World Federation of Scientists and its members for the objective of achieving world peace, and that this would require the application of a scientific approach to all the different aspects of the subject, including an examination of the contributing factors, and an evaluation of the responses.

Within the parameters of its overall objectives, the Panel considered and adopted the reports of its two sub-groups on, namely,

- the Motivation Aspects, under the Chairmanship of Lord Alderdice.
- the Mitigation Aspects, under the Chairmanship of Dr. Richard Garwin.

The reports of these two sub-groups are as follows:

**Report of the Sub-Group on Motivation Aspects:**

The sessions of this sub-group were marked by a particular richness in the material prepared and presented, as well as by genuinely open and candid discussions among the participants. The papers circulated during the Meeting represent the views of their particular authors, but this report as a whole has been accepted and adopted by the participants as a concise record of the work of the group.
Opening messages from H.R.H. Prince Hassan bin Talal and the former Secretary General of the United Nations H.E. Boutros Boutros-Ghali had set the scene by mapping out the current context of international crisis in which the use of terror has assumed such a central role. They pointed away from mere dependence on physical force as a source of human security, welcoming an application of science to the understanding of underlying causes, and appealing for inclusivity, respect, dialogue, mutual understanding, democratization, and the rule of law in addressing the problems.

Dealing with motivations is a long term project and what we would wish to do may sometimes prove difficult if not impossible. Some of the proposals from the previous year were unable to be progressed because of difficulty in accessing sufficient funding. Others required the participation of groups or individuals whose involvement raised practical or other problems. Nevertheless there was a significant widening in the profile of participants from previous years and the papers and sessions did much to build on the foundation of the substantial understandings achieved in previous years.

It was again noted that terrorism was not a new phenomenon and not confined to one cultural, religious or geographical context. We discussed at some length the relationship between terror intentionally inflicted by state actors and terrorism espoused by weaker players as a tactic in asymmetric struggles, and noted that one could scarcely be fully understood without reference to the other. The profound economic and human costs, not least on ordinary people, were underlined along with the threats to respect for international law and the system of multi-lateral relationships which had contributed to global stability over the previous half century and which were now at profound risk. The paradoxical outcome and counter-productive results of security measures and other actions were also identified in a number of presentations. (Terrorisms; Point to Ponder - Senator Khurshid Ahmad)

From the perspective of individual and group psychology, terror describes a state of inordinate fear which, as it escalates beyond what can properly be imagined, disrupts the capacity for rational, reflective thought and produces responses which are generally more primitive and based on emotional reactions. Terror is beyond apprehension or mere fear and seems to be generated by the prospect of profound physical, social or psychological damage, especially the threat of annihilation. If unmitigated the result in an individual or group is regression or the stripping back of functional capacities layer by layer. The act of terrorizing (however it is produced) conveys a deep indifference to the humanity of the victim rendering spurious such higher functions as values, morality, meaning and truth. The resultant envy and the hatred which is mobilized may damage the capacity for differentiation, and symbolization and the language of communication may be lost. The conditions are laid for a profound corrosion of the personality or group characteristics, with extreme violence including the annihilation of the self and the other. A biological analogy might be that of the auto-immune system turning itself against the body. The feeling state associated with terror and the response to it is one of shame and humiliation. (Terror, Terrorizing and Terrorism - Paul Williams & John Alderdice: Killing for a Cause I the frightening phenomenon of terrorism, The 2005 Lionel Monteith Memorial lecture - The Lord Alderdice FRCPsych.)

While these phenomena can be observed in various contexts our focus is on that of politically motivated terror and terrorism engaged upon and experienced by groups rather than individuals. Most terrorists who have been studied (including captured and would-be suicide bombers) do not show significant individual psychopathology or
sociopathy. This has often been interpreted as meaning that they are operating on the basis of ‘rational strategic decisions’ at least by their community or leaders. Sociological research material presented to the group suggested that people in these categories showed a commitment to decisions based more on sacred (but not necessarily religious) attachments, core values, and issues of principle over against instrumental influences. These people were not only or even mainly making the key decisions on the basis of rational economic or what would commonly be regarded as instrumental ‘best interest’ principles. The obverse of this is that symbolic interventions may be the most powerful ones in contexts of conflict and violence and that traditional economic interest calculations of how to defeat an enemy may sometimes be counter-productive. Again data was adduced which tended to support these hypotheses. In the case of those who became involved in terrorist activity from the Muslim diaspora the evidence showed that economic deprivation per se was not the key factor, and that personalised friendship and kinship networks (increasingly mediated by the internet), rather than traditional top-down leadership, was the evolving mode of operation. (Sacred Values, Terrorism and the Limits of Rational Choice - Scott Atran: Global Network Terrorism - Scott Atran)

Detailed analysis informed by political science revealed that while political opponents may often assume that their enemy is stupid, superficial, wicked or unthinking, on the contrary their actions may be informed by a long-term strategy based on an internally consistent model or ‘master narrative’ intended to deal with anxiety, for example fear of the loss of hegemony. The research points to the existence of two prevailing and globally consequential ‘master narratives’ with two distinct and opposing sets of prognostications on motives/root causes and mitigations, authored by two mutually exclusive epistemic communities and their constituencies. The current crisis began to develop before 9/11 as the motivating effects of the two World Wars and the subsequent Cold War slipped into history. A revolution in communication, travel and skills has massively increased the ‘actor density’ on the global stage. The fading of the distinction between domestic and external, the increasing speed of decision-making, the absence of elite ‘privacy’ for decision making, and the relocation of authority, power and legitimacy away from states have all contributed to a sense of vulnerability in the political elites. This has resulted in a shift away from the post-war paradigm, at least as it had come to be widely understood. It is arguable that the post-imperial and apparently more inclusive nature of international relations had sat uneasily on an unchanged ‘Westphalian’ substrate. The fact is however that the relations between society and the state have changed and individuals empowered by the technologies of communication and violence are more than ever before in history negotiating, through their words and actions with the states, locating their own loyalty and implementing strategies for confronting the conditions perceived by them to be oppressive and intolerable. This is not to say that what terrorists do is right or justified – absolutely not – but it is to say that there may not be such clarity in the real world of state-society relations as once pertained. The “War on Terror” is thus more in the nature of a long-term organizing principle than a conventional purposive conflict. (Motive, Mitigation and Normative Dissonance: The Erice Dilemma - Mohiaddin Mesbah)

In the later stages of the Cold War, the World Federation of Scientists at Erice played a role in identifying the potential costs of the nuclear threat as an organizing security principle – the costs being especially catastrophic in the event of them being used (Mutually Assured Destruction). The question is whether it is possible now to fulfil a similar role in assessing the cost/benefits of the “War on Terror”, or (perhaps more analogous with the Cold War) the potential cost/benefits of a confrontation on the issue
of nuclear proliferation in the present. (End of the Longest War - Munther J. Haddadin; In Contempt of the NPT - Alastair Crooke)

The problem with a strategy of defeating enemies rather than winning friends is that it stimulates the very radicalisation which has produced the enemies. (Making the Palestinians Ñ Diët - Alastair Crooke) This radicalisation also has the capacity to reproduce its own mirror images and so amplifies the problem. Radicalisation is not restricted to any one community, nor is it restricted to those who actually undertake violent action, indeed radicals are often opposed to the violence which is done in their name. So the question arises – “What makes the difference between radicalism of thought and violent action?” - after all, most religious leaders seem to be clear that the writings and timeless principles of the major faiths (Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity and Islam) should not properly be interpreted as maintaining an encouragement of, or justification for violence. These religious views have been present for many centuries and the plurality of faiths, ideologies and cultures has not for most of the time resulted in terror and terrorism except where there have been attempts to impose it on others by virtue of superior force. Any such attempts and the disrespect with which they are accompanied may well provoke a violent response as may the perception that all other peaceful options are closed off.

Recognition of the value and humanity of the other, having regard to their human needs and security; providing untied assistance and disaster relief; and engaging in dialogue as the means to addressing disputes are more likely to make matters better.

It is also important to acknowledge the significant differences in interpretation within religious faith communities. These can become fault lines for further division, however they may also, if explored through dialogue, open the door to a global community characterised by pluralist diversity rather than violent divisions. (Dealing with Islam - Pervez Hoodbhoy)

Two of the studies which were presented had been commissioned by previous meetings of the PMPT addressing specific confidence-building measures. Coming out of the 1st meeting was a paper on marking and enumerating casualties rather than disregarding deaths as mere collateral damage. (Counting Casualties: A Framework for Respectful, Useful Records - Baruch Fischoff, Scott Atran & Noam Fischoff) Commissioned by the 3rd Meeting was a proposed mechanism for promising mutual support instead of threatening precipitous massive retaliation against unconfirmed perpetrators in the event of terrorist nuclear attack. (Mutually Assured Support - Baruch Fischoff, Scott Atran & Marc Sageman) There were also oral suggestions to address the key issues of Water, Energy and the Environment.

Proposal for PMPT Meeting in May 2007

In light of the continuing and impending threats, and building on the achievements of earlier meetings and the further progress in discussions this year it was agreed that in 2007 a meeting should be held to address Terror, Terrorism and Radicalisation with particular focus on lessons learned or being learned from the “War on Terror” and on patterns and implications of radicalisation. The purpose of this session would be to explore the proposition that the psychological, social and political ‘reality’ in which each lives is crucial to their reactions. However these studies should not stay on the abstract or theoretical level but address practical matters including symbolic gestures and their context.
It was further agreed that papers for presentation should seek to accompany assertions with the relevant data from which the conclusions have been drawn. Research based on and responding to the various analyses and proposals outlined above and in earlier reports would be welcomed.

It may also be useful to hold a workshop in conjunction with the PMPT meeting in order to maximize the value of attendance at Erice.

Membership of the Sub-Group on Motivation Aspects:
Senator Khurshid Ahmad, John, Lord Alderdice (Chairman), Dr Scott Atran, Dr Bertil Galland, Dr Munther J Haddadin, Professor Pervez Hoodbhoy, Dr Ahmad Kamal, Dr Vasily Krivokhizha, Professor Mohiaddin Mesbahi, Professor Carlo Strenger, Dr Georg Witschel

Report of the Sub-Group on Mitigation Aspects:

Since 2002, the Mitigation Subgroup has considered measures to reduce the impact of potential terrorist use of biological agents against humans; included have been improved air filtration, vaccination, and pharmaceutical intervention against the agent causing the disease or, in some cases, the toxins responsible for severe illness or death. Over the past year, much public attention has focused on pandemic influenza, such as might arise from reassortment of the Type A (H5N1) avian flu that has been spreading from Southeast Asia, but expert consensus is stronger that a flu pandemic is likely than is the judgment that it will derive from H5N1. Even a recurrence or an image of the 1917-18 H1N1 "Spanish flu" that killed some 50 million people worldwide would be a disaster in the modern age of specialization and globalization, and such a pandemic that occurred in the next few years could not be much eased by available stocks of vaccines or antiviral drugs.

Because mitigation of a natural flu pandemic can teach us much about defense against some bioterror agents, because there is a receptive audience to measures against pandemic, and because we have some novel and important perceptions to counter this serious and likely threat to health, life, and society, in the attached paper, "Conquering Pandemic Flu by Practical Measures," we present our analysis and recommendations for countering pandemic flu by nonpharmaceutical means. We speak of an epidemic in terms of a single reproductive actor $R_0$ ("R-naught") and a serial interval $\nu$ ("nu"). For the SARS epidemic, $R_0$ is about 3 and $\nu$ about 8 days. For smallpox, $R_0$ is about 3 and $\nu \approx 14$ days. And for influenza, $R_0 \approx 1.7-2.4$ and $\nu \approx 4$ days. In our paper we take for flu $R_0 = 2$, although we recognize that it will vary from society to society and in various groups within society. Unchecked, an epidemic that begins with $N$ "index cases" would give rise $\nu \approx 4$ days later to $2N$ additional cases, $\nu$ days later to $4N$ more, $8N$ more, and so on, so that after $M$ serial intervals there will be $N (1 + R_0 + R_0^2 + R_0^3 + \ldots + R_0^M)$ cases altogether, until the susceptible population is exhausted and a substantial fraction of the population is resistant or even dead.

The paper proposes a set of practical Personal Protective Measures—PPM— that, in principle and if practiced by almost everyone in the population of a large group or society, could essentially eliminate the damages of pandemic flu in that group or society, by reducing the reproduction factor below 1.0 and thus limiting the number of flu infections per index case to the finite sum of the above series—namely to $1/(1- R_0)$ cases. If such measures reduce an initial $R_0 = 2$ to $R_0 = 2/3$, a 3-fold reduction, each
index case would then correspond to a total of 3 infections—not to 2000 in 40 days and
doubling every 4 days thereafter. To have any prospect of such benefits, the great
majority of individuals must practice modest protective measures; if all complied
perfectly except 33%, the number of cases from index case would no longer be finite.

Even if the efficacy of PPM were demonstrated in a test evaluation, which is not yet the
case, it is clear that relatively few in society would be ready to used such measures if
the necessity presented itself, in the absence of sound information as to what to do and
how to do it. The information does not move itself; major staff resources and effort
would need to be expended to evaluate the effectiveness not only of the PPM but of the
means of communication and persuasion that could be used via schools, place of
employment, clubs, pharmacies, and faith-based organizations to persuade people that
they should equip themselves and practice the PPM.

Pandemic influenza is unlikely to be a terrorist weapon, both because of its potential for
worldwide destruction, even of the society for which a potential bioterrorist some
esteem, but also because it is likely to spread worldwide in any case. Avian flu itself,
in the form that does not spread from human to human, is a more likely weapon of
terrorism, which might be used to do serious damage to the commercial poultry sector
of a target country.

Thus, a successful counter to human pandemic influenza does not eliminate a bioterror
weapon of concern, but the measures that individuals and groups take to protect against
pandemic flu are themselves directly relevant to real bioterror threats such as the
smallpox epidemic that would result from human-to-human transmission in a
population in which vaccination ceased in 1972 when the elimination of smallpox as a
naturally occurring disease was in sight. Furthermore, the availability to individuals
and groups of practical measures such as hand washing, disposable and improvised
masks, elbow bumps instead of handshakes, and improved air filtration, and the
frequent practice of such measures to prepare for an eventual flu pandemic, can provide
effective tools for reducing the incidence of sickness and death from the more
commonly expected bioterror weapons such as anthrax or tularemia. The direct
empowerment of individuals and groups, would be an important supplement to
measures that may be taken by government, such as an alert that bioterror germs may
have been liberated into the atmosphere or building lobby.

There are major differences between protection against pandemic flu and against an
anthrax bioterror attack on a city. Protective measures against diseases without
significant human-to-human transmission do not have the prospect for reducing
casualties by factors of 1000 or more, but only by the protective factor that might be 3
or 5. Against bioterror attack, warning is of greater importance, and those close to the
atmospheric release point may not be able to protect themselves against breathing the
agent. Still, for an attack on a large city, a factor 3 reduction in casualties might save
hundreds of thousands of people. Those who care about mitigating the potential
damage from bioterror attacks should welcome the benefit that would come from a
capability in-being to use personal protective measures against pandemic influenza.

Membership of the Sub-Group on Mitigation Aspects:
Dr. Diego Buriot, Dr. Kevin Clark, Professor Baruch Fischhoff, Professor Richard
Garwin (Chairman), Professor Pervez Hoodbhoy, Dr. Sally Leivesley, Professor Ron
Manley, Professor Richard Wilson.
The papers circulated during the Fourth Meeting are annexed to this Report.

Given the substantive importance of this Report and its Annexes, the Permanent Monitoring Panel on Terrorism agreed that participants would be encouraged to disseminate the Report, in whole or in part, to relevant institutions, agencies, and individuals, in order that it might be widely used and commented upon.

The next meeting of the Permanent Monitoring Panel on Terrorism (PMPT) is likely to take place in Erice in May 2007.
Annex A

List of Participants

Senator Khurshid Ahmad  Institute of Policy Studies
Islamabad, Pakistan
khurshid@ips.net.pk

Dr. Hussein Saleh Al-Shahristani  University of Surrey
Guilford, UK
hussain@alshahristani.com

Lord John Alderdice  House of Lords
London, UK
ALDERDICEJ@parliament.uk

Dr. Scott Atran  Institut Jean Nicod, CNRS
Paris, France and
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, USA
satran@umich.edu

Dr. Diego Buriot  World Health Organization
Communicable Diseases
Geneva, Switzerland
buriotd@who.int

Dr. Kevin Clark  Cranfield University
Department of Environmental and Ordnance Systems
Royal Military College of Science
Swindon, Wiltshire, UK
k.p.clark@cranfield.ac.uk

Professor Adam Driks  Microbiology and Immunology Dept.
Loyola University Medical Center
Maywood, USA
adriks@lumc.edu

Professor Baruch Fischhoff  Social & Decision Sciences Dept.
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, USA
baruch@andrew.cmu.edu

Dr. Bertil Galland  Writer and Historian
Buxy, France
bertil.galland@wanadoo.fr
Professor Richard L. Garwin
Thomas J. Watson Research Center
IBM Research Division
Yorktown Heights, USA
rlg2@us.ibm.com

Dr. Munther J. Haddadin
Ministry of Water & Irrigation of
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
Amman, Jordan
munther_haddadin@yahoo.com

Professor Pervez Hoodbhoy
Physics Department
Quaid-e-Azam University
Islamabad, Pakistan
hoodbhoy@lns.mit.edu

Professor Reiner K. Huber
Universität der Bundeswehr München
Fakultät für Informatik
Neubiberg, Germany
huber@informatik.unibw-muenchen.de

Dr. Ahmad Kamal
Ambassador and Senior Fellow,
United Nations Institute for Training and Research,
New York, USA
kamal@undp.org

Dr. Vasilii Krivokhizha
International Department
Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation
Moscow, Russia
VIKrivokhizha@council.gov.ru

Dr. Sally Leivesley
NewRisk Limited
London, UK
sally@newrisk.com

Professor Ron G. Manley
Defence College of Management & Technology
Cranfield University
Shrivenham, Swindon, UK
ron.gmanley@ntlworld.com

Professor Mohiaddin Mesbahi
Department of International Relations
Middle East & Central Asia Program
Florida International University
Miami, USA
mesbahim@fiu.edu

Dr. Alan Leigh Moore
Redstone Arsenal
Alabama, USA
leigh.moore@msl.army.mil
(via tele-conferencing)
Professor Carlo Strenger
Department of Psychology
University of Tel Aviv
Tel Aviv, **Israel**
strenger@freud.tau.ac.il

Professor Richard Wilson
Department of Physics
Harvard University
Cambridge, **USA**
wilson5@fas.harvard.edu

Dr. Georg Witschel
Federal Government Commissioner for Combating
International Terrorism – Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Berlin, **Germany**
GF-T@auswaertiges-amt.de

Professor Antonino Zichichi
CERN, Geneva, **Switzerland** &
University of Bologna, **Italy**
Distinguished Guests,
Dear friends,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

Allow me to convey my warmest greetings to you and also my apologies for being unable, due to my very busy schedule, to join you in person for this important discussion. I hope, however, in this age of virtual reality to make a contribution from a distance towards a more virtuous reality. In that regard, I commend the Permanent Monitoring Panel on Terrorism of the World Federation of Scientists on addressing these problems and solutions in a rational and practical manner.

I speak to you today from Jordan, which lies at the heart of the West Asia region. West Asia suffers from a variety of internal problems such as human rights abuses, poverty, malnutrition, environmental threats and cross-border crime and terrorism. The region is a chequerboard of economic difficulties, ethnic and confessional tensions, repressive political systems and interstate mistrust. The gravity of political, economic and cultural concerns stands in contrast to the weakness of our multilateral institutions. This creates major difficulties when it comes to generating cohesive regional identity and harnessing collective engagement with external threats. However, the existence of such threats does not detract from the responsibility to devise strategies and reach mutual agreements that will tackle these concerns, promote reform and enhance progressive stability.

Ladies and Gentlemen, when we speak of preventing terrorism, we first of all have to make sure that we put the text in the context. In other words, we should not see acts of violence as isolated incidents but as part of a continuum of human experience. Today, when more and more states have become entwined in a web of mutual vulnerability, international security analysts see the major long-term global conflict as one not between states or civilizations but between an elite and a marginalised majority that is sure to periodically revolt. This issue is exacerbated by the practice of ‘ludism’, that is, the tendency in modern politics to implement measures designed not to address the underlying issues but merely to keep the lid on, dealing with sporadic outbreaks of unrest on an ad hoc basis. In such a context long term control becomes impossible and radical social movements will inevitably be generated. To avoid further proliferation of instability, collective regional and international responses to protect the security and welfare of those in vulnerable societies are imperative.

Fundamentalists on all sides, using literalist readings of holy texts, are choosing confrontation over compromise. Their violence – both conceptual and physical – is a smokescreen for their failure to accept other opinions and identities, or indeed to accept the other within
themselves. Those of every Abrahamic faith – Jewish, Christian or Muslim – who see the world as black and white, rather than a complex and often contradictory interplay of identities, clearly have far more in common than they might care to admit. From their point of view, compromise is nothing but betrayal: Israeli government ministers overseeing the Gaza withdrawal were condemned by far-right Israelis as latterday Nazis, while Arab leaders are passed off as the Pharaohs of a new jahiliyyā.

The problem with such so-called fundamentalist beliefs is that credence in divine authority tends to invalidate allegiance to the secular state. The result is effectively to take the moderate majority hostage, so further undermining the prospects for peace. Across the river Jordan, we see a very paradoxical situation: messianic Jewish settlers seem more concerned with the land that they believe Divine Providence has given them than they are about the State of Israel, while the Palestinian Authority, in its desire for international legitimacy and recognition, appears more concerned about the state than the land it will actually cover.

So how do we deal with political radicalism, extremism, fundamentalism, or whatever we want to call those ideologies that sanction violence in pursuit of their goals? When it comes to Hamas, for example, how do we make them part of the solution rather than the problem? How can we persuade them to evolve from Hamas – from the Arabic for “zeal” – into its mirror image, Samah – “tolerance”?

In the long term, treating Hamas as a terrorist organization meriting a purely military response will only radicalize moderate sentiment and fuel future political violence. When western style democracy is supposedly being brought to the Middle East, it would be hypocritical, not to mention shortsighted, to disqualify them entirely, although the game must have certain basic rules. Can we really negotiate with “terrorists”? So long as we avoid the pitfalls of capitulating or turning them into cult heroes, the answer has to be a cautious yes.

Of course, a purely military cure only exacerbates the illness. Such a policy in Northern Ireland brought the British government precious little decrease in violence for twenty years. As negotiating with terrorists was publicly unacceptable, the first gradual talks were held in secret. Now those same people are within the political fold. The final result? On 29th July last year, the IRA made a firm commitment to non-violent means.

Perhaps this approach can work with Hamas. It might encourage them to temper their highly politicised interpretation of Islam in favour of more subtle and pragmatic political strategies, eventually even decoupling religion from politics altogether. They might even follow the PLO’s own evolution from violent resistance to secret negotiations to the political compromises without which this region is surely doomed.

Ultimately, real security lies not in military strength but in the legitimacy given to those who feel excluded from the political process. If this reduces the immediate possibility of a western style democracy, then it does at least increase the chances of creating a national consensus as the necessary first step to a more inclusive society and eventually halting the march of fundamentalism.

In the UK, meanwhile, the Oxford Research Group has done extensive research into an alternative strategy towards extremism and terror, particularly when it comes to breaking cycles of violent revenge. This strategy consists of five principles. One, avoid violence wherever possible, as it gives militants easy justification for their own campaigns. Two, show respect and cultural understanding, since shame and humiliation are powerful drivers of political violence. Three, “deep listening”: creating spaces for people to humanise their relationships, and to move beyond demonising the other, as in both South Africa and
Northern Ireland. Four, engage civil society, which has a vital role in minimising violence. (It is a shocking statistic that in modern wars and political violence, more than ten civilians are killed for every combatant.) And five, involve women, who can play a key role in defusing terror networks and promoting more effective ways to achieve change.

With the stakes this high, we all have an interest in promoting political participation over terrorism. After all, there are different grades of Islamist, from jihadi anarchists to relative moderates like the AKP party in Turkey. The AKP’s reforms show how mainstream political participation and the quest for power bring compromise: to acquire and maintain power in a democracy, it had to adopt a more centrist position. The responsibilities of power also force Islamists to prove the validity of vague slogans like “Islam is the solution”. As for Hamas, even Israeli commentators like Shlomo ben Ami admit that if it were allowed to operate within a legitimate political space, its agenda would be reformist rather than revolutionary. Let’s hope it can step up to the challenge.

The flashpoints of indiscriminate terrorism in recent years – from Kenya, Tanzania, New York, Washington, Bali, Istanbul, Madrid, Sharm el-Sheikh and London to here in Amman – are ample demonstration that hard security measures remain necessary in a world where ease of transport and communication increase vulnerability to terrorist groups. However, hard security measures can never be 100% watertight, and attempts to achieve this often exacerbate the underlying problems. Knee-jerk measures to restrict individual movement and reduce civil liberties risk perpetuating a vicious circle of action and reaction. This is why hard security can only work as a subordinate part of an overall strategy to tackle root causes. Since there will always be those for whom an end justifies a means, an integrated strategy cannot claim to eradicate all forms of non-state violence, but it would help significantly to reduce preventable bloodshed. The emphasis here is on crisis avoidance and ‘soft pre-emption’ on the basis of understanding the conditions that lead to violence.

In dealing with terrorism, then, we can speak of hard and soft security. The question is about finding a balance or complementarity between the two, so that one doesn’t cancel the other out. Excessive hard security measures can easily backfire by undermining attempts to generate goodwill amongst populations, especially those traumatized by recent conflict or political violence. For Harvard professor Joseph Nye, a pioneer in this field, hard power can come at the direct expense of soft power, such as in the Soviet Union’s invasion of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. As he puts it: “Imperious policies that utilised Soviet hard power actually undercut its soft power.” It is therefore vital to achieve a reciprocal correlation between hard security measures and a predominant ‘soft security’ vision based on human integrity.

The main thrust of soft security is to empower those who might otherwise turn to violence in order to hold a stake in their own future and have their voices heard. Such inclusion and engagement is pivotal in overcoming the frustration and hopelessness that precedes violent outbursts. Democracy and healthy civil society are key frameworks for accountability and peaceful difference, although they are not necessarily sufficient to completely eradicate all forms of violence. It is a mistake to view democracy and terrorism as logical oppositions, particularly when societies are prone to sham reforms or figleaf measures. Nevertheless, there is a strong nexus between peace, security and development which underlines the importance of addressing basic human needs. Overcoming unemployment, poverty, corruption and legal illiteracy are key factors, as are the requirements of good governance, merit-based social mobility, education, healthcare and housing.
Human security is not just a political palliative; it is an ethical enterprise. It is based on the values of solidarity, mutual respect, openness, dialogue, transparency, justice and equity. Since these values are found in different forms in every culture and religious tradition, they need not appear like threatening new ideas imposed from outside. As human security can be implemented most effectively at local or community level, governments must be ready to devolve some power to internal partners. Durable reforms and development must be seen to come from the right actors; if they are perceived as being imposed from outside they are less likely to work in the long run, and may paradoxically provide pretexts for repression.

Resolving non-state violence resulting from interethnic political disputes, however, depends on peaceful conflict resolution and transformation. In these instances it is the conflicts themselves, beyond the internal politics of the parties, that must primarily be addressed. Democratic reform on one or other side, while helpful and desirable in achieving representative leadership, will not necessarily lead to resolution of the conflict. Methods of conflict transformation and post-war reconciliation include the establishment of centres for listening and documentation (CLDs); ensuring full representation, including that of women and moderate religious leaders, in discussions over reconstruction and reconciliation; combining military and civilian peacekeeping; establishing a permanent and neutral Peace and Security Commission under the auspices of the United Nations; trauma counseling; avoiding unnecessary use of violence; third-party intervention and reducing weapons exports.

There is no quick fix solution to the problems of intra-state and transnational terrorism. However, my practical strategies for implementing an integrated security approach to forestall further acts of political violence would be as follows:

1. **Promoting democracy**: ensure effective participation of all citizens in processes to identify and implement measures that have a direct bearing on their lives. The silenced, the moderate and the young voices must be properly heard. Furthermore, encouraging democratic reforms within other states must be complemented by the idea of democratic relations between states.

2. **Ensuring good governance**: narrow the rhetoric/reality gap, eliminate corruption and poor governance, improve access to health and income-gathering activities, increase public support for those unable to meet their own basic needs.

3. **Empowering civil society**: mobilize women’s associations, professional organizations, private sector, NGOs and academics who can use their skills and proximity to ensure that the concept of human security is owned by local stakeholders. Promote freedom of association and a culture of human security. Allow civil society to create intra-national and intra-regional networks to share experiences and build a coherent future, which are far more effective when conducted in the context of comprehensive reform. Sham institutions that are controlled by governments and have little or no influence on policy and decision-making only cloud the issue and fail to provide alternatives to ‘lidiism’. An initiative started under my patronage in the last few years named MECA – Middle East Citizens Assembly – aims at generating a supranational civil consciousness across the Middle East and North Africa region, all the way from Morocco to Azerbaijan, in which participants even from those states with no official diplomatic ties sit down with each other at the same table.

