TERRORISM IN INDONESIA: NOORDIN’S NETWORKS

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TERRORISM IN INDONESIA: NOORDIN’S NETWORKS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Indonesian police are closing in on Noordin Mohammed Top, South East Asia’s most wanted terrorist. In a dramatic pre-dawn raid on 29 April 2006 in Wonosobo, Central Java, they shot and killed two members of his inner circle and arrested two others. If and when they capture Noordin, they will have put the person most determined to attack Western targets out of commission. But the problem of Noordin’s support structure will still have to be tackled.

For four years Noordin has tapped into jihadist networks to build a following of diehard loyalists, and those same networks may be available to others. Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the region’s largest jihadist organisation, continues to provide the hard core of that following: the two killed in the Wonosobo raid were longstanding JI members, as was at least one of those arrested. But beginning in 2004, Noordin began reaching out to young men from other organisations and some with no previous organisational affiliation.

Many JI members reportedly see the group he has cobbled together – he grandly calls it al-Qaeda for the Malay Archipelago – as a deviant splinter that has done great harm to the organisation they joined in the mid-1990s. Noordin, however, reportedly sees himself as leading JI’s military wing, even though he answers to no one. He justifies his actions by citing jihadist doctrine that under emergency conditions – for example if surrounded by the enemy – a group of two or three or even a single individual can take on the enemy without instructions from an imam.

This report examines the way in which Noordin has relied on personal contacts to put his group together. It is based on interrogation depositions, court documents, and Indonesian press reports, with information crosschecked through extensive interviews with knowledgeable sources, both official and unofficial.

For the Marriott Hotel bombing in Jakarta in August 2003, he used a small circle of Sumatra-based JI members who had either been associated with a JI school in Malaysia, Lukman al-Hakiem, or with its prototype, the al-Mukmin Islamic boarding school in Ngruki, near Solo, Central Java.

For the Australian embassy bombing in September 2004, he relied on three networks: the East Java division of JI; alumni of JI schools in Central Java; and a West Java-based faction of an old insurgency, Darul Islam, whose members supplied the key operatives. While individuals from that Ring Banten faction had worked with JI before, military operations had never before been outsourced in this way. It was one indication that Noordin was working on his own.

After the embassy bombing, Noordin was short of funds, weapons and experienced fighters. He turned to two men who had access to all these, neither of whom was JI. One was from a different Darul Islam faction with long experience in the Philippines; the other had been head of the Ambon office of the Islamic charity KOMPAK and could mobilise veterans of Indonesian communal conflicts. Intense negotiations followed with couriers used to relay messages between the bosses. It turned out that neither the Darul Islam nor the KOMPAK leader was interested in joining forces but both were arrested in mid-2005 and began to lose control over their followers, some of whom went over to Noordin.

For the second Bali bombing in October 2005, Noordin relied on his inner circle, including the two who were killed on 29 April, to find and train new members. Recruitment appeared to be rather ad hoc, despite written materials attributed to Noordin suggesting a tightly organised cell structure designed to undertake military operations.

Noordin has shown remarkable determination and capacity to plan operations even as he loses his closest colleagues to police dragnets and remains the target of Indonesia’s biggest ever manhunt. It is not clear who among potential successors could do as well.

But his behaviour following Bali II suggests he is running short of money and experienced cadres. The loss on 29 April of the men who served as both couriers and recruiters has to be a significant blow. The Wonosobo raid was a triumph for the police, and Noordin’s arrest will be an even greater one. But the networks he drew on will survive as a potential source of recruits for future operations.

Jakarta/Brussels, 5 May 2006
I. INTRODUCTION

Noordin Mohammed Top remains the most wanted man in Indonesia.\(^1\) Despite four years of dogged police pursuit and a raid on 29 April 2006 that netted some of his closest associates, he has managed not only to evade capture but also to recruit new operatives for spectacular, once-a-year suicide bombings: the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta in 2003; the Australian embassy in 2004; and three restaurants in Bali in 2005. The 38-year-old Malaysian national by all accounts is not a particularly impressive figure. For a salafi Muslim, his religious knowledge is limited, and he does not speak Arabic. He is not a skilled orator. He has a knack for surrounding himself with devoted followers who possess skills that he does not, however, and his ability to elude police for so long has enhanced his stature. He can also claim to head the one organisation that actively continues to wage jihad against the U.S. and its allies on Indonesian soil.

That organisation is not Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) – at least, not the JI most members would recognise. Noordin and members of his inner circle are JI members. Until 2001 he directed the Luqmanul Hakiem school in Malaysia, headquarters of Mantiqi I, the JI division that covered Malaysia and Singapore. But he increasingly appears to have charted his own path, in a gradual process that began with the 2003 Marriott bombing. By the time of the embassy bombing, he seemed to be operating on his own without reference to the JI central command, although he reportedly still considered himself a member.

He reportedly justifies his actions on the grounds that under emergency conditions – for example if surrounded by the enemy – a small group or even a single individual can take on the enemy without instructions from its imam. In this way, he may see himself as leading the “real” JI, as opposed to the do-nothings who object to the bombings.

However he justifies it, he is running his own show. His followers began calling themselves thoifah muqotilah, Arabic for “fighting force”, in 2005. It was a new use for an old term JI had used to refer to a decentralised special forces unit it planned to set up after the first Bali attack. Noordin seems to have appropriated the term without connection to that initiative.

By about April 2005, according to Indonesian police, Noordin was claiming to head the working group for the Malay archipelago of Tanzim Qoidatul Jihad, the formal name of al-Qaeda.\(^2\) The extent of his actual communication with al-Qaeda is not clear but he certainly seems to have been infatuated with it, aping not only its name but also its materials and tactics. As of mid-2004, he had taken on the nom de guerre of “Aiman”, almost certainly after the al-Qaeda No.2 Aiman Zawaheri. A whole section of a website, www.anshar.net, developed under Noordin’s guidance between July and September 2005, was devoted to articles translated into Indonesian from Sawt al-Jihad, the al-Qaeda online magazine. Noordin’s appearance on a videotape found in November 2005, complete with balaclava covering his face, seemed to be an effort to replicate the videos made by Zarqawi, the prominent insurgent in Iraq.

Noordin’s ties to Ali Ghufron alias Mukhlas, the Bali bomber, remain strong. Noordin reportedly idolises the East Java-born preacher, who was his mentor in Mantiqi I and is also a hafez – one who has memorised the Koran. Mukhlas, while on death row in Bali, continued to give his protégé materials for religious discussion groups, thanks to the lax controls on communications within Indonesian prisons. If Noordin is not convincing as a religious scholar, Mukhlas is, and through a variety of media, printed and electronic, his teachings can be –

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and almost certainly were – used for recruitment and indoctrination.³

Since Bali II, Noordin has suffered setbacks. In November 2005, he lost a key member of his team, the master bombmaker Azhari Husin, during a police siege in East Java; eight followers were arrested in Semarang, not far from the site of the April raid. But his group survived and even grew because of the networks he was able to tap into for shelter, logistical assistance, and recruits.

These networks have changed over time, reflecting Noordin’s increasing distance from JI. For the Marriott bombing, all major operatives were Sumatra-based JI members. For the Australian embassy bombing, Noordin turned to the JI network in East Java, JI schools in Central Java and a Darul Islam group in West Java that had worked with JI in the past but was a separate entity with its own chain of command. The actual bombing was carried out by the latter in a kind of outsourcing operation that was at odds with standard JI practice.

For protection after the embassy attack, Noordin increasingly relied on networks that included but went far beyond JI, taking in non-JI veterans of the two big communal conflicts in Indonesia, Ambon (Maluku) and Poso. He also used those veterans’ networks to reach out to two non-JI figures, KOMPAK leader Abdullah Sunata and Darul Islam leader Akram alias Shamsuddin alias Taufikurrahman. They refused to join him, and by mid-2005, both were under arrest.⁴

The Bali II bombings of 1 October 2005 suggest that once Sunata and Akram were behind bars, their control over their followers loosened, allowing Noordin to bring some of them on board. By early 2006 he was trying to turn his ad hoc band into a more structured armed force that could operate beyond Java and, at least in his dreams, beyond Indonesia.

II. THE MARRIOTT BOMBING NETWORKS

The 2003 Marriott Bombing provides the first case study of how Noordin used personal networks. Plans for that operation developed almost by accident, but as they did, Noordin relied heavily on people he knew and trusted – almost all JI members and many associated with the Luqmanul Hakim school in Johor, Malaysia.

A. THE LUQMANUL HAKIEM SCHOOL

Luqmanul Hakim opened in 1992 on JI founder Abdullah Sungkar’s instruction, with Mukhlas as its director. It was directly modelled on the al-Mukmin pesantren (Islamic boarding school) in Ngruki, Central Java that Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir had founded twenty years earlier. It adopted the Ngruki curriculum wholesale and had the same aim of developing new cadres to wage jihad; moreover, many of its teachers were Ngruki alumni.⁵ After JI’s establishment in 1993, the school became the nerve centre of Mantiqi I, most of whose leading members were associated with it in some way. All the best known JI bombers—Hambali, Mukhlas, Amrozi, Ali Imron, Zulkarnaen, Faturrahman al-Ghozi, Dulmatin, Imam Samudra, Azhari and Noordin himself—either taught, lectured or studied there. It taught young women as well as young men, and Hambali was not the only senior JI member who found a wife there. At its height it had about 350 students.

Noordin began to attend lectures there around 1995, when he was studying for a master’s degree at the nearby Universiti Teknologi Malaysia; he did not join JI until early 1998.⁶ When it was clear that Luqmanul Hakiem needed a Malaysian national as director to stay open, Noordin took the job, although Mukhlas remained the dominant figure.

In late 2001, a crackdown on JI in Malaysia began, and Luqmanul Hakim ceased operations by early 2002. Noordin left for Riau, Indonesia early in the year, and in mid-2002 he and his Indonesian brother-in-law, a Luqmanul Hakiem graduate named Mohamed Rais, moved to Bukittinggi, West Sumatra with their families and opened a repair shop for automobile shock absorbers.⁷

³ Mukhlas was moved from Bali to a maximum security prison in Central Java in October 2005 after Bali II, and controls may be tighter now.
⁴ Abdullah Sunata was arrested for weapons possession and failing to disclose information about Noordin’s whereabouts, Akram for involvement in a 2000 bombing in Yogyakarta.
⁵ Crisis Group interview, Jakarta, March 2006.
⁶ Crisis Group interview, Jakarta, April 2006.
⁷ Rais and Noordin would have known each other at Luqmanul Hakim for at least six years. Rais was an Indonesian national whose family lived in Malaysia, in the village where JI founder Abdullah Sungkar and his entourage settled in 1985. He joined JI in 1995 when he turned fifteen and was sent to Ngruki to complete his education. After graduating in 1995, he returned to
They hired Ismail, another Luqmanul Hakiem graduate, and in November 2002, a month after the first Bali bombing, Azhari Husin joined them at Noordin’s invitation.

B. THE LEFTOVER EXPLOSIVES

The accidental trigger for the Marriott bombing came in December 2002. As police stepped up their hunt for JI members in the aftermath of Bali, Toni Togar, a JI member based in Medan, North Sumatra, got nervous, because his house stored all the explosives left over from JI’s December 2000 Christmas Eve bombings. He contacted Noordin to tell him he was going to throw them out. The question is why he chose Noordin, rather than his immediate superior in the JI organisation, the head of the wakalah, who apparently was reachable.

The answer may give a clue to Noordin’s subsequent activities. The team that carried out the Christmas Eve bombings was led by Hambali and included Imam Samudra and many of the 2002 Bali bombers. From the beginning these men were operating outside the JI administrative structure, not even part of its special forces unit, laskar khos, that reported directly to Zulkarnaen, the person on the central command responsible for military affairs. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir was aware of Hambali’s activities, but most wakalah members were not, and people like Toni Togar were often selected to take part without the knowledge of their division leaders. Hambali had thus set a precedent for a secret team pursuing jihad on its own. This was probably in part because he controlled separate funding, including from al-Qaeda.

Toni Togar and Azhari had both been members of Hambali’s team, and while it is not clear how Noordin got involved, it was logical for Togar to convey his plans to dispose of the explosives to someone within this circle. Noordin, however, saw good materials being wasted and forbade the disposal, saying the explosives could still be used, and he would arrange to take them. Before he could do so, however, Toni Togar showed up at the shop in Bukittinggi and told Noordin and Rais that he had already moved the materials to the house of a JI member in Dumai, Riau.