4. **Promoting education**: this is possibly the most fundamental factor in improving human security, since it ensures awareness among populations of their own history, culture and environment, as well as those of others. Developing curricula for inculcation of knowledge and the practice of human rights and values results in political and economic empowerment
and directly correlates with a better quality of life. Women’s education is especially important, since women tend to suffer more from repression of rights.

5. Establishing a common regional agenda: in this web of mutual vulnerability, international issues must also be considered as domestic issues. Particularly in politically fragmented regions, supranational policies and strategies must be developed to tackle poverty alleviation, productive employment, human rights protection, durable development, economic opportunities and environmental and energy issues, rather than each country viewing these issues merely within their own narrower remit. In addressing human needs it is imperative to go beyond our own specific ‘brand names’ towards a collective view. Environmental and energy issues, for example, are enough to preoccupy us collectively without fighting amongst ourselves.

6. Institutionalizing multilateral cooperation: improve networking and integration between existing global and local institutions, for example in terms of regional human security forums. The complex and interwoven issues of human security require interdisciplinary approaches, albeit without losing focus. Although there is still a long way to go, international cooperation is not a luxury but a necessity.

7. Mobilising the media: to organize awareness and encourage people to explore ways to enhance their own security, and provide forums where ideas, policies and programmes are debated. There they can propose and debate alternative approaches to the common good. Freedom of speech and expression is a prerequisite for efficient citizen involvement in public life.

8. Reconsidering non-interference: cross-border issues, such as forced migration, trafficking and terrorism, problematize the notion of strict respect for state sovereignty. International interference in some form is inevitable; the question is how it is pursued. Many reformists in Arab and Muslim countries argue that intervention in the internal affairs of states in not illegitimate per se, but that recent examples of this operated on false pretexts. Despotic regimes have no inherent right to abuse their citizens’ rights, and it is the international community’s duty to act in such situations. The right kind of interference is that which emphasizes the need for serious dialogue of equals on the basis of shared values and common interests, rather than that which aims to ‘conquer’ the hearts, minds, bodies and soul of a country or region. However, development of alliances and consensus must precede resorting to military or economic actions.

9. Tying energy security to a human vision: energy security cannot come at the expense of reduced human development or increased militarization and economic inequalities. ‘Anthropolicy’, rather than ‘petropolicy’ or pipeline politics, must be the determining factor in long-term strategies. Global partnerships aimed at ensuring sustainable energy, such as the Trans-Mediterranean Energy Co-operation (TREC) or the Community for Water and Energy in the Middle East, have a measurable impact on sustainable development and point the way to equitable and environmentally safe energy production, sharing capital and know-how in exchange for clean and secure energy supply. In areas of conflict, meanwhile, reconstruction of water and electricity supplies are integral parts of the peacemaking process.

10. Durable Development: more effectively underpinned by proper debt relief, trade reform and proper assistance. By the same token, serious action is necessary on climate change, an issue that dwarfs all others in the long term.
11. **Promoting cultural security**: the reasons for paramilitary violence are not always purely political, and economic growth is not the only indicator of a good quality of life. While enablement, social mobility and a merit-based society are important, so is consensus building between adherents of different religious faiths. Initiatives that encourage young people to learn about other people and cultures by analogy, such as the Socrates, Minerva and Erasmus programs, are invaluable in developing better cross-cultural relations.

12. **Developing effective public diplomacy**: it is important to communicate good intentions through developing people-to-people contacts and sharing parts of one’s culture with citizens of other countries through open, two-way exchanges. However, this should not detract from the real issues, which are essentially to do with the facts of the exchange rather than how they are presented. We in the Muslim world could do worse than adapt the “4 Es” policy of Karen Hughes, the US Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy, for our own purposes, these 4 Es standing for engagement, empowerment, education and exchange.

13. **Generating political will**: The key issue is how to generate more effective political will to implement agreed-upon ideas, and establishing what leverage can be exercised other than economic sticks and carrots or the threat of force. The only sensible option to achieve these goals is the use of multilateral forums, despite their inherent problems, as the alternative is continued unilateral militarism.

14. **More institutionalized interfaith dialogue**: Last but not least, we need to work to improve the credibility of interfaith dialogue and bring it to a mass level, rather than allow it to remain purely the activity of a more privileged elite. I have been conducting such dialogue since long before 9/11, when people suddenly began to take such issues as dialogue and cultural exchange seriously once again.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I hope you will find these suggestions useful and practical as a basis for your further discussions. I look forward with great interest to hearing the contributions of the distinguished participants on this topic that is of such importance to us all.

Thank you.
This seminar on the planetary emergency of terrorism focuses on one of the most critical and challenging issues of our times. Nationally and internationally, terrorism poses a direct threat to peace and security, a blatant affront to respect for human rights and the rule of law, and a profound impediment to economic, social and cultural development. In short, it strikes at the very foundations of peaceful, just and prosperous societies.

Terrorism is not a traditional enemy, nor is it a weapon, a movement, an ideology or idea. It is a method, a totally unacceptable method, for pursuing largely political ends. An effective response to terrorism will require action along two distinct but interconnected dimensions. On one side, we must strengthen national and international capacities to prevent terrorist acts and to move quickly in order to mitigate their effects. On the other, we must also confront the root causes of terrorism. While averring that terrorism is never justified, we need to make a sober empirical assessment of the various factors that drive terrorism in particular cases, whether political, social, economic, ideological or cultural. Which of the specific causes can and should we reduce or eliminate? Equally important, we must determine when actions in one dimension may undermine progress in the other and how to strike an appropriate balance, all to ensure a comprehensive, coherent and enduring effective approach.

One essential component of any viable strategy for tackling terrorism over the long term is to promote an alternative method for pursuing political ends, democratic political processes, firmly embedded in a genuine culture of democracy, both within and among states.

Democratization must begin with an effort to create this culture of democracy: a political culture, which is fundamentally non-violent and in which no one party or group expects to win or lose all the time. Such a culture is built at the national level upon a societal consensus not about policy, but about the process and framework of democratic political life: that the will of the people is the basis of governmental authority; that all individuals have a right to take part in government; that power changes hands through popular suffrage rather than intimidation or force; that there shall be periodic and genuine elections, the rule of law and a functioning system of justice; that political opponents and minorities have a right not only to express their views but to have genuine participation in the decision-making that affects their daily lives; and that there can be legal and loyal opposition to the government in power.

Democratization itself is the indispensable process through which the peoples of the Middle East and the world may achieve their aspirations and rightful place in the international community. A democratizing polity can over time bring good governance by holding elected leaders to account for the way they meet, or do not meet, the needs of the people, including minorities and marginalized groups. The process will progressively remove the tendency to express opposition through violent extremism and terrorism.

Democracy as a system of governance can be the foundation for political legitimacy and
internationally recognized statehood, and thus provide the leverage necessary for attaining a people’s interests through cooperative diplomacy, including in the area of counter-terrorism. And democracy is the surest way to bring about social and economic justice, as the people themselves demand that their governments take up policies that serve to reduce inequalities and that help them to lift the burden of poverty.

For all these reasons, democratization can provide a powerful mechanism not only for creating venues for non-violent conflict, political competition and the peaceful resolution of disputes, but also for helping to address the various root causes of terrorism.

If democratization is the most reliable way to legitimize and improve national governance, it is also the most reliable way to legitimize and improve international governance, bearing in mind the substantial differences between the national level and the international level, where there are international organization and institutions, and international decision-making and international law, but no international structure equivalent to that of a state government. Democratization as a process can make international governance more open and responsive by increasing participation, more efficient by allowing for burden-sharing, and more effective by allowing for comparative advantage and greater creativity. Moreover, just like democratization within states, democratization at the international level is based on and aims to promote the dignity and worth of the individual human person and the fundamental equality of all persons and peoples.

Globalization and the new international environmental have strengthened this fundamental link between democratization nationally and internationally. Once, decision-making in global affairs could have only a limited effect on the internal affairs of states and the daily lives of their peoples. Today, decisions concerning global matters carry with them far-reaching domestic consequences, blurring the lines between domestic and international policy. In this way, unrepresentative decisions on global issues can run counter to democratization within a state and undermine a people’s commitment to it. So democratization within states may fail to take root unless democratization extends in some form to the international arena. An important corollary is that it may not be possible to promote democratization by non-democratic or forcible means.

Academia and the scientific community have an important role to play in the democratization process, through encouraging public participation in national and international dialogue on the future, and, even more importantly, in shaping that dialogue and helping to ensure that it is grounded as much as possible in solid evidence and objective analysis. The Permanent Monitoring Panel on Terrorism of the World Federation of Scientists provides an excellent example. I congratulate the Panel on its efforts. And to all participants in this Erice Seminar, I send my best wishes for a most productive and rewarding discuss
List of Papers Circulated at the Fourth Meeting

(a) Personal Note from the Chair – Ambassador Ahmad Kamal
(b) Terrorisms; Point to Ponder - Senator Khurshid Ahmad
(c) Terror, Terrorizing and Terrorism - Paul Williams & John Alderdice
(d) Sacred Values, Terrorism and the Limits of Rational Choice - Scott Atran
(e) Motive, Mitigation and Normative Dissonance: The Erice Dilemma - Mohiaddin Mesbahi
(f) End of the Longest War - Munther J Haddadin
(g) Dealing with Islam - Pervez Hoodbhoy
(h) Making the Palestinians... – Alastair Crooke
(i) Mutually Assured Support - Baruch Fischoff, Scott Atran & Marc Sageman
(j) Connecting the Dots in Global Network Terrorism - Scott Atran, Marc Sageman
(k) Conquering Pandemic Flu by Practical Measures - Richard Garwin
(l) Influenza Pandemic: Predictability and preparedness – Diego Buriot
(m) Maximising pandemic survival in the community: social networks, media and public policy - Sally Leivesley
(n) References and useful websites
As we start our Fourth Meeting, it is perhaps necessary to remind ourselves about the primary and continuing objective of this Permanent Monitoring Panel on Terrorism, and its unique structure and mandate.

As you will recollect, we had originally started debating on the general fringes of the problem after the disastrous events of 11 September 2001. It was not until a couple of years later that it was decided to establish a focused Permanent Monitoring Panel in order to determine whether something could be actually done about the problem, rather than to just continue debating the characteristics of the subject.

The objective of the PMPT then was to apply a scientific rigor, not just in examining a single event in a single country or a single civilisation, but by focusing on the larger topic of Terrorism in a global context, its history, its genesis in different times and places, its motivations, its risk potential, its economic impact, its damage to social structures, and the need for mitigation measures, all this with the objective of finding do-able solutions which could help eliminate or contain it in the future.

We understood very quickly that terrorist acts do not emerge in a vacuum, but that they have deep underlying causes. While the existence of these root causes could not in any way justify the terrorist acts or their tragic impact on the lives of innocent civilians, there was no way in which these underlying causes or motivations could be ignored. It would be much too simple just to point the fingers at others. That was why we divided our consideration of the theme into two distinct but complementary chapters, that of motivations to understand and address the root causes, and that of parallel counter-measures to mitigate the threats.

Neither of these two can stand alone. They are complementary, and have to be followed side by side. The unfortunate tragedy of our policies so far has lain in the belief that sustained top-down counter-measures alone can somehow eliminate the scourge. These policies have not succeeded, because they cannot succeed on their own. Even by the most conservative accounts, more than a trillion dollars, and perhaps double that figure, have been expended so far on these top-down measures, and all that has resulted is that terrorist acts have diversified in their geographical reach, in their numbers, and in their intensity. Turning our faces away from root causes, or deluding ourselves that they just do not exist, will only give continued life to the downward slide brought on by this movement.

The PMPT understood the need for complementarity right from the beginning. That in fact was its genesis. We spoke repeatedly of the need to dissect and understand motivations, and even discussed the possibilities of dialogue with the “other” parties. Not with too much success unfortunately.

So far, the PMPT itself has shown a greater output in counter-measures to mitigate the threat, than in actions to address motivations. This may be understandable, because the former area is more “concrete”, and measures are relatively easier to define and fund. It could also be because so much work in this particular area of counter-measures is being done in just one part of the world, and so much funding exists for this purpose, that there is an inevitable temptation to somehow use the PMPT to fit into an existing uni-centric scheme of things elsewhere.
That, unfortunately, runs the risk of devaluing our purpose here in the PMPT. The PMPT is not a simple adjunct to the counter-measures being planned or implemented elsewhere to ensure the security of any one part of the world. The PMPT is not part of the defence of any single civilization, or a party to the much publicised policies of fear and war. Terrorism has affected us all, not just some of us. The whole world is a front-line state, and in all our countries innocent civilians are dying by droves, either from the initial terrorist acts, or from the asymmetric reactions to these terrorist acts.

Part of the problem arises also from the fact that the chapter of “motivations” involves a very long term process. The underlying root causes have long histories in foreign policy formulation, and reversing them and neutralising the damage, may take years. In the meantime, the door cannot obviously be left unlocked with inadequate counter-measures against terrorist acts in the interim. Mitigation measures must continue, but they must be complemented by a start in addressing motivations simultaneously.

Our search then is for do-able solutions to eliminate or contain the scourge globally, with actions to study and address “motivations” starting as soon as possible, while continuing with concrete measures in the “mitigations” chapter, in tandem. In separating the exercise into two sub-groups, we must be careful not to allow either of them to work in complete isolation, but rather so that each may try to constantly understand the needs and plans of the other, with empathy, and with due appreciation. Only a comprehensive and holistic approach of this type can hold out any chances of success. That is the fundamental truth about this PMPT, and about its unique ability to see both sides of the problem, somewhat like a Picasso portrait which highlights both profiles of the same reality. Hopefully, this session might help push the process forward in this fashion.

We have several new participants, most of whom are personally present, and a couple who have not been able to join us today due to their alternative commitments, but who have nevertheless sent us their views in writing. We are honoured to have such messages from H.R.H. Prince Hassan bin Talal of Jordan, and H.E. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the former Secretary General of the United Nations, both of whom have studied the subject in depth, and dealt with it intimately. Let us start with these two messages. Meanwhile, a very warm welcome to each one of you.

Erice, 18 May 2006
1. Terrorism, however abnoxious and revolting, is not a NEW phenomenon. It is an unfortunate fact that there have been serious episodes of terrorism/terrorisms in almost all parts of the world and all periods of history. This phenomenon has not been specific to any society, culture, religion, political dispensation and historical period, ancient, medieval, modern. Similarly terrorism has not articulated itself in any one shape and form. There have been a variety of expressions, hence my preference for the plural: terrorisms. Even suicide missions are not a contemporary innovation. Recorded history of terrorism and terrorist groups goes back to at least the advent of the Christian era. Beginning with the first century Zealot’s and Sicarit’s struggle to liberate Judea from the Roman occupation; the blood-stained dagger play of the Assassin’s in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, through the Jacobit’s blood-bath in the eighteenth century, Russia’s Narodnays Volyel (People’s Will) and Europe’s anarchists in the nineteenth century, to the twentieth century havoc-wreaking violent outbursts of the Armenian Secret Army for ‘the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), the Zionist armed brigades of Irgun, Stern and Haganah Gangs, Ethnikas Organosis Kyprian Agoniston (EOKA) of Cyprus, Mau Mau or the Land and Freedom Army in Kenya, Bader-Meinhof, Red Army Factors, and the 2nd June Movement of Germany, Euzkadi tes Akantasone (ETA) of Spain, Strategy of Tension and Red Brigades of Italy, Marighda of Brazil, IRA and Protestant Volunteer Force of Ireland, November 17 of Greece, Ku Klux Klan (KKK), Free Speech Movement of Berkley, Whether Underground, Christian Identity (Elohim City, Oklahoma), Anti-Abortionists (Rev. Michael Bray) of USA, Lords’ Resistance Army and Holy Spirit Mobile Forces (HSMF) of Uganda, Sendero Luminoso in Peru, FARC in Columbia, LTTE in Sri Lanka, PKK in Turkey, George Habbash’s Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, PLO, Hamas, Islamic Jihad of Palestine, Fidayeen of Iran, Nexalites and a host of others in India etc. etc. bear testimony to the strong presence as well as diversity and spread, both horizontal and vertical, of the phenomenon of terrorism.

Al-Qaeda may be the current symbol of terrorism, but terrorism is a political reality whose presence can be seen in all times and climes. Exclusive obsession with one actor is bound to falsify the whole matrix of perception, analysis, diagnosis and prescription. It is important to look into the entire spectrum of terrorisms and not merely a particular candidate of our choice, if we really want to understand the complex and diverse phenomena that is terrorism.
2. Terrorism, despite being an awesome reality, has by and large remained at the conceptual level, elusive and nebulous. *Dictionary of International Affairs* (Penguin, 1998) captures this situation in the following words:

- “The issue of terrorism has not so far produced a specific prohibitive treaty mainly because of definitional problems associated with political preference. One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter and so international law has not thus far been able to encompass the phenomenon.”

Shimid lists over one hundred different definitions of the term. The UN General Assembly has not been able to arrive at a consensus definition till now. While there is some general agreement ‘that all acts of deliberate violence against innocent civilians and other non-combatants directed towards achieving specific political objectives belong to the genre of terrorism’, there remain serious differences in respect of violent reactions and resistant movements that emerge in situations where processes of peaceful resolution of political conflicts are denied and people are forced to struggle against repression, occupation or aggression. That is why people’s struggle against foreign occupation, even if violent, could not be bracketed with terrorism in any consensus document. The question of state terrorism also remains a bone of contention. There is no reason why the concept should be confined to individual and group behaviour, to the exclusion of state’s use of arbitrary force against its own people and in respect of other nations and peoples. The authority of the state to use force is conditional by legitimacy of actions. As such the exclusion of state terrorism from any conceptualization of terrorism is unacceptable. When there is a situation of foreign occupation, the legitimacy of people’s struggle to seek their right to self-determination and independence cannot be equated with other forms of political violence. Military repression by state authorities in such situations is as much a species of terror. Similarly state actions against its own people that amount to ‘war crimes’ or ‘acts of genocide’ or ‘indiscriminate violence against civilians’ including bombardment of towns and villages and collective punishment and targeted killings and executions cannot be treated as legitimate uses of state power. Aggression against other states and nations (i.e. actions not covered by the U.N. Charter) must also be treated as acts of state terrorism. Respect for the UN Charter and the principles established by the Neuremburg Trials define the corner stones of legitimate state behaviour. A high level UN Panel has in 2004 warned against stretching Article 51 too far. It affirms:

- “Article 51 needs neither extension nor restriction of its long-understood scope…. In a world full of perceived potential threats the risk to the global order and the norms of non-intervention on which it continues to be based is simply too great for the legality of unilateral preventive actions as distinct from collectively endorsed action, to be accepted. Allowing one to so act is to allow all to (emphasis added).”

The Neuremburg Tribunal clearly stated that aggression is “the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole”.

Justice Robert Jackson of the US Supreme Court who was the U.S. Attorney to the Tribunal is reported to have pleaded before the Tribunal as follows:

- “If certain acts of violation of treaties are crimes, they are crimes whether the United States does them or whether Germany does them, and we are not prepared to lay down a rule of criminal conduct against others which we would not be willing to have invoked against us… We must never forget that the record on which we judge these...”

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defendants is the record on which history will judge us tomorrow. To pass these defendants a poisoned chalice is to put it to our own lips as well”.

The principles established at Neuremburg Tribunal that make it binding on state authority to avoid crimes against humanity, violations of fundamental rights, and aggression against other states are more relevant today than they were in mid-twentieth century. Terrorism’s scope cannot be confined to actions of individuals and groups. State’s actions are to be judged on the same touch-stone.

3. Another lesson from history is not difficult to draw. While there have been episodes of terrorism in all ages and all regions it deserves to be noted that every episode had its limited life. This means that terrorism is neither uncontainable nor uncontrollable. Every expression of this phenomena has to be understood in its socio-historical context and appropriate strategies worked out to contain, control or eliminate it. In the last analysis in most of cases terrorism is the end product of the failure of the processes of crisis-management and conflict-resolution in a society. Tit-for-tat strategy has very limited relevance and is rather very costly. It is only by addressing the issue in all its complexity that an affective, acceptable and least-cost pack of strategies can be worked out for its solution. Reactions based on vendetta, arrogance of power and any one-dimensional approach are bound to fail, even prove counter-productive. That is why an increasing number of intellectuals, analysts and strategists are expressing very strong reservations about the U.S. piloted global "war against terrorism" unleashed after the catastrophe of 9/11. It is time to prepare an objective balance sheet of what has been achieved through this strategy and what costs are being inflicted as a result thereof on people in the United States and the rest of the world.

4. It deserves to be noted that the Muslim people in general and leading Muslim scholars and leaderships of Islamic Movements in particular have from day one unequivocally condemned all acts of real terrorism including the 9/11 outrage against humanity. But they, and many others in the world including the United States and Europe, have strong reservations about the global game played in the name of “War against Terrorism”. They regard much of what is being done as no less a crime, resulting in the death of innocent men, women and children in hundreds of thousands. They openly ask the question: Can terrorism be fought by a war, as is being done by the present U.S. leadership? Or does it need a very

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4 It may be instructive to reflect on an interesting observation of a French intellectual, Emmanuel Todd, about the changed Spanish strategy in the post-2004 Madrid tragedy scenario: “I would like to end on a happier note. The Spanish withdrawal from Iraq gives hope. Bush’s drive to war could have produced, was perhaps meant to produce, a vicious circle of ever rising and widening violence. Once the Spanianards, the Italians, the Japanese, the British and the rest were attacked their population would succumb to the logic of infinite war. When the terrorists truck Madrid on 11th March 2004 no body knew how the Spanish people would react. The Spaniards could have accepted the big lie. The idea that the Iraq invasion was intended to reduce the terrorist threat. The Spanish reaction to terrorism could have been a surge of ethnic hatred, and a closer alignment with the US. It is so easy to forget the initial reason for war (in that particular case the non-reasons), and to get trapped into the vicious circle of primitive fighting. Perhaps the First World War is the perfect example. It grew from the rational pursuit of national interests but soon turned into a meaningless bloodbath. The nations of Europe kept fighting years after they had all lost. The opposite happened in Spain. Spanish voters got rid of Aznar. Zapatero withdrew Spanish troops from Iraq and perhaps this will be enough to break the cycle of increasing violence expected by many, hoped for by some. Perhaps we already owe much more to the Spanish people than we know, because to borrow Bush’s rhetoric for a moment, their vote, their decision, truly was a victory of good over evil.”

After the Empire: The Breakdown of the American Order, Emmanuel Todd, Constable and Robinson, U.K. 2004, pp 210-211
different and multi-faceted strategy? Is it possible to fight terrorism without clearly defining what constitutes terrorism? One cannot fight terrorism without clearly identifying the object; otherwise one would be chasing only shadows adding to intellectual confusion and political anarchy, producing scenarios of greater insecurity. Terrorism and every form of resort to force are not synonymous. War under international law is one example, so are genuine liberation struggles. Indiscriminately equating them with terrorism, as is being done in the case of the Palestinian resistance, to give only one example, is not only flawed but counter-productive. To concede to such an outlandish premise would call for re-writing of all history. Even George Washington and Nelson Mandela, would have to be placed in the category of “terrorists”!

Similarly all acts of “so-called” terrorism are not to be put at par. They differ in their nature, context, objectives, and dynamics. It would be a blunder to target terrorism without addressing to the contexts that have led to their emergence, the causes that characterize them, and the injustices and oppressions that have forced the weak to rise. Asymmetry of power and denial of genuine processes of conflict-resolution can be ignored only at our peril. The nature and the extent of a peoples’ agony that prompts them to revolt cannot be ignored; nor do the causes and factors that drive some people to use methods that involve violence to achieve their political objectives.

It has to be acknowledged that there is nothing like terrorism per se. Terrorism is a complex phenomenon and any one-dimensional strategy to combat it is foredoomed to failure. It may even aggravate the situation, as it seems to be our present predicament.

5. Terrorism is primarily a tactic and a means, and not an end. It would terribly confuse the issue if it is looked upon as an ideology in itself, as is being done by certain quarters. There is no denying that there have been treatises devoted to justifications for the use of such tactics. These works have come from diverse backgrounds, philosophical, political, even moral and religious. From Cicero who is stated to have said “it is a virtue to kill,” through philosophic discourses of the anarchists in Europe, the revolutionaries of the left in Russia (John Most: Revolutionary War Science (1885) to Revered Michael Bray’s A Time to Kill (USA-1980) there is no dearth of literature of this brand. Yet the fact remains that in the final analysis even this diabolical literature in defence of terrorism does not visualize it as more than a tactic – it is not suggested as an end in itself, as an ideology.

In the current debate the perpetrators of so-called “war on terrorism” are trying to confuse and obfuscate by presenting terrorism as an ideology and not a tactic. They try to trace its roots in some “twisted religious concepts.” This may have serious consequences as it may divert the focus of attention from the real causes of terrorism and from the policy parameters that constitute a decisive factor in generating terrorism, to some imaginary concoctions of conflict of values and clash of civilizations.5

Some interesting light has been thrown on the phenomena of suicide-bombing, a subset of terrorism, in a research study by Prof. Robert A Pape of the University of Chicago: Dying to Win, a study based on data relating to all suicide attacks reported between 1980-2003. He states that “the presumed connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism is misleading”. The picture as it emerges from an analysis of the data-profiles built by Prof. Pape is somewhat like this:

“The data shows that there is little connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, or any one of the world’s religions. In fact, the leading instigators of suicide attacks are the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka — a Marxist-Leninist group whose members are from Hindu families but who are adamantly opposed to religion. This group committed 76 of the 315 incidents, more suicide attacks than HAMAS. “Rather, what nearly all suicide terrorist attacks have in common is a specific secular and strategic goal; to compel modern democracies to withdraw military force from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland. Religion is rarely the root cause, although it is often used as a tool by terrorist organizations in recruiting and in other efforts in service of the broader strategic objective”

While it is useful to study the phenomena of terrorism in all its dimensions including the psychological and even pathological aspects of the individual actor, it would be unrealistic not to focus on the political, strategic and contextual aspects. Motivational and bottom-up factors must be studied and analyzed but reductionism that emphasis out of all proportion the ‘pathological’ or ‘economic’ situations, would be flawed, deceptive and unhelpful. Ignoring the core issues and causes that lead to upsurge in violence would be fatal to any realistic understanding of the phenomenon and developing strategies to combat it. Let us face the real issues – they relate to political injustices and sets of policies that have so enraged the people that they prefer death to a life of servitude, ignominy, humiliation and helplessness. Unless this focus changes it is feared “terrorism” and “wars against terrorism” both may continue ad nauseam.

The theories of jihad and concept of martyrdom alongwith the institutions of mosque and madrasah have always been there. Even some “extremist” or “twisted” interpretations have always surfaced in history as is the case with almost all religions, ideologies and socio-political systems. After all, it deserves to be explored as to what is it that leads to the emergence and escalation of the phenomenon of terrorism in the contemporary world, in contra-distinction to rather very long periods of peace, amity and co-existence, despite the availability of these very “texts” and “institutions”?

6. It is also imperative to look into the conceptual, political and humanitarian costs of the present U.S. ‘War against Terrorism’. How many innocent civilians have been the victims of the terrorist’s attacks and how many have been killed as a result of this war against terrorists and in the name of terrorists? Has the war to eliminate terrorists succeeded in weeding them out or has it actually resulted in the production of larger and larger number of “terrorists”? Has America won the confidence, love and respect of the people of the world? How is it looked upon even in the countries it has attacked to destroy alleged terrorists and give their people the gifts of “regime-change” and “nation-building”? Or, has it only led to increase, even explosive increase, in discontent and hatred against America the world over, and made the world on the whole a much more insecure place to live in? What was localized has it not been globalized? Vast political landscapes that were otherwise peaceful have been turned into fertile grounds for the emergence of terrorisms. What was limited to a few orbits of discontentment has been made into a global phenomenon.

7. Some more fundamental issues are agitating the minds of the thinking people all over the world, including the United States of America. What is happening to human rights — particularly the right of privacy, freedom from detention, save through due process of law, right to be treated “innocent” till proved “guilty”, right to defend oneself through lawyers of

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6 Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, by Robert A. Pape, Random House, New York, 2005, p.4
one’s own choice? How many people have been arrested and detained without trial after 9/11? What is the percentage of those convicted by any court of law? How many have been formally charged from amongst those arrested on mere suspicion? Has this not eroded the whole fabric of the rule of law and damaged the fortress of constitutionalism in a number of countries, including the United States? What is happening in the name of “Patriotism” and “National Security” to the civil liberties of the common man and women in general and some targeted religious and ethnic groups in particular in America and a number of other countries belonging to this ‘coalition of the willing’? What new threats are being posed to the values of dignity of man equality of all human beings and their right to be treated according to the law, within the framework of civilized behaviour? Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghuraib and Bagram are not the only festering soars. It is not a fact that “rendition” and “coercive interrogation” have plagued many parts of the civilized world. Huxley’s, Orwell’s and Solzenetsyn’s nightmares of the “Brave new World”, “1984” and the “Gulag” are now haunting the havens of the Free World?

It is also feared that whatever has been achieved over the centuries in the fields of international law and consensus-building on a set of norms of civilized conduct in war and peace is at stake. Basic precepts of law and international law are being rewritten, at least as far as the practice goes, and in a unilateral and arbitrary manner. The powerful are trying to bully and bulldoze others only because they are weak and powerless. Shadows of imperialism and hegemonism are looming on world horizons. National sovereignty no longer seems to be sacrosanct. International borders can be violated with impunity. The U.N. is becoming more and more irrelevant. Mr. Bolton, the U.S. representative at the UN has the audacity to say that the United States has a right to invade Iran whether the UN concurs or not. Unilateral interventions and forced or manipulated regime changes are being sanctified. The very concept of self-defense is being redefined to suit the interests and ambitions of the powerful. Peace and global equilibrium are being increasingly threatened. Prospects of greater and more violent confrontations are on the rise.

Minorities in many parts of the world are being subjected to greater state-repression. ‘War on Terrorism’ is being used by more than one country to suppress their own people. The real list of ‘collateral damages’ of this ‘War’ is assuming menacing proportions.

8. A fundamental question that must be squarely faced relates to the limits of military strategy in the alleged fight against terrorism. Is it really possible to bring terrorism to an end by resort to military force alone? Can this stateless and faceless enemy be chained down in that manner? Is it not time to reflect on alternate strategies addressing to the causes and the factors that breed terrorism? How long are we going to fight the branches while ignoring the roots of the problem? Resistance to OCCUPATION, OPPRESSION and INJUSTICE, is not the real problem – the real problem is OCCUPATION, OPPRESSION and INJUSTICE, which cannot but generate result in resistance. If we target the resistance without targeting the causes, how can we succeed? Focusing on resistance and ignoring the gruesome realities that give rise to struggles for freedom and justice could well prove an exercise in futility. In fact it could be a recipe for promoting terrorism and hatred. It is time to change the focus and address the real issues in a forthright manner. Paradigm change and not marginal changes within the paradigm is the crying need. Logic and not rhetoric should guide our policies. Only then the world may become a more peaceful place for all of us.

9. Finally we cannot afford to ignore another fundamental question relating to the restoration of the rule of law and establishment of a global system based on justice and fair opportunities for all. Conflict-resolution through peaceful means and in accordance with universally accepted processes is a pre-requisite for peace and global amity. In this context the critical issues of globalization and the so-called clash of civilizations too cannot be side-
stepped. Plurality of faiths, ideologies, cultures and civilizations is a reality. It is a reality as old as history. Co-existence, co-operation, and competition between ideas, ideologies and civilizations is natural, even a healthy factor promoting human progress. It becomes a source for discord, conflict, confrontation and war when plurality is not regarded as authentic. Instead, one particular ideology, civilization or political and economic system is forced upon others. If values are imposed on others by virtue of superior power and their resources are aggrandized by manipulation, control or interference this is bound to generate strife, conflict and confrontation. If a hegemonistic order is flaunted on other nations, subjugating other countries and people, this is bound to sow seeds of rebellion, leading to insecurity, destabilization, confrontation, warfare and a spate of terrorism and retaliations.

In the wider context, all men of goodwill should realize that in the current phase of globalization it is only through honest acceptance of each other, respect for plurality of systems, religions and cultures and safeguarding the world from all hegemonistic and colonial adventures that real peace and security can be established on the globe.

Samuel Huntington is credited with the current debate on clash of civilizations. His book is definitely an invitation to such a clash. Yet, there are a few revealing observations in this study which deserve serious reflection. ―Terrorism‖, he says, “historically is the weapon of the weak, that is, of those who do not possess conventional military power”⁷. The message is clear. If the strong are not prepared to respect the rules of law, justice and resolution of conflicts by negotiation and dialogue, terrorism cannot be ruled out. About the alleged clash between Islam and the West he claims:

➢ “The underlying problem in the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilization where people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power. The problem for Islam is not the CIA or the US Department of Defense. It is the West, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the universality of their culture and believe that their superior, if declining, power imposes on them the obligation to extend that culture throughout the world. These are the basic ingredients that fueled the conflict between Islam and the West”⁸.

Huntington is only party right. Islam and the West do represent two distinct civilizations. He is terribly wrong that the two must clash with a view to overwhelm or annihilate each other. Clash is not the natural demand of being different. Conflict and clash arise because the more powerful believe and regard it is their right, an imperative, to use their overwhelming power to impose their values and their rule over others. It is this alleged “obligation to extend that culture throughout the world” that gives rise to clash, not mere fact of diversity and plurality. It is this cultural terrorism that is at the root of current crisis and confusion — pushing mankind towards war, terrorism and bloodshed. If genuine plurality is accepted as the norm, then co-existence, cooperation and healthy competition amongst civilization could become the hallmark of humanity. Operationalization of this vision, the paradigm of pluralism and not hegemonism, can ensure a world order of peace and justice. Then the clouds of clash of civilizations may disappear, and the phantom of terrorism laid to rest. Then only the road to peace, security and prosperity for all can be successfully paved. Has the time not come to think and strive for moving Beyond Terrorism? Can mankind afford to ignore this alternative?

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⁸ibid pp 217-218
Terror, Terrorising, Terrorism

Paul Williams & John Alderdice (May 2006)

Terror describes a state of inordinate fear; of dread that has escalated and intensified to unimaginable proportions. Our conscious, rational thought processes eventually fail to depict it. Metaphor is one way of approaching such an unthinkable state of trepidation; psychic, physical trembling; chaos; anticipation of annihilation, the prospect of being ravaged to the core and extinguished without power to prevent the onslaught. Terror strips us of our capacity to function, layer by layer.

The many levels of experience implicated in terror include conscious panic, the impact of the trauma on the preconscious and unconscious and the drastic consequences for bodily functioning. The effects of terror on the subject are also progressive. Our sense of personal coherence is pitilessly undermined through the dismantling of our capacities and strengths. The objective of such a strategy is ultimately to de-humanise.

Here is an example of intra-psychically generated psychological terror experienced in the transference in an analytic session with an individual. A female patient with borderline psychotic features said the following:

P: "You don't understand. My mother never understood me. When my grandmother was dying, she was very old, I tried to give her the kiss of life. I was breathing into her. I was trying to get her heart going. My mother thought I was hurting her. I wasn't. I wanted to keep her alive, not die. She didn't understand, she just didn't understand. You don't understand (she cried, paused, and then resumed her complaint that I didn't understand her for several more minutes, before suddenly stopping and shouting out, in alarm. The patient then paused and shouted in a terrified way):

You're trying to kill me. (Pause)

A: 'I think you are afraid of what you could do to me if you make demands on me. When you complain about me, as you are doing now, a voice in your head warns you that I will retaliate, even want to kill you. I think that the voice is trying to stop you from letting me know what you're really feeling."

P: (Pause; calmer) It's true, isn't it? People don't like people, they don't, do they? Nobody wants an individual. They can't cope with an individual. I wasn't an individual. It's the only thing I know (long pause). My mother didn't understand me (she paused and shouted again).

You're going to stop my analysis. I know it."

Here, pseudo-hallucinatory voices and psychotic internal figures break through the patient’s sense of reality, creating mental chaos by trying to convince her of my imminent violence. They are organized around a very powerful, psychotic superego committed to protecting the patient from preconceived dangers of dependency on others. From a primitive perspective, the use of terror to perversely ‘protect’ the subject through de-humanisation is deemed legitimate.

Here is another example of psychic terror in which the body as well as the mind plays an important role. A male patient in his 30’s had been violently projected into as an infant by a psychotic mother. A previous baby had died in dubious circumstances 10 months before the patient was born. A subsequent child, 3 years his junior, developed a mental illness. The father, an addict, had died in his forties of a drugs overdose. In analysis the patient became,
for a time, psychotic. At one point in a session he was so tormented by his inability to control his feelings of hatred, ostensibly toward his female partner, that he began to writhe on the couch in evident pain. He twisted and turned, as though unable to contain a mental and physical agony.

Eventually, he rose from the couch, stared at me - or more accurately straight through me - and shouted with primordial hatred:

 règleKeep your platitudes to yourself, you stupid fucking moron.

The patient then fell silent, staggered slowly round the room holding his head, and eventually sat down on the couch, trembling as though on the brink of collapse.

This violent outburst of narcissistic rage seemed to embody a desperate effort to rid himself of a lethal alien presence, through the annihilation of the mental and bodily presence of his analyst. In the process, he himself seemed to fall to pieces. It is as though the patient had incorporated – corporeally registered - the psychological violence done to him as a child by his parents and subsequently by himself. He suffered many terrifying physical symptoms which I came to understand as a form of repetition of these assaults on the psyche-soma.

Terror can arise through external impingement or internally generated (endogenous) trauma, or both. When working with an individual in treatment understanding the interplay between the two, in the transference, is a principal psychoanalytical task. What is, however, striking about all forms of terror is the de-structuring power they exert over our faculties and capacities. Our hierarchy of mental and physical functions is immediately or progressively dismantled and de-graded through the closing off of established means of survival, generating a spiral of fear, rage, humiliation and shame. Witnessing our impotence to protect ourselves as our capacities are denuded is a most toxic inducement of humiliation and shame. The process occurs whether we are the victims of external terrorist actions or whether we suffer a psychotic illness. The dehumanization and degradation that give terror its unique efficacy and toxicity are likely to be responsible for its two most compelling residual mental preoccupations - murder and suicide. The same process of regression takes place in the group which experiences terror. Rational thought gives way to more primitive group processes determined by overwhelming emotions of fear and governed by a different syntax or set of rules, not determined by rationality.

There is much more to say about terror, but now let us turn to the act of terrorizing – in particular, the role of what may be seen as the principal intra-psychic agency employed in the act of terrorizing – the archaic superego or what has recently been called a ‘super’ superego. The fact that this psychotic agency has its origins in the interdependency of sane human beings is of importance in understanding its pathological role. If we reflect, for example, on the fact that pain is pervasive in life, especially in psychosis, then it becomes obvious that pain, biological or psychological, forces us to think about it and to act against it. If we do not, it will persist, and if left unchecked it, or its cause, may ultimately kill us. As clinicians, we have privileged insight into the defences the individual employs against pain. Perhaps the first glimpse we get of our psychotic core, our most radical defence against pain, is in neurotic splitting and projection. Here we see the mind reacting against mental pain through the use of violence against the self. But how does mental pain get to be so great that psychotic defenses come to be seen as a promise of salvation?

We know that an infant’s mind develops by mentally representing internal states, using the mind of another which contains and metabolises the infant’s inchoate experiences.
Recognition of the intentionality of the caregiver’s containing, metabolizing mind permits the infant to establish an internal representation of him/herself as a separate, intentional being with a capacity to address and manage experiences. The quality of the caregiver’s image of the infant is critical for the formation of this representation. Failure of containment and what Bion described as alpha function, that culminates in a breach of the ‘contact barrier’ in infancy, renders the subject vulnerable to excessive permeability. If this continues indefinitely development of the self is massively interfered with leading to extreme physical and mental pain as internalization and representational processes fail. This is the area of vulnerability to psychosis.

Healthy development pursues a different trajectory. Winnicott identified, in a healthy infant’s hallucinatory wish-fulfilments and the need for transitional objects – that is, in the early transactions between infant and caregiver that follow the initial period when mother and baby are barely differentiated - the significance of an emerging space that is employed for symbolisation of the object and of the union of two beings in their moments of separateness. This symbolization of unity with and separation from the object eventually grows into a capacity to use the object. Here we have the emergence of civilization in miniature. Sanity, the location of joy and a love of reality develop in this gap between objects and between mental states that recognize each other – a space where fantasy and reality nourish each other and which becomes the basis for libidinal investment in a sense of inside versus outside. Sick children do not have access to potential space or internal freedom, and as a consequence being alive creates persistent mental pain.

When infants or adults become psychotic they experience good objects and good experiences to be inaccessible or unattainable. This gives rise to some of the most severe forms of mental pain. The situation may be redeemable if the object is experienced as making some attempt to contain and repair the situation.

Such individuals - or groups – cannot bear the experience, or perceived experience, of indifference towards the pain of psychotic anxieties that follow on the loss of the object. This may arise through the continued unavailability of the object. If the ego is forced to give up hope of attaining what it needs then degradation, humiliation and despair quickly follow and a psychological catastrophe is inevitable.

In this situation the subject is susceptible to experiencing the unattainable resources of good objects as being flaunted by their very unavailability. What one could be must, slowly and agonizingly, be renounced as unattainable. The values and morality of good objects come to be seen as perversely and mockingly inflicting unlimited humiliation and shame. Meaning and truth are rendered spurious. Envy may corrode the personality, and the experience of being abjectly excluded can be felt to be final. Psychotic hatred may be mobilized to protect the ego from the re-experience of this pain of mortification. Such hatred may endure, undiminished, for decades.

Another way of describing this disaster is that the ego is obliged to succumb to a superego of inflated proportions and extreme harshness that instigates frenzied, omnipotent attacks against cruel, rejecting, so-called good objects – the very objects upon which the ego depends. These attacks are mounted with no concern for the ego or the subject, ostensible protection of both being the delusional rationale. Intense aggression is mobilized, again apparently to preserve ego functioning, but in practice destroying the capacity for differentiation and any processes leading to symbolization. The language of communication must also be destroyed, and with it the possibility of hope. An analogy might be that of the auto-immune system turning itself against the body.
A situation is brought about in which the conditions for a final solution – that of annihilation – of the self or other or both - are laid.

In the curious logic of psychosis, and, strikingly, of terrorism, we find a parallel phenomenon. It is not a question of conflating terrorism with psychosis, but rather to argue that important structural components are identifiably present in each to the point where it is worth exploring how far the adoption of terrorism may be a symptom of a group phenomenon analogous to psychosis.

One of the most striking of these structural components is the fact that the target of revenge is not the victim – although the victim may suffer terribly: the target is the perceived perpetrator. Whether the victim suffers or not, or even dies as part of the strategy of vengeance, such suffering is of little interest to the terrorist or to the psychotic superego: it is merely a price to be paid in the service of a higher moral cause. The price itself may even be recruited as a rationale for revenge. A decimated bus queue in Jerusalem is a message for the Israeli government, not for the commuters killed and injured, with the fate of the bomber being incidental. Patients who self-harm or who attempt suicide often do so on the basis of fantasies of punishment of the object. Their own suffering is mitigated by its imagined effects on others. Fear of punishment or death may have no influence whatsoever on such states of mind. The suicidal Hunger Strikers in Northern Ireland targeted their deaths purely at Margaret Thatcher and her government, with each death deepening the moral justification for their campaign, from the perpetrators’ perspective. The logic behind many individual suicides carries a similar message - namely: “I will kill the very thing you say you love and in so doing I will show you unequivocally the extent of your failure to love.”

Here is a further example from work with individuals A male in-patient who had made a significant recovery from a schizophrenic illness had begun to make periodic visits home at the weekend, with seemingly minor disruption to his mental functioning. One week in early summer he suggested bringing forward his next trip home to the forthcoming weekend. In a staff discussion it was agreed that this would be safe. Only one person, a new young nurse, voiced disquiet. She was ignored. On the Friday evening the patient left the ward, walked to the railway station adjacent to the hospital, lay down on the railway track and was killed by an oncoming high speed train before anyone could stop him.

The staff were understandably devastated. In a series of meetings that followed a number of signs of rising psychotic anxiety in the patient were identified which the staff, like the patient, had colluded in ignoring. These were linked to a forthcoming summer break in which his psychotherapist and key medical and nursing staff would be away. From the patient’s point of view, it is as though improvement in his condition had begun to threaten him with a fear of the return of the catastrophic losses that had already happened in his infancy, through the anticipated absences of the staff. To the patient’s still actively psychotic superego, murder of the self and its objects was the most suitable countervailing measure to withstand this threat, which the patient both felt and knew that the staff had missed. His reviving sanity was insufficiently developed to resist this terrorization. This type of self-murder would appear to contain both a retributive and a primitive preservative component.

Psychosis, as noted above, is a unique type of thinking in that it can turn against the mind of the thinker and, if unchecked, may destroy it, ostensibly in the service of a higher cause – a fantasy of self-preservation and continuity. It attacks with escalating ruthlessness the remaining intact functions as though attempts by the ego to face up to psychic suffering must be prevented at any cost, even if this requires suicide.
If the individual mind can experience psychosis, then so too can a group mind and with it an entire culture, albeit in different expressive forms. This is because all of us are interconnected and interdependent; we have minds as individuals, but there also exists a group mind. Culture has its origins in the human mind, individually and collectively. Examples of cultural destructiveness are legion, the World Trade Centre bombings being the most graphic. Examples of cultural self-destructiveness that run counter to any rational explanation are also not all that difficult to find – the Taliban’s destruction of their own heritage in Afghanistan is a recent one.

Was the type of de-grading, de-structuring psychological process described above at work in the attempted moral superiority of the terrorists who destroyed the World Trade Centre – that emblem of prosperity that appeared to flaunt across continents its unwillingness to share its beneficence? Was their message: “You, America, who claim to lead the world with your power, wealth and morality, do nothing to understand or help those who suffer unimaginably. Worse, you exploit and destroy them. We will punish your hypocrisy by smashing your hated excesses in a way that you will never forget.”

Why were the Taliban so determined to blow up the statues of the Buddha, knowing full well that governments would have paid them massive sums to save them? Their annihilation of history demanded the murder of these ancient parental figures and of the peaceful reverie and thoughtfulness they embodied. It was as though what the Buddha stands for – understanding, reflection, mutual respect – had become despised as a monstrous affront associated with false promises and lies. It had to be expunged by a ‘higher’ morality supported by a religious violence that blew the ancient world to pieces, knowingly leaving its inhabitants to wander the ashes.

The de-humanising attitude required to carry out these acts is, we need to remind ourselves, not reserved solely for the target. Mercy was withheld towards the indigenous population whom the Taliban represented. This chilling fact is evident in many terrorist organizations, and has been seen in the Maoist insurgencies in Peru and Nepal, the IRA in Northern Ireland and many others. The similarity dynamically to the concreteness and ruthlessness associated with primitive superego functioning is striking.

A thematic trend in Muslim–Western conflicts since the 19th century can be identified in the dangers of ‘temptation’, dangers that uncannily echo the pressures on a superego driven to psychotic thinking. The 19th century Wahhabism movement launched a campaign of purification and Islamic renewal that achieved great influence throughout Arabia, an influence that has endured. Wahhabism rejects Satan; this is its fundamental tenet. The Ayatollah Khomeini designated the USA ‘the Great Satan’: Satan in the Koran is viewed as “the insidious tempter who whispers in the hearts of men”. Satan is not primarily a conqueror or exploiter. He is a seducer peddling promises of political freedom, sexual license, material plenty and technological wizardry.

Wahhabists and their descendants, including Osama bin Laden, criticize the West for humiliating, exploiting, traumatizing and degrading Islam and Muslims through the developments brought about by physical and scientific advances. They see Satan as having gained a foothold from within their midst as a consequence of these advances. The establishment of an Americanised modern state – Israel – in their own heartland is experienced as the most affronting of these assaults.
It is crucially important not to interpret these historical and cultural dynamics in any simple economic fashion. Envy of the West’s wealth does not appear to be primary. Furthermore, evidence clearly demonstrates that terrorist activity tends to emerge not at the nadir of a nation’s misfortunes but when societies are coming out of a history of poverty. It is at the very point of improvement that the situation often becomes vulnerable to breakdown. The Middle East, Chechnya, Bosnia and Kosovo amongst others reflect this. How familiar this idea is in clinical practice! The psychiatrist or psychoanalyst dealing with patients suffering psychosis will be familiar with the risks associated with the beginnings of improvement as psychosis recedes and more neurotic mental functioning is resuscitated. In general psychotherapeutic work, the negative therapeutic reaction is a consequence of similar processes at work. What is at stake in these situations seems to be not so much envy of what others have so much as the ‘stickiness’ of the libido – the mesmeric familiarity with longstanding methods of object relating, including all the ways in which we have learned to deal with ourselves and the other, which are being threatened. This form of loyalty is what makes psychological and social change so difficult.

To recapitulate: it is possible to identify in psychological terrorization and in political terrorism a parallel, triangulated phenomenon: namely, that attacks against victims are designed to affect a different target than the victim. In terrorism, the victim may be the terrorist’s own community or even his or her own body, but the target is ultimately the authority, often a government. This mechanism of triangulation is familiar to psychoanalysis, classically in the conflicts of the Oedipus configuration, but also in the malignant form of triangulation aligned towards incarceration and death rather than freedom and life, which reflects the dynamics of the psychotic superego. The archaic superego attacks its objects and the ego, often at great expense to the subject, with the aim of exacting retribution against the object according to an internal fundamentalist morality.

In addition, both the psychotic superego and the terrorist, whilst in some sense attempting to reform the object by their extreme actions, also seek to provoke the object or authority into over-reaction thereby undermining their legitimate authority and confirming an existing preconception of moral corruption. If the authority in question responds with force in order to deal with the provocation, a dangerous, escalating situation arises. The greater the eye-for-an-eye response adopted by the authority – here George W Bush’s ‘war on terror’ comes to mind – the more the terrorists’ justification for their cause is confirmed and the more vindicated they feel in pursuing their murderous goals.

It is hard for many law-abiding, ordinary people to comprehend that those who engage in terrorism sincerely believe themselves to be entirely justified in their actions. Similar difficulties can arise in trying to understand the position of the suicidal psychotic patient. In both cases it is not infrequent that a terrible wrong – a massive trauma - is being re-dressed from a position of subjugation and weakness, with the subject drawing on reserves of intense aggression at great risk to themselves. These acts may be elevated to a level of moral heroism designed to underline the wickedness of the enemy. The enemy, in turn, may hold precisely the same view but from the opposite perspective.

Any appeal to rational thinking in such a situation will have limited impact. This is why no ‘right plan’ for addressing the content of terrorist or psychotic grievances can in and of itself succeed - such plans are usually met with thinly veiled contempt. The content is no longer the issue; a transformational process is needed to re-structure the very basis of communication.

We need to understand much more of the mental and social consequences of these terrible wrongs, perceived and actual, that human beings are capable of inflicting on each other and
themselves. In the clinical situation many of the causes and consequences that arise in early life are amenable to investigation by psychoanalytic therapy. Perhaps the most important recent development in this area is renewed interest in pathological superego activity as a vehicle for the dehumanization and destruction of life. We could be said to be living through an era in which the ascendency of the superego appears increasingly unchecked and a descent into thinking governed by primitive psychotic processes may be dominant.

If this is true, it is incumbent upon voices of reason to speak out regarding where such activity may lead.

Paul Williams is Psychotherapist at the Centre for Psychotherapy in Belfast, a Training Analyst with the British Psychoanalytical Society Joint Editor in Chief of the International Journal of Psychoanalysis and a Professor at The Queen’s University of Belfast.

John Alderdice is Consultant Psychiatrist in Psychotherapy at the Centre for Psychotherapy in Belfast, an Honorary Affiliate of the British Psychoanalytical Society, a member of the British House of Lords, President of Liberal International and a member of the Independent Monitoring Commission.
A. Introduction: The Power of Faith

Writing in the last century, when the great debates between secular ideologies drove world politics, André Malraux, the legendary French resistance leader, statesman and man of letters wrote: “the next century will either be religious or it won’t be.” Up through the end of the 20th century, few in academia took religion seriously as a prime mover of international politics. In the Middle East, almost the only attention given was to the Western isms: colonialism, nationalism, socialism, communism, democratic liberalism and so forth. In Southeast Asia, scholars referred to Muslims as “statistical” or “nominal” Muslims. There was a general failure to appreciate the power of faith that has always colored how most people, in nearly all societies, believe that they ought to act towards others.

Seeking a sense of community through the power of faith is something the current US administration, and much of the public, increasingly appears to take to heart at home but not abroad. Preempting and preventing terrorism requires that U.S policymakers make a concerted effort to understand the background conditions and enlistment processes that inspire people to take their own lives in the name of a greater cause. Monitoring current political and economic conditions is important, though not necessarily determinant. Rather, what may matter more is the promise of redeeming real or imagined historical grievances through a religious (or transcendent ideological) mission that empowers the militarily weak with unexpected force against much stronger enemies. This was as true for Jewish Zealots who sacrificed themselves to kill Romans two millennia ago as it is for modern jihadis.

Identifying those core values that are considered to be morally essential, protected or “sacred” in different cultures, and how these compete for people’s affections, is surely a first step in learning how to prevent those values from spiraling into mortal conflict between societies (Figure 1). All religions, and many quasi-religious ideologies that make claims about laws of history or universal missions to reform humanity, are based on sacred values. Such values are linked to emotions that underpin cultural identity and trust. These emotion-laden sentiments are amplified into moral obligations to strike out against perceived opponents no matter the cost when conditions of relative deprivation get to a point where terrorists actively seek alternatives because of lack of political and economic opportunity.

Although the field of judgment and decision making has made enormous progress, much more is known about economic decision making than about morally-motivated decision making. There is little knowledge, study or theoretical discussion of so-called essential or sacred values, which a moral community implicitly or explicitly treats as possessing transcendental significance that precludes tradeoffs or mingling with mundane or secular values. What little research there is suggests that standard political and economic proposals (e.g., a democratic vote in favor of majority interests with just material compensation for the minority) rarely succeed in resolving conflicts of over sacred values.


Religious behavior often seems to be motivated by Sacred Values (SVs). A sacred value is a value that incorporates moral and ethical beliefs that can motivate action “independently of its prospect of success.” Max Weber, a leading scholar and founder of modern sociology and political economics, distinguished the non-instrumental “value rationality” of religions and
transcendent political ideologies from the “instrumental rationality” of realpolitik and the marketplace. Instrumental rationality involves strict cost-benefit calculations regarding goals, and entails abandoning or adjusting goals if costs for realizing them are too high. For Immanuel Kant, one of history’s great philosophers of reason, virtuous religious behavior is its own reward and any attempt to base it on utility nullifies its moral worth. 

High cost personal sacrifices to (non-kin) others in society seem to be typically motivated by, and framed in terms of, non-instrumental values. This includes jihadi conceptions of martyrdom, which also involves moral commitment to kill enemy (ḥarbī, as opposed to non-belligerent, ḍhimmi) infidels (kūffār). One psychological review finds that “only a minority of human violence can be understood as rational, instrumental behavior aimed at securing or protecting material rewards.” Historically, religiously-motivated violence tends to underpin the most intractable and enduring conflicts within and between cultures and civilizations.

Political scientists and economists acknowledge the role of religious values in coordinating groups for economic, social and political activities, and in providing people with immunity that goes with action in large numbers. From a rational-choice perspective, such values operate instrumentally to form convergent trust among masses of people with disparate interests and preferences, thus reducing “transaction costs” that would otherwise be needed to mobilize them. Others grant the instrumental value of religion and ethnicity but ask: “why would these be preferred bases for mobilization, energizing the most enduring and intractable conflicts between groups?”

Psychologists have recently developed controlled ways of testing ideas about allied notions of “protected values” and “taboo trade offs.” Psychologist Phil Tetlock and colleagues describe a protected value as “any value that a moral community implicitly or explicitly treats as possessing infinite… significance that precludes comparisons… with bounded… values.” What is clear is that sacred or protected values have a privileged link to moral outrage and other emotions, especially when a person holding a sacred value is offered a secular value or tradeoff such as selling one’s child or selling futures betting on acts of terrorism.

Consider religiously-motivated terrorism (making up nearly 80% of all terrorist events since 9/11). Most terrorists who have been studied - including would-be or captured suicide bombers – fail to show any psychopathology or sociopathy (at least in other parts of their lives). Such findings are often interpreted in ways that would support the idea that terrorist action – including self-destruction - derives from rational decisions to optimize strategies for attaining sociopolitical goals: the religious “bargain” of mostly young men dying for a promising afterlife, ultimate sacrifice as maximizing the goal of improving lives of family or compatriots, which offsets the “opportunity cost” of an educated life lost prematurely, “trading life” for a social identity that is affirmed in death but devalued by continued living.