C. THE NGRUKI LINKS

In January 2003, Rais, Noordin and Azhari moved to Bengkulu, where a group of JI members lived, including Asmar Latin Sani, who became the Marriott suicide bomber. Noordin and Azhari planned the bombing there as a way of putting the explosives to good use. JI members in Bengkulu, Lampung, and Riau were involved in some planning and logistical support but were not told the target.

Interestingly, Noordin began to plan for a spectacular attack with some of the Bengkulu members just as others from their wakalah were taking part in a program to refresh their military skills, as a response to the exposure and arrests that followed the Bali bombings. For most of the top JI leadership, this was a time for training and consolidation—not new attacks. But Hambali had set the precedent of going off on his own, and Noordin followed it.

The next stages of the operation involved small teams with ties to one another beyond the JI affiliation. Getting the explosives from Dumai to Bengkulu via Pekanbaru, Riau, in February 2003 and securing additional materials such as detonators involved Noordin, Azhari, Rais, Toni Togar, and a new team member, Masrizal bin Ali Umar.

Malaysia to teach at Luqmanul Hakiem and joined the subdivision (wakalah) of JI’s Mantiq I in Johor. He remained there until February 2002 when his other Malaysian brother-in-law was arrested as a member of a JI affiliate, Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM), which consisted of Malaysian nationals, many of whom were members of the Malaysian opposition political party, PAS. JI reportedly did not want to seem as if it were poaching from PAS, so it encouraged those interested in JI to form their own organisation. Crisis Group interviews, Jakarta, March 2006.


10 Indictment of Mohamed Rais in South Jakarta District Court, No.PDM-51/JKTS/01/2004.
11 The training was part of a central command decision to try to coordinate training activities with military operations. Mustofa was responsible for training, Zulkarnaen for military affairs, and they did not get along. Individuals kept weapons caches and did not share them with JI as a whole for training. Hambali snatched fiah (cell) members without informing the relevant wakalah heads and used them for operations which bore no relevance to their training. In an effort to move beyond egos, reduce confusion, and base training on a coherent military strategy, the acting amir, Abu Rusdan, approved a single central command coordinating post to oversee training and military functions, with a direct administrative line through the mantiqis to the wakalahs. Trained military units at wakalah level were known as thoifah muqotilah, the original use of the term. Crisis Group interviews, Jakarta, March-April 2006. Only Mantiq II actually got a training program based on the new structure underway in early 2003 but it was discovered by police in June 2003 and many of the participants were arrested. See expert witness testimony of Lobby Loqman SH, 12/12/2003 Badan Reserse Kriminal Polri, Direktorat VI Anti-Teror in case dossier of Solihin alias Rofi. (Loqman refers to the units as thoifah mukhatalah.)
alias Tohir, another Ngruki alumnus and Luqmanul Hakiem teacher. He was a close friend of Rais and would have been trusted completely by the others.

After the explosives reached Bengkulu safely as unaccompanied baggage on an ordinary intercity bus, they were stored at the house of Sardona Siliwangi, another Ngruki student and JI member. At the time the Marriott plot was being hatched, Sardona, who lived in Bengkulu, was working with Asmar Latin Sani to set up a new Ngruki-like pesantren there, and it was he who opened a bank account in March 2003 to facilitate financial transactions for Noordin. That said, he does not seem to have been an enthusiastic team member; it was more that once asked to help, he could not refuse. Noordin only formally asked him to join in early April, and while he initially agreed, he only lasted a few weeks before he decided the demands on his time were too onerous and backed out. Noordin apparently had not shared significant details with him except how to communicate via codes and passwords.

The police were never far behind: Rais was arrested in late April 2003, Sardona in May. The difficulties of mounting an operation had to be severely compounded by knowledge that the police would obtain more information from those in custody but it did not deter Noordin any more than his plans for the Australian embassy attack were affected by the arrests of close associates just before.

In late April, another JI member from Riau was drawn in: Mohamed Ihsan alias Jhoni Hendrawan alias Idris. He had been involved in the 2000 Christmas Eve bombings in Pekanbaru and was a natural choice to help, albeit in a relatively minor role: transporting the explosives yet again.

In May, two tried and trusted team members returned. Toni Togar, whose reluctance to keep the explosives set the whole plot in motion, robbed a bank in Medan on 6 May to raise funds for the project. Ismail, the Luqmanul Hakiem alumnus who had worked with Rais and Noordin in the shock absorber repair shop in Bukittinggi, got an email from Noordin asking him to pick up some packages from a man in Dumai. Ismail did so, and the packages turned out to be cash in Australian dollars, sent by Hambali via a courier. Ismail then got a series of instructions from Noordin on how to bring the cash from Dumai to Lampung.

Table 1 summarises the school ties of the operatives:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education of Marriott Bombers</th>
<th>Names in bold are those most commonly used</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Noordin Moh. Top</strong></td>
<td>Luqmanul Hakiem, 1998-2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Azhari Husin</strong></td>
<td>Luqmanul Hakiem, 1998-2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indrawarman alias <strong>Toni Togar</strong></td>
<td>Ngruki, 1987-1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Asmar Latin Sani</strong></td>
<td>Ngruki, 1991-1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ismail alias Mohamed Ikhwan</td>
<td>Luqmanul Hakiem, 1991-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohamed Ihsan alias Jhoni Hendrawan alias <strong>Idris</strong></td>
<td>Ngruki, 1989-1993</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### D. THE FINAL TEAM

On 4 June 2003, in Lampung, the final team was put together: Noordin, Azhari, Ismail, Asmar Latin Sani, and Tohir. Noordin assigned the tasks. He explained that he was in charge, with Azhari as field commander and Ismail his assistant. Asmar and Tohir would rent the house, buy the vehicles and get the explosives to Jakarta. Asmar had agreed to be the martyr.

When they got to Jakarta, they split into two teams to survey four possible targets. Azhari and Ismail examined the Marriott and a Citibank branch; Noordin and Tohir looked at the Jakarta International School and the Australian International School. Eventually they decided on the hotel because of the American brand name and the fact that it was easy to reach. The bombing took place on 5 August.

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12 Interrogation deposition of Sardona Siliwangi alias Dona Bin Azwar, 28 August 2003.
13 Ibid.
14 A book that appears based in part on transcripts of Hambali’s interrogation says Hambali arranged for $25,000 to be sent: $15,000 for operational expenses, $10,000 for Bali bomber families. Conboy, op. cit., p. 229. Hambali’s younger brother, Gungun, who was arrested in Karachi in September 2003, testified Hambali had secured a promise of $50,000 from an Arab in Pakistan, which was sent via couriers to Thailand and on to Malaysia where some was to support families of arrested KMM members. The money that reached Indonesia may have been from the same source. See interrogation deposition of Gun Rusman Gunawan alias Abdul Hadi, 20 January 2004 in case dossier of Gun Rusman Gunawan alias Abdul Hadi, No. Pol BP/04/III/2004 Den Sus 88 Anti Teror.
15 Interrogation deposition of Ismail alias Muhamad Ikhwan alias Agus alias Iwan, 28 January 2004 in case dossier of Gun Rusman Gunawan, op.cit.
Noordin used only JI members – in fact, a subset of JI members who were Sumatra-based alumni of either Ngruki, Luqmanul Hakim or both. The question is whether the Marriott bombing was JI-endorsed. That members of the central command were apprised is clear: on 7 June, according to Ismail’s testimony, Noordin met the secretary of the central command, Abu Dujanah (an Indonesian national who had taught at Luqmanul Hakim), and Qotadah alias Basyir, a senior member of Mantiqi II who had been involved in the post-Bali military refresher course. (He appears to have been the only JI person involved in that program who went over to Noordin.) That evening, Noordin, Azhari and the two visitors talked in a hotel, then Ismail escorted them back to Jakarta. In late August, after the bombing, Noordin and Azhari met them again in Bandung and talked late into the evening.

Noordin and Abu Dujanah remain at large, Qotadah’s whereabouts are unknown and Azhari is dead, so the substance of their conversation remains unknown. Either Noordin asked Abu Dujanah, as secretary of the central command, to get the command’s endorsement for the operation, or he simply approached Abu Dujanah, as part of the Luqmanul Hakim circle, believing he would be sympathetic to the go-it-alone approach and might be in a position to assist. His argument would almost certainly have been the one he had tried with Sardona earlier, “Our enemies will destroy us if we don’t destroy them first”. 16

As noted, this argument was unacceptable to many JI members, who believed the Bali bombing had been a disastrous misstep. But Abu Dujanah, according to one source, gave highest priority to protecting fellow JI members and whatever he thought of the Marriott operation, he tried to mobilise the JI network to protect the perpetrators.17

III. THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY BOMBING

For the embassy attack, Noordin put his team together using three networks: JI’s East Java division; the informal alumni association of JI schools in and around Solo, Central Java; and an offshoot of the old Darul Islam organisation based in Banten and West Java provinces.

Once identified, one or two men from each of these networks went through their personal networks to mobilise others, relying as often on family, business, neighbourhood, professional, or school ties as on organisational affiliation, though it is sometimes difficult to make the distinction. Affiliation with JI or DI often leads to intermarriage and joint business operations among members. But these ties above and beyond the organisational structure mean the networks can be activated and loyalties invoked whether or not the organisation is functioning or an action is endorsed by a particular leader.

For this mission, the most interesting question is how the East/Central Java and West Java networks merged, and here, it seems, Ambon experience may have been key. It came down to Noordin asking a young follower in Solo in April 2004 where he could find additional operatives with a proven commitment to jihad, and the young man replying, in effect, “I know someone in Bandung who might be able to help…” That person was Iwan Dharmawan alias Rois, who took charge of the logistics and finding the suicide bomber for the 9 September 2004 operation. Before examining how Noordin established contact with Rois, it is worth looking at how the three networks functioned.

A. THE EAST JAVA NETWORK

By late 2003, in the aftermath of the Marriott bombing and the intensified police activity, Noordin and Azhari needed sanctuary. Through October, they hid in the Bandung area, but by November had made their way back to Solo, where they made contact with Usman bin Sef alias Fahim, the head of the JI wakalah for East Java. Fahim was wanted by the police for a range of JI-related activities and was hiding in the Solo area. But as a respected Islamic teacher (ustadz); as head of Darussalam Foundation, the JI front in Surabaya, East Java’s capital; and as the wakalah leader, he could issue instructions to JI members in Surabaya and expect to be obeyed.

In November, Fahim summoned a man named Son Hadi from Surabaya to Solo. A 1991 Ngruki graduate, Son Hadi had worked alongside Fahim in the Darussalam Foundation since 1997. Fahim told him that hiding Noordin and Azhari was a good deed and instructed him to find a place for them in Surabaya.

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16 Interrogation deposition of Sardona Siliwangi alias Dona bin Azwar, 28 August 2003.
17 Crisis Group interview, Jakarta, March 2006. There has been much press speculation about whether Abu Dujanah has assumed the role of JI amir. Crisis Group sources say he has not. But he is one member of the central command who since 2003 has remained in a position to take decisions and, when necessary, communicate with others. Zulkarnaen was out of contact; Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Abu Rusdan, Ahmad Roichan and Mustofa were under arrest; Ustdaz Arif was weak. A source suggested Abu Dujanah, if left to his own devices, would probably not use JI resources for Noordin-style bombings but there is no evidence that he tried to stop his colleague.
Son Hadi returned home and contacted three friends, who knew each other through religious study but who were also likely fellow members of JI. On 18 November, he rented a minivan with money collected as infaq (contributions) from the Muslim community in Surabaya. He and a friend drove to Mojoagung, a town about an hour and a half from Surabaya, to meet Fahim, Noordin and Azhari. All drove to a pre-arranged spot in the city, where the other two friends, one named Ismail, were waiting with motorcycles. They took Noordin and Azhari to Ismail’s house, and everything was fine for about a month.

Then Ismail’s father decided to visit, and Ismail said the men would have to move. Son Hadi contacted another friend, Achmad Hasan, who lived in Blitar, also in East Java. Hasan had been inducted into JI by Fahim in 1996 but he also had a commercial connection to Son Hadi: their wives ran a business making and selling Muslim headscarves (jilbab). In January 2004, another operative entered the picture. Heri Sigu Samboja alias Ilyasa was a 22-year-old Ngruki graduate and religious teacher at the Darul Fitroh pesantren in Sukaharjo, outside Solo. His father, Khumaidi, was an Afghan veteran and friend of Fahim’s. Fahim apparently contacted Khumaidi about sending his son to study with Azhari in Blitar. According to Heri’s statement to police, his father came to the pesantren where he was teaching and offered to send him to study computers and learn how to make viruses that would wreck American data systems. Heri was not particularly interested; he preferred, he said, to go for jihad to Poso or Mindanao. His father said it was very difficult because surveillance was tight and asked him to go instead to Solo to see about the computer study. Heri left the following day, went to a designated meeting place at the house of a religious teacher where he met another young man. The teacher then took the two of them to see Fahim.