These speculations are theoretically plausible; however, no empirical study involving structured interviews or experiments with religious suicide terrorists had ever put these speculations to empirical test, or even adequately to deal with the fact that suicide bombers are generally at least as educated and economically well off as their surrounding populations. Rather than obey a utilitarian “logic of rational consequence” these actors perhaps more closely follow a “logic of moral appropriateness.” Consider, for example, our recent interviews with a number of self-identified recruits for martyr attack from the Hamas Block at al-Najah University in Nablus (which provides more suicide bombers than any other demographic group of Palestinians) as well as a number of active fighters in Indonesia from Jemaah Islamiyah, Al-Qaeda’s main ally in southeast Asia, trained in
Afghanistan, the southern Philippines, Sulawesi and the Mollucas. All were asked questions of the sort, "So what if your family were to be killed in retaliation for your action?" or "What if your father were dying and your mother found out your plans for a martyrdom attack and asked you to delay until the family could get back on its feet?" Almost to a person they answered along lines that there is duty to family but duty to God cannot be postponed. "And what if your action resulted in no one's death but your own?" The typical response is, "God will love you just the same." For example, when I posed these questions to the alleged Emir of Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Bakr Ba'asyir, in Jakarta’s Cipinang prison in August 2005, he responded that martyrdom for the sake of jihad is the ultimate fardh āin, an inescapable individual obligation that trumps all others, including four of the conventional five pillars of Islam (prayer, Ramadan fast, alms, and pilgrimage; only the fifth pillar, profession of faith in God and The Prophet, remains on a par with Jihad). xxii What matters for him, as for most would-be martyrs and their sponsors I have interviewed, is the martyr’s intention and commitment to God, so that blowing up only oneself has the same value and reward regardless of how many or how few of the enemy are killed in the process. xxiii

Although sacred values appear to trump instrumental values when they are in direct conflict, instrumental cost-benefit calculations often prevail when there is no apparent conflict. For example, most would-be martyrs and jihadi religious leaders we’ve interviewed also say that if a roadside bomb can produce the same damage as a suicide bombing without causing the deaths of the bomber(s), then it is preferable. xxiv They would also agree to delay a roadside bombing to fulfill a commitment to one of the sacred pillars of Islam, such as making a first pilgrimage to Mecca (hāj). But our interviewees also say it is wrong to refuse to delay a suicide operation for a first pilgrimage. Although these findings indicate that there may be a partial ordering of preferences among sacred values (martyrdom > hāj), they also suggest that there is no complete or consistent ordering of preferences across all (sacred and instrumental) values. Thus, jihadis show preference both for roadside bombing > suicide bombing, and pilgrimage > roadside bombing, but also for suicide bombing > pilgrimage.

This resulting “non-transitivity” in reasoning seems inconsistent with standard notions of “rationality” that drive most current political and economic theorizing. In addition, inverse instrumentalist reasoning appears in populations sympathetic to suicide bombings: the greater certain kinds of instrumental incentive to undertake a suicide bombing, the less those incentives are morally tolerable and the more likely they are to be disincentives (e.g., in increasing compensation to a martyr’s family for their loss, Figure 2). Of course, one can always recast non-instrumental values in instrumental terms (just as one can always frame any perceptual or conceptual relationship in terms of “similarity”), but the issue is whether in doing so explanatory power to predict further judgments and decisions is helped or hindered.

To further test the relationship between essential or sacred values and support for political violence or peace, we recently conducted surveys of Israeli settlers (N = 601) and Palestinian refugees (N = 535) in the West Bank and Gaza on. We found that emotional outrage and support for violent opposition to compromise over sacred values is (a) not mitigated by offering instrumental incentives to compromise but (b) is decreased when the adversary makes instrumentally irrelevant compromises over their own sacred values.

In the representative survey of Jewish settlers (N = 601) conducted in August 2005, days before Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza, we randomly presented participants with one of several hypothetical peace deals. All involved Israeli withdrawal from 99% of the West Bank and Gaza in exchange for peace. For the 46% of participants who believed the “Greater Land of Israel” was a sacred value, this was a “taboo” trade-off. Some deals involved an added instrumental incentive, such as money (“taboo+”), while in other deals Palestinians made a
“taboo” trade-off over one of their own sacred values without adding instrumental value to Israel (contextually “tragic”). From a rational cantage, the taboo+ deal is improved relative to the taboo deal, so violent opposition to the taboo+ deal should be weaker. Yet we observed the following order of support for violence: taboo+ > taboo > tragic (Figure 3a), where those evaluating the tragic deal showed less support for violence than the other two conditions. An analysis of intensity of emotional outrage again found taboo+ > taboo > tragic (Figure 3c); those evaluating the tragic deal were least likely to feel angry or disgusted.

Results were replicated in a representative survey of Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank (N = 535) conducted in late December 2005, one month before Hamas was elected to power. In this experiment, hypothetical peace deals all violated the Palestinian “right of return”, a key issue in the conflict. For the 80% of participants who believed this was a sacred value, we again observed the following order for violent opposition: taboo+ > taboo > tragic, where those evaluating a “tragic” deal showed lowest support for violence (Figure 3b). We found the same order for two measures ostensibly unrelated to the experiment: belief that Islam condones suicide attacks, and reports of joy at hearing of a suicide attack. When compared to refugees who had earlier evaluated a taboo or taboo+ deal, those who had evaluated a tragic deal believed less that Islam condoned suicide attacks, and were less likely to report feeling of joy at hearing of a suicide attack (Figure 3d). In neither the settler nor the refugee study did participants responding to the “tragic” deals regard these deals as more implementable than participants evaluating taboo or taboo+ deals.

These experiments reveal that in political disputes where sources of conflict are cultural, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or emerging clashes between the Muslim and Judeo-Christian world, violent opposition to compromise solutions may be exacerbated rather than decreased by insisting on instrumentally-driven tradeoffs, while non-instrumental symbolic compromises may reduce support for violence. For example, perhaps were France to yield on allowing Muslim women to wear headscarves in public schools, the effects would now reverberate throughout the Muslim world to the good. The problem, however, is that France, unlike, the USA considers signs pf physical and religious distinction in school an affront to the symbolically defining value of French political culture ever since the French Revolution, namely, a universal and uniform sense of social equality (however lacking in practice). “The only community is the nation,” declared French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin.

Indeed, the American ideal of cultural diversity is perceived by the entire political spectrum in France as an attempt to force an alien notion of community and identity between the only two moral entities recognized in that country – the individual and the state. But recall the results of “tragic tradeoff” experiment with Palestinian refugees and Israeli settlers: even a token sacrifice of one side’s symbolically held position may weaken the other side’s rigid adherence to its own adversarial position.

Finally, instrumentally coercive policies may not achieve lasting relief from attacks that are motivated by sacred values and can exacerbate the problem over time. For example, in our representative survey of Palestinians, we asked the following questions:

1. What is the position of Islam in your opinion regarding the bomber who carries out the bombing attack (which some calls martyrdom attacks while others call suicide attacks) killing himself with the aim of killing his enemies as some Palestinians do. Does Islam allow such action?
2. If a chosen martyr’s father became ill and his family asked him to take care of his father, would it be acceptable to delay the action indefinitely?
3. Would if be acceptable to permanently forego martyrdom if there were a significantly high chance that the chosen martyr’s family would be killed in retaliation?
4. And what if the bombing attack led to the destruction of olive trees and the bombing of his home town and school and the death of the students? Would be acceptable to forgo the attack in this case?

72% of those responding “yes” to (1) and 77% of those responding “no” to (1) also responded “yes” to (2). But 43% of those who responded “yes” to (1) responded “no” to (3) and (4), whereas 72% of those who responded “no” to (1) responded “yes” to (3) and (4). In other words, Palestinians who believe that Islam supports suicide bombers are less likely to support abandoning extreme violence to save a whole family or village from destruction at enemy hands than merely to help out a family member. The results indicate that those who have become radicalized to Jihad (as measured by support for suicide actions) respond to both instrumental sticks (enemy counter-violence) and to instrumental carrots (recall the results for Palestinian refugees on taboo+ tradeoffs) with even greater support for violence. Note, however, that in our interviews with actual members of action groups (e.g., Hamas activists who are members of “martyrs groups” and Jemaah Islamiyah mujahedin) there was overwhelming refusal to consider abandoning a suicide attack either to prevent lethal retaliation against the family or to help out a sick father. This suggests that those who have joined groups committed to acting in support of radical Jihad may reject all tradeoffs. To attract potential recruits away from violent Jihad, and to dry up its popular support, requires addressing basic grievances before a downward spiral sets in where core meaning in life is sought, and found, in religious networks that sanctify vengeance at any cost against stronger powers, even if it kills the avenger.

C. Lessons for Risk Management

Current risk management approaches to countering terrorism often assume that adversaries model the world on the basis of rational choices that are commensurable across cultures. Such assumptions prevail in risk assessment and modeling by foreign aid and international development projects run by institutions such as the World Bank and many NGOs, and by U.S. diplomatic, military and intelligence services. But recent work in psychology, anthropology, religious studies, economics, and political science relating to social conflicts show that culturally distinct value frameworks constrain preferences and choices in ways not readily translatable (fungible, substitutable) across frameworks. Planning and acting in ignorance or disregard of different value frameworks may exacerbate conflict, with grievous loss of national treasure and lives.

From interviewing members of militant religious groups (Christian, Muslim and Jewish fundamentalists), including religiously-inspired terrorists and those who inspire and care for them, our research team finds that such individuals act in ways that often appear to be motivated by non-instrumental values and small-group dynamics that trump rational, individual self-interest. Violation of such values leads to moral outrage and typically “irrational” vengeance (“get the offender, even if it kills us”). Sacred values appear to support behavior that seems motivated independently of its prospect of success. Such values do not seem very sensitive to standard calculations regarding cost and benefit, to quantity, to tradeoffs across moral categories (e.g., family vs. God), to commensuration between different cultural frames, or even to the transitive orderings of preferences that define rationality in standard choice and utility theories. This means that traditional calculations of how to defeat or deter an enemy - for example, by providing material incentives to defect or threatening massive retaliation against supporting populations - may not succeed. For negotiators, policy makers and others who must interact with unfamiliar cultures, it is important to understand sacred values and what part they play in order to know which social transgressions and offers for tradeoffs are likely to remain morally taboo (so that attempts to make them generate only further outrage rather than willingness to negotiate, as would proposals in our society to sell out family, religion or country).
D. Understanding Radicalization Unto Jihad

Why are so many enraptured by the jihadi message of martyrdom? Readiness to listen comes with the global media’s showing of virtually infinite opportunities coupled with ubiquitous images of social injustice and political repression that much of the Muslim world’s bulging immigrant and youth populations can intimately identify with. Mobilization comes when small groups of friends and family must go out in search of a sense of community that gives meaning to their lives. Radicalization comes when they find a clear message and call to action. Al-Qaeda’s acolytes understand and play to this, on Al-Jazeera and countless internet sound and light shows that appeal especially to those ages most attuned to the web.

Living mostly in the diaspora, unconcerned by retaliation against original home populations, jihadists who are frequently middle class, secularly well-educated but often “born-again” radical Islamists (including converts from Christianity) embrace apocalyptic visions for humanity’s violent salvation. From Paris suburbs to the jungles of Indonesia, culturally uprooted and politically restless youth I have interviewed echo a stunningly simplified and decontextualized message of martyrdom for the sake of global jihad as life’s noblest cause. For the most part they do so sincerely, and increasingly many are willing, even eager, to die as they are to kill.

Global jihadism is a thoroughly modern movement filling the popular political void in Islamic communities left in the wake of discredited western ideologies co-opted by corrupt local governments, despite atavistic cultural elements including selective appeals to Muslim history and heartfelt calls for the revival of the Caliphate. It claims the role of vanguard for a massive, transnational political awakening spurred by near universal access to world media. To some extent, Jihadism is a counter-movement to U.S. led economic globalization and the political view expressed in the National Security Strategy of the United States that liberal democracy is the “single sustainable model of national development right and true for every person, in every society.”xxxiii In fact, jihadism’s apocalyptic yearnings and born-again vision of personal salvation through radical action are largely absent from traditional Sunni Islamic exegesis and, indeed, perhaps as much may be learned about such apocalyptic yearnings from the New Testament’s Book of Revelations as from the Qur’an.xxxii Nor does Islam per se or “Muslim civilization” have anything in particular to do with terrorism, any more than some impossibly timeless or context-free notion of Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism or Buddhism can be held responsible for the dead millions these religious traditions have been blamed for.xxxiii

Enlistment and support for violent Jihad occur not under conditions of political repression, poverty, and unemployment or illiteracy as such, but when converging political, economic, and social trends produce diminishing opportunities relative to expectations, thus generating frustrations that radical organizations can exploit. For this purpose, relative deprivation is more significant than absolute deprivation. Unlike poorer, less educated elements of their societies—or equally educated, well-off members of our society—many educated, middle-class Muslims increasingly experience frustration with life as their potential opportunities are less attractive than their prior expectations. Frustrated with their future, the appeal of routine national life declines and violent Jihad gives some perceived purpose to act altruistically, in the potential terrorist’s mind, for the welfare of a future generation. Revolutionary terror imprints itself into history when corrupt and corroded societies choke rising aspirations into explosive frustration. To attract potential recruits away from violent Jihad, and to dry up its popular support, requires addressing basic political grievances and lack of opportunities before a downward spiral sets in where core meaning in life is sought, and found, in religious
networks (increasingly internet-based) that sanctify vengeance at any cost against stronger powers, even if it kills the avenger.

**Figure 1.** The Exponential Growth of Martyrdom: (A) Suicide attacks worldwide, annualized by decade (since 9/11 about 80% of all suicide attacks worldwide are by religiously-motivated Jihadi groups); xxxiv (B) Suicide attacks worldwide, 2001 – 2005.

![Graph A and B](image)

**Figure 2.** Palestinian judgments of acceptability for a family to request compensation for a son’s martyrdom operation (Dinars 1,000; 10,000; 1,000,000). Between-subjects design for a representative West Bank and Gaza sample (N = 1267) shows inverse instrumentality (linear trend, p = .01). Y-axis: 1 = “acceptable”; 2 = “unacceptable”
Figure 3. Predictions of the percentage of the population who would use violence to oppose: a peace deal perceived to violate a sacred value (“taboo” condition), the taboo deal plus an added instrumental incentive (“taboo+”), or the taboo deal plus a sacred value concession without instrumental value, from the adversary (“tragic”) for (A) Israeli settlers (linear trend $F[1,195] = 5.698, P = .018$) and (B) Palestinian refugees ($F[1, 384] = 7.201, P = .008$). Parallel results obtained for emotional reactions by: (C) settlers reporting ‘anger’ or ‘disgust’ at an Israeli leader who would agree to the tradeoff being evaluated ($F[1, 260] = 4.436, P = .036$), and (D) refugees reporting ‘joy’ at hearing of a suicide bombing according to the type of tradeoff being evaluated ($F[1, 418] = 7.48, P = .007$). The trend of emotional intensity and support for violence in each case, taboo + > taboo > tragic, is not consistent with a strictly instrumental rationality account of human behavior.

*Footnotes at Page 100
Motive, Mitigation and Normative Dissonance: The Erice Dilemma

Prof. Mohiaddin Mesbahi

Introduction

The Erice process was founded on the conviction and objective of responding “to the planetary emergency of terrorism” and of mitigating its dangers through an approach that was scientific, comprehensive, complementary, and interdisciplinary. The objective is to achieve world peace and the process requires the application of a scientific approach to all the different aspects of the subject, including an examination of the contributing factors and an evaluation of the response. (Erice International Seminars on Planetary Emergency, Permanent Monitoring Panel on Terrorism, Third Meeting, 5-8 of May 2005, Annual Report, p.1).

As a first time participant, it is humbling and impressive to go through extensive reports, discussions, and suggestions regarding the twin pillars of the Erice Project, namely identifying the motivational factors on the one hand, and discussing and identifying mitigational dimensions and responses. By nature, while these two dimensions comprise a holistic concept, the reality is that by nature there is a disproportionality and incommensurability between the weight, the urgency and do-ability of mitigation strategies and suggestions, vs. the motivation dimension, which is structurally more difficult, and whose amelioration demands some fundamental shifts of behavior, reorientation of strategies of development, political, economic or social; and in this case, the fundamental re-shifting of policies of major states including primary global actors.

The conventional justification for this disproportionality and incommensurability is a good one, namely that dealing with motivations is a long term project and it is actually a complicated process which demands consensus, uniform strategies by various actors, and primarily states, where as mitigating strategies, be they physical, legal, institutional, or military responses to the problem of terrorism are driven by the short term urgency of responding to a threat, the necessity of buying time, and the relative ease of international cooperation via interstate agreements and treaties. In other words, there seems to be a sense that there has been much more success in developing ideas and strategies, that are top-down countermeasures as opposed to bottom-up approaches that presumably should address the socio-economic and political root causes.

There is perhaps, however, an equally intellectually attractive and plausible alternative explanation which might lead to another conclusion, namely, that there could be a fundamental problem with the process of the prognostication of the root causes, or the motives dimension, in actually assessing the nature or genealogy of the post 9/11 environment which the Erice Project has dubbed a “Cultural Planetary Emergency.” One fundamental question to ask in order to understand both the nature and the scope of motivation and mitigation and why their relationship is incommensurate and the energies devoted to them are disproportionate, is to investigate and understand the context within which the knowledge about terrorism as a cultural planetary crisis is produced. What normative ethos, what political dynamics, what strategic context, gives rise to the urgency that sets the stage for debate in the media, the public, universities and conferences? How do we arrive at definitional foundations, what prompts preferences for particular responses and what overshadows other choices? This context creates a powerful framework, within which definition of the problem and solutions are heavily conditioned, even the critique of the
prevailing definitions and solutions are still within the range and limitations set by this framework.

The structure of thought and material elements of this framework provides the condition that both limits and opens various doors to discussions of terrorism in its motivational and mitigational dimensions. This powerful context is the preferred perspective of the United States on the subject matter of terrorism, since the 9/11 tragedy; what I would like to term the U.S. master narrative on terrorism. Without understanding the hegemonic impact of this narrative, its political and institutional preeminence, it would be impossible to understand the frustrations over the incommensurability between the two pillars of the Erice Process.

The production of motivation and mitigation knowledge and its transmission to a target audience, and subsequent actions on the ground, namely the legitimacy of the knowledge, is heavily contextualized by the power structure, namely the “US needs”, and its related discourse. To the degree that this knowledge package is compromised by the power structure and its discourse, it will be ineffective no matter how elaborate and extensive the process of its production and no matter how thorough the seemingly consensual international diplomatic language of target states, NGO’s, or the so called targeted moderate epistemic community.

The grass roots, which is presumably where the trouble is located-the so called swamp of the Islamic world -may be weak and disorganized- but it imposes its weight via non-acceptance of the power driven knowledge production; they see it as illegitimate and at the service of powers that be. And here lie the roots of the major disconnect. In the swamps there are other and more legitimate and authoritative voices, the swamps’ epistemic communities if you will, who have a master narrative of their own, their own crisis theory with its own mitigating strategy. They buy neither the narrative of what the crisis is nor of course what the solutions should be from the outside, especially those produced in their absence by the U.S. A major gulf exists between the two discursive universes, which are while physically living in the same planet, constructing a world of their own making.

For this purpose, this short interpretative essay is devoted to addressing this normative hegemony, its origins and contents and its implications for any intellectual efforts, be it in a local mosque in Cairo, in an interfaith meeting in Washington or in a global setting in Erice, in dealing with the phenomenon now called terrorism or war on terror. The essay first addresses the genealogy and key elements of transformation in US foreign policy after 9/11, second, the US paradigmatic initiative in defining the phenomenon of terrorism, its roots, and counterterrorism strategy, including the expansion of the definition of terrorism to incorporate, in the broadest possible way the U.S. overall national security strategy in the next century, and third to show how the attempt at this normative hegemony is at the core of the U.S. war on terror and to address the implications of this normative hegemony on the target societies, especially in shaping the motive/root cause dimension, and finally to illustrate that as long as the intellectual or as termed in Erice, “scientific debate”, on the issue takes place without acknowledging this dominant frame, or challenging the very premises of its core values in a constructive way, we will continue to see a dichotomy between the energy devoted to addressing the motives and the efforts behind top down mitigation strategies, and therefore the continuous failure of dealing with the issue. Meanwhile, we will all continue to witness the further securitization of relations between the United States and the Muslim world, and the inability of intellectuals, scientists and others to have any real impact on this global crisis.
The Revolution in American Foreign Policy: ñAmerica is at Warø

The Background: International System in Flux

The discussion of revolution or transformation in American foreign policy after 9/11 was not, contrary to the conventional view a completely sudden phenomenon, this transformation took place both within an ongoing debate within the foreign policy establishment, especially the more conservative body of intellectuals and think tanks on the one hand, and a permissive transient international system whose peculiar and uncertain post-Cold war characteristics seemed to await a new normative core (negative or positive) as its organizing principle.

This transitory system had several interrelated characteristics, including its bifurcated structures- unipolarity of material structure with the US as a sole superpower, but with a contested/competing and ambiguous social/normative structure where actors whether great powers or developing countries, in addition to a host of nonstate actors have had claims on the normative substance of the international system. There existed, and continues to exist a major struggle over the normative substance of the international system among all actors, states and societies, a struggle that has found a major frame of reference in the debate on terrorism.

This international system was also a damaged system in a sense that it had lost its organizing principle --the cold war-- without an appropriate replacement; a vague notion of neoliberal “end of history” on the one hand, and the looming “Islamic threat” on the other, seemed poised to become the core organizing code; yet none had the normative and material hegemony to be accepted readily as the replacement for the Cold War ideology as the new systemic organizing principle. The damaged system was also reflected in breakdown in traditional alliance systems, bilateral partnerships, and the emergence of ad-hocism, opportunistic coalitions, and the use of rhetoric of “strategic partnership” as a camouflage for tactical and flexible relations; the result was a new sense of lack of trust for long term relations and commitment, and a penchant for actors to leave all options open.

Furthermore, more than ever before, the current international system was characterized by actor density; never before had so many new actors, especially non-state actors, ranging from NGO’s to terrorist organizations, been empowered by “the skills revolution” of the last century to intrude in a meaningful fashion into the international system; the qualitative shift in violence capacity of nonstate actors was a major factor.

This international system was also a domesticated system, as the distinction between the domestic and external had increasingly faded, the judgmental attitudes of citizenry towards states, and downward (sub-national) and upward (extraterritorial) relocation of authority and legitimacy, and the speed of decision making and the absence of elite “privacy” for decision making, all led to a sense of urgency and panic; a sense of nakedness and vulnerability of the elite and the strategic significance of control of information, propaganda and spin.

And finally the international system’s most contradictory characteristic was its vulnerable core, namely the United States; by far the most powerful actor in a clear cut material dominance of unprecedented scale in history, proved to be the most vulnerable part of the system, not just physically at the “homeland”, but also socially and normatively, globally. The fact that the source of this vulnerability was a nonstate entity is the most important strategic shift in traditional understanding of national and international security, and a core to the discussion of terrorism. The technique of violence perpetrated against the core-beyond its expected technological and cyberspace dimensions, included “suicide” as a routinized
strategy of warfare, questioning certainties of deterrence and introducing and adding a “cosmic” dimension to secular and traditional levels of analysis. The dialectics and symbiosis of supremacy and vulnerability, along with the above characteristics provide the broader context within which the post 9/11 revolution in US foreign policy can be understood.

The American Response: Restoration Paradigm

The post September 11 era, witnessed a significant shift, if not a potential revolution in the American thinking about its priorities and its preferred international norms. This to some extent was the natural by-product of the September 11 tragedy, but perhaps even to a more significant degree was the consequence of an intellectual shift, or the resultant paradigm shift which was born out of the domination of a neo-conservative doctrine, which manifested itself in the normative dynamics leading to justification and implementation of the intervention in Iraq.

This paradigm shift and the resultant ideational mix have two key characteristics. First, an intellectual and conceptual ambiguity which owes its genealogy to lack of philosophical rigor, intellectual laziness, and the urge to produce a super-all encompassing mother paradigm; and Second, the belief in the special and distinct identity of the United States, and thus its unique role in shaping the international order - an American neo-exceptionalism.

The degree to which the post 9/11 US foreign policy is radically different from the past, and especially in its relentless and lonely assault on the very international institutions that the US not only initiated or nurtured, but above all that seemed essential for the post Cold War foundation of US benevolent hegemony, is a matter of some bewilderment and confusion both in the United States - especially among the traditional elite establishment, liberal and conservative, and among US traditional allies; a Gramscian hegemony where the public good claims of the promises of a neoliberal world order either in its Clintonian inspiration or Giddenian/European construct seemed either enthusiastically or grudgingly embraced by the “international community”, and directly or implicitly acknowledged by the US leadership. The US security and national interests, thus while still enjoying considerable sovereignty-laden unilateral latitude, was conditioned or at times constrained by agreed upon international norms.

A key and unspoken impact of 9/11 in the mind and philosophy of the neoconservative universe was the inadequacy of this hegemony, its false promise of security, and its “trick” in undermining the US power and its majesty. Hegemony had emasculated US power by the cobweb trapping of it in international norms that more and more were reflective of norms of late modern “domestic society” where power is emasculated and thus just implied, where its physicality forgotten in discursive exercises of progressive normativity and political correctness. This was a trap that the Athenians were desperately afraid of in their encounter with the Melians; where norms make rational expectation of material superiority inconsequential.

The conclusion that the late modern world had “softened” the deterrent power of US physical and military superiority and thus its failure to even provide essential homeland security is key to understanding the seeming recklessness with which neoconservatives attacked, and ridiculed, while attempting to dismantle and “reform” the international norms and related institutions. The US attitude prior to and after the intervention in Iraq in circumventing basic international norms, including sovereignty, in redefining self defense, and now more broadly
in its attempts at domestic social engineering of target states as key components of its international politico-military strategy must be understood in this context.

It is, normatively, and ironically, a rebellion against a late modern liberal construct -the US domestic dimension of this rebellion is central to an understanding of this process-though beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that the US’s new ideational international construct was organically connected to its reflection on the “malaise” of this late modern world at home and its debilitating impact on the US elite in not seeing the danger to US national interest and security, being duped by the false sense of superiority seemed so appealing in the immediate post cold war hegemony.

The remedy, the neoconservatives argued was to restore the majesty of US power by domination; and of course central to this exercise was the willingness to use force with or without the approval of the international norms and institutions, and then, to undertake a process of change whose political and social norms are codified in newly reformed international institutions and rules -that actually reflect the new US findings and predilections. The security of the United States and the world community was synthesized, and homogenization of identity across the world became the prerequisite long term remedy for resolving the perennial security dilemma; thus the spread of US approved and defined democracy, the enshrinement of acceptable political and social norms including separation of church and State, gender equality, and economic liberalization -as the key task of the new international order and its institutions, including the United Nations.

It was the second characteristic of the US normative shift which explained the intellectual ambiguity and lack of philosophical coherence, and thus policy confusion, namely the free hand and lack of accountability demanded for the United States in this transformative process; a new and much broader sense of American neo-exceptionalism.

The American neo-exceptionalism reflected the conceptual and moral latitude that neoconservatives had embraced by their contradictory and yet forceful adaptation of Hobbesian and Hegelian sovereignty for the United States alone, where no international norms or institution, could reach -even if the US was not only the signatory, but the initiator of the norms (ranging from preemptive war to bending the prisoners of war law). (It is this exceptionalism that underlines the emotive, intellectual and moral laxity towards the exercise of international law, including the Geneva Convention regarding the prisoners, and the eventual double standards, and the sliding downwards towards Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, outsourcing torture and torture erotica.)

This was an exercise that drew philosophically from an anti modern critique of modernity, from variants of German contributions ranging from Hegel to Carl Schmitt; restoration of the state as depository of freedom and self-conscious identity and family, the defense of which demanded a forgotten sense of American spartanism and virtue in which mobilization of the masses necessitated the painful exercise of deliberate falsities and small lies, ends justifies the means, for the bigger purpose of reason of state (Fukuyama recently has used a “Leninist” analogy to underscore this point, America At the Crossroad). Yet, the Hobbesian state was immediately complemented by the neoKantian assertion of democratic peace theory, and thus its corollary Wilsonian internationalism -thus the US plan for pushing for democratization via coercive persuasion and liberal enticement to lay the foundation for national and international security; democracies will not go to war against each other.

The detailed analysis of this normative neo-conservative thinking is beyond the scope of this talk. Suffice it to say, that it is rather a strange combination of Wilsonian internationalism,
power neo-realism, religious-civilizational framework and neo-liberal internationalism. But, what I would like to outline are the normative demands of the United States in setting the substance of the international system.

1. A global socialization, both for the state and the non-state actors, the political elite and the international public alike, that the world has changed after 9/11, and thus the international institutions, norms, discourse, etc., has to reflect that transformation:

   - traditional ethos, norms, and organizations, such as sovereignty, the United Nations, either have to change, or significantly adjust to reflect the changed world.

   - therefore change, or even instability, i.e. “creative chaos” should be considered a positive, though painful pre-requisite

2. There are “non-negotiable norms and values,” such as

   - freedom, free market and rule of law as universal moral and political and economic codes that are not culturally nor geographically contingent.

3. The acceptance of the U.S. definition of threat, responses and security

   - the attempt to frame the normative intellectual and discursive legal frameworks of what constitutes threat, whether it is from states or non-state actors, and the establishment of the framework for remedies and responses to the threats.

   - this is a process of what we can term global socialization with how to securitize an object, whether it is a state or non-state actor and how to desecuritize.

   - central to this global socialization is the US paradigmatic construct of Terrorism, namely its definition, designation, and strategies of responses and solutions; prognostication of motives and mitigation.

This spectrum of international responses to threats which the U.S. is demanding to be institutionalized, is thus dynamic, flexible, and yet very dense. It comprises political, economic, and socio-cultural responses accompanied if not spearheaded by a real threat of military action. It is in this broader context of systemic dynamics and the US self perception of its role in it where the issue of terrorism and its twin dimensions of motivation and mitigation has to be considered.

**Terrorism: Towards a Comprehensive Definitional Hegemony**

By universalizing its pain, and distributing its vulnerability throughout the international system, and demanding security from the world, the United States also naturally feels that it has the right, the obligation and the responsibility as the core of the international system, and the power, if you will, to provide the normative framework and guidance within which the scourge of terrorism is defined, and solutions and strategies are envisioned; universalizing its own knowledge on terrorism and its remedies.
This exercise in production of knowledge on terrorism in both motive and mitigation is complex, expanding, parsimonious and yet flexible to allow the digestion of contradictions and inconsistencies at the service of foundational certainties.

To facilitate the discussion below, here is a summary outline:

1. Establishing a legal, universally acceptable, state-centric technical definition of terrorism to achieve a generic understanding that allows for a widening of the scope to include not only Al Qaeda, but a variety of other groups
2. Providing the reason behind the terrorism, i.e., the motive, and developing countermeasures, i.e., mitigation; crucial to set the normative foundation preemptively of what terrorism is a product of and what terrorism is not emanating from.
3. Establishing new trinity/trifacta of “terrorism-wmd-rogue states”, connecting the discussion on terrorism to the larger objectives and interests of the United State globally; the establishment of the strategic nexus of the threat to the US and the international system
4. A comprehensive mitigating strategy which includes
   - Globalized legal, political, intelligence, interdiction, law enforcement measures
   - Military campaign ranging from low intensity to major total war
   - Regime Change
   - Societal Change (social engineering) via democratization and market economy

The first building block is of course the definition of the problem. What is terrorism? Who is a terrorist? And so on, and eventually, the US has settled for what the Erice report last year had called a “technical definition”. A technical definition, however, is embedded in a normatively pre-emptive intellectual and ideological exercise to set the limit and scope of the motivation on the one hand, and to provide the foundation for a complex set of remedies and mitigation strategies which fit the US overall understanding of the challenge posed by terrorism.

According to the updated National Security Strategy of the United States which was released in March 2006, terrorism is not “the inevitable byproduct of poverty” (the 9/11 hijackers came from middle class backgrounds), terrorism is not a result of U.S. policy in Iraq, terrorism is not the result of the Israeli-Palestinian issue, and finally terrorism is not the response to US countermeasures since the 9/11 terror attack. In four short paragraphs on pages 9 and 10 of the document, the United States eliminates some of the key causes that Erice-type conferences and a good portion of the world, and a significant majority of the Muslim world, believe to be among the core factors which had led to September 11 and especially to a deterioration of international security and global radicalization since the invasion of Iraq. Instead, the U.S. focuses on a) a vague notion of “political alienation,” i.e. terrorists are those who have no legitimate ways to promote change in their own country, b) an ambiguous process where grievances can be blamed on others, c) a subculture of conspiracy, and ultimately d) a murderous ideology that glorifies the killing of innocents. A twisted form of the religion of Islam has been made “to serve an evil end.” (The National Security Strategy, pp 5-8).

The official definition of terrorism by the United States (State Department) defines terrorism as a premeditated violent act perpetrated by individuals, groups, or subgroups, against innocent people for political purposes. In that definition, the target is the audience. Conceptually, it is an attempt to separate the terror inflicted on individuals and people by
states from terrorism perpetrated by individuals, groups, and non-state actors; it is in a way a restoration of the Hobbesian Westphalian state, and re-monopolization of violence as a legitimate exercise of the state. The definition glorifies the state and condemns the individual, not because they kill or terrorize the innocent to score a political, psychological or economic gain, but because they have no right to do so, in the modern conceptions of the state. This definition ignores terrorizing, killing, kidnapping, random or targeted assassinations by the state for the sheer purpose of affecting a target audience, which might be abhorrent, but not fitting into the category of terrorism. It is not the act itself, contrary to the general interpretation, but the identity and the legal authority of the perpetrator that counts.

This is, in a way, a generic, but a technical definition. It is state-centric, and as such, it does appeal to member states who are naturally inclined towards the centralization of violence in their own hands in dealing with their own terrorists and it facilitates international agreement on the problem and opens the door for some form of international collaboration. This linguistic strategy while perhaps self-delusional and wishful at that, is an important normative straight jacket that ignores the reality of the world that we are living in. The fact is that the relations between society and the state have changed, and individuals, empowered by technologies of communication and violence are more than ever before in history negotiating, through their words and actions with the states, making flexible decisions on the degree of the legitimacy of states, locating their own loyalty and implementing strategies for confronting the conditions perceived by them to be oppressive and intolerable.

The Erice definition may not be exactly the same as that of the U.S. State Department, but it is not too far off (PMTP, Erice conference May 2005 Final Report p.13). States, whether small or global powers, do terrorize people, either directly, or by example for political purposes. They use the most sophisticated weapons at times, while they also engage in targeted assassinations, kidnappings, economic terrorism, demolishing houses, disrupting the life of innocents, separating families, destroying communities; yet it seems not included in this technical definition. And here lies the major disconnect. For, a good chunk of humanity, this technical definition, and the superficial separation between state terror and non-state terror, is only a linguistic canard, unacceptable, and only designed to restore to the state a monopoly of the use of violence, and condemn those who might practically do the same thing, but lack the legal authority of the state to do so.

This is not to say that what the terrorists do is right, or justified --absolutely not-- but to say that there may not be such moral clarity in the real world of state-society relations that this definitional straightjacket with all of its enabling technicalities implies. A great chunk of the audience out there, especially in the Muslim world have remained very skeptical of this distinction. For them the horror images of 9/11, in smaller pieces or experience, i.e., the daily destruction of the Palestinian lives, the demolition of their houses, assassinations of their leaders, destruction of communities, economic deprivations and so on, be it in less dramatic fashion and in slow motion pace are witnessed in a routine yet equally painful way; the images of Chechnya are even worse. And since many of the states who are terrorizing their own populations or whoever stands in their way, especially in the Muslim world, and in the Middle East, specifically, have been and continue to be the friends of the United States, this legally parceled out technical definition of terrorism, is designed to perpetuate the existing power structures, policies and arrangements, and demonizing any form of resistance to it. For them there is no technical definition, all definitions are normative and are socially constructed.
The role of this technical definition has been enormous. After September 11th, terrorism became an umbrella for grouping a variety of organizations and groups, militant or otherwise, and for lumping them together with Al Qaeda under this generic definition. Thus, when we talk about terrorism, it is not only Al Qaeda, but it is also Hamas in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Kashmiri militants in Kashmir, the Chechen militants in the North Caucasus, and Chinese militants in Urumchi, and as the U.S. National Security Document indicates, it covers all, from the subways of London to the streets of Fallujah. (The National Security Strategy, p1). This technical definition and its generic global application was crucial for bringing together a host of actors, many with competing national interests, including the US, Russia, and China, and opening the door for collaboration between the United States, the western world and some of the most repressive states in the Middle East and Central Asia, such as Uzbekistan and the legitimation of torture on a somewhat global scale by outsourcing it to allies and friendly countries around the world. The war on terror became a carte blanche for repressive regimes, and allowing even democracies to go after their local opposition, militant or not, with impunity. The set back for human rights on a global scale in the post 9/11 world has been severe and unmistakable.

It is worth noting that this technical definition is subjected to flexibility of application whenever the situation demands, both in overlooking certain terrorists groups who happen to become useful tactically, or more significantly, when states are designated as terrorists when the situation demands it.

**War on Terror (the Long War): The New Global Organizing Principle**

This definitional initiative does not stop with its genericness, and thus its expansive scope to lump together Al Qaeda typology with other militant groups; it is the next definitional expansion and connection that makes it a global and systemic principle, namely the trifecta or trinity of terrorism-wmd-rogue states. It is this nexus that has caused the issue of terrorism to become not only the dominant frame to explain the phenomenon of terrorism per say, but more significantly as the defining framework of the international system. This trinity was evoked to justify the intervention in Iraq in 2003, and it is the same that has driven the public logic of policy towards Syria, Lebanon, and above all the upcoming confrontation with Iran. The enmeshment of the state with non-state actors via the concept of terrorism and crowning this with wmd is an innovative approach to provide the United States with enormous latitude to not only approach terrorism within a technical definition, but to develop a foreign policy and national security strategy to pursue US national interest several decades into the early 21st century. This is a “long war,” as is being termed in the Pentagon, and the achievement “of its goal is the work of generations” (The National Security Strategy p. 1). It is this juxtaposition, that makes the war on terror, whether one agrees with it or not, the critical issue in the study of terrorism, even in its technical confines, when the war on terror’s main frontier becomes Iraq (and perhaps soon Iran), when terrorism has a territory attached to it, where, as President Bush wrote in his preamble to the current US national security strategy, the war will be taken to them: “we will fight our enemies abroad rather than waiting for them to arrive in our country”; (The National Security Strategy, President Bush Letter, p.2)

**The US Mitigation Strategy:**

A) Regime Change

From this expansive and ambitious definitional exercise, there has emerged an expansive mitigating strategy with both long term “software” responses and short term physical remedies. For the immediate short term, there are a variety of low intensity, police work,
intelligence, cross global hunting operations, crowned by preemptive and preventive classic military interventions and invasions of the rogue states. The objective of war is not simply to remove a particular problem, but the much more totalizing twin concepts of “regime change” and “societal change” via overthrowing the old regime, and its replacement via democratization with a new socio-political order. A total concept of war, which is even beyond the Clausewitzian notion of total war, which includes a post war social engineering and societal transformation towards a local version of secular western inspired democracy friendly to the West; a Hobbesian surgery-regime change and its replacement with a neoKantian political order giving birth and reality to democratic peace theory in the international environment. (The National Security Strategy pp. 4-5; 10-11).

The implications for global security are enormous. This in a sense makes the war on terror a conventional interstate war, in addition to militarily chasing a variety of non-state actors globally. This is a war that allows implementation of the US overall restoration strategy which the neconservatives thought was lost in the 1990’s era of US benevolent hegemony. Wars of “preemption and prevention” are central to this restoration strategy; thus the central role of the US military in achieving the primary prerequisite to this restoration, which is regime change.

B) Societal Change

Expansion of freedom and democratization is the key normative-root cause-part of the US response to eradicate terrorism; “as the War on Terror has been a battle of arms and ideas…”, and “democracy is the opposite of terrorist tyranny” (The National Security Strategy p. 9 and p.11).

The implications of the societal change by addressing the “root causes” as envisioned in US strategy has some similarity with those discussed in many international forums including Erice; promotion of rule of law, development, gender equality, democracy, cultural pluralism, etc.. What makes these so called motivational/root causes so problematic, even when they are agreed upon universally, is that collectively they have been and will continue to be heavily affected and shaped by the on going military aspect of the mitigation strategies, especially the use of interstate war. This is the context in which all issues, including democracy, freedom, gender equality, development and poverty are all understood and analyzed especially by the target audience.

The motivational prognostications might be right and legitimate, however, they are consumed by the politicization and securitization impact of top down mitigational strategies, most specifically the use of force. The target audience, presumably the streets of the Muslim world, the so called swamp, has two problems with these mitigating root causes dimension: First, they think that there is a missing link in the motivational prognostication, namely the impact and legacy of US/western policy in the Muslim world, and especially in the Middle East, where US historical twin legacies have been to both perpetuate repressive regimes, both before and even after 9/11 --contrary rhetoric notwithstanding; and second the glaring manifestation of US (or for that matter the international community’s) lack of seriousness and double standards to deal with the quintessential manifestation of Muslim humiliation, namely the Palestinian Israeli conflict.

Those who ignore this aspect of root cause/motivation, are either woefully ignorant or most probably refuse to take proper responsibility and thus the necessary self reflection and contrition for the scourge of terrorism. The epistemic community who refuses to recognize and admit the culpability of the western world in creating the reaction of terrorism, whether
they are the authors of the US national security document or the scientists at Erice, have no credibility for the target audience, the street of the Muslim world. The result is a communication between deaf people, who live in the same physical planet, or even in the same neighborhood, but live in normatively separate universes. Millions of dollars spent on transmitting US and western ideas and hundreds of conferences have hardly left a dent on this wall of perceptual divide.

Furthermore, not only is the legitimacy of prognostication of motivation questioned, the remedies including the bottom up root cause remedies, i.e., strategies of democratization and development espoused by the US/West and conferences such as Erice are tainted by the grand suspiciousness in the streets, as to their hidden political agenda and cultural relevancy. It might be unnoticed, but all root cause approaches are affected negatively by this politicization; democracy as a clever conduit of US domination, via a tiny westernized liberal upper middle class, or a camouflage to sustain the current rulers with a new veneer of legitimacy which they now lack, equality of women and individual freedom as strategy of undermining the Muslim family and societal authenticity, and thus as open season for cultural imperialism and weakening of Islam as the last barrier to western total global political, economic and cultural hegemony.

One of the most far reaching negative implications has been the lost opportunity for the Muslim world to deal with its own serious indigenous problems; to be allowed to be self reflective and self critical rather than be overwhelmed by a top-down and militarized and collective labeling and collective punishment, thus naturally or conveniently taking refuge in blaming the “other” for its state of affairs and shortcomings. The historical moment in the immediate post 9/11 era where there was a sense of Muslim collective shame by association, was quickly buried by the sheer avalanche of an essentially coercive and militarized approach, especially towards the Muslim world based on an implied collective guilt.

An epistem (messenger) community perceived as illegitimate or politicized, kills the message even if the message in its abstract context is legitimate and constitutes a genuine package of “public goods”; in the midst of a West showcasing its military might against Muslim societies, the Muslim streets, listening to their own epistemic communities and preachers, are taking E.H. Carr’s warning to heart that great powers and dominant societies use the public good theories to camouflage their concrete and egoistic national interests.

It is this militarized and politicized context, with the US and its allies at its helm, with all of its positive and negative implications, that Erice has to take into consideration when dealing with terrorism as a cultural planetary crisis. The context admittedly is very complex and overwhelming, but so is the problem; no amount of parceling and technicalization of it, as either a coping strategy, or worse, as a cover to avoid the context, will justify side stepping it intellectually and morally.

It is a thesis of this essay that the current level of intensity and scope of the cultural planetary crisis associated with terrorism, is to a large extent the result of post 9/11 responses to the attack and overall strategy of “war on terror”, and not the result of a sustained attack by a relentless Al Qaeda terrorist campaigns and the world’s response to it. Most people in the world, including especially in the Muslim world, did not know Osama bin Ladin and Al Qaeda; Al Qaeda was not a social movement, it was not a dominant ism even in its original birth place, Saudi Arabia. Our sense of crisis is not a byproduct of a repeated wave of Al Qaeda attacks of which the 9/11 tragedy was the first salvo; no, the global crisis today, and the concern over Al Qaeda as an ism is to a large extent a byproduct of the top down mitigating war on terrorism, culminating in the invasion of Iraq. This is not to belittle the
danger of Al Qaeda’s threat to the US homeland, absolutely not and to the contrary, but to state that the current level of crisis, and in fact, US enhanced insecurity is ironically a byproduct of its chosen normative prognostication and mitigating strategies. In fact, we are regrettably at the threshold of a spectacular rise in this planetary crisis as we are an inch and a leap from approaching the eventual military confrontation between the United States and Iran, in the name of the war on terror.

**The Road Ahead**

If the above proposition has any validity, the US engendered master narrative on terrorism which has deliberately, or by default, led to a perception of Al Qaedaization of an entire socio-political resistance (legitimate or not) of more than a billion Muslims has to be constructively challenged. This master narrative was not the end result of an open and systematized national debate; it emerged from a combination of dominant ideological circles, certain religious and cultural receptivity of a conservative electorate, and a masterful forceful enactment. It also sailed through in the aftermath of the 9/11 tragedy when sense of fear, indignation, and thus self-righteousness was understandably high; affirmation of the “self” as “good” vs. the “other” as “evil” is always natural in national crisis and tragedy. Absence of critical and reflective voices and a complacent media were also crucial.

There is a need for a global reflection on the foundational issues, not to insert apologia into the mix, but realism and fairness; truth and its consequences. This could only happen, as we all know by our own human nature and experience, and as received wisdom by old and new thinkers, in the production of legitimate knowledge about critical and contested events, truth is reached only through democratic communications and dialogue. This is not to say that anyone or any side has a total monopoly on truth, but that we can only approximate the truth when multiple voices are heard; and more, the process itself beyond its discovery benefits, is also the beginning of healing and shattering the walls of mistrust.

We lost the golden moment that emerged out of the ashes of the twin towers and the blood of the innocents shed that day; a treasure of good will that US leaders either through ignorance, anger or arrogance wasted. A humanized, vulnerable, and yet powerful and legitimate America, was replaced by the perception of a “bully” sometimes even unrecognized by its own recent custodians and establishment elite. What to do?

**Some Practical Suggestions**

1. One suggestion could be to establish a highly visible forum led by recognized world leaders and statesmen who can initiate a process of global reassessment of terrorism, motivation and mitigation, by challenging all prevailing and competing frameworks from all sides; a truly global and serious forum that can facilitate the discussion not only between thinkers of states but also from communities and societies; the objective is to use the collective reasoning/wisdom of the “international community” (not in its current pejorative sense which means the West) to reach an epistemic consensus on terrorism.

This cannot be the meeting ground for the like minded alone; but of truly competing perspectives articulated by the true believers and advocates; a true meeting of conflicting epistemic communities.

I suggest three personalities, Bill Clinton, Nelson Mandela and Mohammad Khatami as the troika to lead the effort. The first is one of the most articulate and well read and engaging American leaders of recent times and one with considerable popularity and perhaps
acceptance even in the Muslim world, the second is the quintessential statesman of our time which has been on both sides of definitional paradigms, a “terrorist” and “freedom fighter”; and the last is a cleric, the author and initiator of the dialogue of civilizations, a major personality in the Muslim world and the former president of a country on an apparent collision course with the United States/the West. Perhaps Erice can provide the institutional and logistical support.

2. Revive the “dialogue among civilizations” and complement it with “dialogue within civilizations”. The Erice documents have recognized Dialogue as a key instrument of dealing with key aspects or terrorism. Countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia (in addition to Turkey and Indonesia) can take a lead. Again the challenge is to avoid holding processes where the likeminded and those singing to the choir will gather; we need a serious forum for serious clashes of ideas by true believers. In this regard, it is crucial to provide a meeting ground and opportunity for interaction between neoconservative thinkers, think tanks, including those with strong religious orientation, from the United States with their counterparts from the Muslim world, especially those from Iran and other regional states. Liberal and moderate thinkers are only one --and I am afraid not a very influential-- part of their societies’ respective opinion makers. We need the hardliners and ideologues to have the opportunity to meet face to face. Maybe Erice can help as a neutral ground; although to meet in the region or in the US is more preferable and far more effective. Televised and with the results of the meeting distributed, especially by proper media outlets, educational institutions, mosques, churches, and universities could be very useful. The dialogue within civilizations could be a parallel effort; this is critical for self reflection, identifying authoritative voices, and common ground and recognition of diversities within each civilization.

3. Supporting and encouraging the establishment of “Muslim Advisory Boards” within the non-Muslim world, especially in the West. The nascent experience in the US, which has come about with the persistent pressure of the American-Muslim community has had a relatively successful beginning. These advisory boards essentially carry the twin tasks of dealing with “Muslim issues” within their respective societies, including state-society relations in the context of the war on terrorism, and second to advise and express collective Muslim positions on global issues affecting Muslims, i.e. foreign policy etc. One can envision a situation wherein an annual gathering of representatives of these advisory boards from all over the world will be a very crucial step in creating the foundation for more consensus-driven foundational assessments and decisions on dealing with terrorism. This could also clearly be central to both initiatives discussed above.

The Immediate Challenge

These are perhaps ambitious, but doable, suggestions and somewhat long term; what is immediately needed is a breathing space to stop the disastrous momentum that we are in, to stop further militarization of US/West-Islam relations. The immediate and clear danger to global security, one with profound planetary cultural-security implications, is the looming prospect of a military clash between Iran and the United States. This hostility is now central to global security; it now shapes the Atlantic Alliance, it is severely testing US relations with Russia and China -the “new cold war” against Russia is a factor of this, and it will either way -negative or positive- have a formative impact on the future of US/West Muslim world relations, and of course a phenomenon generically called terrorism.

There is a global crisis in the making; a crisis which is the step child of not only long term hostility between the two countries, but more so a direct and natural consequences of the US master narrative on the war on terror. In fact, Iran was always the linchpin in the eventual US
vision on global success against terrorism. The images of thousands of mourners holding candle lights in the streets of Tehran and the telegraph of the Mayor and fire fighters to their counter parts in New York after 9/11, and then collaboration in Afghanistan against Al Qaeda, was soon to be stunningly overshadowed by President Bush’s “Axis of Evil” speech and now the drum beat of “military option on the table” and even the use of tactical nuclear weapons. (General Wesley Clark, the former commander of NATO, recently indicated that he was astounded to hear, a week after 9/11, that the people in the Pentagon were talking about Iraq and Iran as part of a five year plan-Interview with Air America, May 2006).

Given the enormity of the danger of this war, a war that will certainly consume and reenergize the phenomenon of terrorism, way beyond the current level, it is urgent that the Erice process deliberate on mechanisms to promote dialogue between the two states, and especially facilitate, at an urgent pace, conferences that allow different levels of thinkers, opinion makers and societal leaders from both sides to meet. Here, specifically arranging meetings between conservative thinkers, and think tanks of both sides who only know each other through self-established ideological paradigms to meet face to face, would be especially beneficial. Perhaps the idea of a Troika discussed above can be put into work to deal with this confrontation.

Final words

If only the technical definition of terrorism in spite of its serious limitations and ramifications discussed earlier, were the core paradigm within which motivation and mitigation were framed and the war on terror would have been conducted, we still would have been in a better situation today. The immediate post 9/11 environment was a short lived “golden era”, a historical missed opportunity, so carelessly and perhaps inadvertently wasted by the “neo-Bolsheviks” in Washington, to use Fukuyama’s label. The opportunity was lost because the war on terror was not about Al Qaeda per say or fighting terrorists, it was that and much more; 9/11 was a national tragedy which only sharpened and reenergized an existing (a priori) global ideology of power restoration and establishment of US dominance and security via a forceful, and militarily and socially engineered change in the Middle East.

This was/is a war that was/is heavily conditioned by a strategic and ideational commitment to Israel’s preferences and interests. This discussion, as Robert Fisk has argued, a common belief and knowledge in most of the world (Independent April 27, 2006), remained a taboo until recently when John Mearsheimer and Steven Walt, two influential American scholars with implacable conservative credentials, -both intellectually and politically- called to question the very essence of US foreign policy after 9/11, especially in its uncritical support for Israel, and has urged a new national debate and reassessment (London Review of Books, March 13, 2006).

I brought this subject out to reiterate the central point that discussion of terrorism cannot be done outside the context of the US position; her fear, insecurities, and her suggested strategies and actions in the post 9/11 era both negative and positive, especially in the Middle East. It is this larger context that has fed the so called globalization of Al Qaedaism: self styled, disconnected (neither Madrid nor the London bombing had anything to do with Al Qaeda), inexpensive (Madrid cost 15000 dollars and London the meager 500 Pounds); and localized. It was the larger context, namely the war in Iraq and other dynamics that mattered most. And it is this larger context that again looms large in the horizon for upcoming and seemingly inevitable confrontation with another Muslim state, Iran. This is a war that will guarantee a significant expansion of terrorism, a war that will take “generations to win”.

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Erice cannot ignore or inoculate itself from this larger context if it wants to remain intellectually and morally relevant.

Our planet is a hybrid entity, diversity and unity is its main character. We are all in one way or other hybrids in a positive sense of the word. My own personal life journey is an indication of this hybridity and complexity. As a young boy and man I witnessed my father’s repeated journey between jail and exile and home; for opposing the US-British coup of 1953 which overthrew democracy in Iran (Oh by the way Muslims are not unfamiliar with democracy), for opposing the Shah’s western underwritten dictatorship; and eventually for unmet expectation after revolution. I also saw how Saddam Hussein, the custodian of secularism against fundamentalism, with the support of the West used wmd, and how two of my young cousins perished in its silent burning flames. I also have witnessed and relished the warmth and civic receptivity of my western experience in the United States, as a young student and scholar given enormous opportunities and chance to pursue my goals in a free and democratic and welcoming environment; the magic of the American promise and thus easy and willing embracement of my hybrid identity as an Iranian-American or American Muslim. I also, like so many of you, witnessed the horror of 9/11, though with a bit of a personal twist. My life was threatened by a young American student who in those moments of anger and despair-reflected in his chilling death threat telephone message- saw in me –who he did not even know- an archetypal enemy, a generic terrorist. In a moment of moral clarity, which was only possible in a face to face meeting and dialogue, we reconciled. I wrote then that the war on terror should not allow the terrorists to set the agenda. I am afraid we did the opposite. The blanket generic definition and the black and white certainties terrorize our hybridity and unity. This blanket certainty has to be questioned and challenged if we want to have the chance to win.

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Recent press reports\(^9\) suggest that, during the mobilization for the Afghanistan assault, the then president of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, made contacts with some Al Qaeda oriented Islamists in Afghanistan to reinforce his own plans for resisting an American attack on Iraq that he saw forthcoming. The war on terror was waged in the wake of the September 11 attack on the New York Towers and the Pentagon. Al Qaeda and its leaders, notably Usama Ben Laden, were charged with that terrible crime. The first link of the world’s reaction was an all out attack on Afghanistan, where the alleged perpetrators reside, aimed at bringing them to justice. The military intervention was inevitable after the diplomatic and peaceful efforts to extradite the perpetrators fell on the deaf ears of the Taliban who then ruled Afghanistan.

Saddam purchased private lands from farmers and allegedly stored armament and ammunition in them for later use by the Iraqi resistance. During the Afghan assault Islamists in Afghanistan made their way out and assembled in northern Iraq, the part of Iraq protected by the American no-fly zone, and was outside Saddam’s jurisdiction. Their assembly was made easy by the cooperation of an Islamist organization called Ansar al Islam (the supporters of Islam) that had maintained presence in northern Iraq away from Saddam’s eyes.

The second link in the war against terror came when President Bush and the strategists of his administration wanted to rid the world of Saddam Hussein being the tyrant dictator that he was. After ten years of embargo against Iraq, and many trips of the UN inspection teams looking for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq at no avail, the President decided that Iraq has to disarm its weapons of mass destruction or face the consequences. Sure enough, Saddam faced the consequences and he is now behind bars portrayed as a criminal to the people he had oppressed and to the rest of the world in the televised broadcasts of his trial in Baghdad.

This is what the Taliban and Saddam’s regimes have seen; their regimes were toppled and were replaced by democratically elected governments that need troops to shield them against their own peoples. But what have we seen in the world’s scene ever since?

We have seen democracies opting to scare their public to win their support for the measures the administrations were intent to take to fight terrorism.

We have seen unprecedented security measures implemented inside the United States after a unique legislation had been passed, the Patriot Act. The ease of air travel gave way to security scrutiny. It takes more time to clear security procedures in western airports today than some of the air trips take. Train rides from New York to Boston or Washington D.C became faster to get to one’s destination than the air travel offers. Security measures around public buildings, public transport facilities and other amenities make you wonder if you are living in the democratic countries we once enjoyed. Surveillance of electronic traffic and of domestic and foreign phone conversations inside the United States have been authorized by the executive without sanctions by either the legislative branch or the judiciary. In short, the civil rights of Americans had to be partially suspended throughout the period of war on terrorism. Tight controls and stringent requirements on visas to the United States in particular diverted the flow of tourism and of students elsewhere.

More importantly, we have witnessed an expanded criminal reaction by the terrorist networks in the form of murderous attacks on civilian targets in Riyadh, Jeddah, Khubar, Istanbul,

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Madrid, London, and in Amman. Other murderous acts were committed in Tunis, Yemen and Pakistan. We have not yet touched on Iraq that has been bleeding innocent blood since the Coalition of the Willing waged its assault in March 2003.

What we have suffered in this war in moral and material terms is over a thousand folds what the terrorists themselves have suffered. We moved into Iraq with the pretext of disarming it from the weapons of mass destruction, and no such weapons turned out after much search and research. We confessed that the intelligence information that the policy makers depended on for waging the attack on Iraq was not totally correct. Some reports have alleged that intelligence reports were deliberately distorted, and the Arab and Islamic world tends to believe in these allegations, all to the advantage of the terrorists’ recruitment efforts.