“Do you know why you’ve come here?” Fahim asked.

“To study computers”, Heri replied.

“Well, actually to study electronics”, Fahim said. “Are you prepared to do this?”

They said they were. It must have been clear to both young men that they would be engaged in clandestine activity but they may not have known, nor did Heri’s father necessarily know, what lay in store.

Heri went back to his pesantren and asked leave from the director, telling him, as Fahim had instructed, that he was going to Poso to teach. A few days later, his father picked him up and sent him to Blitar, giving a number to call when they arrived. The number turned out to be Hasan’s, who took them from the bus terminal to his house. They were introduced to Noordin and Azhari, both using false names, and told that they were there to study bomb-making.

Heri and his fellow student embarked on a month-long, seven-hours-a-day course with Azhari in Hasan’s home. A few weeks after they arrived, Fahim called Hasan and instructed him to go to the main mosque in Kediri, a city about two hours away. Fahim was waiting there with two other men – Adung, an old associate of Hambali’s from Malaysia who replaced him as head of Mantiqi I and became a member of the JI central command, and Qotadah, the man who, with Abu Dujanah, met Noordin before and after the Marriott bombing.

They all drove back to Blitar, and it turned out that the visitors had come bearing gifts: 25 kilograms of potassium chlorate and ten kilos of sulphur for bomb making, as well as a pistol and ammunition. Not long afterwards, another visitor delivered about 30 kilograms of TNT.

Sometime in early February 2004, Heri and his fellow bomb-making apprentice were deemed to have completed their studies and were sent home. Adung and Qotadah

\[\text{18} \] The three were Ustadz Anton alias Pak Lik, Ismail, and Jauhari. Anton was a fellow participant in a religious study circle at the al-Ikhsan mosque in Surabaya, where Son Hadi was a regular preacher (khatib) and which also appears to have been a centre of JI activities. Son Hadi told the police, who agreed to put the men up, was also a frequent participant in his study sessions, meaning he was also likely active in the JI wakalah. Jauhari was part of the same circle, but his exact relationship with Son Hadi is not clear.

\[\text{19} \] Interrogation deposition of Son Hadi in case dossier of Achmad Hasan als Agung Cahyono als Purnomo, Jakarta, 10 January 2005.

\[\text{20} \] JI women appear to be important in supporting the activities of the organisation through making and selling Muslim clothing. The wife of Agus Dwikarna (a member of Laskar Jundullah, not JI) was also active in this business, selling in the southern Philippines as well as Indonesia. One factory outside Solo reportedly had difficulties when the woman who ran it, the wife of a Ngruki teacher, was accused by her employees of paying sweatshop wages.

\[\text{21} \] Fahim was in the 1987 intake of Afghanistan trainees but he made a visit to Mindanao in November 1987; it is not clear when Khumaidi was in Afghanistan but they may have been there at the same time.

\[\text{22} \] The teacher was Ustadz Hasbi. The second young man was Ilyas alias Tukiadi.

accompanied Heri to Solo. At least at this stage, Noordin seemed still to have the backing of the members of the central command most associated with Mantiqi I.

Heri informed his father the next day that he had joined for jihad with Noordin and Dr Azhari. Under the circumstances, this was unlikely to have come as a surprise. He returned to teaching at the Darul Fitroh pesantren but stayed in touch with Adung.

Shortly thereafter, Hasan called Son Hadi to tell him that Noordin and Azhari would have to leave his house and take their lethal materials with them. At that point, Son Hadi called an old friend, Chandra alias Farouk, who lived in Pasuruan, East Java, and asked if he could put up two guests. Chandra and Son Hadi had known each other since 1996 when both were studying in Bangil, East Java, and had subsequently become partners in a business to collect and sell used cloth for industrial purposes – another example of JI business ties.24

After Noordin and Azhari moved to Pasuruan, Son Hadi got a call summoning him to Solo to meet with Adung. He was told to bring the respected teacher Abu Fida, another member of JI’s East Java wakalah and the son of the director of the mosque where many JI activities took place. The meeting was apparently tense. Son Hadi reported that he had moved the two fugitives. This was the first Adung knew of this, and he demanded to know who Chandra was. He told Son Hadi that henceforth, he, Adung, and not Fahim, Son Hadi’s superior in the JI structure, was responsible for safeguarding the men, and Abu Fida, not Son Hadi, would be the local man in charge. He ordered Son Hadi to give Chandra’s telephone number to Abu Fida and then sent him back to Surabaya.

Abu Fida took over responsibility for the two men and in April 2004 ordered Hasan to go to Chandra’s house in Pasuruan, pick up Azhari and take him back to Hasan’s house in Blitar. Heri, the young religious teacher, moved in with him. Noordin, who seems to have stayed in the Surabaya area, visited him there twice in May and June.

In May, Noordin asked Hasan’s help in meeting Munfiatun, a young woman who had expressed interest in marrying a mujahid – a warrior for Islam. She would be his second wife; he was still married to Mohamed Rais’s sister from Riau. Noordin had heard about Munfiatun through Hasan, since she was a friend and former roommate of Hasan’s wife when they were university students in Malang.25 Adung performed the wedding ceremony, with Hasan and Abu Fida in attendance. Abu Fida then gave Hasan a long detonating cord to take back to Azhari in Blitar.

By mid-June, Azhari had another bomb-making student, Gempur Budi Angkoro alias Jabir, a Ngruki graduate and cousin of the legendary Faturrahman al-Ghozi, the JI operative and Hambali associate killed in the Philippines in 2003. Jabir was one of the two killed in the April 2006 raid in Wonosobo. He stayed with Azhari until 5 July 2004 and later became an important member of Noordin’s inner circle, reportedly helping recruit the Bali II suicide bombers.

The next day, Adung and Fahim were arrested in Solo. When Hasan heard, he immediately took Azhari, Heri, and all the bomb-making materials back to Pasuruan, where Chandra found them another place to stay. Jabir and Noordin joined them a few days later, and they all stayed there until they left together for Jakarta on 22 July.

B. THE JI SCHOOL NETWORK IN CENTRAL JAVA

The second network that came into play was the web of JI schools across Indonesia, with three of the most important in the Solo area: al-Mukmin in Ngruki; Darusysyahada in Boyolali; and Mahad Aly, otherwise known as Universitas an-Nur, in Solo itself. Many involved in the embassy bombing were alumni of these three schools.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: Education of Embassy Bombers</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Son Hadi</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Syaifuddin Umar alias <strong>Abu Fida</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bagus Budi Pranoto alias <strong>Urwa</strong></td>
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</table>

24 Son Hadi told police Chandra was known as an NII (Darul Islam) activist when they were in Bangil, so he may not have been a JI member. Interrogation deposition of Son Hadi bin Muhadjiir, 15 December 2004 in case dossier of Achmad Hasan alias Agung Cahyono alias Purnomo, Jakarta, 10 January 2005. Another connection to Bangil comes up below: Joni Achmad Fauzan, a man who helped hide Noordin in early 2005 and joined him, went to school in Bangil around the same time as Chandra and Son Hadi, and was a Ngruki alumnus, so may have known Son Hadi there.

25 Interrogation deposition of Achmad Hasan alias Agung Cahyono alias Purnomo, 9 December 2004, in case dossier of Achmad Hasan als Agung Cahyono als Purnomo, Jakarta, 10 January 2005. Munfiatun had been a student at Brawijaya University in Malang.
Urwah, Ubeid, and Deni in the above table were all classmates at an-Nur, and Abu Fida had been their teacher. In March 2004, according to Urwah, he and Ubeid were summoned from Solo to Surabaya by Abu Fida on the pretext of helping develop a concept for the construction of a new pesantren. They left immediately and at the designated meeting place, a house owned by Abu Fida, they found their old classmate Deni. (Deni was a preacher for the Darussalam Foundation in Surabaya from 1997 to 2000, meaning he would have been part of the JI wakalah under Fahim. He was also known as Abu Dujanah’s courier.) Abu Fida introduced Urwah and Ubeid to Noordin.

Sometime in April 2004, Urwah and Ubeid moved to the house in Surabaya and over the next three months engaged in long discussions with Noordin about the need to make war on kafirs (infidels, understood by many salafi Muslims as meaning all non-Muslims) in general, the U.S. and its allies and their interests in Indonesia. He concluded Noordin had both sufficient religious knowledge and the proper spirit for jihad that would make him a good member of the team.

Urwah returned to Surabaya and reported the conversation to Noordin, who made no comment but a week later told Urwah to meet Rois again and to deliver a letter. At the same mosque in Solo, Urwah handed over the letter; Rois read it, and sent back a response via Urwah.

We do not know the contents of the letter, but it appears to have led Rois, within weeks at the end of May, to set up a new military training camp in Gunung Peti, Cisolok, Pelabuhan Ratu, West Java, specifically designed to select suicide bombers. Most participants had undergone earlier training that Rois conducted in 2003, among them Heri Golun, who later detonated the bomb in front of the Australian embassy. Two weeks into the new training, Ubeid’s younger brother, Heri alias Umar, and other men from outside West Java arrived. Deni was already there, having been sent by Urwah shortly after his meeting with Rois in Solo. Deni and Umar – who was arrested in

recruiting his own people, he further alienated the leadership of the JI mainstream.

As Noordin, Urwah and Ubeid discussed the need to find committed mujahidin, Urwah mentioned Iwan alias Rois from Bandung, a Darul Islam fighter whom he had known at least since 2002, when Rois came to Universitas an-Nur about enrolling his brother. Noordin apparently had met Rois earlier, in Ambon or Mindanao. He ordered Urwah to reestablish contact and explore how far he would be willing to take part in a jihad. Urwah called Rois in early May, and they arranged to meet in Solo.

Two days later, at the mosque on the an-Nur campus, Urwah drew him out on his attitudes toward the U.S and its allies and their interests in Indonesia. He concluded Rois had both sufficient religious knowledge and the proper spirit for jihad that would make him a good member of the team.


22 Crisis Group interview, Jakarta, April 2006.


24 Interrogation deposition of Purnama Putra alias Usman alias Usamah alias Ipung alias Risqy alias Uus alias Tikus, 14 July 2005, p. 19, in case dossier of Enceng Kurnia alias Arham alias Arnold, Badan Reserse Kriminal Polri, Detaisemen Khusus 88 Anti-Terror. It may not be a coincidence that around this time a pamphlet was circulating in jihadist groups that was a translation from Arabic into Indonesian of an article that first appeared in the al-Qaeda on-line magazine Sawt al-Jihad. Entitled “You Don’t Need to Go to Iraq for Jihad”, it was written in 2003 by a Saudi jihadist, Muhammad bin Ahmad as-Salim.

25 Interrogation deposition of Purnama Putra, op. cit., p. 19. Noordin did not meet Sunata until after the embassy bombing but Sunata appears to have authorised his followers to secure materials for the bomb, including the detonating cord Abu Fida provided after Noordin’s wedding. Ibid, p. 20.

26 The JI administrative manual, known as PUPJI, authorises working with other organisations but not to the point of ignoring the JI hierarchy.

27 All Urwah says is that he first met Iwan alias Rois in Solo in 2002, when the latter came to his dormitory at Universitas an-Nur and left his card, with the name and telephone of the Sajira courier company. Ubaid and Rois were in Mindanao doing training at the same time but in different camps and may not have met.

28 A source said Ambon but could not remember when Noordin was there. Crisis Group interview, Jakarta, April 2006. Urwah’s testimony suggests Mindanao.

29 Interrogation deposition of Surampto alias Muhammad Faiz alias Deni alias Ahmad in case dossier of Achmad Hasan als Agung Cahyono als Purnomo, Jakarta, 10 January 2005. The men who joined the training in
early 2006 for withholding information about Noordin’s whereabouts – provided the religious instruction, and Rois and his wife’s uncle, Saptono, led the military drills. The training focused on fa’i (robbing non-Muslims to raise funds for jihad), and included simulated robbing of a house. Deni said he did not know who organized or paid for the training, although Rois testified in late 2004 that the funds came from his uncle, himself, and the income from unlicensed gold mining in the area.  

During the training, Ubeid and Urwah visited to see how it was going. Urwah gave Rois a mini-revolver with four 2.2 caliber bullets as a gift from Noordin.

C. THE NETWORK THUS FAR

Noordin had thus far drawn on Fahim and his East Java network, where one link, from Fahim to Son Hadi, brought in at least five and probably six people involved in hiding the two fugitives: Anton, Ismail, Jauhari, Chandra, Hasan and Deni. All except for Chandra would have known both Fahim and Son Hadi through the JI’s East Java wakalah and the Darussalam Foundation in Surabaya, although there were other bonds, such as that between the wives of Son Hadi and Hasan. Chandra was a friend and business partner of Son Hadi’s, but it is not clear whether he moved in the same jihadist circles.

The recruitment of bomb-makers appears to have been a much more personal process. Fahim appears to have used his Afghan connections to get to Heri Sigu Samboja’s father and then the son. Jabir had a blue-blood jihadist lineage, but he also seems to have been recruited individually.

The friendship among three graduates of Universitas an-Nur, Urwah, Ubeid, and Deni and their loyalty to their former instructor, Abu Fida, were instrumental in setting up the most critical part of the operation, recruitment of the field operatives from West Java. This link depended on one critical tie, from Urwah and Ubeid to Rois, and we still do not know exactly where it was forged. But the personal links among the West Java operatives are the most interesting.

D. FAMILY AND BUSINESS IN WEST JAVA

When Urwah contacted Iwan alias Rois, he probably had no idea that he was tapping into a whole clan of Darul Islam members. Two families proved particularly important for the embassy bombing. One was that of Rois’s wife, Wiwit. Her father, Awal Purnomo, was born in Cianjur, the eldest of nine children. Two of his brothers, Kang Jaja alias Aqdam and Saptono, became involved in Darul Islam in the 1980s. Awal himself was inducted as a member only in 1993, at the age of 39. Kang Jaja was the most committed of the three brothers, and it was he who began military training of DI members in West Java with the help of some Afghan veterans.

In 1998, Kang Jaja founded the CV Sajira courier company as a three-man partnership between himself, his brother Awal, and a third Darul Islam fighter, Heri Hafidin, with the idea that the company would both live up to the ideals of Darul Islam and provide wherewithal for its struggle. He personally financed training for his cadre in Mindanao and in late 1999 sent a group of nine, including his nephew, Rois, and his brother, Saptono.

Another in that batch was Roshinh Noor, who became one of the most militant of the group and the shooting instructor in Kang Jaja’s military training sessions. Rosihin married into the second big family involved in the Kuningan bomb. The patriarch, Engkos Kosasih alias Pak Kamal, was a former Darul Islam fighter and commander for the Banten area in the early 1960s before Darul Islam surrendered to the Indonesian government. He had seven children, four of whom died. The three who survived all became involved in Kang Jaja’s group. His son, Agus Ahmad, was inducted into Darul Islam in 1993 by one of his father’s protégés and became an employee of CV Sajira in 1999. His daughter, Iis, married Rosihin, also a Sajira employee. The youngest son, Iwan Sujai, also joined DI and the Sajira company.

In addition to the players linked to the company, there were the three candidate suicide bombers, childhood friends from the same village in Cigarung, Sukabumi, whose fathers were Darul Islam members.

Irun Hidayat was also a central figure. Inducted into Darul Islam by Kang Jaja in 1987 at fifteen, he was in the same class at Serang Islamic High School as Imam Samudra and Heri Hafidin, one of the three owners of CV Sajira. He became a close friend of Rois, and the two went to Ambon in January 2002. Irun became a martial arts instructor in the military training sessions run by Kang Jaja and Rois. Since 1999, Irun also had been the local head of the religious council of the Indonesian Muslim Workers Union (Perserikatan Pekerja Muslim Indonesia, PPIM). He was to call on a fellow unionist to put up the bombers the night before they struck the embassy.

addition to Ubeid’s brother were Dirman, Ade Bahru, Abu Roioh, and Deny Nugraha.  

35 Ibid.
E. MOBILISING THE NETWORK

As noted, when Rois was approached by Noordin through Urwah, he almost immediately set in motion a new training camp to select suicide bombers as a way of striking at what he called American and Jewish interests.

On 22 June, Urwah accompanied Rois and his uncle, Saptono, to Surabaya where Rois met with Noordin. Noordin asked about the readiness of the suicide bombers, and Rois said three candidates had been selected. Noordin said they would have to be “ripened” through additional religious instruction, and designated a teacher, Baharudin Soleh, for the job Soleh, who used the alias Abdul Hadi, may have been used to “ripen” the suicide bombers in Bali II as well. He was killed in the April 2006 police raid. He and Jabir – the other man killed in that raid – were classmates at Ngruki in 1993-1994.

On 25 June, Abdul Hadi accompanied Rois back to Bandung. An immediate objective was to find a pesantren where the three would-be martyrs could get additional religious instruction under trusted teachers. In a plan apparently orchestrated by Noordin, the pesantren would have to take in not only Abdul Hadi and Ubeid’s younger brother as unpaid teachers, but also the three candidate martyrs – Apuy alias Epul, Didi alias Rijal, and Heri Golun – as students. Rois asked Irun Hidayat if he knew a likely one. Irun suggested Miftahul Huda in Cikampek, the pesantren director agreed, and instruction began on 3 July.38

Whatever the plans had been, they were disrupted by the arrests of Fahim, Adung and others three days later. On 15 July Urwah came to Bandung and told Rois that Noordin and Azhari’s whereabouts were now known and they needed his help to find a new place. Rois went to Surabaya the next day to consult with Noordin, and the new priority came to be finding a place for the Malaysians and their followers in the Jakarta area. On 22 July, Noordin, Azhari and entourage, including Hasan from East Java and Heri Sigu Samboja, the young bomb-making apprentice, arrived in the capital, with all the explosive materials.

Rois got Agus Ahmad to put up the group at his house in Cianjur for a few nights. While they were there, word came through that Urwah and Ubeid had been arrested in Solo on 26 July. Noordin ordered his group to move again, putting Rois in charge of the escape. Rois drove Noordin and Azhari to the main mosque in Banten and left them there while he went to see a fellow member of the Ring Banten group, Pujata, who had been arrested and detained briefly in November 2002 for helping dispose of leftover explosives from the Bali bombs. Pujata was understandably reluctant to get involved again when asked to help find a place for the fugitives, so Rois went to see another member of the Banten group, Fathurochman alias Rochman. He had been detained with Pujata in the same case but agreed to help. As it happened, Rosihiin Noor was at Rochman’s house when Rois came by, and Rois told him to see that the explosives were moved and that the group at Pesantren Miftahul Huda left immediately.

Rochman found a house in the Anyer area of Banten, and from then on, Noordin and Azhari moved constantly, rarely staying more than four nights in the same place.

On 5 August, at Noordin’s instructions, Rois set off to retrieve Heri Golun, who had been selected as the suicide bomber, and buy the Daihatsu vehicle that was used in the bombing. He enlisted the help of Irun Hidayat in both tasks. From then until 17 August, frantic activity – moving the principals, purchasing additional materials for the bombs and raising funds – alternated with lulls, when the operatives went to Internet cafes to pass the time.

On 17 August, Noordin asked Rois to check on Heri Golun’s state of mind. When Heri said he was ready, he moved into the house where Noordin and Azhari were and slept in their room at night, so they could give him additional religious counselling.

On 23 August, Rois started to teach Heri Golun how to drive, and on 9 September, the new driver blew himself up in front of the Australian embassy.

F. THE CONNECTION TO CONFLICT AREAS

As noted above, how Urwah and Ubeid, the JI operatives in Solo, knew Iwan alias Rois and that he likely would be able to produce the suicide bombers Noordin sought is an unanswered question. There were already well-established links between JI and the Banten group before Rois came into the picture:

- Kang Jaja and others in the group had been active in Darul Islam before a faction split off and formed Jemaah Islamiyah, so many leaders would have known each other;
- Imam Samudra was reportedly a member of both the Banten group and JI, and maintained ties with his old classmate Heri Hafidin, a leading ustadz in the Banten group and part owner of CV Sajira;
- several Banten members were Ngruki alumni, including Abdul Rauf and Andri Octavia, two of those arrested in connection with a robbery to raise funds for the Bali bombing; and

38 Deposition of Iwan Dharmawan Muthoalias Rois alias Fajar alias Abdul Fatah alias Dharma alias Yadi alias Muhammad Taufik alias Rdho alias Hendi in case dossier of Hasan als Agung Cahyono als Purnomo, Jakarta, 10 January 2005.
Iqbal, the Bali suicide bomber, was a Banten, not JI member, and left a will saying he hoped his martyrdom would help inspire others to restore the glory of the Indonesian Islamic State as founded by Kartosoewirjo.

But why did Urwah single out Rois by name when Noordin asked him about committed mujahidin? Rois’s military record provides some initial answers.

In mid-1999, Rois became head of the Pandeglang, Banten battalion for Region IX of Darul Islam. From sometime in 1999 to February 2000, he trained in Mindanao as one of nine Darul Islam members from the Banten area funded by Kang Jaja. From August to September 2001, in preparation for going to “either Ambon or Poso” (his phrase, suggesting they were of equal importance for jihad), he and Kang Jaja initiated a training course for twelve members of the Banten group, to which they invited a JI-Malaysian as an instructor. The police broke up the course and arrested most of the participants but detained them only briefly. He held another training course, late 2001 to early 2002, in the hills of Ujung Kulon, West Java. In late January-early February, he went to Ambon for two weeks with Irun Hidayat to visit Banten members who had been inserted into Laskar Jihad forces there. From June 2002 until February 2003, he was in Poso.

Eight months in a conflict setting would have been ample time for Rois to demonstrate his leadership capacity, training skills and commitment to jihad. His name would have been known in JI circles. Equally, JI’s reputation in Poso as having the cadres most steeped in religious knowledge would likely have impressed Rois; it may have been the desire to deepen his religious knowledge that led him to want to enrol his brother in Universitas an-Nur. But the meeting must have made a mutual impression, because it was Rois, the individual fighter, rather than Ring Banten, his organisation, that Urwah suggested for the job.

IV. NOORDIN REACHES OUT TO KOMPAK AND DARUL ISLAM

There is little indication that Noordin’s band of diehard followers had any particular structure at this stage. All those closest to him – Ubeid, Jabir, Abdul Hadi and Azhari – were JI members, and he continued to draw heavily on JI networks. But it was clear that resources were dwindling. As noted, since as early as April 2004, Noordin had been trying to get KOMPAK leader Abdullah Sunata and DI leader Akram to join him for good reasons:

- both were known as strong, charismatic leaders and salafi Muslims;
- neither was JI but they had significant numbers of militarily-trained followers, almost all veterans of Ambron, Poso, or both;
- they had routes to the Philippines and training camps in Mindanao that were independent of JI and were actively engaged in finding new recruits;
- they had access to weapons and supplies, from the conflict areas and Mindanao; and
- at least Sunata seemed to have access to funds.

It was clear that if Noordin could draw in either or both, but particularly Sunata, his forces would be considerably strengthened. The problem was that neither had shown any interest in al-Qaeda-style bombing operations. (Sunata’s supply of materials to Noordin seems to have been due to pride in being able to meet the request and showing his superiority as much as anything else.)

Sunata’s focus remained the conflict areas. He went to Ambon in 1999, ran the KOMPAK office there at the height of the conflict in 2000-2001, then moved back and forth between Poso and Ambon, recruiting and training new groups of young men to fight in both places. In April 2004, as Noordin was looking for men and material, Sunata was watching Ambon erupt in violence and trying to figure out how to exploit it. He reportedly believed the jihads in Ambon and Poso were unfinished, that the kafirs there were permanent enemies who if not attacked

39 He arranged to have weapons sent from Umar Patek in the Philippines to a trusted colleague in Ambon and for a military training course, mostly for KOMPAK members, in the hills of West Ceram a few months later, apparently in expectation of ongoing repercussions from the April violence. See interrogation of Abdullah Sunata alias Arman alias Andri, 12 July 2005, p. 8 in case dossier of Enceng Kurnia, op. cit. For background to the April violence in Ambon, see Crisis Group Asia Briefing №32, Indonesia: Violence Erupts Again in Ambon, 17 May 2004.
first, would threaten Muslim lives.\textsuperscript{40} By 2004, after five years of fighting, he may have seen the job of training men for the conflict areas as permanent, and if the conflicts were waning, it was his interest to stir them up. Because of his Ambon role, he had good relations with virtually every jihadist group in Indonesia and seems to have relished the degree to which all sought his help but there was no reason to believe he had any interest in joining Noordin’s very different kind of war.