I have known, for one example, the Iraqi Ambassador who was charged of going to Niger to purchase Uranium for the Saddam regime. That diplomat is a non-Arab Iraqi, and Saddam would not put his eggs into the basket of any one who is not checked out and made part of his gang; well, that diplomat was not. He had been in the foreign service of Iraq since the time of the monarchy there. When I asked him what he was doing visiting Niger then, he replied that he was the Iraqi Ambassador to Italy, and he was on a mission to certain African countries to feel them out for busting the embargo on Iraq like they did on Libya when they challenged the American-led embargo against Libya and resumed flight services to Tripoli. That was his mission in Niger. Somehow, it was picked up, most likely by the Italians, forwarded to the British and the Americans, and somehow the mission became that of shopping for Uranium! I do not want to refer to the speech by the Secretary of State in the Security Council prior to the attack, but by way of deception, the Secretary referred to the real name of Abu Musa’ab al Zarqawi, the commander of the terrorists in Iraq, which is Mohammad Fadhel al Khalayleh, and said that he was a Palestinian. Nothing could be more wrong. The man is Jordanian, from East Jordan, nothing to do with Palestine or the Palestinians; but referring to him as one, the Secretary, or the speech writers hit two birds in one stone: they linked the Al Qaeda affiliated Khalayleh with Saddam Hussein on the one hand, and they reinforced the dark image of the Palestinian resistance fighters on the other. I felt sorry for the information he was handed, but I took it innocently without any notion of possible deliberate distortion of information for political ends.

We are periodically briefed on the number of Americans killed in action in Iraq, thanks to the Pentagon and the Press, but we are not told of how many Iraqis have been killed as a result of the attack. We do not know how many Iraqis have been maimed, or the number of children who have been killed or starved, there is no tally of Iraqi human losses as though they do not count. This conduct of war information is not conducive to appreciation by the Arabs and Muslims. Neither was the carpet bombing in Afghanistan, nor the bombing of civilian targets in Pakistan that housed innocent civilians. On top of that, the President of the United States had already used the word “crusade” in his description of the war on terror when he started with the occupation of Afghanistan. These facts are cumulative in the minds of Arabs and Muslims, and reinforce the notion in their ranks that this war on terrorism is nothing but a war on Islam.

America, the champion of freedom and human rights, is struggling today to redeem its image in the Arab and Islamic world and in many other parts of the globe. Hundreds of million dollars have been and will be allocated for this purpose including the commissioning of radio and TV stations, support of “independent” press in the Arab world, and the advocacy of democracy-seeking parties. What the reputation of America, and Britain for that matter, has suffered is almost irreparable if the current policies of war management and toward the Middle East remain unchanged. I have heard Muslims refer to President Bush and his administration as the true terrorists; some go further than that to include the Christians of the West as possessing an inherent desire to kill their enemies mercilessly. They cite Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Dresden as examples in the recent past, and remind people of the Trail of Tears in America in the distant past.
We can hardly convince Muslims that the assaults on Afghanistan and on Iraq are not part of a war against Islam. In such a context, although repeatedly denied by the President of the United States, the prospects of ending the war on terror or winning it seem to me so dim. As we have noticed, when Islam is the subject of their defense, Muslims do not hesitate to give their lives in ways that we can neither imagine nor comprehend. Look at the reaction in the West to suicide bombing, first in Lebanon by the Hizbollah, then in Palestine by Islamic Jihad, Hamas and others, and now in Iraq and Chechenia. We wonder what prompts a human being to blow up himself and a score of other innocent souls. The answer is clear to me: the bomber is convinced that Islam is assaulted, and that it is his sacred duty to defend it and the land of Islam; every Muslim martyr is promised paradise in heaven which has vivid descriptions in the Qu’ran. To the suicide bomber, the after life he is promised is much superior to his own life on earth, something that makes waiting to get there very difficult for him. This, of course, takes indoctrination and spiritual training of the suicide bombers at the time when they are teenagers. Regrettably, the management of the war on terror facilitates the recruitment of such young zealous Muslims to the ranks of the terrorist organizations.

We have to note that, throughout the war on terror, and in the struggle of Palestinians to end the Israeli occupation, the ratio of the Muslims killed in the process to non-Muslims is high, over ten to one. Yet, the war is continuing. This tells of an endless preparedness on the part of the Muslims to sacrifice lives in defense of the faith and “Dar al Islam” against what they perceive as the infidels and enemies of Islam. There are about 1,200 million Muslims in this world; if 200 Million are considered liberal thinkers (an optimistic estimate), we have one billion Muslims left. At least 35% or 350 million will be in an age bracket suitable for motivation to fight back and defend the faith. With a ratio of 10 to one, these recruits are capable of annihilating 35 million people of their opponents. More, of course, will enter the recruitment age, and more will join to defend the faith. If the war on terror continues in the form it has taken so far there shall be no end to it that is favorable to the western world. There has to be a shift in strategy, a shift in approach.

Many observers in the Middle East see a parallelism between the war on terrorism and the war Israel is waging on the Palestinians. Israel’s leaders have always maintained that the security of Israel is threatened, just like the managers of the war on terrorism scare their own people. Israel’s actions in the name of security has extended to occupation of the West Bank and Gaza among other Arab territories, just like the war on terrorism necessitated the occupation of Afghanistan and of Iraq. The Israeli occupation triggered Palestinian resistance in much the same way as the occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq triggered national resistance, and in both cases terrorists, next to the national resistance, have flourished. The chain of action by Israel in the name of security compromised the democratic character of the state just like the Patriot Act and the tapping of electronic traffic and phone calls tarnished the democratic character of the United States. Israel’s counter measures to what she called terrorists culminated into the detention of Palestinians who are mostly not related to terrorism but are active in national resistance, and their detention lasts for unspecified period of time under the title of administrative detention. America’s Patriot Act led to similar detention of people allegedly connected with terrorism for unspecified periods of time and without the due process of law. The torture and treatment of detainees in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo is a reminder of the Israeli treatment of her own detainees. The night time raids of private homes in Baghdad and other Iraqi cities terrorize Iraqi children just like Israeli night raids of private homes terrorize Palestinian children. We yet have to see American bulldozers demolish the houses of Iraqi suspects just like Israeli bulldozers demolish Palestinian houses, but the attack on Iraqi cities like Fallouja and Samarra are evidence of the parallelism in this respect.

All these countermeasures have not assured neither America nor Israel of victory in their respective wars.

A shift in approach and strategy, in my thinking, is needed; a shift that should aim at winning the moderate Muslims to the front against extremists in the Arab and the Muslim world.
without neglecting the need for protection of national security through acceptable countermeasures. This takes a courageous look at the war theaters as they exist today and as they are likely to develop in the future. As it stands today, I can think of very few groups in the Arab and Islamic world that truly sympathize with America in its war on terrorism, or can condone its unqualified support of Israeli continued occupation of the Palestinian and Syrian territories. Nor can one find understanding among Arabs and Muslims of the Israeli countermeasures in their war on Palestinians. America’s image in the Arab and Islamic world is shaped by its tactics in the war on terrorism and in its unqualified support of Israel. America’s categorization of Palestinian resistance as terrorism does not help change the facts on the ground. There is proof that the groups that America labeled as terrorists in Palestine, and these are Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, both Islamic, have gained more grounds after the war on terrorism and the Israeli war on Palestinians than the case had been before that. Hamas ascended through democratic elections to the authority in Palestine, a result that triggered American and Israeli protest, anger and boycott. The European Union soon joined as did, surprisingly, Canada. Such reaction is not conducive to ending the war on terrorism, nor to ending the resistance against Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands.

The needed shift in strategy is to make gestures capable of winning the hearts of moderate Muslims in order to a) alienate the terrorist groups like Al Qaeda from Muslim populations and environment, and b) induce Muslims to join the camp of anti-terrorism and be active in that camp. My gut feeling today, as it had been when this Permanent Monitoring Panel was formed, is to encourage America to be inclusive in its foreign policy, especially in the Middle East. America as the sole leader of the world should shift toward justice and even handedness. America’s taking sides with Israel places it in the camp of the enemy; this feeling is spread all over the Islamic world. Such a modification of position on the part of the United States is not likely during the tenure of this Administration that is full of Israeli supporters and defenders whether Israel is right or wrong.

The other needed shift in the US policy toward management of the war on terrorism is a reconciliation approach to the Arab Sunni Muslims in Iraq, and a healing policy to re-bridge the rift it had created as it stormed Iraq- siding mostly with the Kurds and the Shiites and marginalizing the Sunni Arabs. America employed divisiveness in Iraq in its post Saddam political designs, thus instating factionalism and divisiveness among the people of the one country. This has to change, and Iraqi national unity re-established. America’s pursuit of democracy may be better founded on secular grounds than the religious and ethnic divides it so persistently promoted.

On the Afghani front, America would do well to listen to the indigenous people, tribes and Taliban included, and to build democracy on the grounds that are fertile to democratic practices. If Islam is the only forum Afghans are prepared to stand on, so be it. In all cases, however, shifts of this type would attract the majority of Muslims and their majority is moderate. They are the bulk of the Muslim world. America gains not much by capitalizing on Arab disunity and Islamic sectarian strife, the opposite is true, and alliance with moderate Islam can suffocate extremism of Islamic groups. These extremists are small minorities but flourish on the injustice American policy induces in the Middle East and the Islamic world at large.

The war on terror as specified and managed today will be endless, and the casualties on all sides will be devastating. The cost to Al Qaeda and Muslim extremists is affordable to them, more so than the cost to the western Christian world will be. It is within the realm of western ability and in compatibility with Christian ethics that the needed shifts be made, and they can be done for the benefit of the West and of the entire world.
DEALING WITH ISLAM
by
Pervez Hoodbhoy

Islamic extremism is weak but dangerous. Faced with internal failure, manifest decline from a peak of greatness many centuries ago, and afflicted by cultural dislocation in an age of globalization, many Muslim societies have turned inwards. This has had profound political consequences that favor violent revivalist Islamist movements, both in Muslim countries as well as in Europe and the United States.

Muslim societies badly need positive change, but the only way by which Muslim societies can become democratic, pluralistic, and free from violent extremism, is by going through their own internal struggles. Iraq laid to rest the thesis that positive change can be imposed from outside. Indigenous reform is difficult but possible. Islam is certainly as immutable as the Quran. But Muslims have changed, and will continue to change. Whether future changes are positive or negative will, in considerable part, depend upon policies and actions of the United States and its allies.

Seven Ways By Which The US Can Make Matters Worse:
1. Continue to declare itself as a superior civilization with a right to impose itself upon the rest of the world. Frankly imperialistic grand global designs, exemplified by the “Project for a New American Century”, have guided the Bush administration.
2. Invade Iran to punish it for trying to develop nuclear weapons, while other nations that have developed them surreptitiously – Israel, India, and Pakistan – have been rewarded.
3. Bomb more Muslim cities, create more Fallujahs.
4. Deny legitimacy of the International Criminal Court, perpetrate more Abu Ghraib’s and Guantanamos….
5. Permit its soldiers and officials to desecrate holy symbols, in particular the Quran.
6. Keep arming and protecting Israel even as it pushes Palestinians ever further into a corner.
7. Permit Christians and Jews and other faiths – but not Muslims – to organize politically and run their educational institutions in the US.

Seven Ways By Which The US Can Make Matters Better:
1. Work quickly and expeditiously towards creating a viable Palestinian state.
2. Have direct talks with the Iranian leadership to defuse the nuclear crisis. Do not, for example, contemptuously reject the overture made by President Ahmadenizhad in his letter to President Bush.
3. Reduce, rather than expand military forces stationed overseas.
5. Soft power is critical. Increase foreign aid to poor Muslim countries, create economic and employment opportunities in those countries, and stop pushing policies that reward their elites only.
6. Stop supporting anti-democratic and unpopular military rulers.
7. Secularize politics and education in the US.
The world needs to chart out a course that steers safely away from xenophobes of US and Europe – who see Islam as an evil to be suppressed or conquered – and the large numbers of Muslims across the world who justify acts of terrorism and violence. Muslims are on the wrong track, headed nowhere.

Political Islam is based on false premises. Each blow inflicted by America has led Islamists to predict that the pain and humiliation will make all Muslims to close ranks, forget old grudges, purge traitors and renegades from the ranks, and generate a collective rage great enough to take on the power of today’s governing civilization. Each time they have been dead wrong. What Islamists fail to realize is that the awesome strength of Western civilization springs from accepting the paradigm of science and logic, respecting democratic institutions, allowing value systems to evolve, and boldly challenging dogma without being condemned as blasphemers. They cannot see why the West’s success has anything to do with personal freedom and liberty, artistic and scientific creativity, and the compulsive urge to innovate and experiment.

Muslims must also realize that trying to run modern states while remaining shackled to medieval religious laws is a bad idea; theocracy is a dead end. Economic development, an expansion of individual liberties, democracy, an explosive growth in scientific knowledge and technological capabilities – these and a host of other benefits will forever remain distant dreams without modernization. Just as Christianity and Judaism were reformed and tamed in the industrialized West, Islam must also be reformed. The cultural climate in Muslim lands has to become respectful of universal human rights, accept the equality of men and women, and acknowledge the sovereignty of the people.

**Prognosis:**
The near future offers little hope. American power, though large, is not limitless. Its armies can destroy and occupy, but it takes much more to build a lasting order, especially on the shifting sands of a violent political struggle. The relationship between Muslims and the West is likely to continue its downward descent. Muslim terrorist groups will continue to recruit successfully as long as large numbers of Muslims feel that they are being unfairly targeted. Unless this changes, and there is a perception that justice matters in world affairs, this trend must be considered irreversible. Modern technology permits even small terrorist groups the ability to cause enormous damage. Moreover, static/declining economies will allow for an abundant supply of terrorist recruits. Unless mitigating economic strategies, skill development, job creation mechanisms, etc are seriously addressed, the situation will deteriorate as Muslim populations expand.

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An interview with Usamah Hamdan – A senior Hamas Leader

Alastair Crooke*

There is an anecdote much liked by management consultants that tells the story of a famous US car manufacturer who commissioned a consultant to find out why their products were lagging behind the Japanese competition. The Chief Executive was particularly troubled by his corporation’s lack of technical innovation despite the numbers of good engineers employed – a case in point had been a recent decision by the engineering division to proceed with a carburettor that was far inferior to that of the competition. He asked the consultant to fix the problem.

After a month the consultant returned to the CEO of the US giant to give his findings: He told him that his enquiries had shown that whilst fifty engineers representing the various engineering divisions had indeed endorsed the carburettor design, he found that when he questioned them individually not one of the fifty agreed with their joint decision. All had acted to further their divisional interests or to accede to what they guessed would emerge as the likely consensual outcome – the line of least resistance. “Fix the problem” the CEO responded, indicating that the size of consultancy fee would not be a problem; but had been surprised by the consultant’s refusal. He told him that making real decisions happen was about leadership – and that that was the CEO’s job.

It is the same problem at the European Union today. Speak to European officials individually, or even to their Governments, and there is almost no one who believes that putting Palestinians on a “diet” will make them more moderate or help start a political process with Israel. Putting Palestinians on a “diet” just short of complete starvation is the term coined by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s chief of staff, Dov Weisglas, to advocate the present US and EU policy of trying to isolate the Palestinian Government politically and financially to the point that it cannot pay the salaries of civil servants or function effectively as a government.

For Europeans, the point of this “diet” is to give the new Palestinian Government elected in January no option but to accede to three US and EU demands: recognition of Israel, renunciation of all violence and acceptance of all earlier agreements dating back to the initial Oslo Accords signed by its rival, Fateh, the late Yaser Arafat’s movement.

Speaking with EU officials it is clear that they worry that far from making the Palestinians put pressure on Hamas to change the principles of the manifesto on which they won a large majority of seats in Parliament, the financial sanctions will serve only further to radicalise the Palestinian street. European Governments also fear a breakdown of Palestinian institutions, were the Government to collapse, with the possibility of civil chaos ensuing. And like those US engineers deliberating on a new carburettor, whilst most European officials privately doubt that their policy will be effective; or worse, believe that it may antagonise Muslims more widely and thereby take Europe out of the game in influencing events in the Israeli – Palestinian sphere, they nonetheless feel trapped into a “default” decision from which they lack the necessary energy or leadership to escape. To be fair, the shadow of the paralysis caused by the European divisions at the outset to the Iraq conflict still haunts Brussels in any area that risks a breach with the US.
Some very senior US officials however are more ready to make plain that the US is not interested so much in Hamas’ transformation to non-violence but in the failure and collapse of the Hamas-led Government. They would like to see a Fateh return to power led by someone closer to the model of the Westernised ex-World Bank official, Salaam Fayed, the former Palestinian Finance Minister.

Senior US diplomats were plain in telling their European counterparts that “the Palestinians must suffer for their choice (in electing Hamas)”. Meanwhile, the US is seeking to build a military militia of some 3,500 armed men around the office of the Palestinian President and to channel as much of the expenditure and functions of the Government through the office of the Presidency. In short, the US is pursuing policies that will lead to the creation of a shadow government centred around the Presidency and on his party Fateh - as counter-point to an isolated and financially starved Hamas-led Government. These officials closely associated with vice-President Cheney’s office talk openly with Fateh visitors about the desirability of mounting a “soft-coup” that will restore the more pliant Fateh to power on the back of the humanitarian crisis affecting the Palestinian People.

The irony of this approach is that it is the antithesis to the struggle to take powers away from the Presidency that defined US relations with the Palestinian Authority when Arafat was President!

Usamah Hamdan, a senior member of the Hamas external leadership, spoke to Prospect Magazine in Beirut to describe the situation facing Hamas:

“I believe that even before the formation of the new Palestinian Government was announced, before even the US or Europe had time to judge us by our actions, US pressure for building a siege had begun. Initially the new Government achieved good progress in finding replacement finance for the Government (from Arab and Islamic states), but subsequently there had been huge pressure exerted by the US on the Arab banking system in order to block others from transferring any funds by the commercial banking system to any bank in Palestine. People will suffer. In addition, Israel is withholding Palestinian revenues and tax receipts (amounting to some $60m per month) and is restricting access at the borders. Collectively, these actions are endangering the survival of the internal Palestinian economy. The Government will insist to do its best; to try to secure finance for its activities and to build a successful economy, but it will not be easy against such obstacles: It would be better for all sides – but particularly for our People – if all were to find a solution to these issues.”

Earlier Mr Hamdan had explained that the Government knew that the bloated state sector needed reform: It needed to be reduced in size. Corruption, which is substantial, had to be eliminated, he explained. These two measures would reduce the budget significantly: Palestinians in his view needed to be more self-reliant - more self-reliant economically and more self-reliant, too, in finding a solution to the creation of a Palestinian State.

The problem he identified of course was how to move from heavy dependency on European funding to greater self-reliance without creating more unemployment. Hamas did not want to swap one financial dependency (European) simply to become dependent on another different donor; but neither could the Government move toward greater self-sufficiency without funding to bridge from the present position of state dependency to one of greater self-reliance.
Hamas needs funding in order to stimulate the economy of Gaza and West Bank. Their ultimate aim is to move public sector employees off the state payroll. Of course their first priority is to pay the salaries of present government employees; but beyond this immediate requirement, they have been looking to Arab states also to fund projects such as social housing projects in Gaza that could soak up surplus public sector workers. Their problem was that, having secured pledges of finance from alternative Islamic sources, US treasury pressure has resulted in no bank, US or Arab, being able to accept deposits or make any transfers into Palestine: The US Treasury has warned all banks in the Region that they risk punitive legal action were they to transfer any funds that could even indirectly benefit the Government. Even the proposal that the Arab League pay Palestinian civil servants by transferring directly from an Arab bank in Cairo into employees’ private accounts in Palestine has been failed with no bank willing to undertake the transfer.

Originally the US and EU position was that they had a moral duty to their own taxpayers to assure that no funds reached a government that they categorised as “terrorist”. Now it seems that US threat of legal action is preventing Hamas making any transfer via the commercial banking system – even of monies donated by States such as Bahrain and Qatar. Are we assuming the moral responsibilities for these Governments too; that they should not be permitted to fund social housing projects in Gaza by denying the banking system to every potential donor? It is clear that without the means to raise finance from any quarter the new Government will fail. Have the US and the EU thought through the consequences of a complete institutional collapse?

Former US President Jimmy Carter in an article of 7 May in the International Herald Tribune suggested that our policy represents a crime: under the title “punishing the innocent is a crime”, President Carter wrote that “innocent Palestinian people are being treated like animals, with the presumption that they are guilty of some crime. Because they voted for candidates who are members of Hamas, the United States government has become the driving force behind an apparently effective scheme of depriving the general public of income, access to the outside world and the necessities of life.”

In answer to what Hamas would do if the inability to transfer funding that they have already raised from Muslim donors could not be overcome, Usamah Hamdan said “we have several options, but our main concern must be what is best for the Palestinian People. Palestinians knew well what they were doing when they elected Hamas – They made their choice for Hamas when they were already under attack from Israeli forces and suffering in their day-to-day lives: they elected us because they expected us to do our best on their behalf”.

Mr Hamdan was not perturbed that the humanitarian crisis would turn Palestinian opinion against them. Recent polls have shown Hamas increasing its popularity at the expense of Fateh. He confirmed that Hamas popularity was growing, commenting that “they know that Hamas is doing its best; they know it is not Hamas that is working against them, and that the pressure is coming from Israel and the US. Equally the people understand the part played by a minority of Palestinians who do not accept the reality of change through a democratic process”.

Behind this mild response however must lie some concern that Europe, whose initial aims were to transform Hamas will now find it hard to accept the reality of an EU policy that has not produced the intended outcome. The EU, faced with a US hard line position, may fail to find energy and leadership to move from a consensual default option of attempting to bypass Hamas. Attempts to channel assistance only to President Mahmoud Abbas risks complicating an already tense internal situation Usamah Hamdan suggests:
“Trying to create a parallel government threatens to undermine all Palestinian institutions. A failure here could damage the whole situation: No one will know which is the real government – each side will blame the other. Worse – there will be no Palestinian side: there will be just two warring rivals. The impact of this internal conflict will not be confined to Palestine. It will affect neighbouring states and the whole Region. It would be better if the International community would begin to work with the democratically elected government”.

Cynics might suggest that Israel has nothing to lose from internal Palestinian conflict. In practice however it seems that many Israeli officials are not enamoured of the US hard line objective of trying to bring about a “soft coup” to return Fateh to power. Not for the first time we see the US being more Israeli than the Israelis.

Firstly, they perceive Fateh to be in serious decline - effectively having fragmented into personal fiefdoms. The Palestinian President and some of the Fateh senior leadership are busy advocating to Israelis the prospect of launching a “quickie” negotiation (six months) on all final status issues related to a Palestinian State. The outcome then would be put to a referendum amongst Palestinians effectively bypassing Hamas and the Government altogether. President Mohammad Abbas is convinced that the “peace majority” of Palestinians would endorse it wholeheartedly.

Israelis it seems are not convinced either that they want a Palestinian partner; or if they did, that Abbas, whom Israel regards as weak, can deliver on any agreement. They are less sure that Palestinians would be so positively “overwhelmed” as Abbas assumes at any prospective outcome that Israeli would be likely to offer him in present circumstances. The Israeli public mood at the present is one of unilateralism. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert will have a sufficiently difficult time persuading his coalition colleagues – particularly Shas, the Orthodox Jewish party - to proceed with unilateral withdrawal. There is little appetite for full Final Status talks in Israel at this time; and not much evidence of popular enthusiasm even for Mr Olmert’s project to finalise the borders of Israeli on the back of a partial withdrawal from the West Bank.

There is doubt amongst many Israelis that even were the US to endorse the partial withdrawal as a “final border” (and it is arguable that the US would accede to such a request) that a declaration that this constituted Israel’s final border would have no real meaning or legitimacy. They expect it would be refused by the World at large. Israelis are well aware that all previous withdrawals from Egypt and Jordan have been to the Armistice lines. In the case of their withdrawal from Lebanon, the then Israeli Premier Ehud Barak even went so far as to ask the UN painstakingly to plot the border metre by metre using old maps to ensure the legitimacy of Israel’s complete withdrawal.

After the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza last year I sat with a number of veteran Israeli political correspondents. They were saddened that, after what they perceived as the trauma and pain of uprooting settlements and the withdrawal from Gaza, nothing really seemed to have changed for the better: there was still violence in Gaza, Qassam rockets were landing in Israel and Palestinians seemed no more ready to acquiesce to the Israeli objectives for a limited Palestinian State. This occurred before the elections that gave Hamas its landslide victory. It was clear that these Israeli commentators were sceptical that limited withdrawal from West Bank really would transform Israel’s strategic position.
It seems however that partial independent withdrawal from the West Bank, however unenthusiastic the following among Israelis, will be the objective for the new Israeli Government for the time being.

In this scenario Israel prefers Hamas to Fateh: The Israeli Government does not want a partner for unilateral withdrawal. To engage with President Abbas would defeat the object - as well as the Israeli presentation that the setting of its boundaries is necessary “because there is no Palestinian partner”? Hamas by contrast does not want to negotiate on a partial solution; can be plausibly labelled therefore as “a non-partner” by Israel. Hamas therefore is perceived in Israel to share a common interest in Israeli withdrawal that could lead to some unstated “understandings” that might facilitate the withdrawal. Israel understands that Hamas would be content that Israel departs any Palestinian land especially when its leaving entails no Palestinian quid pro quo. Hamas would count this a victory.

This prospect would also leave Hamas to concentrate over the coming year or two on its core objective of providing good and competent governance to the Palestinian people. Usamah Hamdan underlined the importance of bringing law and order to the Palestinians: He placed it at the top of the list of Government priorities:

“Asmail Haniya has begun working…there are good and positive signs that he will succeed in securing the internal situation. Some of the other groups have begun working directly with the Interior Minister, and a new co-ordinator of security, who is very popular and commands wide support amongst all factions, has been appointed”.

Hamas’ other priorities Mr Hamdan suggested are to improve the economic situation, to create effective judicial oversight over the security agencies, and above all, to make Parliament the instrument of control and accountability of all Palestinian institutions and ministries. And what did he expect of Israel?

“Without their recognition of Palestinian rights we can expect little from them. This is the key to finding a solution; but without a commitment to rights no one should expect a solution.”

Hamas is a very different movement to that of Fateh. They represent two very different traditions of Muslim thinking. Hamas is a part of the growing Islamist current that is seeking to make a modern democratic State that is not centred on duplicating the Western mindset in terms of its model for modernity. It is not anti-Western, but is seeking to re-think society from a position that is distanced from our prism on history and from our philosophical legacy. This results in their use of language that is different to that to which we are accustomed. We in the West mostly use the language of Nation States, of power and of military force, whereas Islamists use a vocabulary of rights and of ethics. Commentators note that the West is unable to negotiate on their vocabulary; it is therefore seen as signs of intransigence and backwardness; it is viewed as something that must be transformed – transformed by pressure, and conditioned by benchmarks.

So far, Europe and the US have been unsuccessful in transforming Hamas. It has isolated the new Government politically and financially, but to no avail beyond bringing Palestinians to the brink of economic collapse. If Europe persists in this stance it is likely to achieve only the removal of Europe from playing any significant role in the Israeli –Palestinian conflict.

Israel is embarking on a process of unilateral withdrawal. It is not seeking a Palestinian partner, but it will need a Third Party to help facilitate in the absence of direct Israeli –
Palestinian co-ordination. By refusing to engage with Hamas, Europe will be perceived by Israel as having no useful role to play. Israel will see that Europe cannot help – because of their refusal to engage with the government - in the Palestinian sphere in any way useful to their plans; and it will assist Israel in its informal policy of quietly boycotting the International Quartet.

More seriously, persisting with this unsuccessful policy of trying to transform Hamas will sharpen Muslim resentment against the EU everywhere. This comes at a bad time. European policies are in difficulties everywhere. Europe does not know what to do about Iran. No one knows what to do about Iraq or Afghanistan. There is a crisis with Syria; Lebanon is internal paralysis; there is a crisis in Palestine and growing problems in Egypt and in Jordan. We respond to this situation by largely refusing to talk with the fastest growing current in the Middle East, the Islamists. We hope to manage these crises by talking to fewer of those interlocutors who may have influence over events.

The EU could make a start in a new direction by heeding the words of the former advisor to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and head of Mossad, the Israeli secret service, Efraim Halevy, who, when addressing the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations at the beginning of this month criticised Israel for insisting that Hamas first recognize the Jewish State as a precondition for any discussion. Halevy argued that Israel should recognize Hamas first. He foresaw that in so doing, “we will be seeing things we have not seen before” a seeming allusion to talks between Israel and Hamas.

This is right. The EU should stop hanging on so-called “principles” and start a process – the principles will shake down of their own accord!

*Alastair Crooke, a former special adviser to Javier Solana, negotiated with Hamas on the truce of 2003*
The darkest fear in the current struggle with terrorism is a nuclear bomb exploding in a major city. Such an attack would cause massive casualties, social dislocation, and economic disruption. Citizens in the attacked country could experience fundamental changes in their outlook on life, attitude toward the world, and confidence in their leaders.

Any country attacked by a nuclear weapon would feel extraordinary pressure to undertake a drastic response, one that will shape its future and that of the world. The September 11th attacks, with several thousand casualties and tens of billions of dollars in losses, set the stage for the Iraq War. Its costs approximate those of a moderate-sized nuclear explosion. The response to such an attack might be proportionately larger, and include bombing or invading countries suspected of active collaboration or complicity.