Akram is more of an enigma. An Afghan veteran from the same class as Mukhlas (1985), his real name is Muhammad Taufiqurrahman. From Temanggung, Central Java, he was known by fellow Afghan alumni as Shamsuddin. He lived in Sabah for a few years before going to Mindanao in 1987 to set up training for Darul Islam, five years before JI did so – although Fahim, later to become the JI East Java leader, accompanied him on the visit. His elder brother, Abdul Malik, a tobacco entrepreneur, was also deeply involved in sending DI recruits to the Philippines, and both married Filipinas (Akram’s wife is an ethnic Tausug). When JI split from Darul Islam in 1993, Akram stayed neutral and eventually allied himself with another DI leader, Aceng Kurnia.

Both Akram’s men and his Sabah and Mindanao connections would have attracted Noordin’s interest – Tawao, the seedy Sabah port and an Akram stronghold, was a standard transit stop on a route from Indonesia to the Philippines. But like Sunata, Akram had never exhibited any interest in attacking Westerners. If Sunata was more interested in local jihads, Akram, given his background, was almost certainly focused on acquiring the military capacity to build an Islamic state in Indonesia.

\textbf{A. THE GO-BETWEENS}

Each of the three men, Noordin, Sunata and Akram, used subordinates to liaise with the others. Ubeid did this for Noordin until his arrest in late July 2004, about six weeks before the embassy bombing. It is not clear who, if anyone, took his place during the critical period immediately before and after the bombing.

In early October 2004, however, Noordin took on a 29-year-old Ambon veteran, Ali Zein for the job. From his perspective, it was the perfect choice. Ali Zein was a JI member based in Solo with contacts to KOMPAK from his Ambon days. He often visited the Islamic Centre in Solo that was the nerve centre for KOMPAK activities in the conflict areas. He was a friend of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s son, Abdul Rohim, and had impeccable family credentials: he was the younger brother of Fathurrahman al-Ghozi, and his cousin, Jabir, was already in Noordin’s group. When they met for the first time in Pekalongan, Central Java in October 2004, the first task Noordin gave him was to lobby Abdullah Sunata for a revolver.\textsuperscript{41}

Abdullah Sunata’s go-between with JI was Purnama Putra alias Usman, 23, a Solo native who joined KOMPAK and went to Ambon in 2000. Usman was so small and unwarrior-like that one of his many nicknames was Tikus (Mouse), but he knew everyone. He joined KOMPAK at the age of eighteen on the invitation of another friend, Hari Kuncoro, who later married the sister of the JI Bali bomber, Dulmatin. Usman helped produce the KOMPAK magazine \textit{al-Bayan} and some of its many video CDs.

Akram’s go-between with Abdullah Sunata was a 32-year old Bandung native, Enceng Kurnia alias Arham alias Arnold. He was an original member of the Abu Bakar Battalion and AMIN, the young, disaffected militants who in 1999 broke away from the West Java-Jakarta command of DI out of frustration with their elders’ reluctance to wage a jihad in Ambon.\textsuperscript{42} Akram arranged training for Arham in Mindanao. After ten weeks there in 1999, Arham returned to Indonesia and went almost immediately to Ambon.

The go-betweens – Ali Zein, Usman, and Arham – all knew Sunata from Ambon, while Ali Zein and Usman knew each other slightly from the Islamic Centre in Solo and had several friends in common, especially because the JI-KOMPAK bond was long established.\textsuperscript{43} Arham met Usman through Abdullah Sunata in 2003. Arham and Ali Zein never met but Noordin knew of Arham through many other KOMPAK and JI contacts. Although Darul Islam, KOMPAK, mainstream JI, and Noordin had different goals, they intersected and overlapped through the personal networks of their members.

\textbf{B. THE PHILIPPINES CONNECTION}

The ties of the above organisations to the Bali bombers, Dulmatin and Umar Patek, are an example of the intersection. Several months after the 2002 Bali blasts, the two fugitive JI members came to Jakarta and asked Abdullah Sunata as the former KOMPAK-Ambon head, if he could help contact Ambon veterans known as the

\textsuperscript{40} Crisis Group interview, March 2006.

\textsuperscript{41} Interrogation deposition of Ahmad Roﬁq Ridho alias Ali Zein alias Allen alias Abu Husna alias Fuad Baraja, 13 July 2005 in case dossier of Enceng Kurnia, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{42} See Crisis Group Report, \textit{Recycling Militants in Indonesia}, op. cit., for discussion of AMIN.

\textsuperscript{43} For a description of how that link emerged, see Crisis Group Report, \textit{Jihad in Central Sulawesi}, op. cit. The director of the KOMPAK office in Solo and the Islamic Centre that housed it was Aris Munandar, a JI member.
STAIN group.\textsuperscript{44} Most of that group belonged to Darul Islam but Dulmatin and Patek knew they were also Mindanao alumni, and they wanted to get to the Philippines. The normal JI route to Mindanao through North Sulawesi was apparently too dangerous immediately after Bali I; Nasir Abas, head of JI’s Mantiqi III, who normally arranged travel for JI recruits through eastern Malaysia to Zamboanga, was hiding in Poso. Dulmatin and Umar Patek hoped to use the only route left, the DI-controlled channel through East Kalimantan into Tawao in Sabah, Malaysia and across to Mindanao. Sunata agreed to help and found a place for his unexpected visitors to rent.\textsuperscript{45}

Ahmed Said Maulana of the STAIN group was a frequent visitor to his house, so Sunata called him, only to find that he was one of the few members without Mindanao experience.\textsuperscript{46} Then Umar Patek remembered another STAIN member, Arham, Akram’s go-between, whom he probably met in Mindanao in 1999.\textsuperscript{47} Abdullah Sunata knew Arham well from Ambon and that he and his wife lived in Lampung. After a few calls to learn the address, a Sunata adjutant and Umar Patek left for Lampung to see if Arham could help get him to the Philippines and simultaneously open a new training site for Indonesians. Arham agreed, and by the end of March 2003, had succeeded in getting Dulmatin and Umar Patek and their families to the Philippines.

The consequences were significant:

- Abdullah Sunata realised that through Arham’s contacts, he could send KOMPAK recruits to train with Dulmatin and Umar Patek, both Afghan alumni with extensive experience. The fact that they had been involved in bombing operations of the kind Sunata rejected did not matter; they were still expert trainers. He began, therefore, to send small groups of three or four, and he himself went in July 2003 for a month at Umar Patek’s invitation, with a KOMPAK associate, Muhammed Faiz.

- Dulmatin and Umar Patek set themselves up completely outside the JI network in the Philippines. They settled in Pulas, outside Cotabato, where DI trained, not in Jabal Quba, where the JI training camp was, and they had almost nothing to do with Wakalah Hudaiayah, the JI administrative subdivision in Mindanao. They did join with at least two others linked to Mantiqi I, Marwan, a Malaysian, and Darwin, who had fled to Mindanao two years earlier.\textsuperscript{48} They were later joined by Hari Kuncoro, Dulmatin’s brother-in-law.

- Because Noordin was also part of Mantiqi I, he saw Umar Patek and Dulmatin as natural allies.

The result was that the presence of the two fugitives in the Philippines strengthened the triangular relationship between KOMPAK, Akram’s faction of Darul Islam, and Noordin, although the first two had serious differences with the third. It also probably strengthened Noordin’s desire to get Akram and Sunata on board.

C. THE MALUKU CONNECTION

The final piece that strengthened bonds among the actors leading up to Bali II was the Maluku connection. As a prelude to looking at how all these bonds were activated across organisational lines, we can examine three activities: the first military training course run by KOMPAK on Buru island, Maluku in 1999; the KOMPAK office in Ambon in 2000-2001; and a 2004 training course in West Ceram. These help explain how lasting personal networks are formed but also suggest that once one network member is tapped for an operation, it may become easier to get others.

1. Training in Waimurat, Buru, October 1999

Buru is known primarily as the island that served as the penal colony for suspected members of the Indonesian Communist Party during the first half of Soeharto’s tenure. But in October 1999, Aris Munandar of KOMPAK’s Solo office organised and financed a military training course near Waimurat for some 30 people, including many recruits from Java. At least four JI leaders were instructors: Zulkarnaen, JI’s chief of military operations; Umar Wayan alias Abdul Ghoni and Ali Imron, both to play important roles in the first Bali bombing; and Muchtar.

\textsuperscript{44} STAIN is an acronym for State Islamic Institute (Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri). The STAIN group rented a house near this institute in Batu Merah, Ambon, at the height of the conflict. Most eventually returned to Java.

\textsuperscript{45} Interrogation deposition of Abdullah Sunata, 12 July 2005, in case dossier of Enceng Kurnia, op. cit. At the time, Sunata says, they were using funds from the sale of Dulmatin’s relative’s car.

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid. Crisis Group wrongly stated in the report Recycling Militants in Indonesia, op. cit., that Maulana accompanied Dulmatin and Umar Patek to Mindanao. He was asked but did not go at the time. He went to Mindanao later in 2003 with Sunata.

\textsuperscript{47} Sunata asserts that Umar Patek and Arham knew each other in Mindanao in 1999; Arham says he saw Patek for the first time when he showed up at his house in March 2003 and that Patek asked his help not in getting out of Indonesia but in opening a new training facility in Mindanao.

\textsuperscript{48} Marwan alias Zulkifli bin Hir is the elder brother of Dani alias Taufik, arrested in connection with the Atrium Mall bombing in Jakarta of September 2001. He is said to be a KMM founder. Asep alias Darwin is an Indonesian JI member.
alias Ilyas. All were Afghan veterans. KOMPAK, JI, and Darul Islam sent young men for training.

The Darul Islam group included a West Java man, Hilman, reportedly close to Akram; and two men known as Umar and Ali. The KOMPAK trainees included Abdullah Sunata; Asep Jaja alias Dahlan, sentenced to life imprisonment for the May 2005 attack on paramilitary police in Ceram; Salman alias Apud, arrested in Malaysia in September 2003 returning from training in Mindanao; Mohamed Saifuddin alais Faiz, who later helped produce the Sunata-Noordin meeting and was arrested in December 2004 in Mindanao; Hari Kuncoro; Dani Chandra, arrested in mid-2005 for helping hide Noordin; and several others.

2. The KOMPAK office, Ambon 2000-2001

All these and many more maintained contact with each other throughout the Ambon fighting, with the KOMPAK office in the area known as Waihong serving as the nerve centre. Sunata became head of the office in 2000 and was responsible for distributing food and funds to mujahidin and displaced Muslims; in 2004 Asep Jaja, a Buru trainee and high school classmate of Sunata’s, took on the same role informally.

In his role as chief quartermaster for the mujahidin at the height of the conflict, Sunata came to know virtually everyone in JI and DI and many of the local recruited Muslims as well. There were three centres in Ambon at the time:

- The KOMPAK office in Waihong. Sunata frequently returned to Java, bringing new recruits back each time.
- The JI house in Air Kuning. A Bali bomber, Utomo Pamungkas alias Mubarok, was based there. Ali Zein, later Noordin’s go-between, arrived in May 2001. He first met Sunata during a second tour in 2002 and Asep Jaja during a 2003 stint.
- The Darul Islam house near the STAIN complex in Kebon Cengkeh, Batu Merah. The DI contingents in Ambon included people sent by a DI elder, Gaos Taufik; men from the more militant Abu Bakar Battalion (AMIN); and those loyal to Ajengan Masduki. It may have been here that Akram, who fell in the last category, developed a stronger following. One who arrived in June 2000 for his first “tour of duty” was Enceng Kurnia alias Arham, later Akram’s courier.

3. Training in West Ceram, July 2004

Perhaps because he was so bound to Ambon, Sunata believed the jihad there was not finished. After violence broke out there again in April 2004, he resolved to prepare more mujahidin to continue it. He organised and financed a training course in the hills outside Olas, West Ceram – a site used before for KOMPAK-JI training. Many instructors were familiar, including at least two alumni of the 1999 Buru training, Asep Jaja and Moh Faiz. Two of the go-betweens, Usman the Mouse from KOMPAK and Arham from Darul Islam, were present. Sunata also brought three people from an organisation he had worked with in Poso, and a Darul Islam man, Harun, whom he knew from Ambon and Poso (and who had worked with Ring Banten in West Java). A few locals and “leftover mujahidin” – men who came to Ambon to fight but stayed on – rounded out the training team. Sunata sent about twenty recruits.

Three features of this training are worth noting: they used posters of then Indonesian presidential candidate Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono and his running mate Jusuf Kalla as target practice; their funding, whatever its source, was inadequate to cover the planned two weeks; and many of the instructors took part in the attack on the police post in the same village in May 2005. But for this report, the most important aspect of the training is how it emerged out of bonds created more than five years before when the first Buru camp was set up.

D. NOORDIN’S EFFORTS TO BUILD ALLIANCES

All the strands came together in Noordin Mohammed Top’s efforts to get Sunata and Akram on board.

In April 2004, Usman the Mouse went to Surabaya in connection with a small trading business he had with Asep Jaja’s in-laws. He called Abu Fida – the instructor at Universitas an-Nur, East Java JI member, and mentor

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49 Sometime in 2003, after the Bali I bombings, the KOMPAK offices in Ambon, East Kalimantan (Samarinda) and South Sulawesi closed, leaving only the offices in Jakarta and Solo still functioning.

50 Interrogation deposition of Ahmad Rofiq Ridho alias Ali Zein in case dossier of Enceng Kurnia, op.cit.

51 Asep Jaja married a woman from al-Islam pesantren in Lamongan, the school associated with the three brothers involved in the Bali bombs, Mukhlas, Ali Imron, and Amrozi.
of several of Noordin’s young Central Java followers – for a place to stay. Abu Fida put him up but the next day invited him to meet a guest – Noordin – who asked him to be his bridge to Sunata and to tell Sunata that he needed TNT, a detonating cord and Rp 500,000 to find possible suicide bombers. Usman relayed the request to Sunata by email.

A few weeks later Usman went back to Surabaya and told Noordin that he and Sunata were willing to look for the material. Noordin, however, also wanted aluminium powder and more weaponry from the Philippines, including M-16s and rocket-propelled grenade launchers (RPGs). Usman again relayed this to Sunata by email.

In the meantime, he surveyed his KOMPAK friends for explosives and eventually secured ten kg of TNT left over from Ambon from his former high school classmate, Hari Kuncoro, Dulmatin’s brother-in-law. Usman stored this at the room he was renting in Solo, and Ubeid, Noordin’s then-adjutant, picked it up at the KOMPAK-Solo office.

In June, Hari Kuncoro secured the detonating cord and gave it to Iqbal Huseini, a Sunata man, for Usman. Just before Usman left for the military training in West Ceram, he gave the cord to Ubeid in Surabaya, at a mosque near Airlangga University. The police arrested Ubeid and several others in late July 2004, and Noordin was minus a chief assistant.

Plans for the Kuningan bombing went ahead nonetheless, and afterwards the immediate need was for place to hide. In early October Ali Zein was called by a friend in Solo, Iwan, asking him to look for a place to rent in Pekalongan, a town on the north coast of central Java famed for batik.

The choice of Pekalongan would have been linked directly or indirectly to Said Sungkar, a key figure for anyone involved in jihadist activities in the area. Contrary to many assertions, he was not and reportedly had never been a JI member, despite family ties to its founder, Abdullah Sungkar. He reportedly had been a major contributor to activities in Maluku. Ali Zein used Sungkar’s contacts to collect donations in Pekalongan for the Ambon jihad, including from two men who were instrumental in hiding Noordin in late 2004, Imam Bukhori and Ustadz Fathurrahman, both members of the Pekalongan branch of the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI). The connection to FPI, more known for attacks on brothels, casinos, karaoke bars and the like – than for terrorism, is probably less significant than that the men were part of a hardline pengajian (religious study circle) in Pekalongan that Noordin could rely on. It also included Abdul Aziz, a high school computer teacher later found to be the webmaster of a site set up for Noordin and his followers, www.anshar.net.52

Upon the request to find a place in Pekalongan, Ali Zein called Imam Bukhori, asking if a friend could stay at his house. Bukhori agreed, and Ali Zein relayed the message. Three days later, Ali Zein was called to a meeting at Buhhori’s house and found his cousin, Jabir, Iwan, and two other men, Zubir and Aiman – better known as Azhari and Noordin.

A week later Ali Zein told Usman the Mouse at the KOMPAK-Solo office he had replaced Ubeid as Noordin’s assistant. He asked Usman to lobby Sunata to get an automatic pistol for Noordin, who had only an old revolver. Coincidentally, when Usman contacted Sunata, the go-between from Darul Islam, Arham, had just returned from Ambon with a Baretta. Shortly thereafter Arham went to Solo and gave a small carton in a plastic bag to Usman. Usman gave it to Ali Zein, who gave it to Noordin. The contents were the Baretta and 35 bullets.

Ali Zein and Usman met to try to arrange a meeting between Noordin and Abdullah Sunata in Pekalongan, at the home of another FPI member.

1. Approaching Sunata and Akram

At the beginning of Ramadan, mid-October 2004, Usman, Sunata, Ali Zein and Noordin gathered in Pekalongan.53 Sunata and Noordin went off in a room together. According to Sunata, they discussed their similar perceptions about jihad as a pillar of the faith, and Noordin explained his plans for further bombings, asking Sunata to work with him.54 Sunata said he had to discuss it with others. The next day, Usman and Sunata returned to Solo.

Not long afterward, Noordin, Ali Zein, Usman, and Faiz, the veteran from KOMPAK of the 1999 Buru training, met in Pekalongan to discuss a program of cooperation. Noordin told Faiz to lobby Akram, Arham’s boss, and Usman to lobby Sunata. He gave Usman a slip of paper with an email address and password, told him to memorise them, then to open the email once he was in a different city. He then took the slip of paper back.

52 One question is whether the group described as a pengajian was in fact an organisational cell, since JI members under questioning occasionally have used the idea of a religious study group to divert attention from more formal structural ties. But in this case it may well have been more of an ad hoc group, because it is hard to imagine any organisation that could embrace Said Sungkar, FPI and militant JI members at the same time.
53 The material in this section is taken from interrogations of Usman, Ali Zein and Abdullah Sunata included in the case dossier of Enceng Kurnia. op. cit.
54 Sunata testimony in ibid.
In the next few days, Faiz apparently met Akram in Yogyakarta. When he and Usman then went back to Pekalongan, he told Noordin that Akram did not want to be involved; his priority was getting his own organisation in order. Noordin had suggested that all three organisations – his, DI, and KOMPAK – conduct a bomb-making training, but Akram said no one from DI could take part. Usman delivered a message from Sunata that he was ready to send people but needed to know when and for how long. The next day, Faiz and Usman returned to Solo. The training never took place.

2. Moving to Semarang and Solo

Noordin by this time was getting nervous about staying in Pekalongan and ordered Ali Zein to look for a new place in Semarang, Central Java. Ali Zein telephoned a friend from the KOMPAK-Solo office, who said Noordin could use his parents’ house in nearby Ungaran. Then Ali Zein, Noordin, Azhari and Jabir drove to Semarang, together with Iwan. Noordin and Azhari split up a few days later because Noordin was convinced there were spies around.

At this stage, Usman called Ustadz Zaenal at Pesantren Isykarima in Tawangmangu, Solo, which had been founded in 2000, apparently as a Ngruki satellite. Zaenal said the group could use a room at the school reserved for patients affected by djinn (evil spirits), so Ali Zein, Faiz, Noordin and Usman moved in. They told Zaenal that they would take care of all food; Noordin was continuing to supply expenses.

For the first two days, Faiz and Usman stayed with Noordin so Ali Zein could run an errand. When he returned, the first two returned to Solo, where they were editing a video CD of the training in West Ceram that they hoped to use for fund-raising. They returned after another two days when Ali Zein had to run another errand for Noordin. The end of Ramadan was approaching, so Usman, Faiz, and Noordin mostly sat in their rooms reading the Koran. When Ali Zein returned, Usman and Faiz asked Noordin’s permission to continue editing the video.

At this point, Abdullah Sunata told Usman and Faiz – both KOMPAK people who should have been reporting to him – to break off contact with Noordin, so they turned off their mobile phones and never returned to the pesantren. About a week after Ramadan ended (16 November), Usman and Faiz left for Jakarta to give the finished video to Sunata. Shortly later, Faiz left for the Philippines, with the aid of the Darul Islam go-between, Arham, but was arrested on arrival in Zamboanga in December 2004.

In early January 2005, Usman the Mouse, back in Solo, was asked by Ali Zein to meet Noordin again, this time in nearby Kartosuro where he was holed up in a furniture factory, worried too many people were around. Ali Zein needed Usman’s help to find him a new place to stay and suggested Usman ask a KOMPAK friend, Joko Harun. Throughout Usman’s meetings with Ali Zein and Noordin, he had either borrowed Joko’s motorcycle or asked for a lift, so Ali Zein had come to know Joko in the process. Joko agreed, and Noordin moved to Joko’s house in Solo.

That evening, Usman met Noordin in Joko’s house, and Noordin asked him to look for people who could carry out fa’i (robbing of non-Muslims in the interests of jihad) – an indication that Noordin was running low on funds. Usman told him the “Poso kids” were usually up for that sort of thing but he had to get permission from Sunata to contact them.

The Poso reference is important. Until then, Noordin’s post-Marriott network had been centred exclusively in Java. JI unquestionably still had people in Poso but those around Noordin in early 2005 who had contacts there were from KOMPAK, like Usman. The seeds of the idea to bring in the KOMPAK-linked Poso mujahidin rather than just Java-based Poso veterans may have originated then.

3. Sunata refuses

At the same meeting in Joko’s house, Usman mentioned to Noordin that Sunata was in town. The next day, through messages passed by Usman, Noordin and Sunata met again, and Sunata refused Noordin’s original request to join forces. That night, according to Usman, Sunata got angry at him for continuing communications with Noordin, in violation of his earlier instructions.

The next day, after Joko went to work, Usman met Noordin again. Noordin began by talking about why he contacted Sunata, the need to manage operations, allocate money and train personnel. Usman told him that Sunata had ordered him to break off contact from the time that he, Faiz and Noordin were last together, but that he and Faiz had not known how to tell him – and he asked permission to leave

55 Usman and Joko knew each other from the KOMPAK-Solo office; both were friends with Hari Kuncoro, and Joko spent four months with the latter in Ambon in 2002.
56 Interrogation of Purnama Putra, op. cit.
V. THE LEAD-UP TO BALI II

From this point, the documentary record of Noordin’s movements begins to peter out. We will not have a full account until the men arrested after the second Bali bombs testify (several are on trial).

We know Noordin stayed a week in Joko Harun’s house in Solo in January 2005. Azhari appears to have been in Solo then, in the Laweyan area. Sometime in February, Noordin made his way to Pacet, Mojokerto, East Java, where another Ngrikut alumni, Joni Ahmad Fauzan, a classmate of Ali Zein’s, put him up.

While there, Noordin ordered Joko, Joni and Ali Zein to survey possible bomb or kidnap targets in East Java, including: the Christian University of Malang; Americans at an electrical plant, PLTU Paiton near Banyuwangi; a synagogue in Surabaya; the owner of a mushroom processing company suspected of being Chinese or Korean (he was a Chinese Christian from Menado); consulates in Surabaya; and the Novotel hotel in Surabaya, whose manager was suspected of being Australian.

Because of the need to keep moving and stay one step ahead of the police, Noordin was not able to go beyond the initial surveillance and he seems to have moved back to Indramayu, in West Java, where he and Azhari rejoined forces. They appear to have been in West Java for several months before returning to Central Java.

It may have been during their stay in West Java that recruitment of the Bali II suicide bombers began, through the efforts of Jabir, the al-Ghozi cousin who was instrumental from the beginning in helping Noordin evade arrest. Just as Ubeid helped bring in Rois of the Banten group for the embassy bombing, Jabir seems to have been responsible for recruiting the man who blew himself up at Café Nyoman in Jimbaran, Bali on 1 October 2005. Jabir, as noted, had graduated from and taught at the Darusysyahadah pesantren in Boyolali, outside Solo, a JI school. One of his students in 1999-2000 was Salik Firdaus, from Cikijing, Majalengka, West Java. Salik was in teacher training, a program that in schools like Darusysyahadah is often a direct line to JI induction, but he did not finish. Police believe Jabir recruited him, and Salik then brought in the other two suicide bombers.

Salik has the classic JI recruit educational pedigree: he not only attended Darusysyahadah, but also taught at another JI school, al-Mutaqien in Indramayu – where one of those arrested in the 29 April raid was also a teacher.