The pressure to “shoot first and ask questions afterwards” presages a cataclysmically ineffective response. Acting on the basis of limited knowledge, the attacked country may inflict enormous collateral damage, without achieving its critical goals: bringing the perpetrators to justice and preventing additional attacks. Seemingly indiscriminate responses will play into the terrorists’ hands, by mobilizing those who feel unjustly injured or accused by the response.

All other countries have a vested interest in having the attacked country achieve its goals as effectively as possible. They want to minimize needless damage to their own country. They want to keep the response from spilling over to less worthy aims, like using the attack to settle old scores. They want to show solidarity, in order to deny terrorists the victory of dividing the civilized world.

However, they cannot expect the attacked country to work with them, unless that collaboration promises to achieve its goals more effectively than it can on its own. In principle, that should be possible. Determined multilateral pursuit should leave terrorists with no place to hide. In practice, though, an effective response cannot be improvised after an attack. It requires complex technical planning, coordinating law enforcement agencies around the world. It also requires diplomatic coordination, among countries that may disagree on many other topics, including the sources of terrorism.

Thus, the international community faces an urgent need for a multilateral agreement, promising Mutually Assured Support: In the event of a nuclear attack, all parties to that agreement would mobilize all their resources, in order to bring swift, harsh justice to the terrorists and their supporters. In return for that support, the attacked country would refrain from unilateral actions infringing on their sovereignty.

Making that deal attractive will, likely, require other nations to surrender some of that sovereignty voluntarily. For example, they may need to allow the attacked country’s agents to work on their soil or to extradite suspects to countries with interrogation procedures or punishments that they find unacceptable.

These would be deeply painful concessions, even among countries that otherwise trust one another. The difficulties are more acute when nations are divided over essential aspects
of the general struggle against terrorism, including whether some groups are terrorists (rather than freedom fighters) and how appropriate are some measures (like the war in Iraq).

As a result, it is not surprising that no such multilateral agreement is currently under discussion. However, without it, terrorists have a greater chance getting away with mass murder and triggering a spiral of carnage – just as they hope. Not having an agreement sacrifices its deterrent potential. It might even embolden terrorists, by showing them that the “corrupt” nation-states cannot unite, even for cataclysmic threats.

Although understandable, this inertia is unacceptable. Nations must be able to address this extreme threat, while agreeing to disagree on anything else. Deliberations must begin immediately, regarding what all countries will do, should any one of them suffer a nuclear weapons attack, and what the attacked country will refrain from doing, if it receives suitable support.

Those deliberations need not reach a signed treaty, in order to have a stabilizing effect. Just starting them will show the dire threat posed by a terrorist nuclear weapon and the response to its use. Once begun, the talks should become too important to fail.

Sustaining the talks should require taking steps with salutary effects of their own. For example, creating the hot lines needed for an emergency should open communication channels between countries. Defining collaborators broadly should dissuade potential supporters, who cannot know when, say, a financial contribution might link them to a heinous war crime and subject them to an international dragnet.

The closer that the parties can come to a complete agreement, the greater are the chances that they can bridge the final gaps, following an attack. Indeed, when nations are intensely divided on other issues, a prior signed agreement may be politically infeasible. Their goal has to be building enough mutual confidence to be able to put aside other issues, if the acute need arises.

Nations that cannot undertake and stay this course deserve the world’s condemnation. In the Cold War, the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction dealt with the possibility of there being no tomorrow, after a massive nuclear attack. After even the worst imagined terrorist nuclear attack, the vast majority of people will still be alive, even in the attacked country. All nations will be judged by their responses – and their preparations.

In order to guide this process, we propose doctrine of Mutually Assured Support. It creates incentives for actions that reduce participating countries’ physical risks, while enhancing their standing in the ideological battlefield that determines support for terrorists. The doctrine commits all parties to mobilize all resources in order to (a) apprehend and punish all those involved with an attack and (b) prevent additional ones. All nations fulfilling these obligations, to the satisfaction of the attacked country would be safe from retaliatory action. This doctrine addresses the undeniable rights of an attacked country better than it can by itself, as well as the deepest fears of other countries. The process of its adoption should build confidence and security.
Connecting the Dots in Global Network Terrorism
Scott Atran, Marc Sageman

How do terrorists become radicalized? What motivates them? Who among them are most liable to action or defection? These important questions cannot be answered by any available terrorism database. Leaving aside journalistic accounts of terrorism, which rely heavily on anecdotal evidence, serious terrorism research has hit a roadblock because of lack of relevant data. True, there is a number of existing databases (GTD, MIPT, ICT, RAND/START, etc.). But these are all incident-based catalogues of terrorist names and events: who did what, where, and with what damage. They show the geographical distribution and timeline frequency of terrorist attacks, with the focus on operations rather than terrorists. Only a people-based database would be able to answer questions about terrorists belonging to the viral social movement affiliated with al Qaeda, which we call Global Network Terrorism (GNT). And such a database must be freely available for academic, policy and government communities because public access is critical to the peer review that characterizes science and is essential for quality control.

A people-based database should include background information about terrorists and their trajectory within the contexts they arose, enabling scientific testing of various hypotheses about terrorism. We have piloted such a database including over 500 GNT terrorists. Preliminary results refute the two most common theories about GNT, personal predisposition and “root causes.” We find that no individual factor, whether social background or personality variable, leads to involvement in GNT; terrorists are as diverse as the general population. Likewise, no “root cause” or environmental condition generates terrorists; millions of people are subjected to these conditions but very few become terrorists. Our data show that the most fruitful perspective is a middle range one: small group dynamics best reveal the processes that lead people to kill and die for a cause and comrades. This perspective points to a crucial element of a terrorist-based database: namely, the natural history of relationships among terrorists and with their environments.

Building a database useful for scientific research must be reliable and fairly comprehensive. The major drawback in journalistic accounts is that initial reports of attacks are full of speculations, which remain uncorrected and “echo” over time to give error-prone sources a misleading credibility and importance. But the plural of anecdote is not data: some of the available databases we have tested exceed a thirty percent error rate. We rely as much as possible on legal documents, captured information and intercepted conversation entered into trial evidence and court transcripts, because these are subjected to cross-examination, thus approximating “peer scrutiny” of evidence. Good investigative reporting and field interviews done with direct access to information and corroborated through independent means are other good sources of data.

At present, there are dozens of expensive software programs and other government-funded “tools” designed to mine and analyze data, but they have yet to generate a true counter-intuitive insight into terrorism. Claims for predictive power of software applied to incident-based databases usually revolve around analyses of the frequency of regularities in past events to project cyclic patterns of events into the future: for example, via spectral analysis, the application of which to terrorism has not changed appreciably in over 20 years. But if there really were available means to predict low probability events like 9/11 and its aftermath, then we should ascribe criminal negligence to authorities. Because of government hopes of finding a “technical” solution to the problem of terrorism and a preference for “widgets,” and because of the prevailing assumption that “someone out there” must have the
relevant data, in fact no comprehensive dataset presently exists that can sufficiently arbitrate between competing hypotheses.

The project of building such a database is fraught with difficulty, such as assessing reliability of any given information and a new conceptualization of the different relationships linking people. It is critical that social scientists head such a project rather than software modelers and engineers, as is now common. Modelers are generally interested in selective information (“nails”) that can best fit their models (“hammers”). Witness, for example, the current fad for physicists’ scale-free models, which capture network structure and growth like expanding sets of Russian dolls, but which are empirically inappropriate for context-sensitive terrorist networks. Unlike social scientists, modelers also may not appreciate the importance of discarded information, which may hold the key to new insights. For example, the driver of the dead Emir of Jemaah Islamiyah may have been a critical link in re-establishing connections after the arrests for the Bali bombings of October 2002. Because the driver had no criminal record, he would not likely have figured in incident reports, though a people-based database would show him “mirroring” the defunct Emir’s connections.

A preliminary analysis of people-based data is already yielding useful insights. Contrary to conventional wisdom, terrorists seem just like the rest of us. GNT has grown from “bottom up” enlistment through friendship, kinship and (increasingly) the internet, rather than “top down” recruitment by or for terrorist chiefs, as the latest killings in Madrid, Amsterdam, London and Indonesia illustrate. Terrorist operations in Qaeda’s name are not well planned but follow an evolutionary process, based on contingent adaptations to unpredictable events and improbable opportunities, more the result of blind tinkering than intelligent design by hierarchical command and control. A more comprehensive database will test these preliminary hypotheses and inform more realistic interactive modeling allowed by our computing capabilities. But creation of the database is the first step in putting terrorism research on a sound empirical footing, allowing future breakthroughs in understanding and thwarting this troubling human phenomenon. It will set necessary empirical constraints on evolutionary models that are focused on small group dynamics, which network analysts should be developing.


Over the past year, much public attention has focused on pandemic influenza, such as might arise from reassortment of the Type A (H5N1) avian flu that has been spreading from Southeast Asia, but expert consensus is stronger that a flu pandemic is likely than is the judgment that it will derive from H5N1. Even a recurrence or an image of the 1917-18 H1N1 "Spanish flu" that killed some 50 million people world wide would be a disaster in the modern age of specialization and globalization, and such a pandemic that occurred in the next few years could not be much eased by available stocks of vaccine or antiviral drugs. If the pandemic had the lethality (perhaps overestimated at 50%) of the present H5N1 for which there is no evidence of human-to-human transmission, it could kill a billion people or more, but there is no reason to believe that this lethality would be preserved in the transformed virus capable of such transmission and hence pandemic behavior.

Because there is a receptive audience to measures against pandemic flu, and because we have some novel and important perceptions to counter this serious and likely threat to health, life, and society, we present our analysis and recommendations for countering pandemic flu by nonpharmaceutical means. We speak of an epidemic in terms of a single reproductive actor $R_0$ ("R-naught") and a serial interval $\nu$ ("nu"). For the SARS epidemic, $R_0$ is about 3 and $\nu$ about 8 days. For smallpox, $R_0$ is about 3 and $\nu \approx 14$ days. And for influenza, $R_0 \approx 1.7-2.4$ and $\nu \approx 4$ days. In what follows we take for flu $R_0 = 2$, although we recognize that it will vary from society to society and in various groups within society. Unchecked, an epidemic that begins with N "index cases" would give rise $\nu \approx 4$ days later to 2N additional cases, $\nu$ days later to 4N more, 8N more, and so on, so that after M serial intervals there will be $N (1 + R_0 + R_0^2 + R_0^3 + ... + R_0^M)$ cases altogether, until the susceptible population is exhausted and a substantial fraction of the population is resistant or even dead.

On the other hand, if by the nature of the germ or of population density or other measures to reduce the transfer of germs to additional victims, $R_0$ can be reduced below 1.0 (i.e., $R_0 < 1.0$) the sum of successive generations is finite, even for M very large. Then the number of cases C totals $N (1/(1-R_0))$. If we use an example a reduction of $R_0 = 2.0$ by a factor 3, so that $R_0 = 2/3$, $C = 3N$. We identify important measures that we believe may, if practiced, achieve this factor 3 reduction, so that a society in which 60 infective index cases enter per day would thus experience a total of 180 cases per day, or 65,700 flu cases per year—less than the normal seasonal flu that results in some 36,000 deaths each year from influenza in the United States alone. In the absence of such assumed effective measures, recent detailed modeling results\textsuperscript{10} [T.C. Germann, et al, 04/11/06] show on the order of 50% of the 281 M people in the US infected with pandemic flu—2000 times as many.

**Personal protective measures\textsuperscript{6} PPM:**

These personal protective measures—PPM— that would appear to "protect" an individual by an assumed factor 3 would instead protect each individual in the society by a factor 2000. Under these circumstances, note that reducing or increasing the influx of infected persons (index cases) by a factor 3 would change C down or up by a factor 3 only—very different from the dramatic effect of a threefold reduction in the flu transmission factor $R_0$ within the society.

Efforts to reduce the delay and to increase the rate of production of an effective vaccine are important, as are those to increase the production and protection from anti-viral drugs, but a pandemic in the next year or two would find inadequate vaccine and anti-virals for the population as a whole. This early pandemic would need to be met and might be vanquished by PPM in groups or societies which practiced such measures effectively in the face of contagion. Simply put, without such effective PPM, antiviral drugs and vaccines will be exhausted and a pandemic would infect most people and kill many; the assumed effectiveness of PPM in a society would reduce the pandemic to the status of seasonal flu and allow the protection of hospital and health care workers by such pharmaceuticals, even if there were insufficient stocks for the general population.

Influenza is transmitted primarily by the virus in droplets accompanying coughs and sneezes, by persistent aerosols (droplets too small to fall out of the air in a few minutes), and by virus transferred to the hand of the infected person and thence to doorknobs, support poles in public conveyances, hand shakes, or via other surfaces. The hand of a susceptible person acquires the virus, which then enters the body through contact of the hand with the mouth, nose, or eye.

**Primary PPM:**

1. Wash the hands after contact with potential contagion—e.g., when returning home, to the workplace, or frequently in space shared with others who may be symptomatic. If hand washing is inconvenient, use a 60+% alcohol-content hand sanitizing gel.

2. When in the presence of others, use a surgical mask or an N95 filter mask to protect against droplets or aerosols respectively. If masks are not available, improvise a mask such as a scarf over the eyes and mouth.

3. Don’t shake hands; bump elbows in greeting.

4. Keep hands away from your face—especially eyes, nose, and mouth.

5. Don’t infect others; use a tissue or piece of paper towel for sneezes and coughs and have a bag for used tissues.

6. Eliminate or reduce unnecessary trips, even local ones.

7. If you need to care for a person who might be sick with flu, use additional precautions such as diluted household bleach for bed clothes and for cleaning surfaces.

8. Practice these procedures at least one day every two weeks.

9. Clean and circulate air where people are in proximity, e.g., in transport, offices, assembly work.

**Communicating the measures:**

Communicating these measures should be considered an important part of training in public health. International, national, state, and local organizations (including businesses, schools, lodges, and faith-based organizations) should adopt and make available information and training, including check lists, bulletins, and web-based materials. Showing is superior to telling. Simulation games are likely to be made available on the web so that children and web-adept adults can see the effectiveness of PPM in vanquishing epidemics, as well as the impact of non-compliance by some.
Communications should be grounded in scientific evidence (or else identified as speculation). They should be empirically evaluated for effectiveness prior to dissemination. These evaluations will provide effectiveness estimates for the modeling. Communications need to be adapted to the culture and circumstances of their audience; they should be created well in advance of a pandemic, and then updated as needed. In some societies one must begin with mass education that the cause of this disease is germs—not evil magic or God.

**Motivating individuals, families, and groups to practice and evaluate the measures:**

Businesses and public-interest groups have an evident incentive to preserve the health and effectiveness of their members. Still, it will take staff, effort, and funds to adopt such programs, to reach the individuals through their various intersecting affiliations, and to ensure that PPM are practiced on schedule before any pandemic occurs. Examples might be: no access to public transportation on Thursdays without an improvised mask; posted public health rules requiring employers to have dispensers of hand sanitizing gel available in the workplace.

**Validating the personal protective measures:**

Large-scale and simplified computer models are an essential tool for understanding and communication. They should clearly identify assumptions made about human behavior. Results of research regarding that behavior should be reflected in the model, rather than relying on intuition. Where such research is lacking and the model is sensitive to the assumed specific value, then research to establish the correct value should be a priority. Research needs and results should be shared on the web. For a strategy that depends on masks and bleach, ensure that suppliers have planned for rapid transition to manufacture and distribution of such supplies on a timely basis.

**Real-time modeling of the emergence of pandemics in one's society and elsewhere:**

WHO, aided by country teams and international business should make available on the web current and accurate information to guide action by individuals and groups everywhere. Measurements of $R_0$ in one society will need to be interpreted by a model to give characteristics of the virus that a similar model will translate into $R_0$ values for other societies and groups, thereby guiding the intensity of PPM required. Note that only a factor 3 reduction in $R_0$ is required, but if 1 of 3 people don't comply, then even perfect compliance by the rest will not reach the goal. And universal noncompliance by a compact subgroup would allow a pandemic to rage in that subgroup.

**Monitoring adherence to PPM:**

Groups and public health officials should monitor training for PPM and the actual practice in the presence of flu in each group or country. Current and accurate data of case incidence should be made available on the web by responsible and credible groups for this purpose.

**Beyond personal protective measures:**

Prepare the population and groups for self reliance; prepare (and practice) the health care sector to do the greatest good in the face of overwhelming need.
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<th>By Individuals</th>
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<td>Population education</td>
<td>Employee education and stock extra soap, gel</td>
<td>Family education and implementation</td>
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<td>Use of masks</td>
<td>Population education</td>
<td>Employee education and stock</td>
<td>Family education and implementation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reduced contact, elbow bump, cough etiquette</td>
<td>Population education</td>
<td>Employee education and practice</td>
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<td>CDC/WHO data</td>
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<td>Police and fire protection remains operational</td>
<td>Public versus family issue for officials</td>
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Influenza Pandemic: Predictability and preparedness

Diego T. Buriot

"I am sure that what any of us do, we will be criticized either for doing too much or for doing too little…. If an epidemic does not occur, we will be glad. If it does, then I hope we can say… that we have done everything and made every preparation possible to do the best job within the limits of available scientific knowledge and administrative procedure."

"US Surgeon General Leroy Burney, Meeting of the Association of State and Territorial Health Officers, August 28, 1957"

Introduction

While neither the timing nor the severity of the next pandemic can be predicted, the presence of the H5N1 virus in poultry increases the current risk that a pandemic virus will emerge. The risk for a pandemic is certain to persist. The present outbreak in birds began in Asia in mid-2003. By early May 2006, the virus had been reported in domestic or wild birds in 51 countries located in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa as well as in greatly expanded parts of Asia. Of the 32 countries reporting outbreaks in poultry, only two have successfully eliminated the virus from their territories and maintained a disease-free status. The highly pathogenic H5N1 strain of avian influenza virus, which has been circulating in poultry in parts of Asia since mid-2003, has fulfilled all the requirements for the start of a pandemic save one: an ability to spread, efficiently and sustainability among humans. Opportunities for the virus to acquire this ability will persist. Early expectations that the threat of a pandemic might be extinguished by eliminating the virus in animals are not likely to be met in the near future.

From Nature April 2006

The present H5N1 situation is unique: for more than two years, the high visibility of the H5N1 virus, accompanied by research on past pandemic viruses, has given the world increasing warnings that another influenza pandemic may be imminent. As no virus of the H5 subtype has ever circulated widely among humans, population vulnerability to infection by an H5N1-like pandemic virus will be universal. All populations are fully susceptible, and all countries are equally at risk. There are reasons for concern about the H5N1 influenza virus: the virus causes extremely severe disease in humans, it has considerable pandemic potential,
the source of human exposure is not easily removed, the virus is evolving in ominous ways and the world may be on the brink of another pandemic. Yet despite this long warning, no country is fully prepared to protect its citizens.

WHO and international experts believe that the world is now closer to another influenza pandemic than at any time since 1968, when the last of the previous century’s three pandemics began.

Once international spread of a pandemic virus begins, pandemics are considered unstoppable, caused as they are by a virus that is readily transmitted through the air by coughing or sneezing. The fact that infected people can shed virus and transmit disease before symptoms appear adds to the risk of rapid international spread via asymptomatic air travellers. Most experts agree that the next pandemic will reach all parts of the world within three months. Pandemics usually cause abrupt surges in the numbers of people needing medical or hospital care, temporarily overwhelming health services. High rates of worker absenteeism can interrupt other essential services, such as law enforcement, transportation, and communications, and impede business continuity and economic productivity. Experiences during the 2003 outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) suggest that the associated social and economic disruptions will be amplified in this century’s closely interrelated and interdependent systems of trade and commerce. In addition, broad access to electronic communications can be expected to spread public anxiety at equally unprecedented speed. The World Bank has estimated that the first influenza pandemic of the 21st Century could cost the world economy US$ 800 billion within a year.

Concerning human health matters, four main opportunities to act have been identified: reduce high-risk behaviors associated with human infections; improve the detection, investigation, and reporting of human cases and, in so doing, strengthen the early warning system; contain an emerging pandemic virus; and increase pandemic preparedness. A fifth item – considered by many participants to be the most pressing need for adequate preparedness – concerned world capacity to manufacture sufficient quantities of pandemic vaccines and antiviral drugs, at sufficient speed, and to make these interventions broadly accessible to all countries.

These five actions formed the basis of the five-pronged strategic plan developed by WHO immediately after the meeting. The plan aims to achieve two over-arching objectives:

1. to ensure full exploitation of all opportunities to prevent the H5N1 virus from developing the ability to ignite a pandemic and, should this effort fail,
2. to ensure that measures are in place to mitigate the high levels of morbidity and mortality and social and economic disruption that can be expected during the next pandemic.

Each strategic action has a goal that contributes to these larger objectives.

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<th>Goal</th>
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<td><strong>1 Reduce human exposure to the H5N1 virus</strong></td>
<td>Reduce opportunities for human infection and, in so doing, reduce opportunities for a pandemic virus to emerge</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2 Strengthen the early warning system</strong></td>
<td>Ensure that affected countries, WHO, and the international community have all data and clinical specimens needed for an accurate risk assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>3 Intensify rapid containment operations</strong></td>
<td>Prevent the H5N1 virus from further increasing its transmissibility among</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td><strong>Build capacity to cope with a pandemic</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ensure that all countries have formulated and tested pandemic response plans and that WHO is fully able to perform its leadership role during a pandemic</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td><strong>Coordinate global scientific research and development</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ensure that pandemic vaccines and antiviral drugs are rapidly and widely available shortly after the start of a pandemic and that scientific understanding of the virus evolves quickly</td>
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**Transmission characteristics of Influenza virus**

Most information on transmission of influenza virus is based on older experimental studies, inference from observations during outbreaks, and studies with other objectives, especially the assessment of vaccine and drug efficacy. All these sources have substantial limitations: investigations often use different methods, involve a small number of persons, and reflect the behaviour of influenza A and B viruses in seasonal rather than pandemic setting (1, 2).

- **Viral Shedding and Transmission by Persons with Symptoms**

  In otherwise healthy adults with influenza infection, viral shedding 24 - 48 h before illness onset has been detected but generally at much lower titers than during the symptomatic period. Titers of infectious virus peak during the first 24 - 72 h of illness and decline within several days, with titers usually low or undetectable by day 5. Shedding in highly immuno-compromised persons may last weeks to months. Compared with adults, children can shed virus earlier before illness begins and for longer periods once illness starts. Infants with infection requiring hospitalization may shed virus longer. In both adults and children, shedding does not usually continue once illness has resolved. Serologic testing indicates that ≈30% - 50% of seasonal influenza infections may not result in illness.

- **Viral Shedding and Transmission by Infected Persons without Symptoms**

  During the incubation period, persons with presymptomatic influenza infection shed virus at lower titers than persons with symptoms; however, the infectiousness of those with presymptomatic infection has not been studied. Apparently the only published report implicating transmission during the incubation period involves a group of adults in New Zealand in 1991(3). Of 26 adults who bagged fertilizer for 8 h, influenza-like illness (fever, headache, sore throat, myalgia, respiratory symptoms) developed in 16 and mild "cold-like" illnesses developed in 3 persons within 24 to 48 h after working with the fertilizer. A person considered to be the probable index patient had felt unwell during work, although he did not have respiratory symptoms; an influenza-like illness began to develop 6 h after he finished work. Influenza A virus H1N1 was isolated from 2 symptomatic persons; whether these included the suspected index patient and whether that person transmitted infection during an incubation period or the cluster resulted from community exposure are unknown. The group shared drinking bottles and worked in a dusty environment, both of which could have facilitated transmission.

- **Large-Droplet and Aerosol Respiratory Transmission**
Animal studies and most influenza outbreaks among humans suggest that virus-laden large droplets (particles more than um in diameter) generated when infected persons cough or sneeze are the predominant mechanism of influenza virus transmission. However, evidence for aerosol spread (especially in unventilated conditions) is available. Although a direct comparison has not been made, experimental studies suggest that the infectious dose for humans exposed by aerosol is lower than that seen with experimental nasopharyngeal instillation. The precise proportion of infections transmitted by large droplets versus aerosols is difficult to assess and likely depends on the setting but is relevant when developing recommendations on mask use. Data do not exist to quantify the relative efficacy of surgical masks versus respirators in preventing influenza infections in exposed persons, but surgical masks should protect against large droplets, believed to be the major mode of transmission.

- Transmission by Contaminated Hands, other Surfaces, or Fomites

Transmission of influenza viruses by contaminated hands, other surfaces, or fomites has not been extensively documented but is believed to occur. In a nursing home outbreak in Hawaii, an investigation (4) concluded that transmission of oral secretions from patient to patient by staff who were not gloved best explained the outbreak. In an environmental survival study, influenza A virus placed on hard, nonporous surfaces (steel and plastic) could be cultured from the surfaces at diminishing titer for ≤ 24 to 48 h and from cloth, paper and tissues for ≤ 8 to 12 h at conditions of 35% to 40% humidity and a temperature of 28°C. Higher humidity shortened virus survival. Virus on nonporous surfaces could be transferred to hands 24 h after the surface was contaminated, while tissues could transfer virus to hands from 15 min after the tissue was contaminated. On hands, virus concentration fell by 100-1,000-fold within 5 min. after transfer. The authors concluded that transmitting infection from the surfaces tested could require a high titer of virus on the surface; such titers can be found in nasal secretions at an early stage of illness.

- Incubation Period and Infectiousness

The incubation period for influenza averages 2 days (range 1 - 4 days), and the serial interval (the mean interval between onset of illness in 2 successive patients in a chain of transmission) is 2 - 4 days. Also, viral excretion peaks early in illness. These factors enable influenza to spread rapidly through communities. By contrast, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) has a serial interval of 8 to 10 days, and peak infectivity does not occur until week 2 of illness, which allows more time to effectively implement isolation and quarantine measures. The basic reproduction number (R0, the mean number of secondary cases generated by 1 infected person in a fully susceptible population) of the 1918 pandemic influenza subtype has recently been re-estimated by two studies as ≈ 2-3 and 1.8, comparable to that of the SARS-associated corona virus (SARS-CoV) (R0 2-4).

- Amplifying Groups and Settings

Children in preschool and school-age groups are frequently observed to amplify transmission, although any group living in close proximity can do so, and outbreaks are observed in institutions involving persons of all ages. Although transmission may be amplified at mass gatherings (e.g. theatres, sports events) documentation is scarce.

Lessons from SARS

The international outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) was a watershed event. It revealed how much the world has changed in terms of the impact that outbreaks of a
severe new disease can have in a highly mobile and closely interconnected world. During a fortunately brief stay in its new human host, the SARS virus travelled rapidly along the routes of international air travel to infect more than 8,000 people in about 30 countries. Of these people, SARS killed just under 800.

The SARS experience was remarkable in several ways. It caused enormous economic damage and social disruption in areas far beyond the outbreak sites. The previous estimates of the economic costs of that outbreak, US$ 30 billion, are now considered conservative. The SARS experience showed that decisive national and international action, taking full advantage of modern communication tools, could prevent a new disease from establishing endemicity. It raised the profile of public health and appreciation of the importance of international cooperation in health to new heights.

SARS primed politicians to understand both the far-reaching consequences of outbreaks and the need to make rapid containment a high priority. SARS also stimulated efforts to find ways to make the impact of the next international outbreak less dramatic.

Many – but not all – of these lessons are useful as the world braces itself against the prospect of another human influenza pandemic. The unprecedented scientific and medical collaboration that characterized the SARS outbreak, with leading experts openly sharing their latest findings, can also be expected to help the world understand a new pandemic virus quickly and translate this new knowledge rapidly into practical advice for control. The threat posed by the H5N1 virus has already attracted political attention at the highest levels, including the launch of the US-initiated International Partnership for Avian and Pandemic Influenza. This is valuable to advance necessary prevention and preparedness activities worldwide at national, regional, and global levels.

Unlike SARS, however, pandemic influenza is considered unstoppable once international spread is fully under way. The classic public health interventions – screening, early detection of cases, and tracing and follow-up of contacts – that proved decisive in containing SARS will not be sufficient to interrupt the transmission of a pandemic influenza virus. Because influenza virus can be transmitted prior to the onset of symptoms, programmes to screen for symptoms will not detect all carriers. The very short incubation period leaves too little time to conduct contact tracing. Each influenza patient can be expected to transmit the virus to another person within 2 days; the number of cases will grow exponentially. Moreover, influenza spreads easily through the air via coughing or sneezing; SARS transmission required close face-to-face contact with a patient.

One important lesson from SARS is paramount: the importance of real-time monitoring of the evolving situation, supported by advice from the world’s best experts, and immediate communication of information.

The effectiveness of non-pharmaceutical measures for control will depend on the characteristics of the pandemic virus (attack rate, virulence, principal age groups affected, patterns of spread within and between countries), and these cannot be known in advance.