Another Darul Islam man who appears to have come into the network before May 2005 is Agus Purwanto alias Arman. Born in Ngawi, he studied at STAIN in Solo. He was an avid supporter of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, reportedly taking part in demonstrations in support of the detained JI leader in Solo and Jakarta. In June, he rented a house on the outskirts of the city, in Kartosura, Sukoharjo, that he shared with another person, almost certainly Azhari, then suddenly left in August before the lease had run out. Arman blew himself up when he and Azhari were surrounded by police in Malang, East Java in November 2005.

In May, Cholily, a university student from Malang, reportedly met Noordin and Azhari for the first time, apparently in Solo. Police said he had been a JI member since 1999. A press report suggests Cholily was recruited by Ahmad Basyir, a Surabaya-based KOMPAK member arrested in March 2006, but this is not verified. Police, however, said Cholily became Azhari’s apprentice after attending a course in Solo with Noordin, Arman – the DI man above – and Basyir. This may have been the recruitment of the Bali II suicide bombers.


61 Crisis Group interview, Jakarta, February 2006. The man arrested is Solahudin, who comes from a JI family: his brothers, Farhinah ibni Ibu, Abdul Jabar, and Mohamed Islam have all served time in prison for jihadist activity. Abdul Jabar was involved in the 2000 bombing in Jakarta of the Philippines ambassador’s residence and is serving a twenty-year sentence. Solahudin himself is suspected of involvement in the bombings of the Atrium shopping mall and several churches in Jakarta in 2001.


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57 Testimony of Joko Triharmanto alias Harun alias Jek in case dossier of Enceng Kurnia, op. cit.


59 The program is known as Kuliyyatul Mu’alimin al-Islamiyah (KMI), and is usually followed by a year of practice teaching at a like-minded institution. See “Salik Firdaus Jebolan Ponpes Darusysyahadah di Boyolali”, Antam, 1 November 2005; “Pamit ke Batam, Terus Menghilang”, Suara Merdeka, 11 November 2005.

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bomb-making tutorial Noordin had been trying to arrange when he asked Akram and Sunata to take part.

In June or July 2005, Noordin and Azhari returned to Pekalongan. Abdul Aziz, the computer teacher there, told police he was called by Abdul Hadi, the man responsible for “ripening” the Australian embassy bomber, asking him to look for a house for Noordin to rent sometime in July. Noordin told Abdul Aziz to use the house to develop the website, but to work with Misno, who became a Bali II bomber.

From July to September, Abdul Aziz worked to develop the site on his computer in the al-Irsyad high school, Pekalongan. Noordin apparently supervised content, which included a long section of “advice” to fellow mujahidin from Mukhlas, clearly written after he was imprisoned. Abdul Aziz met Misno frequently over the two months and reported that the young would-be martyr told him not to say anything about the site to Said Sungkar, suggesting, indeed, that for all his logistic aid, he was not in the inner circle.66

Sometime in September, Noordin, Azhari and the selected suicide bombers apparently returned to Semarang, a few hours’ drive from Pekalongan, where they could find refuge and more recruits. At the height of JI’s existence, the Central Java wakalah based in Semarang was far and away the best organised, and despite periodic police sweeps, most notably in July 2003, a solid base still existed. It included Subur Sugiarto, who became Noordin’s courier in the role Ubeid and Ali Zein had played earlier.67 He also appears to have brought Semarang-based friends into the network, most of them apparently new recruits, not ex-members of the old wakalah.68 Subur and three of these robbed a mobile phone store in Pekalongan in September to get fourteen telephones for the group’s use.

As plans for Bali II advanced, Noordin conducted training on the second floor of the “Selera” restaurant in Semarang for the three suicide bombers and Anif Solchanudin.69 Anif was originally to have been a fourth “bridegroom” – the code word for suicide bomber – but he was an Ambon veteran, and Azhari reportedly decided he was needed to train others.

On 1 October, Salik Firdaus, Misro, and Aip Hidayat strolled into three cafes in Bali and blew themselves up, killing another twenty in the process. From a base in East Java, Azhari seems to have supervised construction of the bombing backpacks, while Noordin stayed in Semarang.

Over the next few weeks, Subur led a short military training course for five members of the group on the slopes of Mount Unggaran, just south of Semarang; all of the participants paid their own way.70

On 9 November, police arrested Cholily in Semarang as he was bringing an Azhari-made bomb from Malang for Noordin via Tedi, a member of the Semarang group who is still at large. From Cholily police learned of Azhari’s hideout in Batu, Malang, and immediately surrounded it. During the ensuing gunbattle, Azhari was killed; Arman blew himself up.

Noordin eluded capture in Semarang. He has since been traced to Solo; Rengasdengklok and Krawang, West Java; Surabaya; and Wonosobo, Central Java.

67 “Diduga Terkait Dr Azahari”, Sinar Harapan.
68 These included Dwi Wdiyarto alias Wiwid, 30; Anif Solchanudin alias Pendek (“Shorty”), 24; Ardi Wibowo alias Dedi, 30; Aditya Tri Yoga, 29; Wawan Suprihatin, 35; Hari Seti Rahmadi; Sri Puji Mulyono; Joko Suroso; and Reno alias Tedi. All but the latter were arrested after Bali II; Aditya Tri Yoga was later released.
69 “Police nab four suspected terrorists in Central Java”, Jakarta Post, 10 January 2003
70 Terasis Ditempa di Gunung Unggaran”, Bali Post, 8 December 2005.
VI. CONCLUSION

Noordin clearly aspires to head a tightly organised military machine with cells across South East Asia, designed to mount terror attacks on the U.S. and its allies, kafirs, anti-Islamic governments including Indonesia, and other enemies of Islam. He is a long way from that now. That said:

- He can draw on a JI base in Surabaya, Solo, and Semarang. In each he has been able to find reliable couriers who can reach out to other networks for assistance.
- The JI school network remains important, particularly for his inner circle, which is probably still linked to the old Mantiqi I; it included Jabir and Abdul Hadi, the two killed in the April 2006 raid. A critical question is whether it also includes Abu Dujanah and Zulkarnaen or whether JI has fragmented further.
- Whatever his ambitions, Noordin’s “organisation” still seems largely ad hoc but this could be changing. Paradoxically, his constant movement may enhance his ability to set up cells, even as it militates against direct supervision of operations.
- He may be reaching out to other organisations more with Sunata and Akram in jail. There is some indication he is attracting their followers. For access to experienced mujahidin, weapons and funds, contacts in those networks are vital.
- He will be searching for new couriers to the Philippines in particular, and for this he may look to Akram’s older brother, Malik.
- The role of the older JI leaders from Mantiqi II will be critical in restraining younger, more militant members from joining Noordin.
- Since Noordin operates on the principle that going it alone with a small group is a necessary response to the political situation, he may be encouraging-minded groups to do the same, which may have ramifications for Poso, in particular.
- More than ever, controls are needed on what goes in and out of Indonesian prisons so Mukhlas, Imam Samudra and others cannot give Noordin’s group materials, encouragement or radical legitimacy.

There appears to be no one in Noordin’s circle with the in-depth religious knowledge that traditionally distinguished JI from KOMPAK and DI, and there is no hint in any of the materials that have come out of any attention to daa‘wa (religious outreach). That may explain the reliance on Mukhlas’s writings and sermons but also suggests limited capacity to attract JI ustadz.

For the Mount Unggaran training in October 2005, Noordin’s courier, Subur, could marshal only eight participants, who had to pay for themselves. By contrast, KOMPAK’s Abdullah Sunata got twenty to West Ceram in 2004, and he financed them all. Reliance on fa‘i – armed robbery – suggests not enough funds are coming from outside or through infaq (member contributions) to sustain activities.

The efforts to survey possible targets in East Java in early 2005 suggest extraordinary determination to move forward with attacks even while under deep cover and the subject of one of the largest manhunts in Indonesian history. That he had to abort all plans because of the need to keep moving, however, indicates there was not sufficient strength in East Java to go forward without him.

All this notwithstanding, the troubling thing is that there seems to be no shortage of new recruits, and recruiters like Subur Sugiarto or Jabir appear to have had little difficulty tapping into their personal networks to find new people as needed. We do not yet have a clear idea of the recruitment arguments, except that Abdul Aziz, the computer teacher, said he joined not because he approved of bombing but because he shared Noordin’s hatred of the U.S. and its allies.

It also remains true that while very few KOMPAK- or JI-trained bomb-makers seem to have joined Noordin, it only takes one or two to teach others. Jabir, who apprenticed himself to Azhari in 2004, is now dead but the Semarang fugitive, Reno alias Tedi, appears in a Noordin-sponsored video teaching bomb-making step by step.

A final note: strengthening networks in Malaysia, the Philippines, and perhaps Thailand are going to be more important for Noordin, as a Malaysian, than they would be for an Indonesian; that he has reiterated the old Mantiqi I goal of an archipelagic South East Asian operation should not be a surprise. If he can ever again think beyond his own survival, this may mean more efforts to communicate with Malaysian JI members in the Philippines, reach out to the DI members in Sabah, and reactivate old links in Thailand. Noordin’s ambitions are too big to stay focused on Indonesia but the Indonesian police are likely to get to him first.

Jakarta/Brussels, 5 May 2006
APPENDIX A

MAP OF INDONESIA

Courtesy of The General Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin
APPENDIX B

MAP OF CENTRAL JAVA
APPENDIX C

INDEX OF NAMES

Abdul Ghoni
See Umar Wayan

Abdul Hadi
See Baharudin Soleh

Abdul Malik
Darul Islam (DI) member; tobacco entrepreneur from Wonosobo; involved in sending DI recruits to the Philippines; older brother of Akram; married to a Filipina.

Abdul Rauf alias Sam
Member of Darul Islam (DI) faction called Ring Banten group arrested after the 2002 Bali bombing in connection with robbing of a gold store, the proceeds of which went toward the bombing. Serving sixteen-year sentence in Bali. Grandson of DI member, Ngruki alumnus.

Abdul Rohim
Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s son; active in producing video CDs of conflict; frequent traveler to Pakistan and Afghanistan in 2000-2001.

Abdullah Sunata alias Nata alias Arman alias Andri
Head of KOMPAK office in Ambon 2000-2001, sentenced to seven years in prison in April 2006 for withholding information about Noordin’s whereabouts and illegal possession of weapons. Noordin tried to get him to join forces in 2004 but he refused.

Abdullah Sungkar

Abu Bakar Ba’asyir

Abu Dujanah
Real name Ainul Bahri; native of Cianjur, Indonesia; secretary of Mantiqi II, secretary of central command; taught at Luqmanul Hakiem; helped protect Azhari and Noordin Mohammed Top after August 2003 Marriott bombing; Afghan veteran.

Abu Fida
Instructor at Mahad Aly in Solo, also known as Universitas an-Nur; member of Jemaah Islamiyah’s East Java wakalah; mentor of several of Noordin’s young Central Java followers. Arrested August 2004 for harbouring terrorists, later released. Real name Syaifuddin Umar.
Aceng Kurnia

Achmad Hasan alias Agung Cahyono alias Purnomo
Born 1971, lived in Blitar, East Java; BA in economics; inducted into Jemaah Islamiyah by Fahim in 1996; arrested 2004, sentenced to death 2005 for role in Australian embassy bombing.

Adung
Real name: Sunarto bin Kartodihardjo; member of Jemaah Islamiyah central command, formerly driver of Sungkar in Malaysia, then succeeded Mukhlas as head of Mantiqi I. Ngruki graduate, detained 1979-1981 in connection with Komando Jihad. Arrested Solo 2004 for withholding information about Noordin, sentenced to seven years.

Agus Ahmad

Ahmad Rofiq Ridho alias Ali Zein alias Allen alias Abu Husna alias Fuad Baraja

Ahmad Sayid Maulana
Member of AMIN. Leader of Darul Islam in Maluku. Arrested in Sabah, Malaysia in September 2003; detained under Internal Security Act.

Ajengan Masduki

Akram alias Shamsuddin alias Muhammad Taufiqurrahman

Ali Ghufron (sometimes written Aly Ghufron) alias Mukhlas
First director of Luqmanul Hakiem pesantren, Malaysia; Jemaah Islamiyah leader; Afghan veteran; Bali bomber; prolific writer of jihadist literature; brother of Ali Imron and Amrozi; sentenced to death October 2003, currently detained Nusakambangan prison, Central Java.

Ali Zein
See Ahmad Rofiq Ridho

Anif Solchanudin

Apuy
Alias of Syaiful Bahri; Ring Banten member from Cigarung, Sukabumi, involved in 2004 Australian embassy bombing. Initially selected as possible suicide bomber. Arrested November 2004 in Bogor, sentenced to ten years in prison, September 2005.
Arham
See Enceng Kurnia

Aris Munandar
Head of KOMPAK-Solo office that provided major funding for jihadist activities in Ambon and Poso. In October 1999, organised and financed a military training course near Waimurat, Buru.

Asep Jaja alias Dahlan
KOMPAK fighter, high school classmate of Abdullah Sunata; trained in Waimurat, Buru 1999, West Ceram, July 2004; sentenced to life imprisonment for his role in a May 2005 attack on paramilitary police in West Ceram, Maluku; married to woman from al-Islam pesantren in Lamongan.

Asmar Latin Sani
The suicide bomber for the 2003 Marriott bombing, Jakarta; Ngruki graduate 1995.

Azhari Husin alias Zubair alias Zuber

Bagus Budi Pranoto
See Urwah

Baharudin Soleh alias Abdul Hadi
Close associate of Noordin killed in 29 April 2006 raid in Wonosobo, Central Java. Selected by Noordin to “ripen” the young men selected as possible suicide bombers for the Australian embassy bombing (Apuy alias Epul, Didi alias Rijal, and Heri Golun), through giving them additional religious instruction. May have done same for Bali II. Married to sister of Ali Zein.

Basyir
See Qotadah

Bukhori
See Imam Bukhori

Chandra alias Farouk
Sheltered Noordin for twelve days prior to embassy bombing, still at large. Studied in Bangil, business partner with Son Hadi. From Pasuruan, East Java, may have been recruited as possible suicide bomber. Not clear whether Jemaah Islamiyah or Darul Islam.

Cholily
Courier for Noordin, whose arrest in Semarang on 9 November 2005 led to the police stakeout of Azhari’s hideout in Batu, Malang, the same day.

Dani Chandra alias Yusuf
KOMPAK member, arrested in June 2005 in Wonogiri for helping hide Noordin; trained in Waimurat, Buru 1999; two time veteran of Ambon, also went to North Maluku and Morotai during conflict. D-3 degree from Bogor Agricultural University.

Deni
See Suramto
Dulmatin
Real name Joko Pitono. Born in Pemalang, Central Java; Afghan veteran; Jemaah Islamiyah member, taught at Luqmanul Hakim pesantren in Johor, Malaysia; one of most-wanted Bali bombers; in Philippines since 2003, target of Philippines Armed Forces bombing raids, November 2004 and January 2005.

Engkos Kosasih alias Kamal
Former Darul Islam fighter, commander for the Banten area in the early 1960s. Three of his children became involved in Ring Banten, including Agus Ahmad.

Enceng Kurnia alias Arham alias Arnold

Fahim
See Usman bin Sef

Faiz
See Mohamed Saiñuddin

Fathurrahman al-Ghozi
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) member; born Madiun, son of Darul Islam member Zainuri; brother of Ali Zein, cousin of Jabir; Pondok Ngruki graduate; Afghan veteran, class of 1990; instructor in JI’s Camp Hudaibiyah, Mindanao from 1995; involved in several JI bombings including attack on Philippines ambassador to Jakarta 2000, Rizal Day bombing in Manila 30 December 2000; arrested Jan 2002 in Manila; escaped July 2003 from Camp Crame, Manila. Shot and killed in October 2003.

Fathurrochman alias Rochman
Member of Ring Banten, detained with Pujata in the same case. But unlike Pujata, he agreed to help Iwan find a house in the Anyer area of Banten for the fugitives (Noordin and Azhari).

Gembrot
See Mohamed Ihsan

Gempur Budi Angkoro
See Jabir

Hambali
Former head of Jemaah Islamiyah’s Mantiqi I; former GPI member from Cianjur; arrested in Thailand, August 2003, implicated in virtually every major bombing undertaken by Jemaah Islamiyah. In U.S. custody at undisclosed location since 2003.

Hari Kuncoro
Dulmatin’s brother-in-law; KOMPAK and JI member; Ambon veteran; now believed to be in Philippines.

Harun alias Syaiful alias Fathurrobi

Hence Malewa
Born Poso 1979; member of Mujahidin Kayamanya, Poso; took part in July 2004 training in West Ceram; arrested Yogyakarta on suspicion of involvement in murder of Palu prosecutor Fery Silalahi; sentenced to twenty months for weapons possession in April 2006.
Heri Golun
Suicide bomber in September 2004 Australian embassy bombing; member of Ring Banten.

Heri Sigu Samboja alias Ilyasa alias Nery Anshori alias Mohammad al Ansori alias Mohammad Nuruddin alias Akhi Shogir alias Jamaluddin alias Azmi alias Ma’ruf alias Abduf Fatah
Born Solo 1982; studied bomb-making with Azhari, helped assemble embassy bomb, sentenced to seven years, September 2005. Father was Darul Islam Afghan veteran.

Idris
See Mohamed Ihsan

Imam Bukhori

Imam Samudra
Bali bomber, member of both Jemaah Islamiyah and Ring Banten. Sentenced to death 2003.

Iqbal alias Arnasan alias Lacong
Suicide bomber in the 2002 Bali bombings, member of the Banten group, not Jemaah Islamiyah, and left a will saying he hoped his martyrdom would help inspire others to restore the glory of the Indonesian Islamic State as founded by Kartosoewirjo.

Iqbal Huseini alias Ramly alias Rambo
KOMPak member, loyal to Abdullah Sunata, involved in getting the detonating cord used in embassy bombing. Sentenced to four years in prison, April 2006.

Irun Hidayat
Ring Banten member; high school classmate of Imam Samudra, friend of Iwan alias Rois, went to Ambon briefly; martial arts instructor in military training sessions run by Kang Jaja and Rois, teaching martial arts. Since 1999, local head of the religious council of the Indonesian Muslim Workers Union (Perserikatan Pekerja Muslim Indonesia, PPIM). Sentenced to three years, July 2005.

Ismail (Muhamad Ikhwan)

Iwan Dharmawan alias Rois

Jabir (real name: Gempur Budi Angkoro)
Killed in police raid 29 April 2006 in Wonosobo, Central Java. JI member from Madiun, cousin of Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, attended Ngruki 1993-1996, graduated from and taught at Darusysyahada pesantren. He was instrumental from the beginning in helping Noordin evade arrest. May have been responsible for recruitment of Salik Firdaus, suicide bomber in Bali II.

Jhoni Hendrawan
See Mohamed Ihsan

Joko Triharmananto alias Harun (Joko Harun)
Joni Achmad Fauzan
From Mojokerto, helped hide Noordin in early 2005 at a Muhammadiyah orphanage there; classmate of Ali Zein’s at Ngruki; undertook survey of possible targets in East Java with Ali Zein and Joko Harun at Noordin’s instruction in early 2005. Sentenced to six years in prison, April 2006.

Lutfi Haidaroh
See Ubeid

Marwan (real name: Zulkifli bin Hir)
Brother-in-law of Dani alias Taufik (arrested in connection with the 2001 Atrium Mall bombing in Jakarta). In Mindanao with Dulmatin and Umar Patek. Malaysian national, said to be one of the founders of the KMM.

Misno
Suicide bomber in Café Manega, Jimbaran, Bali 1 October 2005. Son of sharecroppers in Cilacap, elementary school education. 23-years old when killed.

Mohammad al Ansori
See Heri Sigu Samboja

Mohamed Ihsan alias Jhon Indrawan alias Gembrot alias Idris

Mohamed Rais
Noordin’s brother in law, a Luqmanul Hakiem graduate; Indonesian national Malaysian resident. Inducted into Jemaah Islamiyah in 1995; Ngruki graduate; Luqmanul Hakiem instructor; member of Johor wakalah of JI’s Mantiqi I. Moved to Bukittinggi, West Sumatra early 2002 with Noordin. Helped in early stages of Marriott bombing; arrested in late April 2003, sentenced to seven yrs May 2004.

Mohamed Saifuddin alias Faiz

Mukhlas
See Ali Ghufron

Muchtar alias Ilyas
Afghan veteran, a Jemaah Islamiyah leader. Instructor at 1999 military training in Waimurat, Buru.

Mukhlas
See Ali Ghufron

Muhamad Ikhwan
See Ismail

Munfiatun
Second wife (2004) of Noordin, friend and former roommate of Achmad Hasan’s wife as students at Brawijaya University in Malang. Sentenced to three years, 2005, detained in Malang.

Mus’ab Sahidi
Friend of Ali Zein who helped him to find a hiding place for Noordin.
Muzayin Abdul Wahab (also spelled Muzain, Mujayin)
Elder brother of Aris Munandar, ustaz and imam of mosque in Cipayung, East Jakarta, mentor of Abdullah Sunata.

Nasir Abas
Former head of Jemaah Islamiyah’s Mantiqi III.

Noordin Mohammed Top
Malaysian Jemaah Islamiyah member, former director of Luqmanul Hakiem pesantren Johor; graduate of Universiti Teknologi Malaysia. Chief strategist in 2003 Marriott bombing, 2004 embassy bombing and October 2005 Bali bombings. No Afghan experience but trained in Mindanao, went to Ambon.

Purnama Putra alias Usman alias Usamah alias Ipung alias Uus alias Tikus
Born Sukorharjo 1981; Abdullah Sunata’s go-between with Jemaah Islamiyah, met Noordin twelve times, helped arrange Noordin-Sunata meeting. KOMPAK member; went to Ambon in 2000; helped produce the KOMPAK magazine al-Bayan and some of KOMPAK’s many video CDs as well. Sentenced to seven years, April 2006.

Qotadah alias Basyir
A senior member of Mantiqi II involved in the post-Bali refresher training, also the man who with Abu Dujanah met Noordin before and after the Marriott bombing.

Rois
See Iwan Dharmawan alias Rois

Rosihin Noor
One of the most militant members of Ring Banten, shooting instructor in Kang Jaja’s military training sessions.

Said Sungkar
A relative of Jemaah Islamiyah’s founder, Abdullah Sungkar, but never a member; based in Pekalongan.

Salik Firdaus

Salman alias Apud
KOMPAK trainee, arrested in Malaysia in September 2003 returning from training in Mindanao.

Saptono
Uncle of Iwan Dharmawan’s wife, instructor in military training camp set up by Rois in Gunung Peti, Cisolok, Pelabuhan Ratu, West Java.

Sardona Siliwangi alias Dona bin Azwar
Jemaah Islamiyah member, Ngruki graduate from Bengkulu; house there was used to store the explosives for Marriott bombing. Opened a bank account in March 2003 to facilitate financial transactions for Noordin. Arrested in May 2003, sentenced to ten years, February 2004, reduced to eight on appeal.

Son Hadi
Born 1977, Pasuruan, east Java; Ngruki graduate, worked alongside Fahim in the Darussalam Foundation – and thus presumably as a member of the Jemaah Islamiyah wakalah – since 1997. Sentenced to four years, May 2005.

Subur Sugiarro
military training course on the slopes of Mount Ungaran, just south of Semarang. Reportedly Jemaah Islamiyah since 1999.

Sunata
See Abdullah Sunata

Suramto alias Mohammad Faiz alias Deni alias Ahmad

Syaifuddin Umar
See Abu Fida

Taufikurrahman
See Akram

Tohir (Real name: Masrizal bin Ali Umar)

Toni Togar alias Indrawarman

Ubeid (real name: Lutfi Hudaeroh)

Umar alias Heri

Umar Patek
Bali bomber, Jemaah Islamiyah member, working with Dulmatin in Mindanao; married to a Balik Islam Filipina.

Umar Wayan alias Abdul Ghoni
Jemaah Islamiyah, Afghan veteran, an instructor for military training course near Waimurat, Buru, Maluku 1999; involved in the first Bali bombing, sentenced to life imprisonment, 2004.

Urwhah (real name: Bagus Budi Pranoto)

Usman (the Mouse)
See Purnama Putra

Usman bin Sef alias Fahim
Head of Jemaah Islamiyah’s East Java wakalah, helped protect Noordin after Marriott, got him additional explosives.
Zulkarnaen (real name: Aris Sumarsono)

Head of Jemaah Islamiyah’s military operations, member of central command; in hiding since 2002 Bali bombs. Afghan veteran, served as instructor at military training course near Waimurat, Buru. Ngruki student 1975-1980, originally from Sragen, Central Java.

Zulkifli bin Hir

See Marwan
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May 2006

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