Recommendations about the most effective control measures will therefore become more precise as the epidemiological potential of the virus unfolds. Virtual networks of experts will advise WHO on such issues as projected patterns of spread, modes of transmission, laboratory diagnosis, and clinical management of patients, and this information will be communicated immediately. All experts hope that use of good risk communications practices at every level and an informed public will facilitate the smooth implementation of control measures, while also reducing some of the social and economic disruption that make pandemics such dreaded events.
**Key Elements of the public health response**

**Pharmaceutical interventions**

Vaccines are the most important medical interventions for reducing morbidity and mortality during a pandemic, and for conferring population-wide protection, but vaccine effectiveness requires a close match with the actual pandemic strain of the virus. Because a pandemic strain, capable of efficient and sustained human-to-human transmission, does not yet exist, the specific pandemic vaccine does not yet exist either. As no country will have adequate vaccines at the start of a pandemic, antiviral drugs assume particular importance as the only possible medical intervention for protecting priority groups pending the arrival of vaccines. Antiviral drugs might also be used to contain or delay the spread of a pandemic at its source.

Pending the availability of vaccines, several antiviral drugs are expected to be useful for prophylaxis (prevention of illness) or treatment purposes. The H5N1 virus is expected to be susceptible to the neuraminidase inhibitors, as two drugs in this class, oseltamivir (commercially known as Tamiflu) and zanamivir (commercially known as Relenza), have been shown, in laboratory studies, to reduce the severity and duration of illness caused by seasonal influenza. The efficacy of the neuraminidase inhibitors depends on their administration within 48 hours after symptom onset. For cases of human infection with H5N1, the drugs may reduce the severity of disease and improve prospects of survival, if administered early, but clinical data are limited.

Another class of antiviral drugs, the M2 inhibitors amantadine and rimantadine, could potentially be used against pandemic influenza, but resistance to these drugs may develop rapidly and this could significantly limit their effectiveness. Some currently circulating avian H5N1 strains are fully resistant to the M2 inhibitors, while others remain fully susceptible.

For both vaccines and antiviral drugs, present constraints – which are considerable – mean that most developing countries will have no or very limited access to either throughout the course of a pandemic.

**Non-pharmaceutical interventions**

Non-pharmaceutical interventions will be the principal control measures during the initial phase, pending the dispatch of the international, regional or national stockpiles of antivirals and/or the availability of adequate supplies of an effective influenza vaccine.

Non-pharmaceutical intervention outside of the health care setting focus on measures to: 1) limit international spread of the virus (e.g. travel screening and restrictions); 2) reduce the spread within national and local populations (e.g. isolation and treatment of ill persons; monitoring and possible quarantine of exposed persons and social distancing measures, such as cancellation of mass gatherings and closures of schools); 3) reduce an individual's risk for infection (e.g. hand hygiene) and 4) communicate risk to the public.

- **Public health information/communication**

Information for public on risks and risk avoidance (tailored to population) information for professionals will be essential. Advice to universal hygiene behaviour, including the
importance of hand hygiene should be one of the strongest risk communication and social mobilization messages provided within the quarantine zone and to the general public.

- **Measures to reduce risk that cases transmit infection include:**

  - Confinement of mild and severe cases, as appropriate, to the local situation, strict infection control within health care settings and on the provision of health care, including within fever clinics should they be established.

  - The use of high efficiency masks by health care workers is described in the WHO avian influenza, including influenza A (H5N1), in humans: WHO interim infection control guideline for health care facilities. Although there is no evidence from influenza on the effectiveness of the use of surgical masks by influenza cases, evidence from tuberculosis suggest that it may be a useful adjunct to infection control if tolerated by the patient. Face masks are also recommended for persons with influenza-like illness seeking medical care to reduce the risk of transmission of influenza, cross-infection and contamination of the health care environment e.g. fever clinic.

Wherever possible, persons developing influenza-like illness (ILI) should be assessed outside health care facilities treating confirmed influenza cases to prevent cross-infection. Options include the establishment within the quarantine zone of fever clinics, phone triage facilities followed by home visits by medical staff, drive-through consultation services e.g. based at petrol stations, and other methods of triage and diagnosis that limit unprotected exposure to the ill.

**Measures to reduce risk that contacts transmit infection include:**

Contact tracing has limited application in pandemic influenza, except in the initial investigation of disease clusters that provide the signal for the technical assessment, given the short generation time and the fact that ~40% of infections are the result of transmission before the onset of symptoms in the source case or by asymptomatic transmission. The close contact groups that can be readily identified for contact tracing consist of households, household clusters, preschool groups, schools, and workplaces.

Efficacy of voluntary changes in social behavior such as voluntary quarantine (home confinement and/or travel limitation, hand washing, hand shake limitations is not known, should also include provision of social care. Face mask use by exposed, asymptomatic contacts of influenza has no scientific basis. However, there may be some protection offered by facial protection (masks and eye protection) to home careers of ill patients by reducing viral load.

Face masks used in public also have no scientific basis and may create an environmental contamination problem if proper disposal facilities are not provided. Facilities for safe disposal of used masks will be required, either by removal from the quarantine zone or local incineration or burial.
Legally mandated measures to increase social distancing have been used in past pandemics and remain important options for responding to future pandemics. The main public health interventions include mandated travel restriction, school and work closures and postponement of mass gatherings in addition to the administration of antiviral prophylaxis and isolation of the ill. Depending on the location, cancelling mass transit services may also be required. In case of a limited outbreak in a country, determining the size of the “cordon sanitaire” will be difficult under field conditions and will depend on the geopolitical characteristics of the source outbreak, and the population at risk is more likely to be determined by administrative divisions rather than epidemiological considerations. Such decision-making will vary between and within countries and is best guided by existing emergency management protocols and procedures.

International quarantine has also been used in the past to slow or prevent the international spread of pandemic influenza with limited results except in small island states. Exit screening at the borders and/or closing borders to international travel and trade may assist outside the quarantine zone e.g. small island nations, but will require the cooperation and coordinated activities of two or more national governments, creating even greater challenges than would otherwise occur.

Much uncertainty exists about the societal acceptability of options for creating social distance and thereby reduction in transmission.

Epidemiologic modeling for prediction, detection and control of emerging infectious disease (EID)

In the United States, mathematical models are familiar, everyday tools in engineering, business, and military applications and in most sciences. They represent hypotheses about underlying mechanisms that generate observed phenomena or the options for action and potential consequences. However, those models are rare in the biomedical-research and public health communities.

Models can be of great value, provided that their strengths and weaknesses are clearly understood by policy experts. Models can provide a means to systematically compare alternative intervention strategies, determine the most important issues in decision-making, and identify critical gaps in current knowledge by integrating epidemiological and biological data.

Examples include the design and evaluation of childhood disease immunization programmes; predicting the demographic impact of the HIV epidemic in different regions, and analyzing the spread and control of the 2001 foot-and-mouth epidemic in Britain. Recent applications across diverse fields include also ecologic niche modeling to identify potential reservoirs for Ebola and Marburg viruses.

The events of September 11, 2001, emphasized that the United States should use every tool available to help prepare for, and respond to, bioterrorism, with smallpox considered to pose the greatest risk owing to the lethality and transmissibility of the virus. Published analysis of the potential spread of smallpox virus in modern urban communities are relying heavily on mathematical modeling to monitor smallpox spread and the potential effects of several types of interventions, in several attack scenarios.
In relation to Influenza, mathematical modeling can help to respond to the two most pressing public health questions: what might be the time course and geographical spread of the outbreak and what is the most effective utilization of available therapeutic and social resources to minimize the impact of the outbreak. Computer models have been developed (6,7) using information available on past influenza pandemics, including number of secondary cases that would occur from the original infected individual, normal incubation period of the illness and speed with which the pandemic would spread and demographic information, such as regional and national population size and age, numbers, schools and large companies, and distances that people travel to work and schools. Models have been developed using a scenario of an influenza outbreak starting in rural Thailand.

According to models, the best weapon is containment at the source. Since no avian flu vaccine currently exist, aggressive containment measures, centered on the prophylactic use of antiviral drugs applied at the source of a pandemic, might contain the outbreak, or slow its spread, if its emergence is detected early. Antiviral prophylaxis would need to reach 80% of the population at the source of the outbreak within 30 days of symptom onset in the first people infected with an emerging pandemic virus, and the need to combine mass administration of drugs with other measures, including area quarantine.

The success of such an intervention depends on several assumptions: (1) the prototype viruses that show the ability to sustain transmission among humans will not be highly transmissible; (2) the emergence of such viruses will be geographically circumscribed; (3) the first clusters of human cases caused by the virus will be rapidly detected and reported, and the viruses will be rapidly identified and characterized; (4) antiviral drugs will be rapidly mobilized from the stockpile, made available to the affected population, and administered to sufficiently large numbers of people; and (5) movement of people in and out of the area will be effectively restricted.

Due to the unpredictable behavior of influenza viruses, it is impossible to know in advance if the first two assumptions will be borne out when a pandemic virus emerges. Effective implementation of rapid containment will require decisions regarding interventions having broad impact beyond the health sector, and will be taken in a climate of considerable scientific uncertainty. The more controversial and draconian of these (e.g. cordon sanitaire) have medical, legal and ethical implications that may vary in different settings. Most of the interventions in the armamentarium of pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical control measures are untried in the context of pandemic influenza, although there is some evidence of their efficacy during past pandemics and the SARS epidemic or as standard precautions against the spread of common respiratory diseases e.g. hand hygiene.

Community acceptability of the intervention by the affected community is essential, which imply effective risk communication and social mobilization to ensure a shared understanding of the measures that will be attempted and the timing of their application, including indicators that containment has failed in that population.

### Strategies for mitigating an influenza pandemic should initial containment of novel influenza outbreak fail

Recently published studies (8, 9), using UK and the US as examples have shown that border restriction and/or internal travel restriction are unlikely to delay the spread by more than 2 to
3 week unless more than 99% effective. School closure during the peak of a pandemic can reduce peak attack rates by up to 40%, but has little impact on the overall attack rate, whereas case isolation or household quarantine could have a significant impact if feasible. Treatment of clinical cases can reduce transmission, but only if antivirals are given within a day of symptoms starting.

T. German and al (10), have developed a model representing the whole U.S. population and have evaluated the effectiveness of different intervention strategies against a pandemic flu virus. Depending on the contagiousness of the virus, a variety of approaches could reduce the number of cases to less than that of an annual flu season. They introduced a small number of hypothetical infected but not yet symptomatic travelers, arriving daily at 14 major U.S. international airports. With these assumptions in place, they simulated a virtual outbreak with a goal to determine how to slow spread long enough so that a well-matched vaccine could be developed and distributed.

Results show that with no intervention a pandemic flu with low contagiousness could peak after 117 days and infect about 33% of the U.S. population, while a highly contagious virus could peak after 64 days and infect about 54% of people.

With the less contagious virus, the three most effective single measures included distributing several million courses of antiviral treatment to targeted groups seven days after a pandemic alert, school closures, and vaccinating 10 million people per week with one dose of a poorly matched vaccine. Regardless of contagiousness, social distancing measures alone had little effect.

With the highly contagious virus, all single intervention strategies left nearly half the population infected. The only measures that reduced the number of cases to below the annual flu rate involved a combination of at least three different interventions, including a minimum of 182 million courses of antiviral treatment.

While the results are specific to the United States, the general findings are expected to apply to other developed countries and could aid the drafting of preparedness plans both here and abroad.

**Conclusion**

The effectiveness of non pharmaceutical public health interventions in affecting the spread of pandemic influenza depends on the transmission characteristics of the virus. If a substantial proportion of transmission occurs during the incubation period or during asymptomatic infection, the population impact of health screening and case-patient isolation will be diminished.

The age distribution of patients is also important. If children play a central role in community transmission, school closure would likely be more effective. Since a new pandemic subtype might have different transmission characteristics than previous subtypes, these characteristics and associated illness patterns must be assessed in the field as soon as human to human transmission begin. Monitoring over time is also needed to assess possible changes as the virus becomes more adapted to human hosts.

Mathematical models can provide a means to systematically compare alternative intervention strategies, determine the most important issues in decision-making, and identify critical gaps in current knowledge.
References


5. WHO avian influenza, including influenza A (H5N1), in humans: WHO interim infection control guideline for health care facilities


Introduction

The infectivity rate of human avian flu may be reduced to levels that are manageable within countries if social network interaction is reduced across time, space and frequency.

The media is identified as the most powerful driver for achieving the necessary changes in social networks alongside an adaptive and agile public policy agenda.

The overwhelming socio-economic costs of any slow down in human activity are assessed alongside compensatory solutions within technology that enable persons to interact across buffer spaces and to transact essential daily life activities without a high risk of becoming infected.

Adaptive human behaviour will reduce the severity of a pandemic and may reduce the residence time of the pandemic within the population. However the cycle of avian flu which is reinfesting animal species from domestic fowl would suggest that humans and fowl will remain reservoirs of this very dangerous disease until a generic form of vaccination is engineered.

Public policy and network recommendations are made for removing all children from school within a country from Day 1 of symptoms of a suspected cluster of pandemic affected persons; widespread encouragement of surgical masks; bio-security programme for every man, woman and child in the country to learn protective behaviour and location of antivirals within supermarkets.

Media recommendations cover protective measures for the media with education on their own social network risks, travel risk and access to information being paramount.

Buffers, Barriers and Behaviour

1. Physical buffer space distance in the home, workplace and in any social activities
2. Physical barriers such as surgical masks for any confined space contacts between persons in travel and for close contact activities.

3. Behaviour development for within each individual for respect of social distance, cooperation in adopting masks and other barriers to infection and participation in collective behaviour patterns for bio security. Self protection and taking care of the ill within close social network when health resources are overwhelmed will become essential behaviour.

11 Sally Leivesley, PhD Lond.,MSPD, BA(Hons) Qld., FICDDS,FRSA,MACE
Managing Director, NewRisk Limited, Frazer House 32/38 Leman Street London E1 8EW
General Office Tel. +44 (0) 20 717 36008, 24 hour line +442086603873, Mobile +447974916470
In recommending these actions there are uncertainties in the research data relating to the type of mask that will be effective in flu pandemic, methods by which people really experience cross infection from flu and the cycle that will evolve between humans and animals with both acting as reservoirs of different strains of the virus.

**Social Networks and the Environment**

There needs to be a definition of the human network environment to describe how clusters of people in various forms and sizes of groups are going to interact during a pandemic. The environment may be described from observations of:

1. Social distance between individuals in living space, working space, home space, travel space

2. Frequency of connections with other clusters of people – the removal of all children from connections with external clusters is an option on the first day that pandemic cases are discovered in a country.

3. Media protection covers education on their own social network risks, travel risk and access to information being paramount. Widespread travel without protection and high networking frequency would create a high level of attrition within this industry if adaptive behaviours and some essential worker strategies are not introduced.

4. Leading persons who make more connections with individuals than others in the group need extra precautions and the risk for each individual can be assessed by ranking of persons in a group in relation to the frequency of connectedness.

5. Environmental triggers that change social network behaviour or act as stimulus to behaviour as essential to behavioural modification. Environmental cues such as a neighbourhood that suddenly has many very ill persons who cannot go to work or school will have an effect on other’s behaviour when this change in the environment is observed.

6. Experience of the persons in the network with managing crises in the past may provide reinforcement for behaviour to adapt to the flu risk.

Vulnerability of networks needs to be considered both internally and in interaction including biological vulnerabilities to pandemic flu and to further disease processes in the recovery period.

There are social motivational issues that create vulnerabilities when some groups are less likely to be susceptible to public information and awareness campaigns. Some networks will suffer more spatial vulnerabilities because of their work, living conditions or the density of the population in the location. Age and level of control over behaviour are vulnerability where certain ages of children, for example may create closer social interaction and higher infectivity rates. Some networks will be more vulnerable from social, educational and cultural differences.

**Recommendations for Networks**

1. Generate person to person discussion of pandemic and protection systems before individuals will perform and persuade others in a network to adopt self protective behaviour.
In the United States as an example, specialists in marketing may use extensive data and research to generate focused programmes for different areas of the country. Market analysts and advertisers have expertise to contribute to this solution.

2. Different groups will exhibit different levels of receptiveness to public messages.

3. Work teams within critical infrastructure create a special case for behavioural modification and at the extreme level of criticality for the welfare of a nation some groups may benefit from voluntary lock down in a facility to service the facility. This is only successful as a strategy if the social networks of those individuals are provided with advices and services to assist protection and if there is connectivity through communications.

4. Keeping teams together is an important activity without any process for replacement of individual members even when this means a whole team may become inactive. There are uncertainties about what level of loss to flu will cause disintegration of many social groups and this may be known only when a pandemic occurs and observations are carefully made. A critical collapse point in a team may be a function of numbers or capabilities and the prediction of this may assist with planning for continuity.

5. Persons may need to self regulate behaviour such as staying at home when others in the local family group are ill so that there is not a chance for infection of work teams.

**Public Policy**

There are considerable economic impacts and potentially destructive outcomes from a purposeful slow down of human connectivity and the removal of individuals from the workforce from illness and care of others may cause massive economic disruption. This will slow down economies and create risks to the well being of a nation. Public policies therefore need to recognise the requirement for technical and social processes to allow human interaction to occur across safe buffer spaces.

Advice to the community on self protection, group protection, bio-security and management of the crisis of any illness in a network is essential to the maintenance of social cohesion and order during times of crisis when a pandemic is at its peak point of infectivity across a nation. This advice will have little effect during a pandemic wave but may be a learned behaviour if governments develop a strategy that is tested by the community.

Clarifying community expectations will be a major challenge for governments and media when local communities and local interpretation of risk is based on cues seen by individuals rather than on government advice through the media.

Global economic reforms will be required to remove the cross infectivity of fowl and humans and to manage distances between people working together under pandemic waves of infection. These reforms will cover transport, social congregations, schooling and workplace.

There may be a surge of information technology demand due to the requirement for home working during a pandemic.

Managing a social restructuring of children’s education, their social activities and patterns of child care within the community is potentially disruptive and a major change in socialisation of the young which may be difficult to achieve.
Information to the Public

There are several key elements of applying space, time and frequency to self protection and some samples of information that can be delivered in twenty seconds with visuals through the media are listed below:

1. One to a bed
2. Your breath is another’s death – so keep 1-2 metres away to protect eyes, nose, mouth, hands from droplets of flu
3. Wash hands many times
4. People who live together or work together infect each other – distances of 1-2 metres will limit transmission of the virus
5. Children spread virus without any symptoms before and after being ill
6. A pandemic flu makes you very ill very quickly - temperature, short of breath, dry cough might occur
7. Fit strong workers have a strong body reaction and carry a higher risk of serious complications
8. Anti viral medicines are essential in first hours, after 48 hours these are not expected to change the progress of the disease and they only function for each day that they are used.
9. All breath, body fluids, bedding are highly infectious from an ill person
10. Any new person coming into a home or work group could be infectious for up to 2 days and a child might be infectious and without symptoms for several weeks.
11. Use water and bleach mixture or other strong cleansing agents to clean infected clothing, bedding and utensils and put items into a very hot wash but always protect face and skin.
12. Masks on the sick person protect others, surgical masks may reduce droplet infection and in high risk situations, particularly in travel where there is low ventilation quality a special viral mask (N95) will reduce the risk of infection..
13. Do not share any food or drink utensils even when all are well
14. Do not travel in planes, buses, train, cars, taxis without a mask, gloves and hand washing. Cross infection in these confined transport modes is very, very high.
15. Estimates are that 2% of all ill may die, 50% of all people may be exposed and 25% of all people will become ill.
16. In a small cluster, a family or working team, if one person is ill expect all others within 48 hours to be exposure cases and some may become very ill.
17. Infection risks are higher when the figures of all new infected people each day are rising and the risks of cross infection reduce when the numbers of new cases each day are falling sharply. A pandemic may come back again.

Medical Care

Home Care for all ill with flu may be a more humane option and necessary in pandemic waves where the hospitals are overwhelmed with victims and unable to function. The disruption of the ill from other causes will provide further social impacts.

An innovate management of medical care by making the social network the prime carer and providing communications information to guide the self- care activities in the community may be more successful than running medical surgeries for persons ill with pandemic flu or complications.
Co-location of anti viral drugs with the community may be more successful in distribution across a long pandemic period as it would relate stocks of anti-virals to population densities based on purchase patterns from super markets.

Focused prophylactic treatment by medical specialists of critical suppliers of long haul trucking, security, media, rail, shipping, water, telecommunications and energy supply lines may reduce the catastrophic failure risk for

An estimate of two years can be made for changes in social behaviour as these will follow a time related process of awareness, learning, motivation to behave, application in relevant situations learned through testing or exercising and practiced on a regular basis or else applied in everyday life. The behaviour has to become continuous, reinforced by others and part of mass social behaviour. It therefore has to be generated by public communications, community education programmes and within schools and other institutions.

Behavioural adaptation is more likely to be effective if it is built onto existing trends i.e. if convergence or home nesting are instinctive public behaviours the utilisation of this tendency may facilitate behavioural engineering. Engineering behaviour against such trends would require more time and be less homogeneous in uptake.

Wearing of masks when a person is ill to reduce spread of contaminating sputum would not be a behaviour that was quickly adopted by for all persons in a country and the percentages that could be assumed in any model of behaviour change would increase at a slow rate. Observations of organisational change and acceptance of protective behaviours in industries such as the petrochemical industry when there is a disciplined and focused training programme across a workforce would tend to support the two year assessment.

The lack of data on surgical masks and droplet infection in relation to an avian pandemic leaves an open question but one that is worth assessing further to add a realistic barrier between people travelling or working in dense situations. Surgical masks are cheap, unobtrusive, easily disposable and already an acquired behaviour in some countries such as Japan.

Media

Media recommendations cover protective measures for the media with education on their own social network risks, travel risk and access to information being paramount.

The media have a role in this form of social change and the media are adept at identifying success in communities across the world where social changes are being attempted. The pre-pandemic communications role would have an impact on the levels of self protection within the community and in a crisis the focus by the public on media statements would increase because of a heightened convergence of people onto media information.

The confidence of the public in preferred media sources would mean that all media outlets would need extensive support and access to government health advice. The less formal ‘blogs’, ‘pod casts’ and other networked communications would tend to act as reinforcing agents to mainstream media messages.

The proliferation of many media outlets and may different patterns of cultural reference to the media may require market reports before assumptions can be made on the level of impact of any health message that is distributed by this medium.
Conclusions

The discussion has focused on a number of measures that may reduce social exposure to pandemic flu but the instinctive behaviour of people may be more successful in keeping individuals away from areas where there are infected people asymptomatic persons. The basic behaviour of ‘nesting’ at home may in itself be a main contributor to the protection of the small social unit. The basic human behaviours may therefore out-perform the efforts of government at social engineering.
References and useful web sites:


Footnotes to Sacred Values

i Direct recruitment plays only a minor role in the global jihadi expansion. Membership increases large through enlistment, that is, self-recruitment. Even in Al-Qaeda’s heyday, before 9/11, would-be jihadis would come knocking at Al-Qaeda’s door, rather than the other way around, with Al-Qaeda accepting less than 20 percent for significant operations.


vi Such sentiments are characteristic of emotionally-driven commitments, such as heartfelt romantic love and uncontrollable vengeance, which are apparently arational and may have emerged under through natural selection to override rational calculations when confronted with seemingly insurmountable obstacles to the attainment of deep-seated needs (see R. Frank, Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions (Norton, New York, 1988). In religiously-inspired terrorism, these sentiments are manipulated by organizational leaders, recruiters, and trainers, mostly for the organization’s benefit at the expense of the individual. In times of crisis, of course, every society routinely calls upon some of its own people to sacrifice their lives for the general good of the community as a whole. One important difference is that for militant jihadis, crisis is constant and unabating, and extreme sacrifice is necessary as long as there are non-believers.


xiv P. Tetlock, ‘Coping with trade-offs: Psychological constraints and political implications,” in S. Lupia, M. McCubbins, S. Popkin (eds.) Political reasoning and choice, (University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 2000). As Tetlock and others have noted, although people with sacred values sometimes seem to treat them as having infinite utility (e.g., in refusing to consider trade-offs), this is something of a logical impossibility inasmuch as infinite value implies that people with such values should spend literally all their time and effort protecting and promoting that value. For this reason, these researchers hold that such values may be only pseudo-sacred, further noting that people with protected values may nonetheless engage in indirect trade-offs. One may be tempted to think of protected values as self-serving “posturing,” but the reality of acts such as suicide bombings undermines this stance. Moreover, protected values necessary to an individual’s identity may take on truly absolute value only when value-related identity seems threatened with extinction, just as food may take on absolute value only when sustenance for life is threatened.


Sensitivity to quantity depends on whether the focus is on the moral impulse of the act, where there seems to be little or no sensitivity (e.g., Does God love less the martyr who dies killing 1 enemy versus the martyr who dies killing 10 of the enemy? Answer: “No”) or on the consequences, which appears to heighten sensitivity (“Does God approve more of a mujahid’s action that kills 10 of the enemy versus a mujahid’s action that kills 9 of the enemy?” Answer: “Yes”).

Of course, while this may be an accurate description of the value motivation that drives people to become suicide terrorists or to support terrorism, the organizations that actually direct suicide terrorism are indeed motivated by instrumental rationality to fight the policies they abhor. Al-Qaeda deputy Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri argues in his “testament,” *Knights under the Prophet’s Banner*, that “the method of martyrdom operations [is] the most successful way of inflicting damage against the opponent and the least costly to the mujahidin in casualties.” Jihadi leaders also point to the sacrifice of their “best and brightest” as proof of the movement’s commitment to the Muslim community, which increases the organization’s political market share. Furthermore, the decision of the terrorist organization to encourage suicide attacks may be driven by a military-technological calculus. In September 2004, Sheikh Hamed al-Betawi, a spiritual leader of Hamas, told me: “Our people do not own airplanes and tanks, only human bombs. Those who undertake martyrdom actions are not hopeless or poor, but are the best of our people, educated, successful. They are intelligent, advanced combat techniques for fighting enemy occupation.”


Interview with Dominique de Villepin in L’a Vie (Paris), no. 314, February 24, 2005, p. 16 : « Il n’y a de communauté que nationale ». But arguably the greatest potential terrorist threat in the world today lies with uprooted and egalitarian Muslim young adults in European cities, who provided the manpower for the 9/11, Madrid and London attacks. Immigrant integration into European societies has always been more difficult than in America, being more state-driven and top down than community-based and bottom up. There is no indication that any rival to Jihadism’s uncompromising vision of a fair and just society is being conveyed to would-be jihadi youth in Europe. Secular education and open elections do not by themselves speak sufficiently to the spiritual and cultural needs their rootlessness generates. The European Union’s increasingly open society is currently more favorable to far-flung networking among jihadis than to an efficient coordination among different government services that remain hidebound to national territories and politics, and to professional hierarchies and traditional languages. Rejection of the European constitution and its idea of further political integration will fix these trends into the foreseeable future. The steep decline in birth rate among native Europeans, which is highest in southern European countries most accessible to immigration from North Africa and the Middle East, and rising need for immigrant labor can only aggravate the problem. Neither Europe nor the U.S. can deal with this alone.


Sacred values not only present strong barriers to negotiation, but also opportunities. Consider the well-known case of “ping-pong” diplomacy between the USA and China. The sacrifice of something of marginal value to one side (losing a ping-pong match where, ping-pong was considered a “basement sport” by most of the U.S. population) was amplified by its value-differential into producing something of great symbolic value for the other side (ping-pong was a sport of national prestige to China). This exchange contributed to a world-historic breakthrough during the Cold War. (Note that cricket matches between India and Pakistan are not likely to have such an effect because cricket has more or less equal value for both countries, so that game becomes zero-sum, with only a loser and a winner.) See R. Eckstein, “Ping Pong Diplomacy: A View from Behind the Scenes,” *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 2, 327 (1993). Contrast this with the efforts of Japan to conciliate China in 2005, which were destroyed by the Japanese Prime Minister’s symbolic attendance at a World War II shrine. Also, much of the back-and-forth between the American colonies and Britain in the lead up to the revolutionary war concerned the validity of a tax that Britain set deliberately at a low level to make the symbolic point that it had the right to tax the colonies as it chose.


DC: National Alliance, 1978), which ends with the hero ploughing his jet into the Pentagon on a successful suicide mission; also Pierce’s analysis of the 9/11 attacks being carried out for the right reasons by the wrong people, Free Speech 7, November 2001, www.natvan.com/free-speech/fs0111c.html. After the closing of the Aryan Nation compound in Idaho and several recent leadership changes, these people have begun calling their new mission “Aryan Jihad.” Before opening up a bit to other races that oppose Judaism, it is necessary that the System be disrupted and broken down. This is the same 'System' that not only oppresses Aryans but is also responsible for oppressing all persons of whatever race or nationality who oppose the erroneous, Judaic-based authority which is the premise for System-rule, available at www.aryan-nations.org/about.htm.

Arguments by outsiders that militant Islam can be undermined by showing it doesn’t reflect the religion’s “truth” or “essence” are likewise vacuous, for there is no “essence” or fixed content to any religion: S. Atran, A. Norenzayan, “Religion’s Evolutionary Landscape: Counterintuition, Commitment, Compassion, Communion,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27, 713 (2004). Nevertheless, debates among Muslims about – for example – whether killing children is acceptable, are critical to how their religion will be interpreted and applied.